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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines in detail the operation of a planning gain 
policy in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets between 1971 and 
1983, using data obtained from records held at the Borough and 
observations of the practice. The practice of planning gain is set into 
the broader context of planning and the still broader social and 
political context. The existing literature and definitions of planning 
gain are critically examined in the light of a theoretical framework 
which concerns itself with the identification of power and politics 
within the planning process. The responses made to the practice of 
planning gain by the Department of the Environment, planning 
inspectors and the courts are explained and critically analysed to 
indicate the lack of articulated opposition. 
The use of planning agreements as a mechanism for the 
enforcement of planning gain is also examined. Section 52 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act is analysed, together with the 
available case law. The use of these agreements in Tower Hamlets is 
discussed in detail. 
The schemes examined at Tower Hamlets are presented in full to 
provide an overall view of the operation of a planning gain policy. 
Details include the effect of negotiation on the content of schemes 
and problems of implementation. 
Comparative material is provided covering the operation of a 
planning gain system which has legislative recognition in Sydney, 
Australia. This part of the thesis is used to illustrate the continued 
existence of negotiation for planning gain and of the restrictive 
responses to the autonomy of local government. 
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PART I: PRELIMINARY 
INTRODUCTION 
3 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine, through a study of the 
operation of planning gain in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 
the extent to which local authorities are able to create and retain 
autonomy within broad areas of policy-making so as to facilitate the 
growth of their own power structures. Opposing views of the nature 
of power and the methods available to mobolise that power will be 
considered so as to suggest that power is not owned or possessed, but 
circulates. The central concern is not the lawfulness of the practice 
of planning gain within any particular jurisdiction but its legitimacy in 
the socio-political context in which it occurs. 
This thesis aims to show how a London borough uses existing 
structures provided by formal planning laws, and develops Its own 
techniques, to perform the functions ascribed to it by central 
government. The form of these techniques and their espousal by 
professional planners will be examined, together with the type of 
reaction received from the formal structure of control to illustrate 
reassertions of the formal distribution of power to mould and shape 
the mechanism of planning gain, rather than to seek to exclude it. In 
other words the official responses given to planning gain have been an 
attempt to limit its use within the confines of the superstructure, yet 
to allow its continuance by using language and controls sufficiently 
flexible to maintain its operation. It will be argued that this Is not 
only evidence of the gap which exists between formal limitations of 
power and reality, but of the Interdependence, rather than conflict, 
between them. 
Planning gain is a topic which has, over the last fifteen 
years, attracted interest from academics, the planning profession and 
from central government, yet the issue remains nebulous and III- 
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defined. Certain patterns can be seen in the treatment of It: some 
studies have an empirical base but most are based on no particular 
methodology; the commentaries by lawyers are largely concerned with 
the issue of legitimacy, whilst those by planners and sociologists are 
more concerned with the effectiveness of the practice. Within legal 
works there has been identified a 'rational-legal' approach, which 
portrays the law as the logical and objective arbiter of legitimacy in 
planning, and a contextual approach, which takes into account the 
factors promoting the practice and the decisions of the courts. There 
is also a genre of articles which are concerned with the mechanics of 
the use of planning agreements to secure gains without considering 
their legitimacy or exploring the reasons for such use. Studies by 
planners have concentrated on the effectiveness of the practice, again 
with an eye upon legitimacy but in the light of 'proper planning 
considerations' rather than upon the precedent of decisions in other 
areas of planning. Work has also been done by sociologists and 
economists with a view to assessing effectiveness but without the 
benefit of collected data. 
From these different approaches arise a number of different 
views on the practice of planning gain. It has been denounced as 
blackmail, or as a practice of `doubtful legality', applauded as positive 
planning, or as a method of compensation for the victims of 
development; it has been identified as a form of unauthorised taxation 
and as the performance of the legitimate functions of a planning 
authority. These views are necessarily reflective of the standpoint of 
the researcher, which in turn is influenced by her or his academic and 
professional background, the motivation for the study and the context 
in which it was carried out. This thesis cannot avoid those same 
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influences, some of which can be controlled for and some of which 
cannot, but they should be acknowledged as far as they are 
discernable to myself. 
My standpoint is essentially that of a lawyer, whose academic 
background could be described as `socio-legal'1 and has emphasised the 
importance of a multi-disciplinary approach. By that is meant any 
subject is approached with the firm belief that law cannot be studied, 
assessed or commented upon without an exploration of the whole 
circumstances in which it operates and an assessment of the political 
and historical reasons for its conception. The objectivity and logic of 
the law cannot simply be accepted without question. `Legal rules' in 
the form of legislation or caselaw cannot be considered absolute, but 
are open-textured and capable of diverse interpretation and 
application. To understand the operation of law it is, therefore, 
impossible to rely only upon the decisions of the courts or the 
commentaries by legal scholars and practitioners: the work of 
sociologists, political scientists, economists, experts on public 
administration are all relevant and necessary resources. Before 
outlining the methodology used in this thesis it is necessary to 
indicate the influence of this type of approach on the study as a 
whole. 
I The term 'socio-legal' is not used here to indicate a taking of 
sides against 'sociology of law', but rather to demonstrate an interest 
in using the methods and theories of the social sciences to examine 
problems about the nature and operation of law. In this sense the 
battle between socio-legal studies and sociology of law which was 
perhaps most evident in the 1970's is not sustained here. See 
Campbell, C. M. & Wiles, P. "The Study of Law and Society in Britain" 
(1976) 10 Law & Society Review, pp. 547-578. This thesis regards the 
aims of both as compatible by examining the inter-relationships 
between law and real people within a theoretical framework which 
offers a critique of the role of law within the social order. 
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ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED TOWARDS PLANNING LAW 
Any subject of interest in the social sciences possesses an 
amorphous quality: it may appear distinct and self-contained but on 
closer examination it is revealed to merge with surrounding areas and 
disciplines. Planning law cannot be contained simply within a box 
bearing that label but necessarily overlaps into political ideologies, 
western liberal thought, the character of professional power, the 
nature of decision making and competing views on human nature. 
Conceptions of the nature and role of planning and of law are firmly 
embedded within the more general expectations prevalent in society, 
and these expectations affect not only the system in its theoretical 
form, but also the manifestations and administration of that system in 
reality. 
These expectations existed within the utopian visions of society 
as portrayed by Plato, More and Marx, but also within the less 
optimistic visions of Durkheim, Weber and Comte and have progressed 
through cycles of structuring, destructuring and restructuring society 
to produce a 'better world'. At various stages of development, 
theories on the form of society and the position of the state have 
been optimistic and pessimistic: they have both guaranteed individual 
freedom and advocated that a strictly limited sphere of freedom is the 
best we can expect. Claims for restructuring have been revealed as 
packages of 'more of the same' by perpetuating the formalism, 
rationalism, centralism, bureaucracy and professionalism identified in 
the nineteenth century. 
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Within this the city was traditionally2 a metaphor for the rest of 
society: an ordered city would produce an ordered society. After the 
industrial revolution the cities became the dehumanising reality of 
disorder, as opposed to the natural, organic order of community rural 
life. 3 The emergence of town planning, then, was accompanied by two 
major ideologies: the first, that planning and regulation would restore 
order and so promote a better, healthier, richer way of life, and the 
second, that community life was the ideal to be recreated within the 
city itself. 4 In England, responsibility for urban planning was vested 
in local administration, the local borough, as the grass roots body 
concerned with the implementation of policy and while the failure of 
planning to achieve social order through physical determinism has been 
acknowledged, 5 concepts of regulation and of community or 
neighbourhood have persisted. 
Within the legal system the city borough now plays little formal 
role. Its powers are restricted to those which are delegated to it by 
government, and where discretion has been given, it has generally 
2 For example, in the works of Plato and Aristotle. See Sennett, 
R. Classical Essays on the Culture of Cities, 1969, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
3 This view is portrayed in the work of Emile Durkheim and 
discussed within the context of the city by Frug, G. E. "The City as 
Legal Concept" (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review, 1057. 
4 The state was to be responsible for restoring social order 
through the city and in some places, such as Paris and Vienna, this 
was blatantly portrayed in the layout and design of space to augment 
the physical control over urban unrest so as to avoid a repeat of the 
1848 revolutions. This is discussed in Cohen, S. Visions of Social 
Control, 1985. London: Polity Press. 
5 For a lucid introduction to the role of, and problems 
surrounding, physical determinism in planning see Foley, D. L. "British 
Town Planning: One Ideology or Three" (1960) 11 British Journal of 
Sociology 211. 
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been tightly circumscribed by the courts; where autonomy exists it is 
strictly confined to 'local' issues. While the legislative structure may 
create discretion, 6 the framework of administrative law7 and the 
prevalence of direct government interventions makes its operation 
limited. Government restraint is felt most directly through the public 
purse by controls on rate revenue, cut-backs in capital expenditure 
budgets, limitations on the method and rate of spending, and 
restrictions on borrowing. There is also restraint in the ability of 
local boroughs to make law or governing rules: they have the power to 
make policies and plans but they are not legally binding. 
These restrictions, together with the assumptions they raise, 
govern perceptions of what amounts to legitimate action on the part 
of the borough in providing services for the local population in 
pursuance of the social welfare role they have historically played. 
The limited budget they have, the difficulties they face in augmenting 
it and the limitations on discretion are in no way controversial, but 
are rather unchallenged, and generally unacknowledged factors within 
the normal picture of local government. It is similarly assumed that 
6 This trend is evident within planning law from the Town & 
Country Planning Act 1947 onwards and is discussed in Part II below. 
7 For example, the application of the ultra vires doctrine to the 
ability of local planning authorities to impose conditions upon planning 
consents only within the ambit of 'planning purposes' (Pyx Granite Co 
Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 1 QB 554) and 
the concept of fettering discretion applied to planning authorities 
entering into agreements under section 52, Town & Country Planning 
Act 1972. Discussed below in Part II. 
8 Through the use of ministerial circulars and economic 
restraints. See Loughlin, M. Half a Century of Municipal Decline 1935- 
1985,1985. London: Allen & Unwin. 
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city boroughs should not enjoy the 'freedom' of private entities9 which 
generally have power to act in any way in which they are legally 
entitled, provided they have adequate finance. The fact that local 
government is controlled by imposed limits, rather than by the 
operation of market forces, is not regarded as extraordinary but as 
the natural result of hierarchical government. 10 
At least two further assumptions can be recognised. First, it is 
a non-issue that local city administration exists within the system of 
government's and secondly, it is assumed that local government will 
misuse any powers it has. Rather than acting in the 'public interest' 
it will, if uncontrolled, act out of private interest and become corrupt. 
Consequently, in order to protect the 'public interest' central 
government and the courts must watch over its operations. The weak 
position of local government within the system appears, then, to be 
the inevitable consequence of the economy and the expanded 
9 This is not to say that local boroughs do not engage in the 
market to raise revenue, for example by entering into partnerships 
with developers on particular schemes or by charging entrance fees to 
council facilities. The point is rather that these activities are 
circumscribed beyond the freedom of individuals or companies. 
10 This point is made by Frug (1980) op. cit. supra note 3. 
11 This has, to an extent, been challenged by the abolition of 
the GLC and the reorganisation of other metropolitan councils in 1985. 
These moves seem to have been directed towards the large Labour 
controlled councils standing in opposition to central government rather 
than against the division of responsibilities between central and local 
government generally. It could, however, be argued that it amounts to 
the same thing as the result is a move towards centralism and a 
further reduction in local autonomy, particularly as it followed closely 
on the heels of the Rates Act 1984 which limited the level of local 
rates and restricted spending. See the Government White Paper 
Streamling the Cities (1983) Cmnd. 9063. For a discussion see 
Loughlin, M. "Municipal Socialism in a Unitary State" IN: McAuslan, P. 
& McEldowney, J. F. Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 1985, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 82/106. 
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bureaucracy typical of the modern state. 12 Tight controls are 
necessary to prevent local protectionism at the expense of national 
political objectives. 
Accompanying this are the criticisms made of the development of 
modern society which have called for increased individual involvement 
in societal decision-making to move away from the domination of 
bureaucracy, the ruling class or other power elites. Assuming that 
pure self-determination would be impossible, the tendency has been 
towards increasing public participation within the existing hierarchical 
system through the use of local filters, such as the borough, to reduce 
the scale of decision-making. 
It follows from this type of analysis that the lack of power 
presently given to local government and the assumptions that 
powerlessness has engendered, discourages or even precludes effective 
participation. 13 By restricting discretion the distribution of power is 
reinforced and its hierarchical division is preserved. In other words 
by formulating the role of local government as one of a powerless 
representative of the state it excludes the opposite role, according to 
the dualities of liberalism, 14 of a collectivity of individuals promoting 
its own interests. Local government then is a personification of 
reason and rationality, acting out of necessity and in the interests of 
the state for the communal good rather than a body acting out of 
desires and passions in the interests of its individual members. 
12 See Gerth, H. & Mills, C. W. (eds) From Max Weber, 1956, 
London: RKP, esp. pp. 196/244. 
13 For a discussion of this in an alternative context see Minow, 
M. "The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered" 
(1987) 101 Harvard Law Review 10. 
14 As described by Frug (1980) op. cit. supra note 3. 
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This definition of its role, and the acceptance of that definition, 
has been achieved through the declared apolitical, objective, deductive 
intervention of the law as arbiter. Through its apparent generality 
and consistency the law represents an ideology of what is 'right' for 
society. It has consistently classified the borough as acting either as 
an individual (freedom of contract) or as a part of the state (the 
inability to fetter its own discretion) on a limited mandate (ultra 
vires). This declared role has affected public perceptions of the scope 
of local government and consequently not only does participation seem 
ineffectual, but local government acts which do not conform strictly 
with this model also appear to fall outside of its legitimate functions. 
The call for increased and effective public participation within 
the existing structure of government does accept that the role of local 
government within the city is the result of various factors including 
political ideologies, economic conditions and the role of the state 
under western liberalism. Yet it carries with it presumptions about 
the nature of power and the existence of 'community values' which 
suggest that power only exists within the formal structure and can be 
meaningfully redirected from above to an identifiable group with 
shared interests. This thesis questions the validity of these 
assumptions by identifying the mobilisation of power by actors within 
the process of planning and by challenging the objective nature and 
existence of 'community values'. 
The idea of power which is presented is not power simply as 
something which is exercised through individual acts, nor in winning 
contests for political control, but as something which is at its most 
pronounced when it is least visible. That is power can be made use of 
and directed by the shaping of preferences and the arranging of 
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agendas so as to exclude challenge15; it is most effective when it 
hides its own mechanisms, rather than when it is formally harnessed 
within the system. '6 The institutionalisation of 'community values' 
does not, therefore, produce 'public freedom' but begs the question of 
what ideas of reality are undermined by making them a part of 
accepted structures. 
It will be argued that the restrictions and limitations imposed on 
power as it is said to be distributed within the formal structure does 
not leave the city boroughs without power, but constrains them to 
produce other mechanisms of power which are not acknowledged by 
that structure. These mechanisms are not devisive or radical nor are 
they an abuse of the system: they are rather a necessary product of 
that system and, moreover, they give that same system the support 
and ability to carry on. Further, by failing to recognise the 
assumptions upon which it operates, the law projects the view that 
existing structures - social and economic relationships - are desirable 
and normal: actions or inactions which preserve the status quo are 
regarded as neutral. By supporting and reinforcing the desirability of 
the status quo in the name of 'certainty' and 'neutrality', the courts 
and the government deny the value of conflicting views and so 
perpetuate existing structures and power differentials. Hidden 
assumptions affecting the pattern of decision-making need to be 
revealed so as to assess the justice of the result. By justice is meant 
not only the value of human interaction as framed by the distribution 
15 See Lukes, S. (ed) Power, 1976, London: Basil Blackwell. 
Readings in Social and Political Theory Series. 
16 Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An 
Introduction, trans. R. Hurley, 1978, New York: Pantheon. 
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of power relationships within which the interaction occurs, but also 
taking account of the many other perspectives that exist. 
Most of the empirical research which has taken account of issues 
of power within the exercise of local government discretion has 
concentrated on the policy-making process. 17 The work done has 
indicated the complexity of local government bureaucracy and its 
strong influence on policy and has examined the relationship between 
party politics and patterns of decision making. Yet it has generally 
confined itself to the formal institutions of local government rather 
than the manifestations of power on the periphery of those 
institutions. Some work has been done on the particular occasions of 
such exercises of power but from other perspectives. Other studies on 
planning gain relating to this thesis have been largely concerned with 
the legitimacy of the process itself. Most of the lawyers who have 
done research in this area have viewed it as being illegitimate because 
it operates outside of the formal system of control and those who 
have considered it contextually have regarded it as a reaction to that 
formal control process in the light of economic necessity. None of 
the work has analysed planning gain in terms of it forming a part of 
the system, within the superstructure of formal control, or as an 
illustration of the mobilisation of power within that system. 
17 These studies have generally been carried out in the field of 
sociology, see, eg. Jones, G. Borough Politics, 1969, London: Macmillan; 
Hampton, W. Democracy and Community: A study of politics in 
Sheffield, 1970, Oxford: OUP. These studies and others are assessed 
in Saunders, P. Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, 1983, 
London: Hutchinson. 
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ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF THIS THESIS 
For the purpose of examining the relationship between planning 
gain and local government power structures, this thesis first sets out 
the specific concept of planning gain into the broader context of the 
planning process which, in turn, is put into its wider socio-political 
context. Part I consists of preliminary matters which introduce the 
thesis itself, explaining the methodology and the meaning of the 
process which forms the subject matter. The reader is then in a 
position to proceed to Part II which contains discussion of the general 
issues surrounding planning gain in Tower Hamlets. The theoretical 
framework is laid out here and, drawing upon the available literature 
and the empirical study itself, critically examines the context within 
which a planning gain policy is operated by giving consideration to 
issues within government, the development of planning law, the 
process of decision-making and the policies and plans influencing that 
decision-making in Tower Hamlets itself. The aim is to suggest the 
factors giving rise to a planning gain policy and the mechanisms 
supportive of such a policy. Therefore, this part also makes use of 
the theoretical framework and the results of the Tower Hamlets study 
to discuss the role of negotiation, and of planning officers, in the 
decision-making process. Finally, the use of agreements as a structure 
to implement planning gains is analysed by examining the authorising 
legislation and the approach the Minister and the courts have taken to 
the scope of such agreements. 
In Part III the details of the operation of a planning gain policy 
in Tower Hamlets is discussed. The results of the study are presented 
in narrative form, with each development scheme representing an 
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individual case study to which references are made throughout the 
thesis. It is in a largely descriptive form to illustrate the techniques 
of the process and the variations produced in schemes through the 
process of negotiation. This forms the basis of the following 
assessment of the methods used in Tower Hamlets to implement 
planning gain through the structures available. Having thus 
established the relationship between the official role of the local 
council and its own creation and use of structures to increase 
autonomy, in Part IV the location of the study moves to an alternative 
jurisdiction. The process of obtaining developer contributions in 
Sydney is examined to demonstrate similarities in the reality of local 
authorities' actions, and the responses to it, in a planning law system 
which has brought the process within the ambit of `legality'. The 
empirical work done in Sydney is important to the arguments raised in 
the thesis generally as it illustrates the difficulties involved in making 
structural reforms to a process which is largely informal and the 
necessarily political nature of decisions affecting the allocation of 
resources. 
Finally, in Part V the official responses to planning gain in 
England and in Tower Hamlets, embodied in ministerial circulars and 
the decisions of planning appeals and the courts, are examined. These 
'official conclusions' are set alongside the conclusions drawn by this 
thesis, taking into account the issues raised throughout. 
A few words must be added on the limitations of this thesis. 
First, this thesis dwells primarily on the practice of planning gain and, 
indeed on planning gain in Tower Hamlets. Whilst I am of the opinion 
that many of the issues raised are of relevance to other areas of 
planning law, and public law generally, and whilst an attempt is made 
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to indicate this, I also accept the difficulties of generalising from the 
specific. In an area largely dependant upon the exercise of discretion, 
and where the discretion of local administrators can be replaced by 
that of a Minister or a judge, there is inevitably a high level of 
subjectivity involved. The intention here is to recognise and illustrate 
that subjectivity within a specific context. Before these findings can 
be generalised many similar studies need to be carried out in other 
areas of administrative discretion. 
Second, this thesis is concerned with examining the subject 
within its socio-political context and the importance of economic 
considerations is acknowledged. However, the overall impression may 
be an understatement of these economic considerations, as the 
financial predicament of local authorities and the property market both 
fall outside of this thesis. This is largely because other research has 
explored town planning generally, and planning gain itself, from this 
perspective. Consequently, the reader is refered where necessary to 
appropriate texts which deal with the financial arrangements, for 
example, between central and local government and the decline of the 
welfare state. The importance of economic concerns is asserted, 
however, in this thesis on a theoretical level. 
Third, a word of warning is necessary about the use of 
Foucault's work in this thesis: his ideas are drawn upon largely 
uncritically and the wide-ranging debate over whether he is really a 
marxist, a non-marxist or an anti-marxist is not explored at all. He 
acknowledges this debate himself and admits to teasing his critics by 
using concepts and phrases from Marx while declaring the redundance 
of labelling himself marxist. This thesis uses his work instrumentally 
and adopts his view of power as something more than the relationship 
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between capital and labour, which orthodox marxists consider to be its 
greatest weakness, as its greatest strength. His absolute denial, as a 
structuralist, of human agency is not accepted outright: the effect of 
human agency is limited by the system and the relationships it 
produces but is still an influential factor. Consequently the context of 
the political economy is of course accepted as significant and essential 
to the study of planning, but power is considered to extend beyond its 
confines as techniques and institutions are formed and operate within 
systems which encompass the exercise of power for reasons other than 
the pursuit of capital. 18 To do otherwise would deny the complexity 
of the process under examination. 
Fourth, there is included in this thesis some comparative data 
and information on planning in Sydney. This is not an exhaustive 
study of the planning system, nor of the process of developers' 
contributions as it exists in that jurisdiction. Its purpose is to 
indicate similarities and to highlight the possible ineffectual results of 
legislating for planning gain, while continuing to restrain the political 
and financial position of local authorities. The intention is not to 
draw direct comparisons between London and Sydney and the 
differences between them may be such as to deny the validity of any 
attempt to do so. The section does, however, provide important 
support for the arguments within this thesis by illustrating the 
continued restrictive approach of the courts and state government 
towards local autonomy and the measures adopted by local authorities 
to secure their own power structures. These power structures in 
Sydney, as in London, continue to exist in a political/economic 
18 See Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, 1980, ed. C. Gordon, New 
York: Pantheon Press. 
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environment where they are necessary to allow the local authorities to 
fulfill their expected role. 
Finally, the data for this research was collected some time ago 
and precedes a number of changes within Tower Hamlets and in 
central government policy. No further circulars have been issued and 
no legislation has been tabled and the practice of planning gain has 
continued, and in fact has spread to boroughs, such as Southwark, 
which, at the time of the study, were operating a restrictive policy of 
no office development (and therefore no planning gain) in their area. 
This study is not intended to be applied generally to the operation of 
planning gain policies and is concerned with data restricted in both 
time and location to particular political and economic considerations. 
The political affiliations of the councillors at Tower Hamlets and of 
the officers have not been considered, nor controlled for, as the scope 
of the research was not concerned with isolating particular party 
concerns, and thus could be questioned on that basis. This is not to 
say that these concerns are irrelevant, indeed the officers were 
concerned about the political objectives of their leadership and 
envisaged changes in policy as the firmly Labour, and at one time 
Communist, controlled council lost its monopoly with the arrival of 
Liberal/SDP councillors in the 1978 elections. 
Yet it is also true that other boroughs with staunchly 
Conservative membership, such as the City of Westminster and 
Kensington and Chelsea, operated planning gain policies, while a 
number of left wing councils, most notably Southwark, refused to 
administer such a policy as it entailed granting consent for offices in 
their borough. The ethos behind planning gain, therefore, seems to 
encompass both political justifications based upon streamlining the 
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planning process so as to make it easier for developers to obtain their 
consents and also justifications based upon redistribution of profits. 
Similarily objections to the policy have come from right and left wing 
councils. The GLC, for example, has been opposed to any office 
development in Central London and has taken a much more restrictive 
approach to planning gain than Tower Hamlets. As a result of these 
considerations, the single factor of party affiliation has not been 
explored in this thesis, nor has it been discounted. Comparative data 
from a Conservative borough was not obtained during the study and, 
thus, the influence of party politics could not be isolated as a 
particular influence upon the policy in Tower Hamlets. 
Despite these limitations this thesis does represent a detailed 
study of the operation of a practice generally misunderstood as a 
result of lack of information, and does provide an alternative 
framework for analysis. If it is accepted that a dialectic progression 
between empirical research and theory is a meaningful way of 
contributing towards resolving questions facing public law, then the 
conclusions from this study should provide stimulus for finding answers. 
CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY 
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Any empirical research in the social sciences will encounter at 
least two sets of identifiable problems. The first set relates to the 
internal validity of the research design, and addresses questions of 
objectivity, reliability and commitment through an examination of the 
relationship between the researcher, her or his theory and the subject 
under study. The second set relates to problems which are external to 
the design and reside in the social and political context in which the 
design is carried out, addressing such issues as accessibility to 
material and the quality of that material. The choice and usefulness 
of the research design may be greatly influenced by this second set of 
problems but, in the area of law and policy at least, is also 
determined by the researcher's perception of the nature of law itself. 
A major problem within legal research which has examined law and 
social control has been the failure to identify the difficulties inherent 
in the nature of law through an assumption that the effectiveness of 
law can be measured against an ideal, and that the 'true' nature of 
power relations is there to be discovered. 
This chapter, therefore, is concerned not only with clarifying the 
choice of research design employed in this thesis, but also with 
identifying the effect of my perception of law and of power relations 
upon that choice. It is impossible to present the methodology of a 
thesis for scrutiny without acknowledging its theoretical base. To 
attempt to do so would be to perpetuate the misconceived view of 
research techniques as neutral devices based upon neutral theoretical 
suppositions and so deny the role of theory in guiding research and 
the interpretation of its findings. Thus research which is geared 
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towards testing the effectiveness or impact of law' by examining the 
actuality of its operation against its stated purpose shares a common 
methodological perspective by collecting data to test an hypothesis, 
but it also shares a common understanding of the form and functions 
of law. It can therefore be argued that if the latter understanding is 
flawed, then the value of the research is severely limited, no matter 
how carefully conducted, and no matter how many variables are 
controlled for. 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 
Most survey research in the social sciences is concerned with 
identifying a theoretical population, discovering a sampling frame 
which meets its characteristics and then using the responses or actions 
of the sample to generalise to the predicted reactions of the 
theoretical population. For example, if the subject to be studied is 
the affluent worker, a sample of car workers could be used and a 
research device could be chosen by using questionaires, longitudinal 
studies, records, observation or other recognised techniques to answer 
particular hypotheses. There will undoubtedly be problems in the 
choice of design and in its application. The study of law and power 
relations, however, experiences problems at the first hurdle if 
assumptions are made about what law is and how power relationships 
exist. Thus identifying the theoretical population of those with power 
I There are many examples of this type of work, particularly In 
criminology where the effectiveness of various pieces of criminal law 
has been examined. For examples of this type of research in various 
fields see the works contained in Black, D. & Mileski, M. eds. The 
Social Organization of Law, 1973. New York: Academic Press. 
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requires an initial decision on where to look for that population. An 
immediate reaction may be to look at those ascribed a particular 
status, and the choice of sample may then be members of the House of 
Commons or the councillors in a particular area. This choice, 
however, is based on the assumption that power is bestowed on certain 
individuals and denies any analysis of power which perceives it as 
arising through various other informal structures. 2 
Similar issues arise with the study of law. Researchers have 
tended to assume that legal goals are self-evident or that they are 
readily identifiable. In examining the effectiveness of law in a 
specific area, or in comparing a practice in reality with the law itself, 
those goals are often not clearly articulated but are rather taken as 
read. This is certainly related to the language of law and the nature 
of judicial and legislative process, but provides a vehicle through 
which the individual preconceptions or biases of the researcher can be 
represented as `objectivity'. 
Another problem which should be raised here is the way in which 
law is perceived within general social theory. Is it a particular form 
of social control worthy of general theory which is distinctively legal? 
Or is it merely one type of rule interlocking with many which shape 
and alter the behaviour and aspirations of those they touch? Laws do 
vary from one culture to another, and from one time to another. 
Disputes which are decided within a legal forum in one time and place 
may be decided within the family, through self-help or concilliation in 
another. Alternatively, there may be no dispute at all. The type of 
behaviour attracting the sanction of the criminal law, for example, 
z This is discussed in detail in Part H. 
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varies across cultures and what is criminal in one may be considered 
'normal' in another. 
Certainly, law is influential and cannot be ignored by social 
scientists. It does deserve particular attention, but it should not be 
detached from other sources or manifestations of authority and power 
with which it interacts. This view has clear implications for 
methodology, as it requires law to occupy a position within the 
research programme which allows at least equal treatment of other 
factors influencing behaviour, and also makes the role of law more 
complex than `effectiveness' testing research has acknowledged. 
It is not necessary here to go on to analyse in depth the role of 
law in planning as this is explored further in the general part of this 
thesis. However, by rejecting a goal-testing approach to the subject 
of this research, it should be added that the Austinian view of law 
inherent in much socio-legal work3 is no longer assumed. 
Consequently, laws are understood not simply as commands backed by 
varying degrees of threats of sanction but as including, in Kelsen's 
terminology, both static and dynamic forms. That is, rules which 
require specific behaviour and define specific acts together with rules 
which define offices and give authority to those offices. The latter 
dynamic rules may limit discretion and lay down procedures for the 
exercise of power and are obviously important in considering 
administrative behaviour. They are also of particular concern as they 
bestow authority significantly to effect and alter the position of 
individuals, but at a level of low visibility. 
3 This is discussed in Feeley, M. M. "The Concept of Laws in 
Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View" (1976) 10 
Law & Society Review 497/524. 
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By moving away from the command model of law, the assumptions 
underlying any approach to empirical research are dramatically altered. 
Laws which merely define or confer rights and status or which offer 
selective incentives to conform, through for example, taxation, enter 
the arena as methods of social control. Areas which have traditionally 
been regarded as depoliticised and falling within the mechanistic 
actions of bureaucrats come under scrutiny, but how should they be 
scrutinised ? It has been acknowledged4 that very few disputes come 
to be litigated before the courts and that the most pervasive social 
control function of law lies in the process through which law is 
applied by individuals to themselves, without resorting to court. That 
is, individuals respond to the abstract set of rules and alter their 
behaviour accordingly in anticipation of the reactions of the court in 
administering law. 
In a host of both blunt and subtle ways law creates a set 
of categories through which people must filter their thinking 
and organise their lives. It is a complex pricing system 
which not only puts a value on the wants people may be 
inclined to pursue, but also affects them indirectly in that 
people must also adjust their wants to the behaviour of 
others whose preferences are in turn shaped by the law. "5 
Thus any methodology adopted must move beyond the limited 
usefulness of considering court decisions alone and also take account 
of the wider, more indirect, effects of the reactions of individuals or 
organisations to the impact of law, and the adaptations they make to 
facilitate that law. 
4 See, for example, Fuller, L. The Law in Quest of Itself, 1940, 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
5 Feeley (1976) op. cit. supra note 3 at 515. 
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By taking account of these issues the methodology of this thesis, 
and the choice of research techniques used, did not address the 
subject of study by placing law and power in the position of 
independent, defineable variables, to be measured beside the 'actual' 
results. Rather it sought to identify the elements and dynamics of the 
process of planning gain, generate a theory about the calculus involved 
in pursuing that process and then examine the whole system, with 
special emphasis upon the function of law. e Under this model, law is 
only one of a range of factors considered, and the theory generated is 
one of decision-making in a particular set of circumstances, rather 
than a theory of the effectiveness of law. Law is perceived to be a 
part of the exercise of political power, rather than an independent 
variable available for comparison. 
THE RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
The above section was intended to illustrate that no research 
technique is neutral, but is dependant upon the relationship between 
theory and empirical work. A more readily recognised external 
problem is one of accessibility to information and material. This also 
raises particular problems where the subject of the research is not 
6 This approach can be compared in general terms with the 
economic approach to law in that the concern there is to take into 
account all of the factors influencing decision-making and thus 
produce a calculus of efficiency. While this thesis does not adopt the 
market model the methodology used has benefitted from research 
conducted by others who have ascribed to that model. A good example 
is provided by Ogus, A. I. "Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision 
Making" IN: Burrows, P. & Veljanovski, C. G. The Economic Approach 
to Law, 1981, London: Butterworths. pp. 210/225. 
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only concerned with power relationships, but with politics and 
controversy. A literature survey was conducted covering both English 
and Australian material, and included sociological, economic, political 
science as well as legal writing. The amount of academic work on the 
specific topic was limited especially in England but accessibility to the 
material that did exist was not a problem, particularly as I had access 
to the University of New South Wales library as well as various 
libraries in London. 
Accessibility to unpublished information did present different 
problems in the two jurisdictions where empirical work was done, at 
least partly as a result of the unspoken, but firmly entrenced, informal 
rules operating in Britain to protect exclusivity of information. This 
is well-developed in an area which is acknowledged as `political', and 
becomes heightened where there is also overt opposition to the process 
being studied. The effect of this exclusivity is a type of 
defensiveness, to protect knowledge from outside scrutiny, which is 
felt not only by those being examined, but also by the researcher 
herself. As Banfield explains 
The case study method requires that the investigator go 
behind the scenes to discover what `really' happens. In the 
United States this is easy: there is widespread feeling 
(witness the affair of the Pentagon papers) that it is 
outrageous for a public body to have any secrets. In Britain 
by contrast, the general opinion, certainly the opinion of 
persons in office, is that what goes on behind the scenes is 
not at all the business of `outsiders'. It would be surprising 
if British political scientists did not share this attitude to 
some degree, at least to the extent of feeling embarassed to 
ask questions that will be viewed as invasions of official 
privacy. "7 
7 Banfield, E. "Urban Renewal and the Planners" (1972) 1 Policy 
& Politics pp. 163/169 at 164, cited by Saunders, P. Urban Politics, 
1979, London: Hutchinson, p. 327. 
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While I am unaware of the situation in the United States, research in 
Sydney was certainly more relaxed than the British counterpart. 
This point can be fairly briefly illustrated by the attitude 
towards interviews and tape recorders experienced in both 
jurisdictions. In Britains not one person interviewed agreed to my 
using a tape recorder, and some refused to answer any questions which 
were not included on a previously approved interview outline. I often 
felt reticent to suggest taping conversations as a result of the 
reaction of suspicion that I received when I did make such a request. 
My later experience in Sydney, on the other hand, shocked me. 
Councillors, developers, representatives of state and local government 
were happy to be taped. In early meetings I armed myself with lists 
of typed questions, only to receive the reaction `Why don't I just tell 
you all I know about developer contributions and afterwards you can 
question me about anything else you need to know or that I've left 
out. ' 
The reaction in Sydney was to make everything as open as 
possible, whereas in London it was far more geared towards releasing 
as little information as was necessary. This anecdote does not provide 
evidence of differences in attitude generally, and could be explained 
by other variables between the two jurisdictions or between the 
individuals involved. Yet it did have an effect on my perception of 
the types of question that would be answered, and the type of 
methodology necessary to obtain certain information. In Sydney 
specific information could be obtaining by asking a very general 
8 These comments relate to my experience with councillors and 
other officials in London who I interviewed. I did not experience the 
same difficulty with those lawyers and planners at Tower Hamlets who 
I saw on a regular basis and who readily provided me with information. 
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question, or even no question at all, but in London this was not so. 
Similarily copies of documents, plans, policy statements were supplied 
to me without hestitation by those interviewed in Sydney, again often 
at their initiative rather than my own. 
Whilst these underlying problems with accessibility were 
pronounced they had little practical effect upon the thesis as a whole 
because of the formal links established with Tower Hamlets before the 
empirical work was undertaken. These links, effectively diluted 
problems of accessibility as far as information from planners and 
lawyers at Tower Hamlets was concerned and provided me with a 
status which allowed me access to councillors, developers, the GLC 
which would otherwise could have been denied or, at least difficult. 
Thus, the interviewing problems in London were confined to my 
encounters with persons who saw me as a researcher, rather than as a 
person connected to Tower Hamlets. This in itself may have created 
additional problems, in that the information I was given may have 
been coloured by the image I possessed but, if anything, disclosure 
was perhaps more, rather than less frank, as a result of my close 
association with Tower Hamlets. 
The links with Tower Hamlets arose through the funding of the 
empirical work and essentially provided me with freedom of access to 
all the planning gain scheme files held at the legal and planning 
departments at Tower Hamlets. These links indirectly brought me into 
a close working relationship with a number of planners and lawyers 
who made themselves available to explain, clarify and add to the 
information available from the records. In addition they would include 
me in meetings with developers, the GLC, interest groups and other 
councils as well as circulating copies of memorandum and other 
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internal documents to me. This situation arose as the result of 
existing connections between the legal department of the borough and 
Brunel University Law Department which developed through a 
placement scheme for students as a part of their undergraduate 
studies. Brunel made inquiries of all the placement solicitors in this 
scheme who qualified as potential participants in the Collaborative 
Award in the Social Sciences scheme introduced through the Economic 
and Social Research Council in 1982. Tower Hamlets suggested 
participating in a research project on planning gain and the research 
design submitted was authorised by the ESRC for funding. 
The effect of this relationship between Tower Hamlets and myself 
was to provide a unique opportunity to examine in detail the operation 
of a planning gain policy, not only through documentation but also 
through personal contact with those administering the practice and its 
implementation. A similar relationship did not exist in Sydney and the 
data I obtained there was not comparable, in that it provided an 
overall picture of the situation. That data was collected for the 
purpose of illustrating structural differences and similarities whereas in 
Tower Hamlets the research project was designed to explore the detail 
so as to promote a deeper understanding of a practice which could 
only be superficially assessed from the outside. Consequently, both 
projects will be dealt with independently. 
Methodology in Tower Hamlets 
As indicated above, the reasons for choosing Tower Hamlets as 
the area for this study were all pragmatic, but can be supported on 
the grounds that Tower Hamlets would, under other circumstances, 
r 
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have been a sensible and obvious choice. Planning decisions regularly 
involve negotiation between planners of the relevant authority and the 
developer submitting an application. Those negotiations may concern 
the physical details of the scheme, the timing of the scheme and the 
possible problems with approving the scheme, and thus may also extend 
to the actual content of the application or anticipated application. It 
follows that an important aspect of development control lies in 
negotiation and those negotiations may result in planning gains for the 
borough. In any negotiation the bargaining power of the parties is a 
vital consideration and in Tower Hamlets this aspect was well 
pronounced. 
As a London borough it is likely to attract far more development 
than rural areas and significantly more than many of the Northern 
cities. The western edge of the borough abutts the City and as such 
offers prime sites for the expansion of the business and financial 
centre of London. It represents an area where office development is 
highly profitable and where land values are susceptible to rapid 
fluctuation and available sites are in short supply. Developers are 
anxious to build commercial developments in the area and at the same 
time it is traditionally residential and industrial, and has also 
experienced problems of urban decline and deprivation. In these 
circumstances there is a need for housing and public buildings and a 
corresponding demand for development. 
In addition, Tower Hamlets published a planning gain policy in 
1972 identifying a requirement to provide a 'community benefit' on any 
application for office development within the borough. This policy 
was issued in response to the demand for development and the 
schemes offered by developers to encourage the grant of permission at 
32 
the time of the property boom in London and has been consistently 
applied to produce a large number of planning gain schemes, and thus 
a working sample. Within this sample the range of planning gains 
actually provided was reasonably broad and included housing, shopping 
facilities, industrial floorspace, restoration of listed buildings, the 
renovation of an art gallery and theatre, the restoration of an 
important church and some 'community' buildings. Further the 
borough had taken the policy to appeal and had made use of section 
52 agreements in implementing the schemes. 
All of these factors meant that information on the operation of a 
planning gain policy was likely to be available and that a sizeable 
number of schemes were likely to have been implemented. It was in 
fact possible to examine systematically all of the files in the planning 
and legal departments on office schemes in the borough since the 
policy was first implemented. The study was completed shortly before 
the Borough Plan Inquiry when the office policy became part of that 
plan, which had gone on deposit in February 1983. This was largely 
coincidental in that the original proposal to collect data between 
January and July 1983 was extended by a further six months because 
the number of schemes and the bulk of documentation had been 
underestimated. The policy included in the borough plan largely 
mirrored its office policy counterpart, but also coincided with the 
publication of a government circular on planning gain and a substantial 
internal reorganisation of staff at the borough. The planning officer 
responsible for most of the schemes in Spitalfields was promoted to a 
different position and the solicitor who had dealt with all of the 
section 52 agreements also left the Council. The information produced 
by the study therefore spanned a period of eleven years in which 
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there was no direct interference by central government and in which 
internal relationships in the Council and with developers became well 
established. 
The actual results of the study which appear in Part III of this 
thesis were achieved from a variety of sources. Foremost among these 
were the contents of the files held at the borough and the 
unstructured conversations with planners and lawyers involved with the 
schemes. The file data were undeniably useful although the 
information contained therein was not always complete. Also it was 
largely based upon objectives different from my own and generally 
lacked information on a number of the more interesting and pertinent 
questions addressed, such as the process of negotiation. The benefit 
of observational material, such as that collected through attending 
council meetings, public inquiries and planning appeals similarly was 
constrained by a formality which my research hoped to transcend. 
I spent twelve months in all at the legal and planning 
departments as there were over two hundred files dealing with the 
past cases of planning gain. As a result of this I became a familiar 
part of the council and was privy to many meetings and discussions on 
planning gain schemes which were under consideration. This 
information was not structured and was at best qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, and at worst impressionistic but was certainly necessary 
to supplement the less problematic documentary data. As an overt 
observer, however, I was also subject to the limitations of my 
position. I was still at the mercy of my contacts and, consequently, it 
is not possible for me to judge how even my access to information 
was in reality. As I was attempting to observe an informal and 
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largely private decision-making process it was not possible to 
guarantee that I was always 'in the right place at the right time'. 
In addition to this information collected at Tower Hamlets I also 
conducted a small number of interviews with developers, 
representatives of interest groups in Tower Hamlets and 
representatives of the Greater London Council. The sample of persons 
involved was not significant and the interviews were a combination of 
formal questions and unstructured conversation. In view of the 
subject matter involved it soon became evident to me that an 
unstructured approach was preferable, as direct questioned produced 
formal responses which really told me very little about the 
interviewees opinions or experiences. This part of the research in 
fact produced little valuable material other than reassertion of 
information largely available in published form. 
Methodology in Sydney 
Apart from the literature survey, the findings for this section 
came primarily from a series of interviews conducted with councillors, 
planners, developers and the Department of the Environment and 
Planning. A formal questionnaire was originally used but was not 
pursued mainly because, as indicated above, those interviewed provided 
information freely and spontaneously. Also it was not clear to me at 
the outset which questions were the most appropriate to ask, and in 
retrospect the questionnaire drafted9 appears banal. It seems that the 
main purpose for using a structured interview technique is to obtain 
9A copy of this questionnaire appears in the appendix. 
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quantifiable responses. This was not relevant here, partly because of 
the small sample of interviewees, but mainly because the purpose of 
the study did not lend itself to statistical analysis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The information collected overall was brought together in the 
following chapters of this thesis to support a particular argument. 
The way in which the data has been interpreted is dependant to a 
large upon my acceptance of certain central theoretical and 
epistemological precepts, and can only be defended on that basis. The 
data is not representative of a test of the theoretical position but is 
an application of that theory which is capable of being tested by 
alternative interpretations. How reliable, then, are the results of this 
study ? 
In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider what 
it is that social science research can in fact achieve in terms of 
value-freedom and objectivity. Weber recognised that values 
necessarily contribute to the selection and direction of research and 
recommended that those values be declared by the researcher so as to 
enhance objectivity. This recommendation has been widely criticised'O 
and social scientists have been accused of hiding their subjective 
views behind a mask of credibility. Gouldner, " for example, has 
10 See, for example, Wright-Mills, C. The Sociological 
Imagination, 1959, New York: OUP, esp. Chapter 3, Abstracted 
Empiricism; Hughes, J. The Philosophy of Social Science, 1980, London: 
Longman, esp. chapters 2&3. 
11 Gouldner, A. For Sociology, 1973, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books. 
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referred to social scientists as being 'naive', in believing that they can 
recognise their own biases, and 'smug' in maintaining that the values 
they declare are acceptable ones. To Gouldner social research is 
necessaily partisan and objectivity can only be attained through the 
personal integrity of the researcher which prevents her or him from 
adopting the interests of a particular group and from suppressing data 
which runs counter to those interests. Popper similarily relied upon 
integrity but saw it arising through the 'community of scientists' 
subjecting findings of others to criticism. 12 
Certainly over the last twenty or thirty years the decline in 
positivism has encouraged the recognition of `social studies' as defying 
scientific rigour. 13 The concepts being examined are value-laden and 
often imprecise, and the data is manipulable, unpredictable and 
contingent upon the theoretical framework within which it is used. 
This does not mean that 'anything goes' in social science research, 14 
as a methodology is still necessary but it does mean that the integrity 
of the researcher and the internal consistency of its application are 
fundamental to the validity of the research produced. A further 
requisite for qualitative research to withstand scrutiny is that the 
results are presented in such a way that the findings may be 
empirically disconfirmed. 15 In other words the deductions made from 
12 See Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970, 
2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
13 See, for example, Ryan, A. The Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 1970, London: Macmillan; Keat, R. & Urry, J. Social Theory 
as Science, 1975, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, esp. chapters 1&4. 
14 See Feyerabend, P. Against Method, 1975, London: New Left 
Books. 
15 See Ford, J. Paradigms and Fairy Tales, 1975, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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the account of data in any given study should be disprovable through 
the presentation of other facts. There are problems with this in that 
the interpretation of information as `fact' can be subject to the same 
dependance upon standpoint and individual perception, 16 but this 
requirement has some force if it is applied within the same paradigm 
as the study itself. Overall, this means that the application of data in 
this thesis must be judged within these confines, and should not be 
regarded as a universally applicable test regardless of theoretical 
stand point. 
16 See Hughes (1980) op. cit. supra note 9, chapters 4&5. 
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In this chapter the various definitions given of planning gain will 
be discussed in order to illustrate the importance of giving due 
consideration to competing ideologies. This questions the usefulness of 
attempts by academics to ascribe a 'neutral' definition to a practice 
which concerns itself with the redistribution of resources and 
represents a preliminary insight into the competing approaches to the 
subject. The prevalent forms of analyses which are self-evident from 
the various definitions of planning gain appearing in the available 
literature are taken up in later chapters. The aim here is to reveal 
those forms and to stress the importance of recognising the standpoint 
of the definer. 
As practised in Tower Hamlets, planning gain becomes an integral 
part of considering the planning merits of an application. When an 
application is received from a developer for the construction of an 
office building or a change of use to offices the reaction of the 
Council is, first, to inform that developer of its office policy and of 
the policy contained in the GLDP and then to invite the developer to 
discuss the application with a planner at the Council. The merits of 
the application are therefore not considered outside the issue of gain, 
only in the light of it. The office policy of the borough has been 
framed in such a way as to make planning gain a legitimate concern 
of the planner in assessing the value of a particular development, thus 
projecting a certain view of the scope of planning and the powers 
available to the council. 
Few definitions have acknowledged this connection. The one 
given by the public lawyer Jeffrey Jowell in his empirical research Into 
the extent and scope of planning gain agreements refers to the 
process of negotiation but puts it squarely in the context of extracting 
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a benefit for the community rather than as an aspect of planning 
itself. 
The achievement of a benefit to the community that was 
not part of the initial application (and was therefore 
negotiated) and that was not of itself normally commercially 
advantageous to the developer. " 
There are clearly a number of problems with this definition, some of 
which Jowell acknowledges. In the first place it refers to the `initial 
application' which is factually inaccurate. In many cases developers 
would negotiate planning gains before any application was submitted. 
Secondly, it falls into the same trap as many of the less acceptable 
definitions by confusing the content of planning gain with the method 
of achieving it. A more blatant example of this is provided by the 
doyen of planning law, Sir Desmond Heap, in his article villifying the 
practice of pursuing a policy of planning gain which he defines as 
The withholding by the local planning authority of planning 
permission for development until a Section 52 agreement has 
been negotiated and completed. "2 
This has the additional factual error of assuming that planning 
gain only includes those schemes which use a section 52 agreement. 
While it is true that in recent years the use of section 52 agreements 
has increased, especially in connection with larger or more complex 
developments, planning gains have also been implemented in Tower 
Hamlets and elsewhere through the use of conditions on a planning 
I Jowell, J. "Bargaining in Development Control " (1977) J. P. L. 
414/433. 
2 Heap, D. and Ward, A. J. "Planning Bargaining - the Pros and 
Cons: or How Much Can the System Stand ?" (1980) JPL 631/637 at 631. 
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permission, by approving a modified planning application or by entering 
into a voluntary agreement under other pieces of legislation. 3 
Jowell's definition is also unacceptable in that it suggests that all 
planning gain is achieved through negotiation. It is true that the 
content of the gain is mostly the subject of negotiation but the 
suggestion to include some gain has come from developers as well as 
from the Council. 4 It is not accurate to portray the process as one in 
which the negotiations always put the developer in the position of 
having to include something in his scheme that he had not anticipated. 
It may be that he did not anticipate the extent or the precise nature 
of the gain, but in view of the increasing number of published office 
policy documents in London, an acceptable definition must at least 
address itself to the knowledge of the developer. 5 
It may also be the case that a developer will include something 
in a scheme which may look like a benefit but is intended to improve 
the profitability of the scheme-6 As an extension of this the 
developer may include a gain proposal, knowing of the local authority's 
3 eg., section 126 Housing Act 1974, section 111 Local 
Government Act 1972 and under local legislation. 
4 This apparently occurs in other Boroughs as well as Tower 
Hamlets, See eg., Appeal against the decision of the London Borough 
of Richmond upon Thames Council to refuse planning permission... at 
26/30 London Road, Twickenham, DOE Ref. T/App/5028/A/81/09717/G7. 
[1983] JPL 265-269; McLaren v SSE and Another, QBD 10 December 
1980, unreported but noted (1979) SJ 370. (Transcript: Barnett, Lenton). 
5 Within Tower Hamlets certain developers, such as Central & 
City always included gains in their schemes. In fact the director of 
that company was adamant that developers should provide gains within 
development schemes to reduce any detrimental effects it may have on 
the community and to reward the area for granting consent. This 
view was expressed in the course of correspondence and meetings 
between that director and the Council. 
6 See Kirk, G. Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society, 1980. 
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office policy, in order to avoid the delays, and thus the costs, of 
negotiation. Thus, as well as avoiding the delays and costs of an 
appeal against a refusal, the developer who does this reduces delay to 
a minimum. In Tower Hamlets a number of schemes involved even 
years of negotiation, so the savings involved in volunteering benefits 
could be immense.? 
A final problem with this definition as stated is that it includes 
the phrase 'benefit to the community' which categorises planning gain 
as a practice which appears to be outside of the responsibility of 
planning authorities. That is, if it were understood that planning was 
generally concerned with benefitting the public this phrase could be 
reworded so as to move planning gain into the ambit of planning. The 
choice of words and the implications those words are meant to convey 
requires careful clarification. This point highlights the often 
discernable divergence of opinion between lawyers and planners as to 
what planning actually is. The Royal Town Planning Institute ('RTPI') 
for example has portrayed public benefit as the pivotal concern of 
planning. 
It is a fundamental and proper objective of planning that 
new development should at least not offend the public point 
of view, and wherever possible be beneficial. Over the 
years, the public has grown to expect planning authorities 
to ensure that change not only meets basic standards but is, 
7 See, for example Part IV, Results of Study chapter: Rodwell 
House or the Tarn & Tarn schemes as compared with Brushfield Street 
16/18 & 31 Fournier Street or even the Camperdown House Scheme. 
It is also relevant to point out, however, that many of the delays 
were not produced simply by negotiating the gain, but rather in 
negotiating the terms of the S. 52 agreement. For an example of this 
see Results of Study: Buck & Hickman scheme. This proposal was 
submitted in 2 parts, one in August 1978 and the other 2 months later, 
and the schedule of works under the s. 52 agreement was not finally 
agreed until 1983. For discussion see chapter on Negotiation in Part II 
below. 
43 
additionally, generally to the public good and benefit and 
that every opportunity is taken to meet this expectation. 
Development control has the purpose of putting into 
effect policies aimed at achieving that objective, and 
determining the degree and nature of the public benefit to 
be derived; it is in achieving this that in practice applicants 
for planning permission and the local planning authorities 
negotiate. "8 
Overall, the major deficiency in almost all of the definitions of 
planning gain which appear in the literature is the lack of any 
reference to its connection with the planning merits of an application. 
The effect of this is to maintain planning gain as an illegitimate 
concern of a planning authority and thus a misuse of power, and so to 
reduce the autonomy of planners to decide what its legitimate 
concerns are. Consequently, the domain of law, as a formal method of 
control, is preserved to circumscribe the practice as unlawful. In 
Tower Hamlets planning gain negotiations are seen as a necessary part 
of assessing the acceptability of the proposals on planning grounds 
thus retaining the power to treat them as legitimate. 
This view is basically shared by the RTPI who see the problem as 
ensuring that planning gain negotiations do not go beyond this and 
into the realm of inducement to accept a scheme which is 
unacceptable on planning grounds. 9 They go on to state that if gain 
negotiations are conducted to secure benefits beyond the merits of the 
scheme ( which could be assessed by themselves through professional 
8 RTPI Planning Gain Guidelines Working Party, Agreed 
Memorandum and Code of Practice, 16 November 1982. London: RTPI. 
9 The views of the RTPI represent the opinions of the 
professional body laying down standards for its members and as such 
are strongly influential on what planners see as acceptable practice. 
See Vasu, M. L. Politics and Planning :A National Study of American 
Planners, 1979 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. For a 
discussion of the relationship between planners and their professional 
body. 
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guidance or through the courts if litigated) then the local authority 
would be seen as imposing a local tax or betterment levy on the 
developer. 10 This view has also been expressed by the Royal Institute 
of British Architects (`RIBA') 
The RIBA is indeed opposed to the concept of developers 
securing a distortion of planning principles by offering 
inducements - 'the mere sale of development rights' - but at 
the same time views the act of planning as an exercise in 
balancing advantages and disadvantages in the interests of 
the community. The achievement of the greatest gain and 
the smallest loss will affect in different ways the developer, 
who is concerned with capital and running costs, taxation 
and financial return, and the local authority, which is 
concerned with wider social implications. "I' 
This converts the problem from being one of the lawfulness of 
planning gain, to the control of reasonableness of the planner's (local 
planning authority's) act. In other words the RTPI assert that 
following a policy of planning gain is lawful and in accordance with 
good planning practice as long as it accords with published plans and 
policies and is pursued in a reasonable way. It would be unreasonable 
if monies collected from the developer were not used in connection 
with aspects of the scheme which make it acceptable in planning 
terms, nor would it be reasonable to allow it to compromise planning 
standards. The definition suggested by the RTPI, however, is not 
without problems and it again reflects a distribution of power within 
the structure so as to give themsel and their members a degree of 
autonomy from the courts and central government. 
A Planning Gain is a benefit which accrues when in 
connection with the obtaining of a planning permission, a 
developer incurs some additional expenditure or other 
10 RTPI An Approach to Planning Gains, May 1981. London: RTPI. 
11 RIBA Comments submitted to the DOE on the PAG Report, 
January 1982, para. 2. 
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, 
liability beyond that required to meet normally accepted 
planning standards in providing a benefit he would not 
otherwise choose to provide but which the Local Planning 
Authority has justifiable planning grounds for seeking to 
achieve. " 12 
The difficulties here, in so far as there continues to be a gap 
between the practice in Tower Hamlets and this definition, stem from 
the phrase 'normally accepted planning standards' and from the 
remaining impression that the developer would not suggest the 
inclusion of gains. The latter could be remedied quite simply by 
replacing the word 'otherwise' with 'necessarily'. As to the former 
there are problems of interpretation. As it stands, the phrase 
probably means very little at all and could be omitted while leaving 
the philosophy behind the definition intact. 
A planning gain accrues when, in connection with the 
obtaining of a planning permission, a developer offers, 
agrees or is obliged to incur some expenditure, surrender 
some right or concede some other benefit which the local 
authority has reasonable planning grounds for seeking to 
achieve. "13 
Here the concern is what is fair and equitable in the exercise of 
the policy and this should be related to the wider context in which 
the decision takes place so as to examine whether the policy is 
12 RTPI Agreed Memorandum and Code of Pracitice (1982) 
op. cit. supra note 8 para. 9. 
13 Stungo, A. and Dempsey, M. "Current Topics: Planning Gain" 
(1982) JPL 2/5. This definition is almost identical to the one put 
forward by RIBA in its submission to the DOE on the PAG Report, 
except that the last line reads "which the local authority has 
reasonable grounds for seeking to secure. " The definition suggested by 
the London Boroughs' Association was also very similar but not so 
precise as it merely refers to a developer "incurring some expenditure 
or other liability in providing a benefit which the LPA has reasonable 
planning grounds for seeking to achieve". 
0 
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reasonable under the social and economic'4 conditions that prevail. 
To do this requires an acceptance of the view that planning should 
take these elements into account and is not merely concerned with 
physical determinism. Certainly the 1968 and 1971 Acts bear witness 
to this and there is a growing body of literature to support the view 
that spatial arrangements are themselves an effect of, and effective 
on, social and economic distribution. '5 
The government definition, however, is a long way from this 
approach. In October 1981 the Secretary of State's Property Advisory 
Group ('PAG') published a Report entitled 'Planning Gain' as a 
consultative document. 1 This was distributed to relevant 
organisations, including the RTPI, RIBA, Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors ('RICS') and the London Boroughs' Association ('LBA') for 
comment and a circular was introduced under the 1971 Act at the end 
of 1983.17 The definition given in the circular demonstrates a failure 
14 Conditions are described here as 'social and economic' 
because of the use of a distinction between economic conditions and 
other conditions which appears in the 1971 Act, for example in 
relation to structure plans ss. 6&7. This does not mean that the 
distinction is necessarily a valid one. See Posner, R. A. Economic 
Analysis of the Law 2nd ed. 1977, Boston: Little, Brown & Co, esp. 
chapter 1. 
15 The starting point for the articulation of this view can be 
read in Foucault's work. See eg. Power/Knowledge, 1980, ed. C. Gordon, 
New York: Pantheon, esp. "Questions on Geography" at 63/78. 
IB The RTPI were concerned that they were not consulted 
before the PAG Report was prepared because of the interests 
represented by PAG. 'The Group itself does not, of course, adequately 
embrace the planning view where this differs from the developer view 
and we would have been pleased to have helped at an earlier stage. ' 
Letter from RTPI President to the Minister of Local Government & 
Environmental Services, DOE, dated 28 January 1982. 
17 DOE Circular 22/83 "Planning Gain ", 1983 London: HMSO. 
This document is discussed in greater depth in the chapter on official 
Responses to Planning Gain in Part VI of this thesis. 
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to appreciate the role of the local planning authority as one including 
positive responsibilities in producing plans to influence and shape 
development in the light of social and economic considerations. 
" 'Planning Gain' is a term which has come to be applied 
whenever, in connection with a grant of planning 
permission, a local planning authority seeks to impose on a 
developer an obligation to carry out works not included in 
the development for which permission has been sought or to 
make some payment or confer some extraneous right or 
benefit in return for permitting development to take place. 
As such, it is distinct from any alterations or modifications 
which the planning authority may properly seek to secure to 
the development that is the subject of the planning 
application - such as changes intended to reduce the scale 
or intensity of the proposed development, or to improve its 
layout or its impact on the local environment. " 
This really amounted to a denial of the RTPI and other 
professional bodies' view of planning and a reassertion of the views 
expressed in somewhat vaguer terms in the PAG Report, under the 
guise of a 'neutral' definition which purports to treat planning gain in 
a non-judgemental way. 
'Planning Gain' occurs when, in connection with the 
obtaining of planning permission, a developer offers, agrees 
or is obliged to incur some expenditure, surrender some 
right or concede some other benefit which could not, or 
arguably could not, be embodied in a valid planning 
condition. "18 
This definition views the proper exercise of planning powers as being 
reflected in the courts' approach to what amounts to a valid planning 
condition. 19 This severely limits the role of planning beyond that 
anticipated by the post 1947 Acts as the attitude of the courts has 
18 Property Advisory Group A Submission to the Department of 
the Environment on "Planning Gain " 1981, London: HMSO. 
19 This approach is not novel. See, eg., Ratcliffe, J. "Planning 
Gain is Not the Answer" (1974) Built Environment 148. 
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been to restrict20 the type of conditions which may be imposed to 
those which 'fairly and reasonably relate' to the development. 
The planning authority are not at liberty to use their 
powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object 
may seem to them to be in the public interest. "21 
Taking this approach the attainment of planning gains becomes an 
ulterior purpose, rather than a legitimate planning concern. 
Bargaining in the field of statutory controls is inherently 
objectionable. Development control is a regulatory function- 
and it is no more than that - the powers available to a 
local planning authority being, like it or not, negative in 
nature. The system was not designed for, nor is it suitable 
for achieving the ulterior object of sharing out development 
profits in land. "22 
This rational-legal approach of the courts, taken up by many lawyers 
writing in the field of planning, has been examined in detail 
elsewhere23 and it clearly represents only one particular view of the 
role of planning. 24 
In submitting his report to the Minister for Local Government 
and Environmental Services in July 1981, the Chairman of the PAG, Sir 
20 See the landmark cases of Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham-by-the- 
Sea UDC [1964] 1 All ER 1; Rv Hillingdon LBC ex Darte Rovco Homes 
Ltd [1974] 1 QB 720; Newbury DC v SSE [1980] 1 All ER 731. 
21 Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v Minister of Housing and Local 
Government [1958] 1 QB 554 per Lord Denning MR at 572. 
22 Heap & Ward (1980) op. cit. supra note 2 at 637. 
23 See eg., McAuslan P. The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980, 
Oxford: Pergamon Press, Urban & Regional Planning Series, Volume 22, 
and Loughlin, M. "The Scope and Importance of `material 
considerations'" (1980) 3 Urban Law and Policy 171. 
24 McAuslan (1980) cited ibid. recognises this narrow approach 
as indicative of the courts' concern with protecting private property 
rights from interference by the state which runs counter to the 
increase in widely-drawn legislation to assist a managerial form of 
government. See chapters 6&9. A similar argument appears in Jowell 
(1977) op. cit. supra note 1. 
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Jack W. Hughes made this view of planning explicit when he described 
planning gain as `arrangements whereby local authorities in granting 
planning permission achieve planning or other community gains at the 
expense of the developers' and concluded that, except in certain 
limited circumstances, planning gain had no part to play in the system 
of planning control. His views were not shared by any of the 
professional bodies consulted, who found not only the approach but 
also the proposed controls unsuitable and inadequate. 
... it seems untimely, especially when the Government policy 
to reduce local authorities' capital expenditure, to propose 
that local authorities should not negotiate in cases where it 
would be reasonable for the developer to make capital and 
other contributions to facilitate development. The 
consequence of such a decision would be to discourage 
development at a time when there is a general acceptance 
of the need to stimulate it. Although attitudes of developers 
to the practice of seeking planning gain vary widely there 
are many who accept the principle and are willing to 
provide gains if they are seen to be related to the 
development and negotiated in a reasonable way ... The problem thus appears to be one of deciding what is 
reasonable in all the circumstances ... We do not think that the brief guidelines in paragraph 9.01 of the PAG Report 
will be adequate for this purpose. "25 
Revising the definition of planning gain on the lines suggested by 
RTPI was advanced by all of the professional bodies, as was the 
adoption or incorporation of the RTPI Memorandum and Code of 
Practice produced by their Planning Gain Guidelines Working Party. 
This working party was composed of RTPI members with architectural, 
surveying and legal backgrounds plus two members of RIBA. Early in 
1983 the Code of Practice, slightly amended, was adopted, after several 
lively debates and with collaboration from the LBA and the 
0 RICS submission on the PAG Report dated 10 February 1982. 
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professional bodies, as RTPI policy in the form of a Practice Advice 
Note. 
The circular definition attempts to deal with the issues raised by 
the RTPI by recognising that the method of achieving gains should not 
be confused with the concept of planning gain and thus does not 
relate it to the issue of what amounts to a valid condition. Yet it 
immediately falls into the trap of restricting the valid use of planning 
powers to 'changes intended to reduce the scale or intensity of the 
proposed development, or to improve its layout or its impact on the 
local environment. ' This was added to the original draft circular 
distributed for consultation. The other change made was to omit the 
word 'positive' from the type of obligation which the authority seeks 
to impose and to add the word 'extraneous' to the types of rights or 
benefits conferred. The potential effect of this latter addition could 
be severely limited by a narrow interpretation of the final sentence. 
The overall effect of this definition seems to be potentially to 
address the circular to almost all requirements or obligations on the 
developer made in connection with the grant of planning permission 
even if the application as submitted is deficient in a material way if 
compared with the objectives set out in a development plan or other 
published policy. It is ambiguous in that elsewhere in the circular 
there is an acceptance of the principle that applications should be 
considered on their merits and in the light of a development plan and 
other material considerations. 
By looking at each of these definitions in turn a number of 
unacknowledged assumptions can be recognised. First, there is the 
assumption that local authority action must be restricted and defined 
by mechanisms other than the operation of the market: that they 
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perform only a limited function within government and those limits 
should be prescribed. Secondly, many of the definitions assume that 
the law has a part to play in determining what amounts to planning 
considerations. This is allied with the problem of having no definition 
of the scope of planning itself, thus it becomes the role of the law to 
determine not only questions relating to limitation of powers, but also 
as to the reasonableness of planning considerations. Thirdly, there is 
an assumption that there is overall benefit to some party (the 
community) and loss to another (the developer) by planning authorities 
operating a policy of planning gain. Inherent in this is the further 
assumption that there is a community whom the local planning 
authority or its officers can identify and whose shared interests they 
can represent. 
All of these assumptions recur in similar form in other areas of 
planning law and public law generally. They are symptomatic of the 
problems inherent in a system which allows for the substitution of 
discretion exercised by an elected body with that of the judiciary in 
the determination of questions which involve the distribution of 
resources. Whether the decision is made by the local authority or by 
the judiciary it is still a political question determinable not through 
the simple application of a set of rules but through the interpretation 
of such terms as 'reasonable', 'proper (planning) considerations' and 
`public interest'. Any definition will then necessarily involve a 
standpoint on these interpretations and cannot be apolitical or neutral. 
Without some recognition of the position of planning and 
local 
government within the structure and within the political, 
economic 
system any given definition will merely reflect a view 
of the 
distribution of power. 
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Martin Loughlin26 has made the most developed attempt to define 
planning gain by stating the definition and discussing each element 
seriatim. The result Is still not acceptable because the process of 
forming this definition is wholly dependant upon unacknowledged 
assumptions of a practice which is undeniably political and value- 
laden. His definition does not refer to 'community benefit' ( but does 
refer to 'material benefit' without identifying the intended beneficiary) 
but still suggests that the process is detrimental to the developer and 
falls outside of the scope of local government and normal planning 
practice in which the law has a valid role to play. 
planning gain is the achievement of a material benefit or 
advantage by the local authority, which may be ultra vires 
if achieved by imposing a condition on a grant of planning 
permission, but which is nevertheless provided by the 
developer, although not commercially advantageous, in the 
expectation that the planning application will, as a result, 
receive more favourable treatment ". 27 
Certainly as far as the practice in Tower Hamlets is concerned 
much of this definition is superfluous and a statement to the effect 
that the object of the process is to secure a balanced mix of uses 
would probably be included. The method of enforcing that gain would 
not be included in the definition itself and the overall impression 
would be of allowing permission to develop only where the planning 
objectives for an area were achieved. As a suggestion 
planning gain is the achievement of a balanced mix of uses 
in accordance with published planning policies through the 
provision of such a mix by a developer in anticipation of a 
grant of consent. " 
26 Loughlin, M. "Planning Gain: Law, Policy and Practice" (1981) 
1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 61/97. 
27 ibid. p. 61. 
53 
The political platform upon which this is based may be to provide the 
'community' with some 'benefit' in return for the benefit of consent 
given to the developer, but its administration is based upon the aim of 
realising that objective through the exercise of proper planning 
criteria. Another successful London borough operating a policy of 
planning gain, the City of Westminster, has quite different political 
affiliations but used it to allow developers to obtain their consents in 
the most efficient manner. Consequently, what was achieved was 
essentially the same mixture of uses but the motivation was different. 
The definition would hold in both instances, but it ascribes a role to 
planning authorities which the courts and central government would 
not espouse, as it limits their scope to intervene in pursuit of their 
own (political) objectives. 
Any definition of planning gain will, therefore, represent the 
interests of the group or individual asserting it. The aim in the 
following chapters of this thesis is not to produce a universal 
definition of planning gain, but to present a view of how the practice 
operates in reality whilst taking account of the competing Ideologies 
acting upon it. The central concern is not the lawfulness of the 
practice of planning gain but its legitimacy in the socio-political 
context in which it occurs. That context necessarily involves a 
consideration of the nature of the social system and the existence of 
power within it. By `power' is meant not simply the formal 
relationships which bestow little autonomy on the Iocal authority, but 
includes the mechanisms created within broad areas of policy-making 
which facilitate the growth of alternative power structures. 
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To explain this more clearly it is necessary to make reference to 
two opposing views of analysing power which are explored more fully 
in the following chapters. In the first view, power is a right which is 
given up by the population of the state to a sovereign body, and the 
sovereign body, in accordance with this social contract, exercises that 
power in the interests of the state within limits imposed to as to 
avoid oppression. In classical theory this is checked by the courts. 
In the second view, the exercise of power does not stem from 
Contractual obligations but from struggle: power is exercised on the 
basis of an historically determined structure which resulted from 
struggle between different interests. It continues to be exercised 
within that framework, but also in accordance with the result of 
continual struggle to uphold and perpetuate existing inequalities. 
distributions, language and so. 
Limitations are imposed under this latter model through formal 
rules. but also through mechanisms which arise out of necessity to 
reproduce the formal divisions of power. According to Foucaults, the 
superstructure of power constantly requires the production and 
circulation of 'discourses of truth' so as to allow society to function 
along the lines intended by the superstructure. Power institutionalise 
and professionaiises this process so that Its exercise will reproduce the 
status Quo. On this analysis the exercise of power is not an abuse of 
the system but a result of it and supportive to it. Thus what is 
interesting is not to assess whether any exercise of power is lawful 
but to examine the occasions where it steps outside of the formal 
See especially 'Two Lectures'IN: Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other writings 1972-1977. ed. Colin Gordon, 
1980, New York: Pantheon. He uses this approach In examining 
historically sexuality, the growth of prisons and mental asylums. 
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rules, develops its own techniques and professionalism, but continues 
within the confines of the superstructure perpetuating the same 
relationships and distributions. It follows from this that whatever 
definition is ascribed to the practice of planning gain, the purpose for 
which that definition is made, the context in which it is advanced, 
and the standpoint of the protagonist are as relevant as the words 
themseif. 
Added to this are the problems of language which any definition 
must encapsulate. Many of the terms used within the fields of law, 
politics, planning, social policy are capable of several meanings. Thus 
the form of the definition is complicated in that its use by persons 
coming from different standpoints may interpret it in different ways. 
While it is possible to assert that some words do have a definitive 
meaning this assertion cannot be maintained with respect to such 
examples as 'reasonable', 'planning', 'planning purpose' and 'lawful'. 
Any definition, therefore, should be approached not as an embodiment 
of neutrality, but as a prompt to explore whose interests are being 
denied by its formulation. 
The following part of this thesis explores the contextual concerns 
surrounding planning gain and includes a discussion of power 
relationships generally and in the specific area of negotiation in 
planning. The formal structures through which the product of those 
negotiations may be implemented, and the reactions by lawyers and 
planners to those structures, are also examined. 
PART II: THE GENERAL PART 
CHAPTER 3: THE WIDER CONTEXT OF PLANNING LAW: ISSUES IN THEORY 
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At the heart of the Rule of Law lies a distinction between the 
public and private spheres of life' and between law and politics2 
which a number of writers on public law3 and legal theory doubt still 
exist. Certainly studies made on the distinction between private law 
and public Iaw4 have affirmed that the division is not well-defined; 
that the public sphere does not operate on democratic principles alone 
but is influenced by the traditional domain of private law, that is the 
market. The assumptions of a separation between the realms of the 
law, the executive and parliament and the effective role of each have 
been brought into question as the machinery of government has 
expanded in size and into areas traditionally considered private. 
In the modern world the social and political realms are 
much less distinct... The functionalization (of politics) makes 
it impossible to perceive any serious gulf between the two 
realms; and this is not a matter of a theory or an ideology, 
since with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the 
'household' or of economic activities to the public realm, 
housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the 
private sphere of the family have become a 'collective' 
concern. In the modern world the two realms indeed 
constantly flow into each other like the waves in the never- 
resting stream of the life process itself. "5 
I See Austin, R. "The Problem of Legitimacy in the Welfare 
State " (1982) Pennsylvania Law Review 130 pp. 1510-1517. 
2 See Dicey, A. V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 1885. London: Macmillan. 
3 See for example K. C. Davies Administrative Law Text 1958, 
especially pages 1-43. 
4 See Atiyah, P. S. The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of 
Contract. 1979 Oxford: Clarendon Press; Also Thompson, E. P. Whigs 
and Hunters 1977 and Hay, D. et. al. Albions Fatal Tree 1977 both 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, show how legislation was used in the 18th 
Century to alter the basis of property relations and the social framework. 
5 Arendt, H. The Human Condition, 1958. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, cited by J. Habermas " Hannah Arendt's Communications 
Concept of Power " IN: Lukes, S. (ed. ) Power, 1986, at 75/93. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
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The well-documented growth of 'the state' in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries produced a myriad of government departments, 
local authorities, tribunals, corporations, governmental and non- 
governmental agencies. Powers of ministers Increased and there 
appeared a growth in negotiation between departments and their client 
groups to strike mutually beneficial bargains. 6 Alongside this was a 
change in the form of much public legislation so as to lay down broad 
guidelines and delegate powers rather than to impose specific rules. 
The Franks Committee7 reported in 1957 that there was a lack of 
safeguards in the exercise of administrative power and that 'openness, 
fairness and impartiality' were attributes no longer encouraged. 
This same report did go on to treat policy as distinct from its 
implementation and its effect and maintained the idea of tribunals as 
impartial adjudicators reviewing questions which could be divorced 
from the political choice they in fact represented. This insistence on 
reinforcing the theoretical divisions under the Rule of Law is normal 
as the State is still viewed as operating under the beliefs of 
nineteenth century liberalism. Controls on the system, under this 
analysis, exist in the election of representatives to parliament, which 
is the body responsible for the formulation of policy, and in the court 
system. 
Taking each of these bodies in turn it is possible to demonstrate 
that the system of control is no longer directed towards legitimating 
a Barker, A. (ed) Quangos in Britain. 1982, London: Macmillan. 
Report on Administative Tribunals and Enquiries. 1957 Cmnd. 218 
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the exercise of administrative power. 8 The developments in 
government outlined above have revealed the fallacies in the system as 
described in the Rule of Law so as to produce a discordance between 
the exercise of power and the system intended to control it. 
One of the least important parts of the British 
political system is the chamber of the House of 
Commons, and it is in very real danger of 
becoming an irrelevance. "9 
PARLIAMENT 
Under nineteenth century liberalism it is assumed that parliament 
is at the top of a hierarchical government; it is the body responsible 
for formulating policies as goals and those policies result from 
meaningful debate open to public scrutiny in which the views of the 
opposition are heard. The members elected to the House are there to 
represent the interests of the state rather than those of the individual 
electors1° (although they may overlap) and thus constitute an impartial 
body distinct from the executive. ' 
8 See Bagehot, W. The English Constitution, 1963. London: Fontana. 
9 Marsh, R. Off the Rails, 1978 cited by Harlow, C. "Power 
From the People ? Representation and Constitutional Theory " IN: 
McAuslan, P. and McEldowney, J. F. Law, Legitimacy and the 
Constitution, 1985. London: Sweet & Maxwell. Modern Legal Studies 
Series, at p. 78. 
10 There has been a lengthy debate on this point which is 
summarised by C. Harlow in " Power from the People ? Representation 
and Constitutional Theory " IN: McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. 
cited ibid. pp. 62-81. 
11. This view was expressed by Lord Diplock in relation to local 
government in Bromley Borough Council v GLC [1982] 2 WLR 62 at 107 
"a council member once elected is not the delegate of those who voted 
in his favour only: he is the representative of all electors. " 
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Habermas12 among others has recognised that changes in the 
mechanisms of politics has taken away this controlling function. 13 
What he is referring to is the much discussed rise of corporatism14 
together with concentration of responsibility for policy formation in 
the hands of a few. The latter has been chronicled by Ashford 15 who 
concluded that this power was concentrated in a consensus elite of so 
few ministers and senior civil servants that policy formulation is 
devoid of both accountability and critical input. Under Thatcherism the 
numbers with such responsibity have if anything contracted as her 
power has increased. 16 By comparison, the departments of state have 
progressively grown17 as too has the importance of party politics and 
the party whips. 
The other half of the picture is the post-war increased 
involvement in policy issues of bodies who are participants in the 
market. The government itself is such a body1s and has involved 
quasi-autonomous governmental and non-governmental agencies (Quagos 
12 Habermas, J. "The Public Sphere - An Encyclopedia Article" 
(1974) 1 New German Critique 49-55. 
13 That is not to say that parliament ever operated in more 
than a limited way as a control on administrative power. See Lewis, N. 
& Harden, J. The Rule of Law and the British Constitution, 1986. 
London: Hutchinson. 
14 Lewis, N. and Wiles, P. "The Post-Corporatist State? " (1984) 
11 Journal of Law & Society. 
15 Policy and Politics in Britain: The Limits of Consensus, 1981. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
1° See Harlow, C. op. cit. supra note 10 
17 Benn, A. "Manifesto and Mandarins" IN: Policy and Practice: 
the Experience of Government, 1980. London: Royal Institute of Public 
Administration. 
18 See Jessop, B. The Capitalist State, 1982. Oxford: Martin 
Robertson. 
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and Quangos) in secretive negotiations to deliver policies to the 
members of those agencies and others having relationships with those 
agencies. This process is based on bargaining and the agencies 
themselves, such as nationalised industries and the Trades Union 
Congress, have significant power within the market with which to 
negotiate. Quangos also usually have no rule-making procedures, no 
grievance procedures and no independant appeal structure against 
decisions they make19 all of which goes to confirm the lack of 
accountability. 
It has been acknowledged, at least in the field of political 
science, that these 'networks of conviviality'20 do play a role in 
government and although the influence of the Trades Union Congress 
and a number of other powerful consultative agencies has declined, 
their position has been filled by others which have continued to exist 
or by those which have recently appeared. 21 Parliament therefore 
continues to play a peripheral role in policy formulation and the 
legislation it produces has bestowed wide discretion on all levels of 
the bureaucracy. 22 
This 'corporatism' can be described as a form of government in 
which the state is not endeavouring to expropriate the private sector, 
nor to impose a collection of narrowly defined procedural rules in the 
form of legislation on its operation. The state is rather seeking to 
19 Lewis, N. "Who Controls Quangos and the Nationalised 
Industries? " IN: Jowell, J. (ed) The Changing Constitution, 1985. 
London: OUP. 
20 Lewis & Harden (1986) op. cit. supra note 13 
21 Lewis & Wiles (1984) op. cit. supra note 14 
22 This Is evident in the history of the Planning Acts, discussed 
below in chapter 4. 
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'work with' the private sector to enable it to evolve policies which 
are responsive to this flexible and pragmatic relationship. 23 The state 
can retain the flexibility to do this by enacting general enabling 
legislation rather than legislation which aims to guarantee individual 
rights. 24 This has been perceived as a necessary result of government 
through corporatism. 
It seems fairly obvious that where government merely 
imposes procedural rules, as in the classic case of 
nineteenth century parliamentary democracy, an explanation 
of those rules, comprehensible to the informed public, is 
generally perceived as necessary. Where the various 
agencies of government `work with' their private sector 
counterparts, by contrast, the understandings and practices 
which develop within each particular field of policy tend to 
become tacit rather than explicit, and the purpose served by 
governmental involvement tends increasingly to be seen as a 
technical and professional matter, rather than as a matter 
of legitimate public and political scrutiny. "25 
This pattern may be changing as a result of Thatcher's declared 
centralist ambitions, 2 evidenced by a concerted move to restrict local 
authority spending since 1979 and to give Secretaries of State broad 
powers of intervention, 27 but the enabling legislation remains. 
Moreover this move further restricts the power of parliament by 
23 See Harrison, R. J. Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political 
Evolution of Modern Democracies, 1980 and Winkler, J. "Corporatism" 
(1976) 19 European Journal of Sociology pp. 100-136. 
24 Pahl, R. and Winkler, J. T. "Corporatism in Britain: Why 
Protecting Industry Need Not Mean More Bureaucracy" (1976) The 
Times, March 26, p. 7; Winkler, J. T. "Law, State and Economy: The 
Industry Act 1975 In Context" (1976) British Journal of Law and 
Society 103. 
25 Reade, E. J. "Section 52 and Corporatism in Planning" (1982) 
JPL pp. 8-16. 
26 See Loughlin, M. Local Government and the Modern State, 
1986 London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series. 
27 Loughlin, M. Half a Century of Municipal Decline 1935-1985, 
1985. London: Allen & Unwin. 
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continuing to concentrate policy decisions in the hands of a consensual 
elite. 28 
There are however major definitional problems in much of the 
work by lawyers which relies upon a model of corporatism in 
government. The word involves a denial of conflict which is not 
necessarily supported in the political science literature. Corporatism is 
not another word to describe power bargaining but includes within it 
an element of class harmony. Schmitter, in his history of 
corporatism29 explains that it arose as a reaction to the competition 
and individualism inherent within the development of capitalism. It is 
this individualism which Thatcher has claimed to return to. 
Consultation with labour and with capital was Intended to identify the 
underlying common interest of both groups so as to produce 
government by consensus (this does not exclude disagreements but does 
require fundamental agreement on ultimate goals) rather than through 
conflict (where the most powerful group or groups prevail) or through 
rationally and objectively weighing competing interests. 
Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified into 
one body, forming one corpus, hence the word corporatism. 
These elements are united because they are reciprocally 
interdependant, each performs tasks which the other 
requires. "30 
28 What this means is that the formulation of policy is seen to 
be moved down the hierarchy to the level of individual ministers. 
This is not contrary to the rule of law in itself nor does it offend the 
dirigiste organisational model discussed below, but it does add to the 
problem of control. On another level it enforces a bargaining model 
of organisations because in reality the minister uses these powers as a 
tool to negotiate with bodies coming under his department. 
29 Schmitter, P. C. "Still the Century of Corporatism? " (1974) 36 
Review of Politics, 85-131. 
30 Pahl, R. E. and Winkler, J. D. "Corporatism in Britain" (1976) 
The Times, 26 March, p. 7. 
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He goes on to identify a crucial distinction in how that 
consensus is achieved : under 'state corporatism' the state is active in 
establishing the unity and stands above the agencies representing the 
various economic interests ; with 'liberal corporatism' however the 
agencies are autonomous and co-operate because of the mutual inter- 
dependence between them and the state. It is this latter type which 
identifies most closely with tripartism, where the government, the TUC 
and the CBI are viewed as mutually responsible for policy formulation. 
There is an assumption within this that the 3 elements are equally 
powerful in instituting changes in policy and can influence their 
respective electorate. 
Studies made of this tripartite arrangement, 31 however, have 
concluded that the relationship is not one of consensus and that the 
degree of power to effect change has not been consistent or equal. It 
is true that these same studies show an influence over policy by these 
and other agencies but an equality of power and agreement on long- 
term goals is absent. 
If we accept that there is a close identity between 
tripartism and liberal corporatism our evidence seems to 
throw considerable doubt on the idea that Britain is, or in 
future will develop into, a liberal corporate state ... However this does not mean that Britain approximates to a 
system of state corporatism. Indeed we have shown that 
the government's decisions are influenced by the CBI and 
the TUC. In addition the government's autonomy is 
constrained by other British interests, notably the City and 
by actors external to the system. "32 
31 See for example the work of Marsh, D. and Grant, W. which 
includes "Tripartism: Reality or Myth ?" (1977) 12 Government and 
Opposition, 194-211 and "The Politics of the CBI: 1974 and After" 
(1975) 10 Government and Opposition 90-104. 
32 Grant and Marsh (1977) ibid. p. 211. 
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Ultimately the government has responsibility and is the element which 
remains accountable to the wider electorate in that re-election is at 
stake. Also there are clearly many factors affecting economic policy 
not least of which include international finance and party ideology. 33 
It is important therefore not to consider corporatism as a phenomenom 
to explain changes in government so as to give inadequate 
consideration to the broader social and economic context. 
The most relevant development here is the increasing role of the 
state in the management of economic and social conditions which has 
been taking place since the First World War. This has necessarily 
involved the participation in decision making of the major functional 
agencies (which grew as a response to the increased intervention) in 
those spheres, further smudging the standard divisions of politics, 
economics and society. As the state required a greater degree of 
GoC rut 
professional advice in order to maintainLthe market economy's less 
powerful groups, that is those which did not represent major economic 
interests, became marginalised and those with economic power became 
formalised. 
What a description of this does not determine is the form of that 
participation or the distribution of power within it. There has been a 
long standing debate within political science on the distribution of 
power within 'liberal democracies'. The choice mooted is between a 
pluralist model in which many interest groups compete and an elitist 
model in which an elite or a number of elite groups hold the bulk of 
power. As a variant on the latter is the idea that pluralist methods 
33 Although it should be acknowledged that some writers have 
shown that party ideologies have tended to converge making this a 
less significant influence. 
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are used to conceal control by an elite, the most clearly empirically 
explained method of this appears in the literature on committees which 
suggests that manipulation of agendas can remove decisions from the 
public arena. 34 
Cawson35 has suggested that the effect of corporatism has been 
felt in land use planning and the introduction of official levels of 
public participation is a device to legitimate state intervention in that 
area and to encourage public support. In his argument he 
acknowledges the decline in the power of parliament as opposed to the 
increased powers of technocrats employed in local government, but 
goes on to suggest that rational policy-making methodologies laying 
down the form of participation facilitate corporate forms of 
representation. In order to do this legislation is used to bestow 
discretion on the technocrats so that they may respond to official 
participation rather than participation from all sources. 
This is not to say, however, that the process of negotiation at 
all levels of the planning process is a manifestation of corporatism 
even when it is taken as defined by Cawson36 
Corporatism is a politico-economic system in which the state 
directs the activities of predominantly privately-owned 
industry in partnership with the representatives of a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, 
34 See Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. "The Two Faces of Power" 
(1962) 56 American Political Science Review, 947-952 and "Decisions 
and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework"" (1963) 57 American 
Political Science Review, 641-651. Also Lukes, S. Power: A Radical 
View, 1974 London: Macmillan. 
35 Cawson, A. "Environmental Planning and the Politics of 
Corporatism", 1977, Working Papers in Urban and Regional Studies, No. 
7, University of Sussex. 
sa Cawson, A. "Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role of the 
State. " (1978) 13 Government and opposition, 178-198. 
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hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated interest 
groups. " 
Negotiations may take place outside of this system and although 
facilitated by the conditions described as necessary for corporatism to 
develop are conducted in response to economic and social conditions 
and on the basis of power differentials, rather than on underlying 
consensus values. 37 Indeed there has been an increasing amount of 
literature on the decline of corporatism (some question whether it ever 
existed38) and the continued lack of mechanisms to legitimate the 
decisions of public bodies. 39 
THE COURTS 
As far as the courts are concerned, judicial interference with the 
administration is, in the words of Professor de Smith, 'sporadic and 
peripheral'. Where they have interfered their choice has been 
selective and political40 and the strict test introduced in Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation41 has ensured 
that the exercise of discretionary powers will only be reviewed in very 
exceptional circumstances. 42 Where judicial review has taken place 
37 This point is taken up below, see Section 3. 
38 See Marsh & Grant op. cit. 
89 See for example the discussion in Lewis, N. and Wiles, P 
The Post-Corporatist State? " (1984) 11 J. of Law & Society 65-90. 
40 See Davis, K. C. (1958) op. cit. supra note 3. 
41 [1948] 1 KB 223 
42 This approach was affirmed in Bromley London Borough 
Council v Greater London Council [1982] 1 all ER 129. 
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the Divisional Court has preserved the distinction between law and 
politics, while delivering judgments which have been analysed as 
protecting property interests. 43 
This approach by the courts can be explained in terms of law as 
ideology, in that by agreeing to interfere in only limited circumstances 
and in refusing to act in others they are enforcing the belief that 
politics and law can be distinguished and treated separately. As E. P. 
Thompson points out, for law to be successful as an ideology it must 
appear as fair and indeed independant. 44 If the courts were to 
subject the administration to regular review the ideology could be lost. 
This was presented by Douglas Hay as an explanation for the 
continued introduction in the 18th century of penal legislation 
imposing the death penalty for property offences even though the 
courts rarely made use of that sentence. 
An ideology endures by not being wholly enforced and 
rigidly defined. Its effectiveness lies first in its elasticity, 
the fact that men are not required to make it a credo, that 
it seems to them a product of their own minds and their 
own experience-The second strength of an ideology is its 
generality. Provided its depths are not explored too often 
or by too many, it remains a reservoir of belief throughout 
society. "45 
Through concepts of majesty, mercy and justice the courts were able 
to enforce the authority of the ruling order by seeming to stand apart 
from it. 
The punctilious attention to forms, the dispassionate and 
legalistic exchanges between counsel and the judge, argued 
43 For example see McAuslan, P. Ideologies of Planning Law, 
1980. London: Pergamon Press. 
µ Whigs and Hunters, 1977. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p. 25. 
45 Hay, D. (ed. ) Albion's Fatal Tree, 1977. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. p. 55. 
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that those administering and using the laws submitted to its 
rules. The law thereby became something more than the 
creature of a ruling class - it became a power with its own 
claims, higher than those of prosecutor, lawyers, and even 
the great scarlet-robed assize judge himself. To them, too, 
of course, the law was The Law. The fact that they reified 
it, that they shut their eyes to its daily enactment in 
Parliament by men of their own class, heightened the 
illusion. When the ruling class acquitted men on 
technicalities they helped instil a belief in the disembodied 
justice of the law in the minds of all who watched. In 
short, its very inefficiency, its absurd formalism, was part 
of its strength as ideology. "'a 
So by refusing to deal with the politics of a decision the 
integrity of a system based on the separation of powers is preserved 
and the gap between the process of law and control of that process 
continues to be concealed. At the same time the ad hoc approach to 
review of the exercise of discretion which results while helping to 
conceal the values behind that exercise (if the courts were to explain 
general principles on the exercise of discretion the values would be 
difficult to obscure) amounts to a denial of the hortatory function 
behind the rule of law. 47 This denial however is a mundane 
occurence: as Atiyah explains there is an established move towards 
pragmatism and away from principle by the courts exercising their own 
discretion on the basis of the circumstances of the individual case, 
rather than in accordance with principle. 
My argument here is that law, in its reluctance to interfere in 
the making of administrative decisions, is performing an essential 
function at two levels. One is in terms of the symbolic effect of 
their inaction and the second is the internal logic it precipitates. It 
performs a function within the social order as impartial adjudicator 
46 ibid. P. 33. 
47 Atiyah, P. S. From Principle to Pragmatism, 1978. Oxford: OUP. 
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and at the same time reasserts the validity of that order by 
symbolically affirming it. 'e 
PARALLELS IN ORGANISATION THEORY49 
The conflicting pictures of democracy discussed above can be 
analysed through useful models familiar to organisational theory but 
generally unknown in legal literature. They have occasionally been 
used to clarify the apparently competing features of a system 
operating on the basis of rationality and accountability and one on the 
basis of bargaining. However, the majority of studies in this area 
have neglected to acknowledge the existence of power bargaining and 
those that have failed to go on to explore prescriptions. The 
usefulness of these theories is, therefore, essentially descriptive but 
also instructive as to the mismatch between reality and the traditional 
control mechanisms. 
Under the Dirigiste paradigm (based on classical organisation 
theory) as with the Rule of law, it is assumed that rationality is not 
only desireable but can be achieved through a hierarchical system of 
organisation. That hierarchy contains clearly separate divisions with 
policies as goals of the organisation decided upon by the top level for 
the good of the organisation. They have the authority to make policy 
48 Why the law should act in this way is discussed in Kairys, D. 
The Politics of Law, 1983. Pantheon Books. 
49 This section draws heavily upon the various works of 
McMahon, L., Barrett, S. and Hill, M. especially Barrett, S. and Fudge, 
C. (eds) Policy and Action, 1981 London: Methuen; McMahon, L. 
Paradigms within Policy Analysis, 1981 Bristol SAUS unpublished paper; 
McMahon, L., Barrett, S. and Hill, M. "Power Bargaining Models in 
Policy Analysis ... What Prescriptions for Practitioners ?" 
(1983) Public 
Administration Bulletin No. 43, Prescriptives on Policy Analysis. 
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and to pass it to the next level for its administration. This level is 
itself divided as a pyramid of responsibility concentrating discretion in 
a small number at its peak and leaving a large number simply to apply 
rules and procedures at its base. As a policy passes from the apex to 
the base it is converted into a system of rules which require no 
discretion and can be mechanistically applied without personal interest 
or political motivation by the personnel. These are the Weberian 
ideal-type bureaucrats, administering the system `without hatred, 
passion, affection or enthusiasm'. Included in the organisation are 
mechanisms to ensure objectivity by detecting and preventing any 
biases. 
Much of this is familiar to the above discussion. The process of 
law-making is regarded as something distinct from its implementation 
and it is assumed that laws are the product of rationality : problems 
are simply identified, alternatives for remedying them are considered 
and the best solution is adopted and becomes law. There is relatively 
little literature which points out that the identification of a state of 
affairs as 'a problem' and the use of law to address it is in itself a 
political act. The problem will usually have many causes and to remove 
them could be impractical, politically undesireable or too fundamental 
to the existing system of government. So the choice of passing a law 
may represent the cheapest, most politically acceptable, least 
disruptive action rather than the best in terms of remedying the 
problem. 50 Moreover the choice in formulating the law in a particular 
50 See Bankowski, Z. and Mungham, G. Images of Law, 1976 for 
a criticism of lawyers and their tendancy to define problems too 
narrowly and Twining, W. and Meirs, D. How To Do Things With Rules, 
2nd ed. 1982. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson for a discussion of the 
use and formulation of rules generally. 
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way, for example as a narrow rule or as a principle, may also be made 
for reasons other than for 'the good of society' or for maximum 
effect. 
The reduction of policies and the application of rules assumed 
under this paradigm has long been questioned by legal theory and has 
been clearly articulated by the realist movement in jurisprudence. The 
discussion on the need to interpret rules and the impossibility of 
reducing policy to a mechanistic exercise is now well-developed and 
will not be reassessed here. 51 This debate however has not meant 
that the division between the political nature of policy formation and 
the objective nature of implementation to achieve defined goals and 
rationality52 has been effectively eroded. 
An alternative paradigm is that of organisations operated through 
power bargaining. This paradigm regards it as a necessity to 
acknowledge the existence of power and conflict within the 
organisation so as to understand and resolve problems that occur. It 
draws upon the empirical studies done in the fields of political science 
and sociology which show that policy implementation and formulation 
are highly political exercises. 53 In doing this there is a recognition 
of the conflicts, coalitions, bargaining and compromises which are 
51 See Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, 1961. Oxford: OUP; 
Gottlieb, G. The Logic of Choice, 1968. London: Allen & Unwin; 
Llewellyn, K. The Common Law Tradition 1960 New York: Little, Brown. 
52 This distinction is made by Weber in "Politics as a Vocation" 
reproduced in Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W. (eds) From Max Weber, 1948 
London: RKP. No discussion of Weber's work is included here, suffice 
it say that he does go on to recognise the problems inherent in such 
a distinction. 
53 See for example Rex, J. Social Conflict, 1981. New York: 
Longman; Vickers, G., Value Systems and the Social Process, 1970. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. Other references appear in Barrett & Fudge 
(ed. ) Policy and Action, 1981. London: Methuen. 
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bound to exist and the formulation and implementation of policy are 
seen as one reactive process rather than two separate ones. M So in 
this case the individuals wanting a policy to be put into effect and 
those who actually implement it are 'almost Hobbesian' in their pursuit 
of self interest55 and it is the distribution of power, both formal and 
informal, which determines the outcome. Informal distributions of 
power arise from groupings and allegiances within the organisation 
which may vary as formal positions are taken over by different 
personnel, and as conditions inside and outside the organisation 
change. 
... no matter how permanent organisational structures may 
appear, they are dynamic ideofacts rather than static 
artefacts, and as such are constantly being modified and 
adjusted through the bargaining process. "56 
According to the latter model policy does not come from above 
but is a product of negotiation and may represent the interests of any 
individual or group of individuals who possess sufficient power to 
prevail over the others. Administrators are not passive creatures 
without political motivation or personal interests, but are actively 
pursuing their own goals. It may be that these goals are given the 
same name as those espoused by those who made the policy, but their 
54 See Barrett and Fudge (1981) ibid. p. 25 which states the view 
that policy making and implementation is "an interactive and 
negotiative process ... taking place over time, 
between those seeking 
to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends". 
ss This self-interest may be the product of socialisation, as 
explained by McMahon et. al. "Power Bargaining Models in Policy 
Analysis ... What Prescriptions for Practitioners 
" (1983) Public 
Administration Bulletin No. 43, Perspectives on Policy Analysis. p. 54. I 
would add that socialisation here must be read in its widest sense to 
Include the expectations of one's profession, the influence of persons 
with whom one regularly Interacts and the perception of self. 
56 McMahon et. al. (1983) op. cit. supra note 40, p55. 
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interpretation of those goals may be significantly different. Thus 
there is the recognition of power and politics at all levels. 
Rationality, access to information and the arrangement of that 
information become bargaining tools and tactics which may be used 
legitimately within the process of conflict. 
Clearly these two organisational models would experience 
problems in implementation of policies for different reasons. Under 
the dirigiste model lack of communication down the hierarchy, 
unforeseen effects on implementation or breakdown in the 
implementation process could possibly be remedied by improving 
communications, research, the organisational structure itself. 
Requiring the personnel to adhere to strict rules or guidelines could 
also be helpful. These measures however would make no sense if the 
organisation were infact based upon the power bargaining model, where 
problems are likely to result from the distribution of power and 
conflicts in the values, interests and goals of the participants. 57 
Studies on policy analysis which have revealed as a problem the 
perceived imbalance between what ought to be (the dirigiste model) 
and what is (the power bargaining model) have not produced any 
suggestions on how to remedy it beyond falling back on managerial 
controls. There are other studies which have pointed out the 
imbalance but see it as a necessary (and possibly desireable) product 
of economic developments in society. 58 This approach has the benefit 
57 The argument that there is an imbalance between reality and 
prescription is succinctly stated by McMahon, L. et. al. (1983) op. cit. 
supra note 40. 
58 See Braybrooke, D. and Lindblom, C. E. A Strategy of 
Decision, 1970. New York: Free Press who identify this as political 
incremental ism 
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of implying that the reality should be overt rather than covert but 
carries with it blanket approval of private government, discretionary 
legislation and lack of political accountability. 59 It also tends to 
assume that the parties active in the process are representative or 
their appearance of being representative is not something which can 
be improved upon. a° All in all it fails to deal with issues raised by 
inequalities of power and in access to that power, 61 on the assertion 
that comparatively this system of government is no worse than the 
alternatives. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In order to assess the possible approaches which can be taken it 
is necessary to clarify what can be expected of law and what law is. 
This entails a reassessment of the rule of law to take into account the 
realities of the law-making process so as to acknowledge the 
inextricable links between law and politics (which in turn necessarily 
Se In Lindblom's analysis he deals with representation as an 
issue within "partisan mutual adjustment" ie. the process of fragmented 
decision making through which the autonomous participants effect each 
other so as to produce policies. He states that the objection to this 
based upon lack of adequate representation of interested parties is not 
persuasive " unless it can be shown that more centralised political 
decision making represents a fuller array of interests and does so 
more consistently with principles of democratic equality. In many 
cases it does not. " "Still Muddling, Not yet Through" (1979) 39 Public 
Administration Review, 517-526. 
00 Lindblom (1979) op. cit. supra note 58. 
61 See Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Theory, 1970. 
Cambridge University Press. 
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includes social and economic conditions62). Until this step is taken 
proposed measures for reform will not address the true nature of 
perceived problems, but will merely deflect attention from the fallacy 
of the rule of law. 
Law is contingent on history and on culture; it is active in 
shaping values as well as reactive to them. Although formal laws and 
institutions (gesellschaft) have been emphasised they do not alone 
explain the function and forms of law. Such a limited view may have 
been appropriate to the nineteenth century but is patently 
inappropriate to modern society. Habermas63 made a valid distinction 
between law as 'medium' (substantive law through which social life is 
regulated so as to produce certain required results in the distribution 
of value in the economy) and law as 'institution' (procedural law 
through which the institutions of the state are arranged and inter- 
related with other public and private entities). The latter has been 
identified64 as the most appropriate to modern states where under 
prevailing economic conditions it is necessary for the state to 
intervene in existing arrangements so as to facilitate efficiency within 
the state and avoid crises in rationalisation and legitimation of public 
power. It would include the redesign of the framework of institutions 
62 This assertion is well-documented but see for example 
Habermas, J. Reason and Rationalisation of Society, 1984, London: 
Heinneman and Weber, M. Economy and Society, 1978. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
03 Reason and Rationalisation in Society ibid. 
64 See for example Teubner, G. "Substantive and Reflexive 
Elements in Modern Law" (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239. 
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so as to encompass self-regulating systems65 which presently are seen 
as falling outside of law because of their 'informal', 'political' or 
'private' nature. 
Tony Prosser has taken this model to suggest changes to the 
theoretical base of public lawaa so as to bring accountability and 
participation back into the arena. He argues that law will only 
provide an adequate `social learning framework' if policy is publicly 
considered and debated in the light of opposing suggestions. The 
reference to social learning67 is also from Habermas who takes the 
view that there is an evolution in the ability to make decisions and to 
cope with social developments, both in terms of conceptual talents and 
institutional framework. Without meaningful participation this evolution 
will not take place. 
It is a question of finding arrangements which can ground 
the presumption that the basic institutions of the society 
and basic political decisions would meet with the unforced 
agreement of all those involved, if they could participate, as 
free and equal, in discursive will-formation. 
Democratization cannot mean an a priori preference for a 
specific type of organisation. "68 
65 In this would be included planning gain as a process 
facilitated by discretionary legislation which diffuses responsibility and 
power throughout the levels of bureaucracy while largely containing 
accountability to a committee system. This point is taken up below in 
chapter 4. 
6e "Towards a Critical Public Law" (1982) 9 Journal of Law & 
Society 1-19. 
57 Other writers including Rousseau and Mill have referred to 
democracy as a learning process. See Pateman, C. Participation and 
Democratic Theory, 1970. Cambridge UP. for a discussion. 
"8 Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 186 1979 
London: Heinneman. Quoted by Prosser, T. " Democratisation, 
Accountability and Institutional Design: Reflections on Public Law " IN: 
McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. pp. 170-190. 
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This post-Marxist approach to the state addresses the issue of 
power at all levels by allowing state action to intercede where 
capitalism leads to conflict. That conflict may be between classes or 
within a class and is the product of a failure in the market to 
recognise legitimate needs. In order to avoid a crisis in legitimation 
(where the state does not have popular support) or in rationality 
(through administrative decisions) the state has to adapt the system 
and this may involve taking action which will not benefit all or part 
of 'the ruling class'. Such adaptations are performed to preserve the 
system of distribution of wealth and to allow the market to continue 
to function. '9 
By recognising that such reorganisation is possible and necessary 
to the existing economic order Habermas acknowledges the scope of 
law as being much broader than legislation, judge-made law and 
existing institutions. He also removes the distinction between law and 
other social sciences while envisaging a system of accountability and 
control of public decision making by creating structures to shape 
social development. 
There are some very clear problems with applying this type of 
analysis, not least the difficulties of implementing a system of 
effective public participation in decision-making when those who are 
in a position to participate are usually a selective group. Research 
done in this area70 highlights this by pointing out that objectors who 
69 For a discussion of how this theory compares with other 
theories on state action in the context of the city see Badcock, B. 
Unfairly Structured Cities, 1984, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
70 See for example, Simmie, J. Power, Property and Corporatism: 
The Political Sociology of Planning, 1981 London: Macmillan, Sociology, 
Politics and Cities Series. He states the characteristics of a group 
which are necessary for it to exert power are (1) formal organisation; 
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voice their opposition to planning applications are small in number, 
usually members of some organised group which has resources and 
access to information, and sufficiently educated, self-confident and 
eloquent to articulate their views. They are also in the large part 
people who are personally affected in some way by the proposals being 
made. Overcoming these obstacles so as to produce a meaningful 
debate seems to be at least beyond the public purse. 
A further difficulty is that changing the institutions responsible 
for monitoring so as to produce a more democratic system could well 
fall into the trap outlined in the section on organisational theory, 
above. That is, changes in the structure are normative, managerial 
measures which will only treat the symptoms rather than the causes. 
The government has progressively interfered with local government 
discretion by taking ad hoc measures to limit their spending power71 
and has exerted other internal controls to reduce autonomy. This has 
been done within the existing structure regardless of declared 
intentions to localise government and legislation which bestows 
discretion. The government has gone so far as to abolish a duly 
elected Council to enforce its political will. 
My point here is that Prosser's suggestion to move towards a 
critical public law based on restructuring institutions and redefining 
(2) command over resources; (3) some Incorporation into the decision 
making process of either central or local government. Other groups 
had little or no influence and sometimes suffered material and 
uncompensated loss. See pp. 300 ff. 
71 See Loughlin, M. "Municipal Socialism in a Unitary State" IN: 
McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) pp. 82-106. 
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law so as to take account of the 'jobs'72 which fall within its range 
but have been consistently denied by replicating a proclaimed 
adherence to the rule of law, is both desirable and inadequate. It 
involves the admission of the political nature of the sytem, but it is 
no guarantee of an improved methodology of control. As with much 
work in this area the presumption underlying it is that the dirigiste 
model and the power bargaining model are parallel forms of 
government. It is thus argued that the reality is kept secret and 
operates at a level below that of legitimate exercise of power and 
what is needed is a new structure tailored to legitimising the reality. 
This view, however, ignores the relationship which exists between 
the two levels. The bargaining level is a product of, and also a 
vehicle of, the level of legitimate power. Power is not something 
which is possessed by individuals or groups but something which 
circulates to be used by those individuals or groups and also to 
produce those same entities. It is not a question of power then being 
wielded by groups against other groups in an underhand way and in a 
way the formal structure disallows. It is rather that the formal 
structure acts as a superstructure within which power is circulated in 
such a way as to reinforce and replicate the superstructure. Changing 
72 Karl Llewellyn has defined the appropriate jobs for law to 
undertake. See Llewellyn, K. "The Normative, the Legal and Law Jobs" 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355. Lewis has summarised this as "a 
series of socially necessary tasks to be performed In any given 
organisational framework. Procedures for the resolution of grievances, 
for planning and monitoring, for describing the legitimate anatomy of 
groups (their constitutions) are necessary conditions of social 
intercourse. " Lewis, N. "Delegislation In Britain in the 1980's" IN: 
McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. 107/127. See also Lewis, N. 
"Towards a Sociology of Lawyering in Public Administration" (1981) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 32 at p. 89; Summers, R. "The 
Technique Element in Law" (1971) 59 California Law Review, 733. 
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the institutions of power will not change its operation into so-called 
'legitimate' power because the ideology, the discourse, will continue. 
Foucault discusses the redundance of analysing the way in which 
power is distributed in the framework of state by the example of 
sovereignty. By looking at the ideology of liberal democracy it would 
seem that power is concentrated at the top and the way in which it 
filters down the sytem has been the subject of minute study. The 
fact that reality bears little relationship to the structure should 
prompt investigation of where the power in reality lies and how it 
continues to operate by producing its own ideology, institutions, 
rationalisations. On this basis Foucault encourages bottom-up analysis 
rather than top-down. 
The system of right, the domain of law, are permanent 
agents of these relations of domination, these polymorphous 
techniques of subjugation. Right should be viewed, I 
believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but 
in terms of the methods of subjugation that it 
instigates. "73 
He goes on to clarify the issues involved in conducting a 
meaningful analysis into this area of conflict, and I will quote him at 
some length so as to cover the methodological precautions he believes 
necessary to show how the whole complex of laws and the institutions 
and apparatus for bringing them into effect mobilises `relations of 
domination'. 
" ... it seemed important to accept that the analysis 
in 
question should not concern itself with the regulated and 
legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with 
the general mechanisms through which they operate, and the 
continuous effect of these. On the contrary it should be 
concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate 
destinations, with those points where power surmounts the 
73 Foucault, M. "Disciplinary Power and Subjection" IN: LUKES, 
S. (ed) Power, 1986. London: Basil Blackwell 229-242 at 232. 
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rules of right which organise and delimit it and extends 
itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes 
embodied in techniques ... In other words, one should 
try to 
locate power at the extreme points of its exercise, where it 
is always less legal in character ... it is a case of studying 
power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is 
completely invested in its real and effective practices. 
What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, 
at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship 
with that which we can provisionally call its object ... 
power, if we do not take too distant a view of it, is not 
that which makes a difference between those who 
exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have 
it and submit to it. Power must be analysed as something 
which circulates ... individuals are the vehicles of power, 
not its point of application ... One needs to 
investigate 
historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how 
mechanisms of power have been able to function ... We need 
to see how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, 
in a precise conjuncture and by means of a certain number 
of transformations, have begun to become economically 
advantageous and politically useful ... power, when it is 
exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but 
evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or 
rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological 
constructs. "74 
Foucault, in stressing the need for analysis at this level, is 
building on the belief that power operates not on one level of right 
and one of obscure shadows, but that both are a part of the system, 
both have their own discourse but they are of a different kind, and 
both represent a type of normality although one is represented as 
`sovereignty' while the other is a `disciplinary power'. The conclusion 
he draws on one level is that by changing the form of sovereignty the 
parallel form of power will not disappear although it may change in 
form. 
All of this is said in the light of his theory75 that all fields of 
knowledge and practice are 'discursive formations'. In this common 
74 ibid. at 232-233. 
75 See The Archaelogy of Knowledge, 1972. Trans. A. Sheridan. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
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modes of thought are carried through the social, economic, 
institutional and technical elements in any one discipline : their 
practices are not organised around the objects addressed but produce 
those objects. In viewing knowledge in this way Foucault explains 
that `objectivity' is a construct of the discipline itself and 'truth' can 
only be assessed in the historical context and in light of the 
particular practical concerns of that discipline. It is the discourse of 
the discipline itself which consolidates practices. 76 In looking at law 
and the social sciences as a knowledge-field he specifically states that 
its form is moulded by its close relationship with power and 
knowledge, and that this affects the rules both governing and 
crystallised by practices within that field. » It is therefore necessary 
to examine the concealed practices and hidden rules to reveal the 
actual structure of that discipline. Law can only find its integrity 
through these practices and not through imposing a structure from 
above. 
Another major difficulty with accepting Habermas outright is 
brought out by this. That is, while dealing with the politics of law, he 
elevates the technocratic development of law to the extent of 
excluding moral choice. 78 In his analysis law is responsive to the 
economic and political climate and he, like a number of post-marxists, 
gives no weight to the ideology of the discipline itself. 
70 A lucid discussion of this appears in Cotterell, R. B. M. "Law 
and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and Confrontations of 
Disciplines. " 13 Journal of Law and Society, No. 1, Spring 1986 9-33. 
n See "Two Lectures" in Foucault, M. Power/K nowledge, Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972/1977, ed. C. Gordon, 1980. New 
York: Pantheon Books. 
78 See Habermas, J. Communication and the Evolution of 
Society, 1979. London: Heinemann. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent literature has emerged from a number of different 
perspectives which has illustrated changes in the way law exists and 
operates. In government, rules and discretion are used as mechanisms 
to order the distribution of power so as to place the responsibility for 
decision-making at different levels of the system. ' Bureaucratic- 
administrative documents (some introducing mechanistic controls while 
others delegate wide discretion) regulating behaviour within 
government are in abundance and their selective form and relationship 
with other types of law have been questioned. 2 The concerted effort 
within government to distinguish legal principles from other policies or 
aims has also been a central concern of legal philosophy3, and the 
move from principle to pragmatism4 has also attracted growing 
interest. 
These factors, together with the issues raised in the previous 
chapter, have generally produced a system of government which is 
more diverse than classical theory would suggest. As a specific 
example of this, the framework of planning provides rules of varying 
levels of generality and allows for the regulation of planning 
I For a discussion of the texture of rules see Twining & Meirs 
How To Do Things With Rules, 2nd ed. 1982. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
2 See Kamenka, E. & Tay, A. E-S. " Beyond Bourgeoise 
Individualism: The Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology " IN: 
Kamenka, E. & Neale, R. S. (eds) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, 1975. 
3 See Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, London: 
Duckworth. 
4 Atiyah, P. From Principle to Pragmatism, 1978. Oxford: OUP. 
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authorities by various types of ministerial measures. This framework 
has been amply described in the planning texts and all that will be 
presented here is an indication of those parts of the system which 
facilitate or encourage negotiation. The aim here is to take account 
of the context of the particular type of bargaining involved in the 
subject of this paper rather than to explain the reasons for this 
context or to ascribe a causal connection between the legal structure 
and the operation of planning gain. 5 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PLANNING ACTS 
Although it is often stated that planning legislation resulted from 
the need to improve the living conditions of the working class after 
the industrial revolution, public control over the use of land was 
evident on the statute books long before the industrial revolution. 
This early legislation was generally confined to matters affecting 
public health rather than the interference with private property 
rights6 introduced in the mid-nineteenth century. At this time it 
directed its much needed attentions towards the improvement of 
sanitary conditions particularly of working class housing. 
" The cottages are very small, old and dirty, while the streets 
are uneven, partly unpowered, not properly drained and full 
s As indicated above, it is necessary to consider the issue of 
planning gain in its context so as to be able to analyse it as part of a 
discourse with its own meaning. The intention is briefly to introduce 
the legal structure as distinct from seeking to explain the bargaining 
process simply as a product of this framework. 
6 eg. An Act for Them Which Cause Corruption Near a City or 
Great Town to Corrupt the Air, 1388 C. 13.12 Ric. 2., Statutes At 
Large, vol. 2, p. 306. See Ashworth, W. The Genesis of Modern Town 
Planning, 1954 London: RKP; McAuslan, P. Land, Law and Planning, 
1975 London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Law in Context Series. 
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of ruts. Heaps of refuse, offal and sickening filth are 
everywhere interspersed with pools of stagnant liquid. The 
atmosphere is polluted by the stench and is darkened by the 
thick smoke of a dozen factory chimneys. A horde of 
ragged women and children swarm about the streets and 
they are just as dirty as the pigs which wallow happily in 
the heaps of garbage and in the pools of filth. "7 
The nineteenth century legislation does however also reveal a 
movement towards more positive powers. 8 The new wealthy 
industrialists were building spacious squares and avenues in the cities 
and various professionals, city officials and social reformers were 
advocating a more efficient and rational form of development to 
improve social conditions. 9 By improving sanitation and restricting 
disease it was assumed there would be an improvement in the problems 
caused by vast differences in wealth. In this context grew Howard's 
ideal of a `Garden City' for the working class but measures to bring 
this about were peripheral despite the two cholera epidemics in the 
1830's and 40's. 
Finally the 1909 Housing, Town Planning etc. Act gave local 
authorities powers mainly to demolish and build housing by producing 
planning schemes which they could exercise at their own option. The 
Act contained strict limitations, required the approval of central 
7 Engels, F. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 
Trans. and edited, W. O. Henderson & W. H. Chalour, 1958 Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, on working class housing in Manchester. Cited in Gracey, H. 
Urban Sociology and Planning: Sociology of Planning and Urban 
Growth. 1969, London: CES, University Working Papers, No. 7. 
e These Acts were really forerunners of the 1909 Act. See 
McAuslan, P. op. cit. supra note 6 for discussion. 
9 This was not necessarily for philanthropic reasons as present 
conditions brought congestion, disease, economic burdens on city 
administration, shortage of labour and fear of revolution. See Gracey 
(1969) op. cit. supra note 7. 
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government and applied to only a small proportion of land. All of this 
seems to have discouraged use of the Act except for a few garden 
suburbs. Some of these limitations were relaxed'° in 1919 but it was 
not until after the war that local authorities were required to perform 
development control functions to effect the necessary reconstruction 
of towns and cities. 
The early twentieth century legislation had also introduced a 
form of betterment tax, under which any person who owned land 
which increased in value as a result of a scheme would be taxed to 
the extent of 50% of that increase (this was raised in 1932 to 75%) 
and there were also provisions made to compensate anyone who 
suffered a reduction in value. In 1932 lapsing provisions were 
introduced which had the potential effect of slowing down 
development, and the system was abolished in 1939. There was clearly 
an intention in these early stages to restrict the effect of locally 
administered planning on the market and also to restrict the financial 
benefits it could have for landowners. 
The 1947 Act, which followed three government Reports on 
aspects of planning", introduced a system designed to take account of 
social and economic conditions and to move towards a 'broad brush' 
approach to planning. The assumption in the earlier legislation that 
social conditions could be improved merely by reorganising the spatial 
arrangement of cities was removed from the legislation. It was 
10 For example The Town and Country Planning Act 1932 
allowed schemes to be produced for any land rather than land likely 
to be developed. Ashworth (1954) op. cit. supra note 6. 
Royal Commission on the Distribution of Industrial Population 
1937 (Cmd. 6135) (The Barlow Report); Committee on Land Utilisation in 
Rural Areas (Cmd. 6378) (The Scott Report); Expert Committee on 
Compensation and Betterment (cmd. 6386) (Uthwatt Report). 
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anticipated that planning schemes under the 1932 Act which had 
consisted of zoning layouts would be replaced by plans which covered 
other broader social and economic considerations. 12 
The Act created a national system of planning authorities (which 
coincided with the jurisdiction of local authorities) and brought all 
development, not only that included in a local authority scheme, under 
their control. Applications had to be made for any development and 
the planning authority could grant or refuse permission and impose any 
conditions 'it thinks fit'. There was also broad discretion in the 
legitimate criteria that the local planning authorities could take into 
account when reaching their decision. Not only must they consider 
the development plan but also 'other material considerations'. 
This legislation set up a system of discretion within a network of 
rules. The local authorities were not now merely allowed to draw up 
plans, they were required to do so. These plans would not be the 
only basis of decisions, but a major one. The previous system of 
mandatory rules in the form of zoning plans had met with little 
success; few authorities had actually produced plans. Yet development 
plans produced under the 1945 Act were map-like, with rigid zones and 
plot ratios to reproduce the physical determinism which underlay the 
previous legislation. 13 Jowell14 explains this with reference to the 
ideology of local authority planning and the formalised criteria which 
12 The 1947 Act defined a development plan as a plan 
"indicating the manner In which the local planning authority propose 
that land in their area should be used. " 
13 Planning Advisory Group Report The Future of Development 
Plans, 1965 London: HMSO. 
14 Jowell, J. " The Limits of Law in Urban Planning " (1977) 30 
CLIP 63. 
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required certainty for developers, accountability to the 'public 
interest', predictability and protection for the bureaucracy against 
public pressure. 
The complaints made against legal formalism, 'the tyranny of 
rules' were all mirrored against this approach to planning. The rigid 
maps could not accomodate 'individualised justice'15, were unable to 
deal with environmental problems, made no contribution to urban 
design and were rapidly out of date. Consequently in 1968 a further 
Act was passed in which further rules required local authorities to 
produce plans after conducting a survey of land uses and major 
economic and social forces operating in the area. These plans were to 
contain a written statement of policy and must set standards, only 
using diagrams as illustrative with no maps at all. 
The plans produced after this piece of legislation were less 
specific and included a broader scope of policies, often drawn in wide 
terms putting them high up on a ladder of abstraction. 16 The 1971 
Act added a second tier to the system so that the newly formed 
county authorities'? produced generalised policy statements while the 
new district authorities were responsible for local plans to deal with 
the detailed needs of their areas. 18 There were many practical 
15 Davis, K. C. Discretionary Justice, 1971. Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press. Quoted by Jowell ibid. 
16 See Twining & Miers (1982) op. cit. supra note 1. 
17 Under the Local Government Act 1972. 
18 There is an inherent simplicity in this division which is 
lacking in reality and there is a plethora of circulars which seem to 
endeavour to clarify the respective responsibilities with unsatisfactory 
results. For a discussion see McAuslan (1975) op. cit. supra note 6, 
pp. 142-244. 
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difficulties associated with this and there have been long delays, 
particularly in the production of local plans. 19 
The system of betterment tax referred to above reappeared in the 
1947 Act but under the administration of central government and 
without provision for compensation on refusal of consent. The Act 
made it a levy on the increased value produced by the grant of 
consent. The provisions were imposed as a part of the aims of the 
Act, that is to make the right to develop subject to government 
control and to protect the market from the effect of such control. 
The Uthwatt Report preceding the Act put forward proposals which 
were intended to keep the benefits of a public act within the public 
purse. This was done in the context of considering a system of 
nationalised land holding, and their proposals went hand in hand with 
Increased powers of compulsory purchase. The theory was that if 
'development value' were vested in the government before it was 
realised all profits which arose as a result of the consent would 
remain public. 
Problems arose in the application of the levy because of the 
basic assumption that land changed hands at existing use value, rather 
than market value. It met with severe political party opposition and 
when the Conservatives took over in 1951 the levy was abolished, 
leaving the rest of the 1947 vision of development control intact. The 
Labour Party returned to power in 1966 and the following year set up 
the Land Comission which subjected development gains to a flat rate 
of tax, 40%. It was intended that this body would have powers to 
acquire land in pursuit of a policy of nationalisation, but change of 
19 The position in Tower Hamlets provides an example, see 
Operational Issues, below. 
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government in 1970 brought about the repeal of the Act creating it 
before those powers were effected. 
The toing and froing between the two political parties was based 
upon an opposing ideology of private property rights : Labour firmly 
advocating the inequity of private interests benefitting through public 
acts from the ownership of land and the Conservatives equally firmly 
defending the 'right' to profit from ownership as a necessay base to 
the economy. 20 In the early 1970's the rise in land values was so 
rapid, with profits accruing to a small number of people that it 
seemed possible that a compromise would be reached between these 
two opposing stands. Capital Gains Tax introduced in 1971 did catch 
increased land values on disposal and Development Land Tax was 
brought in five years later also to levy on increases in value. 21 
This legislative framework since the 1909 Act has also provided 
for public participation. The terms of that participation have become 
increasingly formalised and in the early days it represented a 
justification for continued centralised control. The principle that a 
person should be heard before his interest in property is interfered 
20 This reflects the different ideologies in planning law 
recognised by McAuslan (See McAuslan, P. The Ideologies of Planning 
Law, 1980, Oxford: Pergamon, Introduction) as the 'Traditional Common 
Law Approach' (based on John Locke, seeing law as a vehicle for 
protecting private property rights) and the 'Orthodox Public 
Administration and Planning Approach' (based on Bentham, seeing the 
law as protecting the public interest even at the expense of private 
property). 
21 These taxes are not explored here as their complexity and 
exclusions provide subjects of study in their own right. See Joseph, 
C. 1980, Development Land Tax: A Practical Guide. 2nd ed. 1980 
London: Oyez Publishing Ltd and Pinson, B. On Revenue Law. 14th ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
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with was a strong basis for this22, but it must be seen in the context 
of other moves for increased public involvement such as local 
government, industrial relations, 'minority' interest groups and so on. 
It has concentrated mainly at the local level of planning and is at its 
most evident at public local inquiries and in consultation exercises in 
the preparation of local and structure plans. There is also imput from 
local amenity groups on an ad hoc basis and from certain groups who 
must be consulted before certain applications for planning permission 
are decided upon, for example in the case of historic buildings. 
At a micro level persons in the immediate vicinity of a 
development must be asked for objections and planning committees are 
open to the public. The planning framework does provide the 
possibility for public input, it is heralded as the most successful 
example of participation in government23, but difficult questions arise 
as to its effect. 24 How representative is it? Is it necessary in a 
system of elected local councils? Is the present position satisfactory? 
As far as planning gain is concerned public participation plays 
little direct part in the process. The policies of the council and the 
statutory plans are open to public scrutiny and in consulting the 
public on particular schemes there is some input, but there is no 
22 There is a long line of cases confirming this (even where the 
legislation does not make provision) which is generally thought to 
start with Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 143 E. R. 414. 
See McAuslan, P. The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980 Oxford: 
Pergamon Press for discussion. 
23 See McAuslan (1980) ibid.; Harlow, C. and Rawlins, R. Law and 
Administration, 1984 as cited in Harlow, C. "Power from the People? 
Representation and Constitutional Theory" IN: McAuslan, P. & 
McEldowney, J. F. (1985). 
24 See MHLG People and Planning, The Skeffington Report, 1969 
HMSO; Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Theory, 1970, 
Cambridge UP. 
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involvement at the stage of negotiation other than through the elected 
members of Council who consider the proposals in development 
committees. Tower Hamlets officers have made some effort to involve 
local community groups in planning gain schemes by voluntarily 
consulting them generally on planning gain policies. But this is not 
formalised and such consultations are limited to the most active groups 
in the area, namely Spitalfields Housing and Planning Service and 
Spitalfields Local Group. 
Both of these organisations have a management committee and a 
well-established organisational structure. There is an active 
membership with charismatic figures who are well known in the 
Borough. They both receive funding from the GLC and have articulate 
and educated members who are prepared to put the views of their 
membership to the Council both in meetings and by written 
submissions. 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
Under the English system of Planning law the local authority in 
reaching its decision on a development application must take into 
account the development plan and any other material consideration. 
The local authority is legally bound to produce a plan but the plan 
itself is not a legally binding document but a consideration to be 
taken into account with others considered to be 'material'. The 
decision as to what is and is not 'material' is made at first instance 
by the local authority itself and is subject to the possibility of review 
by the courts. At the same time each case must be considered 'on its 
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own merits' and the legal framework provides the possibility of appeal 
against that decision if it is not an unconditional consent. 
What this amounts to is a framework of flexibility capable of 
taking account of changing circumstances and different localities while 
encouraging a movement away from the strict application of rules. 
This carries with it, inter alia, the 'problem' of uncertainty and also a 
division of responsibility which confers decision-making powers on 
local authorities and, through delegation and professionalism, on their 
officers. The potential extent of governmental power is not clearly 
defined and, while the state retains administrative discretion the rules 
are not strict and are capable of being questioned and interpreted 
differently when they are judged as encroaching upon individual rights. 
This necessarily affects the attitude of the various actors within the 
development control process to central control. Local authorities have 
a measure, albeit increasingly limited, of financial independence from 
central government25 but they are clearly not autonomous2 having a 
right of access to central government and a duty to make reference to 
them under certain circumstances. 
Also relevant to the context of planning decisions is the 
profession of planning, both in terms of its personnel and its own 
aims which may conflict with those of the local authority. There has 
existed a professional body responsible for the supervision and training 
25 For an account of this decline see Loughlin, M. Local 
Government in the Modern State, chapter 2.1986, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series. 
26 See, for example, the findings of Barrell, D. et. al. (Five 
Project Papers on a Comparative Study of Planning in the Netherlands 
and England, 1975. Unpublished, Oxford Polytechnic, Department of 
Town Planning) on a comparative empirical study of planning in 
Oxford and Leiden which concluded that Oxford local authority was 
far less Independant. 
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of planners since the first Town Planning Act of 1909 and a Town 
Planning Institute was formed in 1912.27 The membership was 
concentrated within the professions of civil engineers, architects and 
surveyors which corresponded to the dominant ideology of physical 
determinism. The strength of the RTPI has increased and it takes an 
active part in shaping planning practice in the U. K. The importance 
of this is to make it plain that local authority planners are members 
of an identifiable group in their own right as well as being officers of 
the Council concerned. 
The relevance of this is supported by the suggestion28 that a 
distinction may be made between policies and other statements of aims 
or intentions that remain in force for a period of time and 
`operational decisions'. The latter may be defined as a decision or `an 
act which passes into history once carried out'29 but has the 
additional characteristic of implying `a tendency to create a firm 
commitment to a course of action'. 30 Those persons concerned with 
issuing planning permissions are then primarily involved in making 
operational decisions when they consider that particular development 
(in the light of policies) and the possible impact it will have on the 
policies themselves and on other areas of choice. As an example , 
27 The School of Civic Design was formed in 1909 to train 
planners and in 1910 the RIBA convened the first town planning 
conference. In 1911 the RIBA published a guide to town planning 
procedures including a section on development plans and surveys to be 
conducted by planning authorities. See Gracey, H. Urban Socilogy and 
Planning : Sociology of Planning and Urban Growth, 1969 London: CES, 
University Working Papers, No. 7. 
28. Barrel[ et. al. (1975) op. cit. supra note 26 Project Paper V, 
Section 3.2. 
29 Friend (1974), cited by the above work. 
30 ibid. 
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before a planning policy is applied to a development there is 
consideration of the daylighting effect it will have on other 
properties, the alternative uses that site could be put to which may be 
lost because of land shortage, the effect on neighbouring sites if the 
development leads to increased land values, and so on. 
In order to ascertain how the system operates it is helpful, 
indeed necessary, to examine the detail of how decisions (which may 
be defined as 'a choice among alternative modes of action'31) and 
non-decisions ('a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a 
latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision- 
maker'32) are made. 33 The sum total of conduct at this level 
ultimately affects the openness and accountability of the system of 
government as a whole as channels of appeal and political 
accountability are dependant upon these decisions. The content of a 
report to a committee, the wording of that report, the professional 
opinions stated as authoritative, or the absence of such opinions, are 
influential and may (like committee agendas) shape the discussion of 
issues and the outcome of the meeting. The actual impact of these 
factors largely depends upon the personality of the committee itself 
but the potential is undeniably there. 
This takes the analysis into a broader field than pure decision 
making and conscious non-decision making by looking at the 
31 Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. Power and Poverty. Theory and 
Practice, 1970 New York: O. U. P. p. 39. 
32 ibid. p. 44. 
3 This approach to study of power structures is largely 
Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. See The Archaelogy of 
Knowledge, 1972. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books and Power/Knowledge, 
1980, ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon. 
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mechanisms which feed the process and also feed off it. The 
organisational structure allows for the mobilisation of bias by members 
of that organisation both consciously and unconsciously. By producing 
plans and policies the local authority not only strengthens its 
bargaining position in conflicts over the content of any given scheme 
but it also allows that position to be projected in several different 
ways. The developer coming to the local authority faced with a policy 
which requires him to do something he would prefer not to do will 
create choices as to how to deal with the issues raised by the policy. 
Those choices will be fed by his own concerns and by his future 
interests. The local authority similarly has its interests to protect and 
it will perceive those interests as being satisfied if the policy is 
fulfilled. There may be several different gradations within which the 
policy can be taken as having been fulfilled and the officers make a 
decision as to that fulfillment which may or may not accord with the 
views of the members of the Council. However, in reaching that 
decision the officer will not necessarily be brought into conflict with 
the developer but may present the policy in such a way as to appear 
reasonable to the developer. He may be affected by the role he 
considers he plays in the system, the expectations of his profession, 
his view of what the public interest is, which may also be coloured by 
constant exposure to the development industry. 
When this decision is presented in a committeee report a number 
of the factors influencing it may not be documented, not as a 
deliberate act of deception but as an unconscious part of the process. 
The language used in the report, the interpretation of the policy and 
the presentation of the facts can all effectively limit the basis of the 
ultimate decision which lies with the members themselves. The 
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members themselves are also part of the process and of the 
organisation and have their own interests and perceptions which they 
bring to the committee room and they may choose, consciously or 
unconsciously to make or not to make an issue out of the information 
they receive. 
According to this view, power does not come from a single 
source, nor is it wielded by one party against another, nor is it 
restricted to conscious action. Active non-decision taking has been 
put forward as an alternative view on the exercise of power, but it 
still does not take into account the intricacies of the process or the 
effect of ideologies of the actors in unconsciously as well as 
consciously mobilising bias. The avoidance of conflict is a central 
issue but so too is the recognition of the part played by factors and 
issues feeding and being reproduced by the system and process itself. 
An oft-quoted extract from Marx is a useful reminder of this. 
Men make their own history but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past. "34 
The other significant element here is the absence of conflict, what 
Bachrach and Baratz refer to as 'agreement based on reason'. 35 
Bachrach and Baratz in their seminal work on non-decisions limit 
themselves to an image of power based only on conflict, but this is 
too restrictive. The absence of conflict does not mean that there is 
necessarily a consensus of views between the public and the 
developers, or even between the planners and the developers, but that 
84 Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works, Volume 1, p. 247. 
1962, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
35 op. cit. supra note 31, p. 20. 
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the possibility of conflict has to a large extent been written out by 
latent and overt mechanisms for the ordering of priorities and 
perceptions. 36 Plans produced in the form of statements of policy 
provide a framework for this process to take place. 
THE PLANS 
Town planning is geared towards producing plans in the form of 
written statements, maps and diagrams which represent a set of rules 
to govern human conduct. 37 This 'enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules'38 has produced both specific rules, 
such as zoning provisions, and standards, such as those of amenity and 
of producing social mix. The plan also lays down procedures and 
criteria to achieve particular objectives such as improving housing, 
increasing employment and preserving the character of an area. This 
latter category of standard is what Dworkin defines as a 'policy', that 
is a type of standard 'that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the 
community'. 39 
Overall this system of planning produces a mixture of types 
of rules and consequently involves allocating power and discretion to 
36 See Lukes, S. Power: A Radical View, 1974 London: Macmillan 
for an explanation and critique of Bachrach and Baratz's work. 
37 This is plainly stated by Jowell, J. in "The Limits of the Law 
in Urban Planning" (1977) 30 C. L. P. 63. 
38 Fuller, L. The Morality of Law, 1969. 
30ý Dworkin (1977) op. cit. supra note 3, p22. 
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different levels of the system. 40 This paper does not adopt Dworkin's 
strict division between rules, principles (or standards which guide but 
do not determine outcomes) and policies (as defined above) but treats 
all three as forming part of the planning framework and as bestowing 
different levels of discretion. It is not assumed that each type of rule 
(in its broader sense41) will affect outcomes in a particular way but 
that all types may be drawn in different levels of generality so that 
differences become questions of degree rather than of fact. 
THE OFFICE POLICY FRAMEWORK in TOWER HAMLETS 
The Greater London Development Plan 
For the period in which this study was carried out the statutory 
local plan for Tower Hamlets was the Initial Development Plan, 
produced under the powers of the 1947 TCPA for the whole of 
London, as approved with amendments in 1962. One of the stated 
principles of that plan was `to restrain further office development, 
particularly in the centre of London'. 42 The IDP used a broad system 
of zoning to designate the development control aims for each area. It 
was not legally binding and neither the designations nor the stated 
principles and policies were intended to be defensible rules, but rather 
40 For a discussion of the effect of the different levels of 
specificity in rule making see R. Dworkin (1977) op. cit. supra note 3 
and Twining, W. & Meirs, D. - How to do Things with Rules, especially 
chapter 3.1982,2nd ed. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
41 This accords more with the definition given by Twining & 
Miers cited ibid. (at p. 127) of rules as a general norm guiding conduct 
or action in a given type of situation. 
42 IDP Section 5 (iv). 
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were guidelines for development. Having said that, the designations 
were still used as a firm basis for considering applications. 
The Greater London Development Plan, however, supersedes the 
IDP where the two conflict and is the strategic Plan for Greater 
London approved in 1976, following the changes made in planning law 
in 1968 and 1971. The recommendations of the PAG in 1965 were to 
move away from zoning as a form of control and to substitute 
strategic policies in a Structure Plan and leave Local Plans to deal 
with the more specific requirements of each area. This means in effect 
that the policies contained in the GLDP have been given more 
weight43than the zoning provisions contained in the earlier style plan 
while the restrictive approach to offices has been retained as a local 
policy. 
The GLDP itself contains the policies on office development 
within the context of employment policy and states that in restricting 
and encouraging growth of offices the characteristics of the location, 
the supply of labour available and the type of employment created are 
all relevant factors. « It then goes on to identify specific locations 
within Greater London where it considers office development can be 
approved `with benefit' and lists two such areas for Tower Hamlets 
namely Liverpool Street/ Spitalfields and Gardiners Corner/Aldgate 
East. 45 The notes following this table point out that the locations are 
given as a point of reference and the extent of those area and the 
43 For example, in the appeal statement on Fairholt House the 
Council states in relation to office policy "the IDP is now nearly 20 
years old and it perhaps is more useful to take cognizance of the 
policies expressed in the GLDP" 
" GLDP para. 4.11. 
45 para 4.14. 
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'exact spots where development may be allowed' are to be decided by 
the local plan for each Borough. 
The plan goes on to say that office devlopments should be 
encouraged to locate in these areas only subject to account being 
taken of environmental conditions, capacity of public transport, the 
attainment of planning advantages and the availability of labour. 
Provided these conditions are considered offices may be located 
outside of the identified areas if there are significant facilities for 
passenger interchange or if the traffic generated can be accommodated 
by the capacity of existing roads while complying with traffic flow 
requirements. Examples of planning advantages are given as 
(1) Improvement of the public transport system at railway 
termini and interchanges; 
(2) Provision of special benefits in the form of buildings, open 
space, pedestrian access and other facilities for the use of the 
public; 
(3) Redevelopment of areas of poor layout or design; 
(4) Conservation of buildings or places of historic or 
architectural interest; 
(5) Provision of residential accommodation in conjunction 
with the development; 
(6) Provision of small suites of offices, particularly if 
available on a rental basis. "46 
Tower Hamlets' Office Policy Document 
To follow up the GLDP the Council introduced its own office 
policy47 which sets out specific guidelines for office development in 
the Borough. This is a statement intended to bridge the gap between 
the GLDP and the IDP pending the introduction of the Borough Plan. 
46 para 4.15. 
47 It was first approved in March 1972 but later framed in the 
context of the G. L. D. P. and the public consultation over the 
Spitalfields Interim Report 1977. 
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It is based upon the locations identified above but goes on to define 
those areas and the requirement of planning advantages in more detail. 
This was done on the basis of the relationship between a strategic 
plan and local policy documents so that the former merely provides a 
framework for the latter, which is the view put forward in the note 
to the table of preferred locations mentioned above. 
In Interpreting the use of locational criteria the Council's view 
as expressed in their office policy is that outside of the stipulated 
locations office development is to be refused unless the application is 
one of exceptional merit, a somewhat more discretionary proviso than 
the one contained in the GLDP. Inside the locations cited office 
development should be encouraged but this does not mean that all 
applications for offices in those areas will be allowed, they must at 
least meet the other requirements of the GLDP. 
What has resulted is a policy expressed48 to be based on 
established town planning practice and on the same considerations 
underlying the GLDP approach to office development. That is to say 
the Borough seeks to acheive a balanced and varied pattern of land 
uses, prevention of speculative increases in land values and will 
consider each application on its merits in the light of the policies 
appropriate to the area concerned. All of these are assisted by the 
GLDP's inclusion of the requirement to take account of the attainment 
of planning advantages. In the case of mixed use of land the 
development should contain a balance of uses so as to avoid exclusive 
concentration on those which provide the greatest financial returns 
48 These considerations behind the office policy appear in a 
number of appeal statements made by the Council, for example see 
Results of Study (chapter 7) : Fairholt House and the discussion of 
this appeal in chapter 11. 
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and this is mirrored in the Secretary of State's action of making 
Office Development Permits subject to the condition of a certain 
amount of residential use forming a part of the scheme. 49 Such 
emphasis on mixed use is justified not only as an accepted approach to 
`good planning' but also as perpetuating traditional patterns 
particularly in Spitalfields. As far as speculative increases in land 
values are concerned, allowing office permissions inevitably raises land 
values and this in turn restricts the possibility of other sites in the 
vicinity being put to less profitable uses. By requiring those type of 
uses to be put into the scheme itself, the Council argues, there will 
be more diverse land patterns and lower land values overall. 
Consequently the policy not only ensures new mixes of use but allows 
existing industrial and residential uses to remain by restricting 
competition on land use. 
In considering each application on its merits the role of the 
Council is seen as weighing up the potential benefits and disbenefits 
of the scheme in relation to policies relevant to that area and site. 
If planning advantages in the form of say housing forms part of the 
scheme they will help tip the scales in the direction of consent 
because of the benefits it represents. The policy stresses, however, 
that by putting forward a planning advantage a scheme which is in 
breach of existing policies will not be made acceptable. The example 
given is of an application for offices in a location not suitable for 
that use, consent will not be forthcoming merely by the addition of 
some residential use or restoration works being included. 
49 See, for example Results of Study (chapter 7): 1/4 Blossom 
Street. 
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On these bases the inclusion of planning advantages in an office 
development is elevated to a requirement 
This Council requires office proposals, except for offices 
ancillary to other uses, and small local service offices, such 
as solicitors and banks, to include the benefits of housing, 
industrial accommodation, sports and leisure facilities or 
other non-office employment activities. " 
An additional proviso is added that change of use from industrial to 
residential is generally discouraged unless that use is relocated 
elsewhere or that use is an inappropriate one to the site. By way of 
a guideline where the proposed benefit is housing, the office policy 
suggests that schemes involving the restoration of listed buildings 
should include 50% new residential use and 50% new office floorspace; 
where no restoration is included the ratio of office space to planning 
advantage should be 45 : 55. Where the proposed benefit is other 
than residential the Council can take into account the particular costs 
involved. 50 
The office policy includes a brief description of the preferred 
locations and of the planning aims to be achieved in each : 
(a) Gardiners Corner/Aldgate East 
Within the area bounded by Braham Street, Maansell 
Street, Whitechapel High Street and Whitechurch Lane, the 
Council aims to achieve comprehensive office development 
with a Borough shopping centre, sport and leisure facilities 
and single person residential accommodation. To the south 
between Braham Street and Alie Street, selective infill and 
conversion of office development will be encouraged. Within 
this area, it is intended to retain the mix of light industrial 
and residential uses. The restoration of listed buildings will 
be encouraged and existing community buildings, such as 
Camperdown House, should remain in their present uses. 
50 Such considerations were generally taken account of. For 
example, the costs of providing a sports hall at Gardiner's Corner in 
the Sedgwick-Forbes development. It is evident even on residential 
schemes. See for example Results of Study (chapter 7) Brushfield St 
No. s 16/18. 
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(b) Liverpool Street/Spitalfields 
Within the three Conservation Areas in Spitalfields- 
Elder Street, Fashion Strret and Artillery Passage, office 
development with restoration of listed buildings and creation 
of residential accomodation will be encouraged, and within 
the Artillery Passage any existing shops should be retained. 
The emphasis of development should be on conversion 
and restoration of listed buildings. However, there is scope 
for suitable infill development. In the Whitechapel Station 
Area the Council aims to achieve office development which 
also includes improvements to the underground station, 
single person residential accommodation, industrial 
development and the retention of existing shopping frontage. 
(c) London Docks 
Office development will be encouraged within the north- 
west part of the former London Docks between Thomas 
More Street and the alignment of the proposed Pool of 
London Route and a riverside site in Wapping High Street. 
Office development in this area could be linked to the 
provision of community facilities in Wapping. 
The Borough Plan 
A planning report was prepared on West Spitalfields in 197751, 
following a programme of consultation, which, as well as providing 
factual information, summarised the main problems (as they appeared 
from the consultation exercise) and suggested policies and guidelines 
for development control. The Council expressed in that report a 
commitment to preserving the character of the area in terms of its 
mixed uses and its buildings and stated two main objectives on office 
policy which recognised that an area so close to the City would 
attract development interests. 
(19) To designate areas for office development where such 
development will meet local and/or Borough wide needs... 
51 Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields - Interim Report, 
Volume 1 (February 1977) LBTH. 
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(28) To accept the present levels of General Rates accruing 
from this area, rather than exploit the area for the 
purposes of the Borough's rate income. "52 
Other objectives related to such matters as encouraging refurbishment 
of listed building, improving the residential environment and protecting 
industrial uses from disturbance. The report explains that this policy 
of balancing mixed uses was particularly relevant to Spitalfields 
because of its geographical location making it so attractive to 
pressures of high land values generated by office development and 
went on to recommend that new offices should be linked to new 
housing and conservation wherever possible. 
This specific study of West Spitalfields was a part of a 
programme of consultation and research to produce a draft local plan 
for Spitalfields which in turn was a forerunner to the Borough wide 
local plan. As it was designated as a draft local plan it took account 
of Borough policies and GLC policies likely to be applicable during the 
period of the plan and encouraged formalised participation of local 
people. Lengthy reports were prepared and detailed strategies for the 
improvement of the area were set out, first in the form of issues 
raised by the studies and secondly as objectives to be achieved. 
A network of studies and reports to produce draft local plans 
were carried out in the areaas surrounding Spitalfields and similar 
consultation studies were instituted in 1977. These draft local plans 
then were used as a basis for the draft Borough Plan. It was this 
latter plan which was regarded as the formal Local Plan for the 
Borough and it went through statutory procedures for consultation. A 
draft was published in February 1982 for public consultation and the 
5. para 4.2.1 - 4.2.4. 
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revised draft which resulted was placed on deposit with the Secretary 
of State the following year and a Public Inquiry was subsequently held 
in 1984. The Borough Plan and the GLDP were then the statutory basis 
of planning decisions within the Borough and the tasks of the Borough 
Plan were expressed as being to : 
(a) formulate the Council's proposals for the development 
and other use of land in the borough over the next 10 to 15 
years; 
(b) elaborate in detail the relevant policies and general 
proposals of the Greater London Development Plan; 
(c) form a detailed basis for development control and for 
the co-ordination of development; and 
(d) bring local and detailed planning issues before the 
public. "53 
In explaining and setting out those policies and proposals the 
Plan necessarily referred to matters falling outside of the planning 
functions of the Council but which generated the need for planning 
control in the form detailed in the Plan. In this category the Plan 
included housing, education and recreation and explained in the 
introductory section that these 'related but non-planning activities' 
would be included in reasoned justifications as 'Complementary 
Policies' where they supported planning policies but would not have 
the statutory force of those policies once the Plan had been adopted. 
The Plan was produced in such a way as to detail 'Planning Policies' 
in capital letters so as to distinguish them from 'Complementary 
Policies'. 
The Plan expresses the role of the Council in dealing with office 
development in the Western part of the Borough as a balancing of 
53 Borough Plan para. 1.4 LBTH. 
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benefits and disbenefits. On the benefit side complying with the 
GLDP preferred locations criteria the Council could extend London's 
commercial and business core to produce increased employment, a 
broader rate base and an opportunity to replace old and cramped 
buildings. The disbenefits would include the threat to an area 
characterised by mixed uses, a reduction in residential space, cheap 
manufacturing and retail accommodation and not necessarily increased 
employment of borough residents. 
The Plan attempts to reconcile these two themes by 
identifying what is valuable and worth protecting, so that 
development can be encouraged in and guided to those 
places where it will not undermine the existing character or 
drive out activities which have a long association with the 
area. So the policies make explicit where, and what kind 
of, commercial development will be appropriate, refining the 
general indications of the preferred office location policy to 
ensure that the scale, pace and siting of change respect the 
things of value : residential communities and the services 
that support them; the built heritage and its overall scale; 
existing activities and linkages. "54 
Within this context the Plan goes on to re-affirm the published 
office policy and the specific requirement for planning advantages to 
ensure the retention and improvement of facilities in the area so as to 
avoid the loss of the 'characteristic range of activities' present in 
many parts of the borough. Other stated objectives of the policy are 
to safeguard the environmental amenites of residential areas, to 
protect industrial areas from threat of displacement and to widen the 
range of job opportunities, all to ensure a mix of uses. 
ALL OFFICE DEVELOPMENTS OVER 200s/m MUST BE 
ACCOMPANIED BY SOME FORM OF PLANNING 
54 Para 3.16. 
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ADVANTAGE, AS OUTLINED IN PLANNING GUIDELINE No 
3, 'PLANNING ADVANTAGES'55 
Planning Guideline No. 3 includes a table setting out the type of 
benefit regarded as planning advantages in each location but states 
that other suggestions from developers will be considered. It also 
stresses that by providing planning advantages the developer will not 
be exempt from other requirements of the Plan nor from statutory 
obligations, such as the proper maintenance of listed buildings. 
The Plan changed the basis of the location requirements by 
restricting office development only to sites within 400m. of a public 
transport interchange. In addition there could be no loss of housing, 
industry or good shopping facilities. All applications meeting these 
criteria also had to provide planning benefits unless they were small 
offices providing a local service. In addition to the written statement 
of policy the plan annexed the RTPI guidelines which included 
provision for public consultation on the type and extent of planning 
advantages that should required. 
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE OFFICE POLICY 
As a result of the publication of the Borough Plan, some 10 years 
after the publication of the office policy document, responses from the 
public were received on planning gain policy and are interesting 
because they reflect on past Council practice as well as future 
expectations. Twenty six objections were received on the office 
policy, ten of which were made generally, two of these from 
55 Para 4.88. This policy appears in the draft plan before 
revisions in substantially the same form at para 4.79. 
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individuals and the remainder from organised groups. Most objections 
were to allowing any office development rather than specifically 
addressing themselves to the desireability or otherwise of a planning 
gain policy. 
For ease of reference the objectors and objections appear in 
Table 1 below. The objectors are listed in descending order, with 
those objecting on most grounds at the top. The objections are also 
listed in order of support. The Council at the Inquiry did accept 
most of these objections but took the view that the restrictions 
included in the plan were sufficient to 
reduce the impact of office development to a minimum, whilst 
protecting housing, industry and existing community facilities. The 
requirement of substantial planning advantages was put forward as a 
means of controlling increases in land values and the exclusion of 
other uses, and the locational criteria were cited as a method of 
ensuring certainty for developers and the electorate. The Council also 
explained that a policy of complete exclusion of office development 
would be unsupportable on appeal, resulting in loss of control over 
office development and nothing to compensate for the disadvantages 
involved. 
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A B C D EFGHIJK 
SHPRS * * * **** 
---------------------- 
SLC 
----- 
* 
--- ---- -------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 
GLC * 
----- 
* 
--- ---- -------------------------------------- 
**** 
---------------------- 
CHGL 
----- --- ---- -------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 
A. M. Fletcher * 
------ - 
----- --- ---- 
* 
-------------------------------------- 
** 
- -------------- 
SLP * 
----- --- 
* 
---- 
* 
-------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 
JDAG * 
----- --- ---- -------------------------------------- 
** 
---------------------- 
Docklands Forum 
----- --- ---- -------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 
THET 
----- 
* 
--- ---- -------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 
Graham Allen 
--- 
----- 
* 
--- ---- -------------------------------------- 
-------- ----------- 
TOTALS 6 
----- 
6 
--- 
4 
---- 
4 
-------------------------------------- 
4332222 
Key objectors objections 
CFCL Campaign for Boses in Central London A Offices mean few extra employment opportunities 
DP Docklands Forum B Oversupply of offices in Tower Hamlets 
GLC Greater London Council C Forces out other uses, especially housing & industry 
JDAG Joint Docklands Action Group D Forces up land uses, making other uses uneconomic 
SBPRS Spitalfields Housing Planning Rights E Conflicts with GLC's Community Areas Policy 
Service P Encourages offices within 400. of interchange 
SLC Spitalfields Local Committee G Results in loss of population and reduced services 
SLP Spitalfields Labour Party H Causes blight 
TEST ? over Hamlets Environmental Trust I Planning gain is no compensation for the 
disadvantages of offices 
J Policy extends area available for office use 
K No substantial gains have been achieved 
Table 1: Objections m the Office Pblicy within the Borough Plan, by 
Identity of ObjecCxs and Mature of Objections. 
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This view was supported with examples where, in the early 
1970's, the GLC had refused all office development and had lost on 
appeal. Southwark had a similar problem in the 1980's. M 
A policy of arbitrary total refusal of planning permission for V, offices would be extremely difficult to justify on appeal. 
Landowners and developers would be encouraged to appeal 
against planning decisions and discouraged from attempting 
to reach agreements with the Council which would involve 
planning advantages. It is highly likely that a high 
proportion of appeals would be successful. The Council 
would lose control over office development and planning 
permissions would be granted in an ad hoc and almost 
random fashion across an extensive area of the Borough. 
This would create problems of inflated 'hope values ' of 
property and resulting blight would seriously affect much of 
the Borough. "57 
By insisting on planning advantages within a development the Council 
can ensure mix of land use and minimise speculative increases in land 
values and such development will be contained by the locational 
requirements. The Council argued that it is not a function of 
planning to fine tune the market by allowing fewer office 
developments in times of oversupply and that the measure included in 
the borough plan must be justifiable on land use grounds to ensure 
their enforceability. 
The Council denied some of the objections raised, such as the 
conflict with the GLC Community Areas Policy when planning 
advantages in fact provided housing in the areas concerned and the 
56 As a matter of interest Southwark Council changed its policy 
in 1985 from one of refusing all office permissions to one of requiring 
planning gain and since that time have been involved with a number 
of large developments including substantial housing and community 
facility gains. In 1983 they had 5 appeals against refusals for office 
developments and all were allowed. 
57 Proof of Evidence of Ian Draper, Chief Planner for 
development control, local plans and Implementation in the western part 
of the Borough 1975-1984, May 1984 prepared for the Borough Plan 
Inquiry. para. 6.3. 
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low level of local employment created by office developments. Most 
significantly the Council demonstrated that the policy as operated until 
1984 had produced 'substantial planning gains' in the form of 340 
residential units and 9,847m2 of industrial floorspace and other 
advantages including the partial restoration of Christ Church, 
Spitalfields, a leisure centre at Gardiners Corner and work to the Half 
Moon Theatre at Mile End. These figures actually relate to 
implemented schemes, there were more permissions but many had not 
reached fruition by 1984. 
None of the unimplemented schemes were referred to in the 
evidence submitted to the Inquiry and the amount of money paid by 
the developer towards the restoration of listed buildings was also 
omitted. This latter point however could merely reflect the Council's 
deliberate attempts to disassociate itself from actual payments made. 58 
What is perhaps more interesting is that not all of the implemented 
schemes are detailed on the list submitted to the Inquiry. For 
example, those schemes including the payment of money to homeowners 
for the renovation of their listed houses are not detailed, 59 nor are 
the Wearwell schemes where the planning gain was put to the 
committee as the large amount of floorspace acquired in the Borough 
by the developer. The schemes upon which the Council relied are 
detailed at the end of this section. 
m For example, in all of the Christ Church Schemes the Council 
would enter into an agreement with the developer whereby the 
developer undertook to comply with clause one of an agreement 
executed between the developer and the Friends of Christ Church. 
The amount of money paid to Christ Church was stipulated in that 
latter clause, together with a requirement for the Friends to use it for 
restoration purposes. Refer to chapter 7. 
59 See note 61 below. 
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The Council also produced figures to show that there had been 
no reduction in the population in the western part of the Borough 
(Spitalfields and St. Katherines Wards) since a planning gain policy had 
been in operation. In fact there had been a marked increase on the 
electoral register figures between 1971 and 1983, mainly as a result of 
flats built for the Guiness Trust on the border of Tower Hamlets and 
the City. These flats negotiated as planning gain for the Wingate 
Centre which lies mainly on the City side of the border accounted for 
295 of the 387 new residents in both of these wards. A total of 71 
people were displaced by office developments on previous residential 
sites. 
There are of course problems in relying on electoral roll entries 
to determine movements in population especially when the areas 
involved have large numbers of immigrants who may be unfamiliar with 
the electoral registration system, have language problems or be 
alienated from official process. There also problems in assessing the 
impact of these increases without appreciating something of the 
character of the areas involved. 
The studies conducted in 1977 in Spitalfields using census data 
collected in 1971 reveal a declining population, with a large number of 
single men and a large proportion of non-family accomodation. 60 It 
also indicated a mobile population and a disproportionate share of the 
Borough's institutional population, including those living In hostels and 
sleeping rough. In Spitalfields as a whole in 1971 60% of households 
did not have a bath, 34% had no exclusive use of an inside toilet and 
80 Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields, Interim Report, Volume 
2: Detailed Studies, Section B Population, Housing and Environment. 
1977: LBTH. 
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almost 50% had no exclusive use or no hot water. When compared 
with figures for London as a whole (9 have no bath, 18% lack or share 
an inside toilet and 13% share or lack hot water) the standards are 
very low. 
Taking a closer look at the residential gains implemented by May 
1984 most of the residential floorspace was built or acquired by 
housing associations and was comprised of mainly bedsitters, one- 
bedroom flats and hostel accomodation. Perhaps the most notable 
exception to this is the 50 flats built on Mansell Street (Goodmans 
Yard scheme) for the private market which were offered for sale in 
1983 at a price of £85,000 for a studio. The Peabody development was 
also for the private market but aimed at the lower end of that 
market. Assistance was also given to some individual home-owners for 
the restoration of their listed homes as part of planning gain 
schemes. 61 On the other hand most of the housing displaced by offices 
was private accommodation. 
One major problem with communication was made clear at the 
Inquiry in that many of the objectors were unaware that the larger 
housing developments were in fact built as planning gain. Spitalfields 
Housing and Planning Rights Service (SHPRS) objected absolutely to 
any further office development on the western side of the Borough 
largely on the grounds that it destroys the environment of an area 
with mixed residential and industrial uses. They advanced the view 
that the only way to protect the residential communities was by 
61 For example Eric Elstob received money from Central & City 
under the Congo Scheme to renovate his home at 14 Fournier Street. 
Central & City did another such scheme with the owner of 31 Fournier 
Street In connection with offices at 16/18 Brushfield Street. See 
chapter 7 for details. 
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outlawing office development completely and cited housing 
developments which were themselves built as planning gain for nearby 
off ices. 62 
Specific objections were also raised about the new locational 
criteria which essentially made other sites, those around the specified 
transport interchanges at Whitechapel, Mile End and Bethnal Green, 
into prefered locations. Some groups were radically opposed to any 
extension, while others suggested that it would be preferable to 
indicate precise sites for office development, leaving all other sites 
available for other uses. The Council justified its position on the 
grounds that their approach was responsive and would allow each 
application to be viewed on its merits and so retain flexibility. 
To identify specific sites would be outside of the function of a 
Borough Plan and would tend to be prescriptive in that those sites 
would have to be used for office development. This would be 
problematic if the market was not such as to encourage further office 
growth in the city fringe area. The Council also argued that as the 
site now had to be within 400m of the designated interchanges it 
would in effect limit the number of sites available rather than extend 
it. 
62 For example, the Guiness flats built as a part of the Wingate 
Scheme. Refer to chapter 7. 
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Scheme63 Offices64 
5/7 Folgate St 888m2 
1/4 Blossom St 1253m2 
13/17 Folgate St 903m2 
Planning Gain 
Refurbishment for residential use 
for housing association 7225m2 
as above 1076M2 
as above 232m2 
Christ Church Schemes 
a) OCL 6865m2 
b) FABS scheme 5156m2 
c) 87/95 Mansell St. 4645m2 
10/14 Folgate St 1006M2 
Black Lion Yard 7432m2 
Police Station Site 2787m2 
Commercial St not 
implemented 
238/40 Whitechapel Rd 1393m2 
36 Paradise Row 390m2 
485/7 Bethnal Green Rd 371m2 
Wingate Centre 6540m2 
Nat. West. Scheme 56,700m2 
63 Mansell St 719m2 
Sedg wick-Forbes 31,201 m2 
Goodmans Yard 25,547m2 
CWS Schemes 
Restoration works at Christ Church 
Refurbishment for residential flats 
1006 m2 
Construction of modern industrial 
units, ran by GLC as new technology 
centre. 4645m2 
Refurbishment of 7 listed houses and 
construction of 32 flats for a 
housing association. 
Refurbishment as industrial 
workshops 464m2 
Restoration of 2 listed buildings 
as above 
195 flats for a housing association 
Land acquired by GLC for housing 
development: not built 
Refurbishment as 5 residential flats 
leisure centre, including sports 
hall, theatre, squash courts; multi- 
storey car park; shopping centre 
4645m2 
50 flats and 4 squash courts 
63 Refer to Results of Study section for more detail. 
64 There are some differences in floors pace figures given here and those 
appearing in the Results of Study section due to changes in the details of the 
development during construction. 
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a) 75/89 Leman St 7432m2 small industrial units managed by 
LBTH, 7432m2 
CHAMPS scheme 11,629m2 land purchased and 1/3 of a 400 seat 
auditorium 
Buck & Hickman site 5634m2 new industrial units 4413m2 
Peabody Scheme 1672m2 Refurbishment of 80 Peabody flats 
Camperdown House 5866m2 Refurbishment of Whitechapel Art 
Gallery 
30 Alie St 120m2 Refurbishmentasindustrialworkshop 
93m2 
Table 2: Tower Hamlets' Implemented Planning Gain Schemes at May 1984. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The involvement of public authorities in planning is itself 
justified by the requirement to perform this type of balancing of 
choices. Land in London, and especially on the City fringe, is certainly 
in short supply and the use of a site for one purpose will of course 
make it unavailable for another, thus reducing the possibility of that 
other use being available within the area in question. Some uses are 
necessarily more profitable than others and thus more likely to be 
built, and if built can have a carry on effect so as to increase land 
values and further reduce the possibility of other sites being developed 
for less profitable uses. 
In addition local authorities have limited resources and in 
encouraging one or other type of development must also be aware of 
the spending or saving of public funds which will result if permission 
is given. All of this puts a heavy burden on those persons directly 
involved in the process of weighing up these competing demands: they 
must establish a base of knowledge and be able to form an overview 
of the different areas of choice in order to be in a position to make 
the operational decisions required of them. The plans and policies are 
there so as to simplify this process and to act as rules and guidelines 
to build up a body of precedent. 
In putting the plans and policies into effect there may be 
organisational problems in communication of information and how that 
information is deciphered and co-ordinated. The procedures which are 
established within the organisation become part of the process of 
piloting any intention to develop through the development control 
process. 
123 
The plans and published policies are also intended to produce 
some certainty and guidance to developers and to the communities 
affected. They are documents of accountability of the elected 
representatives to their electorate and of planners to the members. 
Written into the expectations of this system is a series of assumptions 
which have parallels in the rule of law: all sectors of the community 
are safeguarded through the process of public participation and 
through the election process; policies and plans are capable of being 
applied systematically and objectively; the committee process is a valid 
sytem of accountability and it is possible to fit together competing 
interests and planning criteria to reach a consensus. 
These expectations however must also be read subject to the 
status of the plans and policies concerned. Structure plans and local 
plans are statutory documents, but they are not legally binding and 
are intended to be frameworks and not strict rules. Thus, there is an 
interdependence between plan-making and development control which 
provides the operators of the latter process with a discretion, which 
they exercise subject to the possibility of an appeal if the decision 
conflicts with the development plan. Some planning research has 
viewed this discretion as an essential to an effective development 
control process. 
... a planning system which does not allow for flexibility in 
the handling of complex and uncertain situations will 
experience stress within its organization and procedures. "63 
To impose a system of strict rules on the operation of a 
discretion is not an alternative available to government, as they each 
°s Barrell D. et. al. (1975) op. cit. supra note 26, Project Paper 
V, p. 21. 
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represent contradictory approaches. The history of planning legislation 
indicates a move from rules to discretion and that discretion appears 
throughout the character of the system of development control. 
Consequently in viewing the practice of planning gain within this 
structure it must be seen as a particular exercise of discretion 
bestowed by the legislative framework and which has arisen within a 
particular political context of restraint on local autonomy. 
CHAPTER 5: NEGOTIATION 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws upon the findings of theiower hamlets study 
and the available literature to present a view of negotiations for 
planning gain. As indicated above, the planning process facilitates 
negotiation by the form the legislation takes and by the position of 
local government within the system. Negotiation clearly exists in the 
form of discussions over the design, content, plot ratio and other 
physical features of the proposals. It has, however, become 
controversial in the area of planning gain where it is considered that 
local planning authorities have overstepped the boundaries of 
physical planning. In discussing the issues involved reference is 
regularly made to the data obtained from Tower Hamlets and the 
reader is refered to chapter 7 where the case studies appear in 
alphabetical order. 
For negotiation to take place it is not only necessary for there 
to be a discretionary framework and an organisational system that 
supports it there must also be a relationship between the parties 
which is conducive to the process. Both sides must have something of 
value to offer. Outside of metropolitan areas local authorities trying 
to encourage development' have seen any commercial or industrial 
development as planning gain in itself2 whereas, it is argued, in 
London negotiations are generally over the extent and type of gain 
I Main, S. The Role of Negotiation in Development Control, 
1979. Unpublished student dissertation, Department of Civic Design, 
University of Liverpool. 
2 Jowell, J. "Bargaining in Development Control" (1977) JPL 414- 
433. 
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rather than over providing it at all. 3 Certainly this is so in the 
Boroughs which have a published office policy calling for planning 
gains, although other Boroughs still view the process with some 
scepticism mainly because of unfamiliarity and lack of knowledge4. 
In central London land is at a premium and commercial 
developments are profitable ventures. A developer, in accordance with 
classic economic theory, will be anxious to maximise profits and 
minimise expenses. To obtain a grant of permission is in itself a 
valuable exercise. Delays naturally mean reduction in profitability; the 
value of a development cannot be realised and capital is tied up which 
in turn means payment of interest on loans and/or other missed 
opportunities for want of investment capital. The developer therefore 
may not be able to calculate an actual maximium return on a 
development because of market imperfections and limited knowledge of 
actual costs over the development period, but he does have a certain 
rate of return which he requires on each development and is not 
prepared to go below. 
Delays in obtaining a permission are costly and so are planning 
appeals which have an inbuilt wait factors as well as uncertain 
3 Caddy, C. "Implementation: When the Development Control 
Officer Meets the Developer. " (1978) 64 The Planner No. 3 (May) 86-87. 
4 This was evident in meetings between Tower Hamlets planners 
and those from Hackney and other Boroughs who regarded the work 
on planning gain in Tower Hamlets as exceptionally well developed and 
organised. 
5 It is interesting that the Minister has recently (May 1988) 
informally indicated to London Boroughs that he wants to reduce the 
waiting period for an appeal to a maximum of 3 months. A number of 
planners (from Southwark and Tower Hamlets) have verbally expressed 
the view that if this is done their bargaining power will be 
dramatically reduced so as to diminish the chance of negotiating 
planning gain at all. In fact it is suspected that this is the reason 
for the Ministers approach. 
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outcomes. The approach of developers to this can be summed up in 
the minimax principle under which the risk of maximal loss is 
minimised. In other words the developer will prefer to negotiate even 
if it means some loss of profit, rather than risk a refusal of planning 
permission or wasted time and expenditure by taking it to appeal. 
The present system therefore does not only provide a legal 
framework which allows planning gain to operate, it also provides 
procedural restraints which give the planners bargaining power. By 
the system is meant not only the law, but the political environment 
which necessarily includes social and economic conditions. These 
conditions do not simply mean market forces (which are an important 
but not the only manifestation of economic considerations) but also 
encompass community considerations and the myriad other effects of 
the distribution of wealth. 
Negotiations for planning gain are generally conducted in private, 
are unstructured and ad hoc. As far as Tower Hamlets is concerned 
there is a consistency of approach to the negotiations in that planning 
gain is a mandatory requirement on office development applications 
and the policy is applied consistently. This fact, and the policy itself, 
is introduced at the earliest stage of any proposals for commercial 
developments. In this way the policy acts as a basis for what the 
Council will be prepared to accept, but is itself negotiable and not 
always considered appropriate to the particular circumstances of the 
application. 5 Moreover, the terms of the policy allow manoevrability 
in interpretation of such terms as `community benefit'. It is 
difficult, therefore, to quantify not only the value of the gains 
6 See, for example, the Wearwell schemes in chapter 7. 
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achieved in terms of -actual 'benefit' to the local authority and 
'disbenefit' to the developer, but also the balance of bargaining power 
between the parties during negotiation. 
It is often assumed that negotiations to produce planning gain 
are the same as any other form of negotiation leading to a 
contractural relationship and, within this, is an assumption of some 
equality in bargaining power. Yet this type of equality of status is 
difficult to prove. Some have suggested7 that it patently is not there 
and the process holds developers to ransom by preventing them from 
conducting their business without acceeding to the imposed wishes of 
the council. On the other hand, developers have in the past used 
planning gain to reduce their liability to pay development land tax and 
may gain themselves from the 'community benefit', 8 as well as, in 
theory at least, 9 obtain consent without unnecessary delay or expense. 
The form of negotiations and the status of the parties is 
important as it is directly relevant to any proposed system of control. 
To proceed by stated requirements and to proceed by negotiation are 
antithetical modes of operating; even mutually exclusive. The remedy 
of structural control will not, therefore, be necessarily effective when 
7 See Heap and Ward, "Planning Bargaining - the Pros and Cons: 
or How Much Can the System Stand ?" (1980) JPL 631-637. 
8 For example the leisure centre at Gardiners Corner is 
restricted for use by employees of the company occupying the offices 
during certain hours, is has obvious benefits in terms of potentially 
more productive staff aswell as higher rental values for the complex 
as a whole. Also in Mansell Street the housing built was luxury 
apartments and the squash courts were attached to this housing, 
making them sellable at a profit. Refer to chapter 7. 
9 See chapter 7: many of the schemes In fact took a 
considerable amount of time to settle either because of problems at 
the stage of negotiation or during the drafting of the section 52 
agreement. 
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applied to a system based upon negotiation. For example, the 
introduction of an arbiter between the interests of the developer and 
the council as a form of control assumes that the parties are in 
dispute and that the dispute can be equitably mediated. If, however, 
the parties possess inequal bargaining power the process of arbitration 
will not improve that distribution and will not necessarily produce 
resuIts. 10 This has been amply explored not only in the literature on 
the law of contract and monopolies but also in the public law field 
which is plagued by the problems of substituting political discretion 
with judicial discretion, while leaving the position of the parties 
intact. 
The idea of competing structures in the decision-making process 
has been explained by Aubert through the use of models. He 
identifies a `triadic model' which involves an external and independant 
arbiter between the two parties in conflict who weighs the arguments 
to decide the issue on their behalf and so resolve a dispute. In 
opposition to this he places the 'dyadic model' where there is no third 
party and the parties must negotiate and compromise to reach a 
decision. In this latter model the forum is not one of antagonism but 
of the avoidance of conflict. The parties are concerned to reach a 
compromise position so as to facilitate a continuing relationship and to 
obtain mutual benefits. The two models, therefore, are based on 
different views of decision making. " If the parties to a dyadic 
relationship cannot avoid or compromise their conflict they may have 
10 See chapter 10 for a discussion of these issues in the context 
of the structural reforms introduced in New South Wales. 
11 These models are discussed in McMahon, L. et al "Power 
Bargaining Models in Policy Analysis ... What Prescriptions 
for 
Practitioners" (1983) Public Administration Bulletin No. 43. 
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to refer to the triadic system when the process of negotiation fails. 12 
To do that, however, involves a movement from one phase to the next, 
they are not parallel or interchangeable but different levels of 
decision making. 
It is clear from the data that the parties are concerned not to 
move into a triadic forum. There is a continuity in the relationship 
between developer and planner and there is often an element of 
establishing good relations for future contact with the Council. A 
number of the developers in Tower Hamlets were not merely interested 
in submitting one successful application but had a whole series in 
mind. 13 The geographical location of the borough on the city fringe 
added to this by making future development in the area likely 
and thus continued interest by developers was sustained. Thus by 
simplifying the negotiation stage and by assisting in the drawing up of 
an agreement a developer could expedite the process, avoid delays and 
maintain an ongoing relationship with the council. This involved the 
developer in initiating negotiations by presenting proposals for gains 
at a very early stage, and a number of the planning agreements were 
drafted by developers' solicitors and submitted to the Council, rather 
than vica versa. 14 
There is a strong indication in the correspondence between the 
Council and developers that time is the all important factor and that 
12 On the techniques for keeping negotiation alive see Fisher, 
R. & Ury, W. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving 
In, 1981, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
13 Obvious examples of this are Central & City, O. C. L., Tarn & 
Tarn and Wingate. See chapter 7. 
14 Linklaters & Paines appear as the solicitors for a number of 
the developers active in Tower Hamlets and they normally did submit 
drafts, on occasion before the sub-committee met. Refer to chapter 7. 
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delays must be avoided and compromises reached. This extends to the 
formation of the agenda for committee meetings, with the developer 
anxious for nothing to prejudice the possibility of approval. The 
views of the Members, therefore, become part of the negotiations 
giving force to the planner's argument. For example, on one 
particular scheme ('BAGS')15 there was a dispute as to the content of 
the planning agreement and Central & City's solicitors, Linklaters & 
Paines, wrote to the Council suggesting that the clauses of the draft 
agreement be given effect by attaching conditions to the consent 
rather than being included in a separate voluntary agreement. The 
letter in response pointed out that the Council members themselves 
were concerned with issues of enforcement, suggesting that the scheme 
was unlikely to be approved without a voluntary agreement. 
... Although you state that a planning condition, such as draft condition 1 enclosed with your letter, is easily 
enforceable I regret that I do not agree with you. In the 
event of a breach of the condition, leading to occupation of 
the offices before the completion of the residential works, 
the Council would be faced with a most difficult situation in 
attempting to take enforcement action. If such a condition, 
however, is also the subject of voluntary agreement between 
the parties, the Council has a number of other options open 
to it which would give a much better chance of ensuring 
the completion of the development as originally envisaged. 
I might add that members of the Council are themselves 
very concerned that schemes of this sort should not be 
approved unless there is a high prospect of their being able 
to enforce necessary conditions. "16 
15 Refer to chapter 7 for details. 
16 Letter from the Solicitor to the Council to Linklaters & 
Paines dated 10 September 1985. 
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THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IN TOWER HAMLETS'? 
The planning officers usually became involved in a scheme at a 
very early stage. Developers approached the Council both to guage 
the likely reaction to a particular proposal and to submit a particular 
scheme. They also made inquiries to discover what Council policy was 
on a particular type of scheme or to obtain information on criteria 
they should meet in submitting a scheme. Since 1971 the standard 
practice on receipt of any application or enquiry, whether verbal or 
written, which involved the change of use to, or the construction of, 
offices was to provide a copy or explain the content of the published 
office policy. The intention was to establish a systematic approach to 
planning gain and to form a body of precedent which would convey 
the message to developers that if you want to build offices in Tower 
Hamlets you must provide planning advantages. 
There developed, since this time, an increasingly close working 
relationship between certain planning officers and certain legal officers 
of the Council. Most of the planning gain opportunites naturally arose 
on the western side of the Borough where the boundary met the City 
and the responsible planners were allocated by area. Thus the same 
planners would deal with the bulk of the planning gain schemes. It 
was this part of the Borough that was defined in the GLDP as a 
preferred office location and was under some pressure from developers 
. 
17 The attitudes and intentions of the planning department 
expressed in this chapter reflect as accurately as possible the 
approaches conveyed to the writer during the course of conversations 
and meetings with various officers of the Council. As such the 
authoritative worth of these expressions is an obvious target for 
criticism except in so far as these views are reflected in Council 
policy. The limitations of this are well documented and accepted and 
are discussed above in chapter 1. 
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anxious in the early 1970's to invest in office development on the city 
fringe. The state of the market at this time was such that property 
development, particularly London office development, was the most 
desirable form of investment. 1s Interest rates were low and offices 
were in high demand which, in turn, put Tower Hamlets in an ideal 
bargaining position so as to bring back to the constituency some of 
the profits the boom was endowing on a small number of individuals. 
In those early days the influence of this argument was 
undoubtedly strong. The membership of the Council was strongly left- 
wing with a number of communist party representatives and the 
redistribution eth is was not far below the surface. The Borough 
itself was deprived. That same western fringe had historically been 
the home of wave after wave of newly arrived immigrants19 and was 
characterised by high concentrations of mixed uses of land, multiple 
occupancy of buildings, street markets, and hostels for the drunk and 
the homeless. This was the area graphically portrayed in, amongst 
others, Arthur Morrison's Child of the Jago, Bernard Shaw's Major 
Barbara and Charles Dicken 3' Bleak House. It had hosted Oswald 
Moseley's Black Shirt riots, had suffered from intensive bombing 
during World War 2 and, more recently, befriended National Front 
violence. 
18 See Marriott, 0. The Property Boom, 1967, London: Pan 
Books, fr aoscvsiion of We, öa<k5rouý l-c Wh i Pe. ýý. 
19 Which included Huguenots, the Irish fleeing from the potato 
famines, the Maltese, the Jews escaping the Pograms and Asians from 
Uganda. One building on the corner of Fournier Street, Spitalfields 
embodied these changes by being used as a church, then a synagogue 
and finally a mosque. See Kerrigan, C. A History of Tower Hamlets, 
1982, London: LBTH. 
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Architecturally Spitalfields claims unique pockets of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century heritage. Hawksmoor's church at its centre, 
Huguenot terraces and Victorian tenements spreading outwards, with 
reminders of the paternalistic movement following the Industrial 
Revolution in workers' estates and almhouses dotted around. An area 
ripe for gentrification but also teeming with sweat shops, small 
businesses, a growing clothing industry inherited from the mass Jewish 
immigration following the Russian pograms and again after the war 
began. Half of the population of Spitalfields were born outside of the 
United Kingdom and by the 1970's most of that percentage were from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Housing standards were low and the 
proportion of homeless was far above the average for London. 
Tower Hamlets for many years had the longest housing list in the 
country. On the other side of the coin, local government by the 
1930's had become critically involved in social welfare. Government 
reorganisation in the 1960's and 1970's dramatically decreased its 
social welfare policy role as there was increased centralisation of 
government functions, but it continued to provide social welfare 
services on a growing scale. This effectively turned local government 
into a redistributive mechanism with little or no power to innovate 
redistributive change. 20 
Alongside these developments were increasing restrictions on the 
finances of local government. Since 1976, certainly, there had been a 
central government policy of encouraging restraint in local 
expenditure. The effect of this has been felt most severely since 1979 
when the Conservative government drew express correlations between 
20 See Foster, C., Jackman, R. and Perlman, M. Local Government 
Finance in a Unitary State, 1980 London: Allen & Unwin. 
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the economic crisis and the level of public spending. From that time 
on, local government has been perceived as a bastion of inefficiency 
and a whole series of measures, culminating in rate capping21, have 
been introduced to severely limit local government coffers. 22 In the 
early 1970's, however, the property market appeared to be booming 
and the opportunity was there for the planning authorities to return 
some of the profit of a public act back to the electorate. 
In the western part of the Borough the original intention was to 
include a residential element in every scheme on the same site as the 
office development. The overwhelming problem with this was 
financial, in that developers could not obtain finance for the offices if 
the scheme was for mixed use. To avoid this difficulty the officers 
would negotiate for off-site residential gains conscious of the problem 
of keeping a relationship between both elements. The legal 
requirement for conditions on a consent covering the gain element to 
be related to the office element was translated into a distance 
calculation, in that they asked for a residential element within one 
quarter of a mile of the office element, wherever possible. This 
distance requirement was not always met. For example, in the 
'CHAMPS' scheme, where the relocation of the Half Moon Theatre 
appears as planning gain, the relocation took place a long way from 
the office development. 23 
21 See Local Government and Planning Act 1980, Local 
Government Finance Act 1982 and Rates Act 1984. 
22 See Loughlin, M. Local Government and the Modern State, 
1986 London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series for a 
discussion. 
23 See chapter 7 for details. As this did involve a relocation the 
Council considered the departure to be nevertheless justifiable on 
planning grounds. 
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Another major restraint on bargaining was that the Council 
should not, and should not be seen to, benefit directly from gain 
negotiations. This was interpreted as meaning that no direct payment 
should be made and no Council member should receive benefit in kind. 
Officers would not negotiate so as to have a lump sum paid into the 
Council coffers even if it was to be used for community benefit 
purposes. These criteria set Tower Hamlets apart from neighbouring 
boroughs, some of which did not seem to realise the importance of 
either relating the two elements of a scheme or of maintaining a 
detached role. 24 
As a result of these criteria every gain was expressed in physical 
terms even if it was to be implemented by a third party. The clearest 
examples of this are the Christ Church Schemes, CHAMPS scheme and 
Camperdown House. 25 All of these involved the payment of money to 
refurbish or renovate property. The first group of schemes were to 
provide sufficient funds to renovate the Hawksmoor church in 
Spitalfields. 26 The Friends of Spitalfields who were responsible for 
fund raising for this purpose were a charitable organisation and they 
restructured themselves so as to be in a position to manage the sums 
of money they received from developers. Most significantly they 
24 For example, in February 1983 a neighbouring borough 
council asked a chief planner from Tower Hamlets to give them 
guidance on planning gain. An informal meeting was held attended by 
representatives of this council's Valuers Department, Planning 
Department and the Borough Solicitor. The planning gain schemes 
they had been involved in by that date included one in which the 
developer funded a swimming pool on the other side of the borough 
from the office development. The others involved payments into the 
general account of the council, the intention being to use the monies 
received for an industrial scheme nowhere near the development sites. 
25 Refer to chapter 7. 
26 This is discussed in more detail in 'chapter 8. 
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found themselves in the position of having a substantial bank balance 
after three payments were received and they wished to use the 
interest for the maintenance of the church as well as for its 
restoration. Consequently, the terms of their agreements with 
developers were amended so as to allow for this, as was their own 
constitution. 
The planning gain arrangements were structured so that the 
developer entered into an agreement with the Council to contribute to 
the restoration and refurbishment of Christ Church. Each agreement 
contained recitals which explained the provisions in paragraph 4.15 of 
the GLDP and the Council policy to acheive planning gain on all office 
developments. Restoration of listed buildings was considered by the 
Council to be a valid form of planning advantage and this was 
supported by the GLDP provisions encouraging such works. This 
agreement would go on to provide for the Council to issue a planning 
permission in the form attached to the agreement, on completion of a 
restoration agreement between the developer and the Friends. After 
clause 1 of that agreement had been complied with the developer could 
then apply the internal finishes to the office building. 
The restoration agreements made reference to the Council office 
policy and to the fact that the developer was contributing to 
restoration works for that purpose. Clause 1 would provide for the 
payment to be made of a stated sum within a stated period of time 
and the Friends for their part agreed to hold the money on trust to 
use the same towards a schedule of works. Thus the agreements were 
related in terms of office policy and the physical product of planning 
gain, but the payment of money was between the developer and the 
Friends of Christ Church. 
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A similar format was applied with regard to refurbishment works 
at Whitechapel Art Gallery and the relocating and extension of the 
Half Moon Theatre. A number of other schemes had involved the 
provision of housing and again the Council did not benefit directly. 
The agreements would provide for the developer to build housing or 
dispose of the residential content to the Council, the GLC, a housing 
association or some other body approved by the Council by way of 
long lease or sale. The developer would either have to complete the 
residential element, or dispose of it before applying internal finishes 
to the offices, and often the disposal was more convenient to the 
developer. Again, the agreement would be to provide housing as 
planning gain and the details of any disposal were between the 
developer and the body concerned with the Council's approval. 
This had not always led to a successful result, particularly as 
many of these residential works had been put in the hands of housing 
associations, some of which were connected to the developer, which in 
the late 1970's were no longer guaranteed enough resources to 
implement the scheme. They would have acquired the land from the 
developer for a small nominal amount but would not be able to fund 
the building works27 because of the lack of finance from the 
Department of the Environment. 
Another way of achieving this detachment had been through 
negotiating for industrial space which was later put under the 
management of the GLC. 28 In one case Tower Hamlets did agree to 
27 This happened with the BAGS (West) scheme and the site 
earmarked for residential use later became the subject of an office 
application. See also 37/41 Artillery Lane, both discussed in chapter 
7. 
28 Whitechapel Industrial Centre. See chapter 7. 
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manage industrial units built as planning gain, but nothing of this 
appears on the planning files and was conducted through separate and 
distinct negotiations. In no case did planning gain take the form of a 
building in which the freehold or leasehold was handed over to the 
Council. At the end of the study period the Council were negotiating 
for a Council library and sports centre in Whitechapel High Street 
which involved representatives of the Council being appointed onto a 
management committee and the Council itself would issue identity 
cards to those wishing to use the facilities. The officers of the 
Council considered this to be a problem in that the Council could be 
seen as using its planning powers to achieve `ulterior purposes', that 
is providing services attributable to other Council departments. 
In order to avoid this possible problem of legality by the 
Council's act being regarded as falling outside of `planning', the 
Borough solicitor advised the planning department to simply purchase 
the library at its market value (which was anticipated to be less than 
the construction costs) and to also buy, at market value, the sports 
centre after it had been built. The land on which it was to be built 
was owned by the Council and the developer would have to purchase 
the land before construction began. The sum total of these latter two 
transactions were anticipated to cancel out any overall cost to the 
Council. The effect, therefore, would have been the same as if the 
developer allowed Tower Hamlets to manange the facilities which had 
no commercial worth to the developer, but the part played by the 
planning gain policy in the transaction was very much simplified as 
the agreement could merely provide for the construction of these 
buildings as part of the development scheme. The sales would be at 
market value and at arms length and thus safe from criticism. 
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In the early days of the policy the Council had taken a 
technical29 and financial approach to their role as negotiators. 
Valuers had been used to assess the likely profit accruing to the 
developer on any given office scheme and the planners would use this 
profit margin as a negotiating tool. The officers went to the 
Committee with very optimistic schemes30 based on taking a large 
proportion of the developers profits and these were negotiated 
downwards in order to reach a compromise. Many of the earlier 
bargains were never implemented as developers were not prepared to 
sacrifice a dictated level of profit and what resulted was an ad hoc 
implementation of office schemes dependant on the committment of 
individual planning officers to the bargaining process. 31 
This type of bargaining occurred during a period of boom and at 
a time when the GLC were adamantly opposed to any office 
development. They operated a restrictive policy in the Community 
Development Areas ('CDA's') where they were the local planning 
authority. In the early 1970's such an area existed within the western 
part of the borough, namely the Stepney-Poplar CDA, and the GLC 
refused two large office schemes (Minet's development in Leman Street 
29 The Tarn & Tarn schemes set out in chapter 7 involve 
intricate calculations of square feet carried over as credit from one 
scheme to the next. 
30 For example, the Tarn & Tarn Schemes in the early 1970's 
refer to a level of 60% residential to 40% offices in any scheme. This 
has since been scaled down to 50: 50 where the renovation of listed 
buildings is concerned. 
31 This was a view expressed by a planner involved in 
negotiations in the western part of the borough throughout the study 
period and before and was supported by the solicitor responsible for 
planning agreements and consents. No data was available on file to 
either support or deny such a view as these early negotiations either 
took place before the policy was published or were not recorded. 
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and Beagle House in Braham Street) on a policy of no more offices in 
London. Both were granted on appeal on economic grounds in that 
the offices brought employment to the borough and contributed to 
national export figures. This restrictive policy was also operated by 
some of the London Boroughs, perhaps most consistently, until 1985, 
by Southwark, and it raised speculation as to obtaining consents on 
appeal. 
These developments prompted Tower Hamlets to produce and 
implement a policy on justifiable planning grounds, specifically the 
attainment of mixed land use in an area where such a mix had 
traditionally existed. By using planning ideology to support the 
desirability of perpetuating such a mix of use the operation of a 
planning gain policy was firmly grounded within what the planners 
(and indeed the lawyers and politicians) advocate to be the legitimate 
role of planning. 32 
It also appeared to remove the role of the planner from what 
was perceived as a `political' role (trying to syphon off development 
profits to deprive the entrepreneur and return them to the community 
which created them) to the neutral 'professional' (objectively weighing 
the competing land uses and deciding upon an appropriate mix in the 
best interests of the community). Both of these words have many 
meanings and connotations and evoke at times opposing impressions 
and reactions, seated in the context in which they are used and the 
ideologies which support them and which they support. They clearly 
are capable of possessing a meaning which embodies a judgement as to 
the potential merit of any resulting act. When a person is said to act 
32 The issue of planning ideology is considered in greater depth 
in the following section. 
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in a political way, or as a political animal, there is a sense of 
distrust, that the person is acting out of self-interest or for ulterior 
motives. Yet when a person acts in a professional manner the action 
takes on a neutrality, it becomes the act of a person acting in 'a 
proper way' and in accordance with the rules and standards 
appropriate to such an act. 33 
In this way by relying upon a published policy which places 
planning gain in the context of the pursuit of what is recognised as 
legitimate objectives of planning it does not merely signify the 
creation of a guideline upon which to build a body of precedent. It 
does far more than this. It evokes and reproduces the ideology of 
planning, of professionalism and of law. The planners have a rule, 
created within the legal framework of planning, which can be put 
forward as a justification for their negotiating position. The rule is a 
flexible one and capable of interpretation and reinterpretation 
depending upon the circumstances presented and the aims of the 
planner. Nevertheless it stands as a symbol of the range of what the 
planner can legitimately ask for. 
Clearly, however, the actual effect of the policy was still 
recognised by the planners as involving the redistribution of resources 
and the methods of describing the operation of the policy almost 
invariably encompassed more than what many would regard as `pure 
planning grounds'. This goes some way to indicate, not that the 
planners slip up, but that it is indeed impossible to isolate planning 
functions from the political. 
33 For an insight into semiotics see White, J. B. When Words 
Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitution of Language, 
Character and Community, 1984 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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The Council, through its office policy, is concerned to 
ensure that office development makes a positive contribution 
in the Borough by offering direct community benefits in this 
socially deprived area - particularly in relation to 
improvements in housing and the expansion of job and 
leisure opportunities that can be taken up by local people. 
To this end and to assist developers in the preparation 
of schemes, the Council has adopted what it feels is an 
appropriate ratio to aim for. This mix of uses is based 
upon valuation advice, and has proved to be achievable in 
practice. Judging from the amount of new building activity, 
the policy is obviously no bar to investment. "34 
Thus the position here goes beyond what Tucker has identified as 
a distinction between councils whose central concern is financial 
viability of the scheme, and those who direct themselves towards 
planning objectives. He concludes that in the former case planning 
objectives are blurred by financial considerations but this does not 
give adequate weight to the inter-relationship between planning 
objectives and economic considerations. That is, the science of 
planning is not blurred by economic considerations but planning is fed 
by and feeds the economic. 
The planners must also inevitably be affected by the political 
ideology of the council membership as it is they to whom they report 
and who must accept their proposals, but the personality of the 
Membership also has an influence. 35 The planners at Tower Hamlets 
have recognised that the Council members are concerned about office 
development in the Borough, as it increases the rates revenue and 
there has been some direct interference in negotiation by the members 
themselves who are aware of what the developers are likely to agree 
34 Statement by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets in the 
Appeal by Daxmay Properties re Fairholt House, Whitechapel High 
Street, E. 1. May 1982. Paragraphs 7.6 - 7.7. This appeal is discussed in 
chapter 11. 
35 Refer to the section on planners below. 
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to because of the precedents set. Some of the schemes have been 
specifically aimed towards satisfying the interests of the political 
leadership. For example, with the CHAMPS scheme the developer 
knew that the leader of the Council was strongly supportive of the 
Arts and opposed to the Half Moon Theatre leaving Tower Hamlets. 
Also with Camperdown House the Whitechapel Art Gallery approached 
an individual Member to explain their need for funding and the 
Member referred it to the planners to use as a planning gain 
scheme. 36 
The planner as a professional is perceived to be the best person 
to judge what is an adequate mix of land use. The validity of the 
existence of town planning and its benefit to the public is assumed 
and replicated in the rule itself. The existence of a policy indeed 
affirms the value of planning, particularly as it carries with it the 
framework of the law. The policy also is intended to achieve benefits 
for the community, and there is with this the assumption that the 
planner can determine what it is that `benefits', can recognise a 
'community', and that such a community exists. Thus the planner 
appears as objective, professional and altruistic acting only in the 
public interest and on established principles. 
The policy then acts as a starting position for negotiation, as do 
any development briefs that have been produced for certain sites. For 
example, the brief prepared for the site at Gardiners Corner was for 
36 There may also be indirect interference which is more 
difficult to monitor. For example a Member of the Council worked for 
Wearwell at the time their schemes were approved. Some of the 
Wearwell schemes infact provide no tangible planning gain as such 
although the fact that they recently acquired industrial space 
elsewhere in the Borough and were an important local employee was 
put forward as a planning benefit. For details see chapter 7. 
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200,000 square feet of offices and a leisure centre. 37 Sedgwick 
Forbes, who successfully tendered a scheme, in fact required 300,000 
square feet and added shops and a theatre as additional gains. 
Another example was Goodman's Yard where there was no brief but 
the anticipated amount of office space was around 200,000 square feet. 
Oversea's Containers Limited (OCL), the developer, were not prepared 
to build offices below 300,000 square feet as they needed the space 
for expansion, but they were prepared to build fifty residential flats 
and four squash courts and this scheme was accepted subject to the 
occupation of the offices being limited to OCL for five years. The 
increase was justified to the Committee on the basis of keeping OCL, 
a valuable employer and exporter, in Tower Hamlets as well as the 
residential element. In fact, the residential flats which were built 
were of high quality destined for the private market and OCL did not 
occupy the offices. 
THE PLANNERS 
The system of development control relies upon professional 
judgements made by the actors within it, who use previous decisions 
as precedents but have the task of interpreting and reinterpreting 
standards and policies to assess the acceptibility of each application 
on its merits. Planning assumptions play a large part in this as does 
the political ideology of the Membership of the council. 38 The 
37 Refer to chapter 7. 
38 See Loughlin, M. "Municipal Socialism and A Unitary State" 
IN: McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. 82/106 at p. 92. 
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planner must be able to justify his attitude to a scheme on the basis 
not only of the criteria he has been educated to espouse but also on 
his knowledge of what the committee he serves will be prepared to 
accept. 
The planning process puts the planner in the position of 
objective arbiter between competing uses for the scarce resoure of 
land. In making his choice he has certain tools which may be made 
use of, some of which are espoused in statutory and/or public 
documents and others which come from the profession and ideology of 
planning itself. These sources endow the planner with a neutrality; he 
is an adviser to a duly elected Council and that advice is given in the 
public interest with political ideals being filtered into the system at 
committee level. 
This view of the role of planners is enforced by the ideology of 
the discipline itself. The purpose of town planning at its simplest 
level is to produce an arrangement of uses which produces an orderly 
balance in the best interests of the public. To produce such a balance 
is an unquestioned good, the only criticism comes in whether or not it 
is being achieved by the policies adopted by the council. In other 
words the purpose of planning takes on a 'common sense ' value, it 
becomes a tradition, a self-evident and self-justifying truth. This is 
also the case with the social benefit aspect of planning. That is, 
town planning is taken as producing a better and healthier society. 
By aiming to reduce overcrowding and congestion, to provide more 
open space and gardens, to encourage neighbourhoods and community 
living, to restore our architectural heritage and to avoid blight are all 
viewed as attractive aims which will help improve the standard of 
living. 
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This goes hand in hand with physical determinism, that by 
controlling plot ratios and restricting development in some ways, while 
encouraging it in others, will help to remedy problems created by 
unequal distributions of wealth. Included in this is a view of planning 
which takes on a definite social significance in that it provides the 
physical framework for an improved way of life, and that improvement 
will result from controlling urban growth, from encouraging low 
density housing and from promoting a community lifestyle. 39 The 
social effects of this have become a part of the ideology of planning. 
Almost unconscious aims espoused by individual planners and promoted 
by their professional body, they take on a neutrality which reinforces 
the arbital role of their decision making. 
The truth of these precepts has in turn shaped, and been shaped 
by, the law and the institutions of planning. The achieved status of 
'truth' has provided a mechanism for the production of knowledge and 
technologies to affirm the expertise of planners so that the objectivity 
of their role is validated. The profession of planning has its own 
terminology, its own techniques, its own self-justifying values; all of 
which sets its members apart from non-planners but also invests the 
profession with a trust, reinforced by law, that it operates on the 
basis of true values exercised in the public interest. Other writers40 
have examined the way in which the mechanism of public participation 
serves to validate the functions of planners. That is, by formally 
39 See Foley, D. L. "British Town Planning: One Ideology or 
Three ?" (1960) 2 British Journal of Sociology 211 for a classic 
statement of these differing levels of planning ideology. 
40 See, for example, Simmie, J. Power, Property and 
Corporatism: The Political Sociology of Planning, 1981. London: 
Mpcinillan Press. 
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including the public in the process, planning is seen to be sympathetic 
to the wishes of the community, yet the views expressed through the 
participation exercise only reflect certain articulate interest groups. 
By inverting this, participation appears as part of the mechanism for 
affirming the validity of the planning process in that it is seen to be 
operating in the public interest, whereas it continues to have a limited 
definition of what the public interest iS. 41 
The ideologies of planning, then, are not merely constructs 
invented to provide for the growth of a profession; they provide an 
apparatus of knowledge and of power. 42 They are not ideologies in 
the traditional sense of that term but are capable of producing a form 
of truth on which the persistence of the mechanism depends, what 
Foucault refers to as discourse. This puts planning into the network 
of power, as an apparatus which operates alongside the law and often 
in conflict with it. The two cannot be separated, but at the same 
time have a degree of independence as they are involved in the 
business of producing their own discourse as well as supporting each 
others'. Both are concerned with ensuring the functioning of society 
and with concealing domination and, as such, are necessary elements 
of the network of power, yet the discipline of planning has the 
freedom to develop its own mechanisms for supporting the system as a 
41 On this see McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980 
Oxford: Pergamon Press, Urban & Regional Planning Series, Volume 22, 
esp. Part 1. 
42 This analysis views power not as somethin. g which is 
possessed by a group or an individual to be used against another, but 
rather as Foucault perceives it as something more than repression in 
that it can positively create knoledge and discourse so that power 
becomes a network throughout the social body which is mobilised and 
reproduced by its exercise. See Power/Knowledge, C. Gordon (ed), 
1980. New York: Pantheon. 
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whole. In creating and implementing those mechanisms planners are 
constrained by their own discourse and the structure of the state but 
are also dedicated to realising the truth upon which society can 
function. What results is a complex sytem which cannot be reduced to 
economic determinism and which must be analysed in the context of 
individual apparatus' of power rather than simply legitimacy of action. 
The self-eviadent precepts upon which planning operates must, 
therefore, be seen not only as attractive ideals but as a vehicle for 
making value laden choices as well as representing such a choice. 
Planning decisions inevitably involve the allocation of value between 
competing claimants. Land is a limited commodity and thus its use for 
one purpose denies its use for another and resticts the amount of land 
available for that other use. The decision will also affect the value of 
land in that vicinity and will deny or encourage hope value for the 
potential of that land. The decision will have economic effects for 
the council through the rate base and for landowners and developers 
through the opportunity to make profit. It has carry on effects for 
the public in the area and, potentially, in the wider population by 
affecting availability of types of property available to the market and 
the level of amenities and services. 43 
To contend, therefore, that planning decisions are made through 
a balancing of land use requires a balancing not simply of technical 
criteria but of political variables. Planning, however, has no patent 
political nature in that both political parties have both not questioned 
the usefulness of planning and the same planners serve successive 
43 See Koegh, G. Planning Gain: An Economic Analysis. 1982, 
unpublished discussion Paper in Urban and Regional Economics, Series 
C. No. 12, Department of Economics, Faculty of Urban & Regional 
Studies, University of Reading. 
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council members. Yet the ideology of planning does stand for a 
political choice to confirm the importance of neighbourhood concerns 
and to centre their attention on the physical result of planning. " As 
Simmie points out 'So far, nobody has taken a radical political view of 
physical planning'45 and he goes on to illustrate the upper class values 
inherent in the failure of planners to be active in recognising and 
redistributing social inequalities. 
It could be argued that planning gain represents the radical 
planning that Simmie has been calling for for over 25 years, in that it 
involves an attempt to return development profits to the community. 
Upper class ideology is exemplified in planning by the 
garden city, garden suburb, new town thinking of the 
twentieth century ... A second aspect of upper class ideology in physical planning is the failure to recognize that to be in 
favour of planning is to be in favour of either ensuring that 
market forces produce a specified set of results or of 
interfering with those forces so that goals are obtained. 
This physical planning has failed to do. There are three 
examples of this failure : 
(i) over-reliance on the private sector in housing; 
(ii) insufficient resistance to development lobbies; 
(iii) the failure to appropriate communally increased 
land values... '46 
Yet the process is still couched in the terms of development control. 
The policy is not proclaimed as a revolution, but as an everyday 
application of the aim to achieve a balanced mix of uses. Negotiations 
take place so as to ease contributions from developers with guidelines 
44 It is interesting that there is little evidence of input from 
other social sciences into the area of planning. See Musil, J. Urban 
Sociology and Planning: Examples of Sociological Research Relevant to 
Planning Problems in Some European Countries. 1969, London: Centre 
for Environmental Studies, University Working Paper, 5. 
45 Simmie, J. F. "Physical Planning and Social Policy " (1971) 
Joutrnal of the Royal Town Planning Institute, 450-453. 
46 Simmie (1971) ibid. 
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flexible enough to accomodate what the developer is prepared to do. 
It is marginal and ad hoc with results that fall far short of the 
expectations behind the Community Land Act or the 1947 Planning Act. 
Nevertheless it is a patently political process. Planners are 
exercising power which leads to a determination of who gets what, 
when and how. 47 They are involved in the authoritative allocation of 
values48 through making routine decisions which have a high policy 
content and through structuring the agenda upon which policy making 
takes place. 49 The expertise of the planner will be relied upon by 
local politicians who are reluctant to make decisions in the early 
stages of a scheme. Altshuler5ý in his empirical work, has concluded 
that this is done so as to reduce the number of controversial decisions 
the politician has to make, which can also be posited as the reason 
for recruiting expertise or professionals into the system. The 
Members do not have to accept the advice they are given by their 
officers but, at the same time, the status of an expert is such as to 
engender trust and to give authority to that person's views. 
Significant planning problems are never simply a question of 
applying technical criteria to a set of facts. The balancing act must 
go on by prioritising one aspect of an application against another, one 
47 Lasswell, H. D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, 1958, 
New York: Meridian Books. 
48 Easton, D. The Political System, 1953, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
49 See Vasu, M. L. Planning and Politics: A National Study of 
American Planners, 1979 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, who makes this point in an empirical study on planners' 
attitudes. 
50 Altshuler, A. The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis. 
1965, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
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policy in a plan against another. In negotiating a planning gain the 
planner has to decide what should be given priority and what amounts 
to a sufficient gain. For example, in negotiating an office 
development and housing in Mansell Street the planner decided that 
the housing in the scheme was sufficiently important to allow the 
developer to build even more office space than originally anticipated 
for the site. 51 In ordering priorities the planner may have the 
support of precedent, valuations on profitability and land use patterns 
to guide him, but he is not simply applying a fixed rule, but using 
those concepts to justify the value laden decision he makes. 
That decision will be fed by his professional background and the 
guidance to practice given by his professional body. It is also 
coloured by anticipating the reaction of his political leadership and his 
own approach to the implementation of the policy in question. There 
is also a conscious consideration of the legitimacy of the process. In 
other words, the planner in his negotiations will be aware of what is 
likely to be enforceable against the developer and, particularly where 
the scheme under consideration is innovative, the planner will use his 
knowledge of the law to limit what he is prepared to accept or 
suggest. He will consult with lawyers as he consults with valuers, if 
not more so, to determine the limits of an enforceable bargain. 
The influence of the law, which is often portrayed as minimal in 
the literature, is also felt in that the planner as well as the developer 
does not want a scheme to go to appeal. This is for two reasons. 
Firstly, the validity of the policy and its strength as a negotiating 
tool will remain intact as long as it is untested. Although Tower 
51 See chapter 7. 
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Hamlets is confident in the office policy they have no control over an 
Inspector and, thus, the possibility of an appeal makes them 
vulnerable. Second, an appeal is publicity for the policy and attracts 
academic and public scrutiny in a forum of antagonists. While the 
council and its officers do consult with the public through formal and 
informal channels there is a paternalism in this type of participation 
which sets that process apart from an appeal. 
The planner is also influenced in his standpoint by the 
Ministerial directions he receives from central government. The issue 
of a circular on planning gain following the PAG report was viewed 
with trepidation. The planners and lawyers at the Council analysed its 
contents to see if it placed restrictions on the operation of the policy. 
It was interpreted by them, and an information report was made to 
the planning committee indicating that although there were problems 
with the document it did not prevent the policy from continuing to 
operate. 52 The planners then do not negotiate planning gain in the 
belief that they are acting in an illegitimate way, or in disregard for 
what the courts and central government indicate is lawful. Rather 
they are anxious to build a strong position from which they can 
defend the legitimacy of their actions on planning grounds. 
The decision of the planner is also influenced by the wider 
context of planning gain. In the history of the Borough there have 
been refusals on office applications which have succeeded on appeal. 
As a result of this there is an acknowledged belief, in the Council and 
among the officers, that office development cannot be avoided and 
planning gain represents a compromise to help compensate for the 
52 See chapter 11 on official responses to planning gain. 
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disbenefits of development. The planners often put this into the 
context of lack of public funds to provide the gains which the 
developer will provide and the problems of unemployment, housing, 
community facilities elsewhere in the Borough. 
It has been suggested53 that the negotiations in planning gain 
schemes depend upon the desirability of the scheme and the confidence 
and ability of the officer. Certainly these are both influential 
factors54 and can lead to differences in result. Some planners were 
anxious to adhere strictly to policy guidelines, whereas others were 
prepared to be more pragmatic in their approach. Some were eager to 
secure a scheme55 which had some element of gain attached to it even 
if the extent of that gain was less than anticipated so as to make it 
an economically feasible compromise for the developer. Yet such an 
analysis is too simplistic in that it fails to recognise the political 
53 See for example, Main, S. The Role of Negotiation in 
Development Control, 1979. Unpublished student dissertation, 
Department of Civic Design, University of Liverpool. 
54 At the end of the study period there was a change in 
personnel at Tower Hamlets as a result of reorganisation. Following 
this the Borough Solicitor was annoyed to receive a letter from 
Central & City which informed him that the planning department had 
told him they were no longer prepared to negotiate off-site gains even 
though the council had made no resolution to that effect. See chapter 
11, below. 
55 During the Inquiry into an appeal on 36/40 Artillery Lane in 
1983 a planner was examined as to why a 6-storey glass-clad office 
building (FABS Scheme) had been approved in 1979 when it was 
completely out of character with the area. He responded by saying 
approval was recommended by another officer and he would not have 
done the same. He considered the renovation of Christ Church as 
planning gain had nothing to do with ensuring a mix of uses and 
represented a contradiction of Tower Hamlets policy although the 
report on the scheme justified the gain as according with that same 
policy. He went on to suggest that the scheme would not be approved 
since the reorganisation of officers. 
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nature of the negotiations and the influence of professionalism and 
knowledge on the planner. Vasu's conclusions are more satisfactory" 
In reality, the basis of any recommendations made by a 
planner or any professional is probably the result of an 
interaction of his own values with the values of his 
profession, his expertise, and the situation in which he finds 
himself. " 
The expectations this places on a planner are considerably high. 
He is an employee of the council and only answerable to its Members. 
His decisions, if adopted by the committee, become a precedent for 
future decisions. He is not appointed because of any affiliations to a 
political party and has no formal training in sociology, economics or 
political science. He has a great deal of contact with the development 
industry and does form strong working relationships with some 
individual developers57 which may consciously or subconsciously affect 
his perceptions. 58 
56 Supra note 49 at p. 21. 
57 The most glaring example of this in the data collected was 
Central & City who entered into several planning gain schemes, 
including those involving the payment of money to third parties for 
the restoration of listed buildings and were responsible for the 
relocation of the Half Moon Theatre. 
55 By way of anecdote on this point, a Tower Hamlets planners 
was heard to remark after being told the details of one scheme "Why 
did [the developer] get all of that office space anyway ? ". The planner 
who had negotiated it replied "I don't know. I think that he just kept 
increasing it bit by bit and we kept agreeing. " 
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THE BENEFITS DEFINED 
Utilitarianism brought to public law the problem of determining 
the public interest by making the legislature responsible for creating 
legislation which was a reflection of it. 
... The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is 
composed, that is their pleasures and their security, is the 
end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in 
view. "59 
Bentham to an extent recognised the problems of definition this 
approach to government created 
The interest of the community is one of the most general 
expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no 
wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a 
meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body, 
composed of the individual persons who are considered as 
constituting as it were its members. The interest of the 
community then is, what? - the sum of the interests of the 
several members who compose it. "60 
He adds a footnote to this passage which reads 'interest is one of 
those words, which not having any superior genus, cannot in the 
ordinary way be defined'. 
By the early twentieth century the courts had accepted the 
relevance of public interest to administrational, together with the 
separation of the legality of the decision and the political choice it 
represented. Administrators being accountable to the courts on issues 
of legality (were they acting in accordance with their powers under 
59 Bentham, J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, edited by Burns, J. H. and Hart, H. L. A. 1970, Reprinted in 
Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 3rd edition, 1972 pp. 185/186. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See the landmark cases of Board of Education v Rice [1911] 
AC 179 and Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120. 
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the law? were the right procedures observed? the principles of natural 
justice met and so on) and to parliament on issues of policy. The 
enforcement of this division has presented obvious problems to public 
lawyers, many of which are illustrated in the area of planningG2 and 
even more minutely in the area of planning gain. 
The Town Planning Acts have reflected this commitment to public 
interest by incorporating wide discretion into this system. By allowing 
local government to impose whatever conditions it thinks fit on a 
planning permission6, there is an assumption that that discretion will 
be exercised in accordance with the public interest. Similar 
observations can be made about the provision allowing local planning 
authorites to take account of other material considerations in its 
deliberations on the application. 64 The courts in overseeing the 
exercise of discretion inherent in those sections have taken a 
restrictive approach65 and McAuslanGG has explained this in terms of 
the differing ideologies upon which the planners and the courts make 
their decisions; the former concerned with the protection of private 
property rights, and the latter with the ideology of public interest. 
Research in the United States has gone some way to showing 
that planners themselves are aware of some of the problems inherent 
62 For a discussion see McAuslan, supra note 41. 
63 Section 29 (1)(a) TCPA 1972. 
64 Section 29(1) TCPA 1971. 
65 For a detailed discussion of this see Loughlin, M. 
Development Control: The Importance of Social and Economic 
Considerations, 1977, LL. M. Dissertation, University of Warwick; 
Loughlin, M. "The Scope and Importance of 'material considerations" 
(1980) 3 Urban Law and Policy 171. 
65 Supra note 41. 
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in the concept of public interest. Vasu67 distributed 1145 
questionnaires to public and private planners and obtained an almost 
70% response rate. Two of the statements made, to which they either 
agreed or disagreed, were 'There is a solitary public interest in which 
all social and political groups hold a share' and 'Urban Planners by 
virtue of their professional training, are in the best position to be 
neutral judges of public interest'. While 45% of public planners and 
40% of private planners were prepared to agree with the first 
statement only 28% of public and 25% of private planners saw 
themselves as being in the best position to judge what it was. 
In the context of planning gain the local planning authority is 
called upon to assess the public interest in a particular way in that it 
is the arbiter of what does or does not amount to a community 
benefit. At grass roots level this task falls on the individual planner 
in his private negotiations with the developer. This puts the planner 
in the position of protagonist for an 'adequate community benefit' 
while he has one eye on what his members are likely to accept and 
the other on what the developer is prepared to do. 
The concept of community benefit is, like the term public 
interest, not something with a clear objective meaning and can only be 
judged in the light of perceptions based upon knowledge and 
experience which in turn brings into play the whole framework in 
which the process takes place, as well as the personal and professional 
values of the planner and his members. It is necessary to examine 
what feeds that knowledge and experience to assess whether the 
87 Supra note 49. 
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interpretation of the term community benefit is one which is 
representative of that so-called community-68 
As a preliminary observation the term carries with it the sense 
of acting on behalf of an identifiable group who themselves have a 
consensual base. That is they operate as 'a community' with 
'community values'. The role of the planner and the council seems to 
be to identify what those community needs and values are. The 
assumption that the community exists is not questioned and the 
planning gain policy speaks of the community in non-specific terms. 
That is, community benefit is in the singular and is not related to any 
particular geographic area, socio-economic class or racial or ethnic 
group. There seems to be a presumption that a collection of land uses 
or types of development can be identified which all, or possibly the 
majority, will view as a benefit to them. 
Along with this is the presumptions that these 'community 
benefits' can be identified by the local authority and that this 
identification can effectively take place through existing methods of 
enquiry and institutionalised forms of participation. 69 It also assumes 
68 The planners at Tower Hamlets have acknowledged this in 
their call for information through the publication in 1976 and 1977 of 
9 Topic Papers on the Borough Plan. For example, the Topic Paper on 
Leisure & Recreation points out that the Council must choose between 
different options so as to prioritise spending on one form of leisure 
activity over another and this raises questions as to the importance of 
leisure facilities as opposed to other services and the ranking of those 
facilities. The Paper concludes "These are difficult questions, because 
it all depends upon personal values, and people are bound to disagree 
with each other. This Council cannot decide on priorities without 
knowing what people who live in the borough think. It is vitally 
important, therefore, that you help the Council make the right choice. " 
Similar statements appear in each Topic Paper. 
69 There is a paradox here in that the Council Is aware that 
only limited Interests are Infact represented but as they are the only 
views they have they are taken as the views of the community. This is 
evident from the consultation exercises preceeding the local plan for 
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that planners and council members are equipped to perform this 
identification process and will take steps to ensure that they 
effectively balance the interests of the electorate. 
The starting point for the assessment of what amounts to a 
community benefit lies in the documents which exist as guidelines, that 
is the GLDP, the office policy itself and previous agreements reached 
with developers. All are public documents and have gone through a 
system of participation either in the form of consultation exercises 
and an Inquiry or adoption in a public forum. These documents 
represent the products of a legitmate pattern of interaction between 
pressure groups and the council in making policy through which all 
pressure groups are theoretically accorded access. It is clear, 
however, that the pluralist dream does not function along the lines of 
the ideal. 7° Those groups which are organised, articulate and have 
some relationship with the decision-making process are the most likely 
to participate in this forum71, and many people remain unrepresented. 
As a documented example of the problem72 is the consultation 
exercise conducted in 1976 preceeding a local plan for Spitalfields in 
which ten meetings were held between the planning department and 
various interested groups. Two of those were held for local residents, 
the second at the request of those attending the first. Fourteen 
Spitalfields and the Borough Plan. 
70 See eg., Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 1970 
Cambridge UP. 
T1 See Simmie, J. Power, Property and Corporatism: The Political 
Sociology of Planning. 1981, London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Sociology, 
Politics and Cities Series. 
72 Towards a Local Plan for 'pitalfields, Interim Report, Volume 
1 Consultation Report and Volume 2 Detailed Studies, 1977 London: 
LBTH. 
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groups were represented at that meeting as members of the Spitalfields 
Consultative Committee and the Spitalfields Community Action Group, 
two highly organised and well-structured pressure groups with internal 
management committees and funding. Their views appear in the report 
as the community', even though the same report acknowledges the 
lack of input from the Asian community in Spitalfields which 
comprised about 50% of the population of the area in the early 
1970's. 73 
The project office undertook to assist the Planning 
Department in arranging a meeting with representatives of 
the large Asian community in the area and also with the 
translation of a summary of the Issues raised in the 
Discussion Paper. Unfortunately little interest developed 
and in the end neither the meeting nor the translation was 
achieved. "74 
The GLDP lists in broad terms what it is that amounts to a 
planning advantage75 and includes 'special benefits in the form of 
buildings, open space, pedestrian access and other facilities for the use 
of the public' as well as residential accomodation, conservation of 
buildings, improvements in public transport and the redevelopment of 
areas of poor layout and design. Tower Hamlets' office policy used 
this as a basis for the more specific requirements listed with reference 
to each of the preferred office locations and included housing, 
industrial floorspace, leisure facilities, restoration of listed buildings 
and 'other non-office employment activities'. The type of housing 
encouraged at Gardiners Corner and in Spitalfields was single person 
accomodation, a shortage of which was identified by means of surveys 
73 Census 1971, extracted in Volume 2 ibid. 
74 Volume 1 ibid. p. 2. 
75 See above, The Context of Decision Making, chapter 4. 
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and census data, although clearly even from the groups who did 
participate in consultation exercises there was no consensus. 
The discussion about housing was a forceful reminder that 
any determination on the part of local authorities to obtain 
a public concensus (sic) of opinion om some subjects will be 
a fruitless task. Local views on housing were as diverse as 
one would expect from a nation-wide survey and imply that 
only a range of housing options, both within and outside the 
area, will meet the needs and aspirations of the 
community. "75 
All of the benefits achieved were then justified within this framework, 
which stood as a reflection of what could amount to a benefit for the 
community, thus tailoring to some extent the options available. 
There are two other possibilities for pressure group interaction 
with local government which have been identified by LaPalambora in 
his work on Italian politics» and which appear in Tower Hamlets. 
Firstly, what he refers to as 'Clientela relationships' which exists 
w hen 
an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeeds in 
becoming in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the 
natural expression and representative of a given social 
sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or 
reference point for the activity of the administrative 
agency. "78 
This represents a substantial narrowing of the principles espoused by 
public participation exercises in that the council comes to regard the 
views of a single, or a limited number of groups, as representative 
rather than pursing or being open to the views of all. Even if the 
7 Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields, Interim Report Volume 
1, p. 12. 
77 LaPalombara, J. Interest Groups in Italian Politics, 1965 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
78 Ibid., p. 262. 
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council continues to be open to diverse views and indeed requests 
information on a broad base the views of certain of those groups may 
be given more weight, while those of others diminished. This may not 
be the result of a conscious choice by the council or the planners but 
as a result of the visibility and pressure of the groups concerned as 
opposed to the presumed apathy of the silent majority. This has the 
effect of replacing the concept of 'public interest' or 'community 
interest' with that of the limited interests of the organised groups 
involved. 
The second type of interaction Is 'Parentela relationships' which 
exist where a group gains an imput into the system not because they 
are representative of a sector of the population of an area but 
because of their attachment to the administration. The links between 
these groups and the administration are usually indirect and are based 
upon the party politics of the administration so that they are 
supportive of that policy and at the same time are likely to benefit 
from it. The administration will accomodate and effectively subsidise 
the group who in return provides information and a mechanism for 
control. This is very close to the idea of corporatism; the influence 
of these groups is pervasive and their relationship with the 
administration is not one simply of negotiation but of shared interests 
in regulation and control. 
In the context of gains achieved in Tower Hamlets it is not easy 
to reflect this dichotomy. Clearly, some interest groups stood apart 
from the others in terms of their involvement with the Council both 
in the formal participation exercises and informal consultations. Not 
all were influential, and those who stood opposed to planning gain 
being used at all maintained a relationship with the Council of conflict 
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rather than of influence. These groups did have some Inevitable 
effect in that they constituted an opposition causing the Council to 
justify its policy and to be aware of the possibility of criticism. 79 
Most active among these groups were the Spitalfields Housing and 
Planning Rights Service (`SHPRS') who opposed any office development 
in Spitalfields and the stance of the officers of the Council In 
meetings with them was to weaken this view by illustrating the 
benefits of planning gain. 
At the time of the Borough Plan Inquiry this group, and 
othersaO, were of the view that planning gain did not provide adequate 
means of compensation to the community and had failed to ensure a 
mixture of uses. The main concern of SHPRS was to work towards 
keeping land values down so that industrial and residential 
development in Tower Hamlets would not be discouraged and while 
recognising the benefit of the housing association element in some of 
the schemes, disputed the actual benefit brought to the local residents 
by expensive private housing and squash courts. 
On the other hand, groups that did accept the practice were 
consulted on schemes and were provided with information on schemes 
under negotiation. For example, in 1981 the Spitalfields Local 
Committee presented the Council with a list of criteria by which 
planning applications should be considered and called for increased 
consultation. 
79 Peters, B. Guy "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of 
Pressure Group Influence on Bureaucracy" (1977) 9 Administration & 
Society, No. 2 191-218. 
80 See the objections to the Borough Plan discussed above in 
chapter 4. 
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1. There should be no further office development in 
Spitalfields. 
2. Where in spite of local committee opposition, office 
planning permission is granted the developers should 
provide a housing gain for Spitalfields the size of which 
should equal or be greater than the square footage of the 
office development. 
3. No consent should be granted for the demolition of 
listed buildings unless agreed plans already exist for their 
replacement and these plans are certain to be carried out. 
In general the listed buildings of the area should be 
conserved wherever possible. 
4. Buildings inside the periphery of the Conservation Areas 
should all be preserved and rehabilitated. 
5. There should be no loss of residential usage whatsoever. 
6. New industrial schemes should be judged bearing in mind 
the following points: number of local jobs created; degree of 
visual, chemical, noise pollution; degree of traffic generated; 
whether or not the development is in an existing Industrial 
development zone. 
7. Change of use of small business premises and shops 
should be judged bearing in mind the following points: local 
jobs created/lost; local need for the new shop/service being 
proposed; degree of pollution as above. 
8. There should be support of all housing schemes which 
are designed to local housing needs. "81 
There is also evidence of the influence of organisations seeking 
gains, such as the Whitechapel Art Gallery, the Friends of Christ 
Church Spitalfields and certain private individuals who owned listed 
properties in Spitalfields. 82 All of these were strongly in favour of 
planning gain and had connections with Council members or the 
officers themselves. The restoration of listed buildings in Spitalfields 
81 Agreed Criteria for Consideration of Planning Appplications, 
Spitalfields Local Committee, November 18,1981. 
82 One of whom was also on the Committee of the Friends of 
Christ Church. 
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and the promotion of the Arts were aims espoused by a number of the 
elected members who also sat on the planning committee. 
SUMMARY 
In the context of negotiation planners regard themselves 
prinipally as professional advisers, conducting themselves in accordance 
with the policies of the Borough, the expectations of their professional 
body and the knowledge gleaned from the Borough solicitors on the 
enforceability of the proposals. Some selected interest groups play a 
part in the formulation of policy but the views received from 
organised local interest groups is not automatically treated as the 
community interest. It is first measured against the professional views 
of the planner and the relationship of the group to the council. In 
all, any evidence of a community view on planning gain is lacking and 
the determination of what amounts to a gain is based upon competing 
factors which are weighted by the planner in accordance with his 
values, the values of his profession and organisational demands. 
The planner then does not stand as representative of the 
'community interest' against the interests of the development industry, 
but is himself making political decisions which become accountable 
through the Committee system within which he appears as technical 
advisor. 83 He is open to acquiring knowledge and experience not only 
03 It is clear that he does not regard himself as representative 
of the community, for example in dealing with objections raised by 
community groups to the Borough Plan where he projects himself as a 
professional giving advise and opinion based on knowledge of planning. 
See Draper, I. Proof of Evidence to the Borough Plan Inquiry Relating 
to Office Policy, May 1984 LBTH. 
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from his profession and his organisation, but also from the 
development industry he is regulating84 which is itself pursuing Its 
own interests in promoting patterns of urban growth to produce its 
own financial security and gain. 
84 The problem of regulation activities resulting In a promotion 
of the interest of those being regulated has been explored, particularly 
in the United States, with regard to administrative agencies created to 
regulate sectors of the economy which become the champions of the 
regulated. See eg., McConnell, G. Private Power and American 
Democracy, 1969 New York: Knopf. This should be related to the 
discussion on clientela relationships above. 
CHAPTER 6 
IMPLEMENTATION: THE USE OF PLANNING AGREEMENTS 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the use made of planning agreements in 
implementing planning gain schemes. As indicated above, formal 
agreements between the developer and the council are not the only 
mechanism used to enforce arrangements over planning gain in 
development schemes. When they are used they represent another 
phase in the process and the form of the agreement may be the 
subject of another round of negotiations between the parties. This 
raises a distinct set of issues as the agreement over the content of 
the scheme and the level of planning gain must be reduced to a form 
which is likely to be upheld by the courts. The central concern here 
is not the role of negotiation in planning, but rather the legitimacy of 
using this type of mechanism to secure implementation of planning 
gain schemes. 
Alternative methods of implemention which have been used are 
conditions attached to a planning consent or simply the inclusion of 
the planning gain element as a part of a revised scheme. The latter, 
however, does not put the council in the position of being able to 
require the developer to complete all of the works included in a 
scheme. The use of conditions is also problematic as the courts have 
taken a restrictive view of their use. As a result the use of planning 
agreements has increased to facilitate enforcement of the arrangements 
made over planning gain and the officers at Tower Hamlets made a 
diligent effort to ensure that the agreements were in fact enforceable 
at law. 
This chapter concentrates upon the use of these agreements and 
the issues of legality they raise. The possibility of these agreements 
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being struck down as ultra vires the local authority or as a fetter on 
the exercise of discretion is examined. The limited case law and 
literature on the use of planning agreements is discussed together with 
the limitations placed on their use by central government. The 
agreements which were actually used in Tower Hamlets, their form and 
content, are examined in chapter 8 after the details of schemes have 
been presented. 
ISSUES OF LEGALITY 
Since the earliest Town and Country Planning Act in 1932 local 
planning authorities have had the power to enter into agreements, as 
part of their development control functions and, since 1968, the 
approval of the Minister has not been required. 2 In addition, similar 
powers were included in other pieces of general legislation including 
s. 126 of the Housing Act 1974 (superceded by s. 33 Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982), s. 38 of the Highways Act 1959, 
s. 111 of the Local Government Act 1972, and in local legislation such 
as s. 16 of the GLC (General Powers) Act 1974. Planning agreements, 
therefore, often make reference in their recitals to all, or many, of 
these instruments in order to take advantage of the often overlapping 
powers they bestow. 
The present powers included in Section 52, TCPA 1971 are as 
follows: 
1 s. 34 TCPA 1932; s. 10 TCPA 1943; s. 25 TCPA 1947; s. 37 TCPA 
1962; s. 52 TCPA 1971. 
2 Scedule 9, paragraph 19, TCPA 1968. 
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(1) A local planning authority may enter into an agreement 
with any person interested in land in their area for the 
purpose of restricting or regulating the development or use 
of the land, either permanently or during such period as 
may be prescribed by the agreement; and any such 
agreement may contain such incidental and consequential 
provisions (including provisions of a financial character) as 
appears to the local planning authority to be necessary or 
expedient for the purposes of the agreement. 
(2) An agreement made under this section with any person 
interested in land may be enforced by the local planning 
authority against persons deriving title under that person in 
respect of that land, as if the local planning authority were 
possessed of adjacent land and as if the agreement had been 
expressed to be made for the benefit of such land ... 
(3) Nothing in this section or in any agreement made 
thereunder shall be construed - (a) as restricting the 
exercise, in relation to land which is the subject of any 
such agreement, of any powers exercisable by any Minister 
or authority under this Act so long as those powers are 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of the 
development plan, or in accordance with any directions 
which may have been given by the Secretary of State as to 
the provisions to be included in such a plan; or (b) as 
requiring the exercise of any such powers otherwise than as 
mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection. " 
In the introduction of a similar clause in the TCPA 1947 the 
Lord Chancellor stated that agreements under this section could be 
used to deal with many things including `gifts of land in consideration 
to develop other land; for permitting public rights of access to private 
lands in consideration of permission. '3 Beyond this there has been 
little government comment4 on the scope of the section although the 
addition of subsection (3) in the 1947 Act has been said to indicate 
that parliament had contemplated section 52 agreements being used to 
restrict statutory powers in that it sanctions such a use where the 
3 Parliamentary Debates, Lords 1946-7 Vol. 149, col. 636. 
4 See below. 
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subsequent exercise of power accords with the development plan or a 
direction from the SSE. 5 
The section itself limits the use of agreements to covenants of a 
restrictive or regulatory nature and does so by equating the position 
of the planning authority with that of a neighbour who can enforce a 
restrictive covenant made for the benefit of the land he owns. This 
has been identified as problematic in itself, as it uses a private law 
analogy to indicate the powers of a public body and so fails to take 
due account of the public law restrictions on the exercise of such 
powers, the public nature of the agreements6 and the unsatisfactory 
nature of the law on restrictive covenants.? 
The limitation of the section to covenants which restrict and 
regulate the development or use of land has been largely covered by 
adding a reference to section 126 of the Housing Act 1974 into the 
planning agreement. This section allows local authorities to enforce 
positive and negative covenants against subsequent owners of the land 
to which the agreement is addressed. It does, however, haveits own 
5 Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v Brandrose 
Investments Ltd. [1983] P&CR 349. 
6 This problem is compounded by the jurisdiction of the Lands 
Tribunal to discharge or modify such agreements under the Law of 
Property Act 1925, section 84(1), as amended by Law of Property Act 
1969, section 28, as if they were restrictive covenants. The 
jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal was confirmed by Gee v National 
Trust [1966] 1 WLR 170 and has been exercised to discharge an 
agreement less than 10 years old even though the planning authority 
opposed it on the grounds of conflict with planning policy and 
creating an undesireable precedent for other developers to remove 
agreements. negotiated as a part of the development control process. 
Re Beecham Group Ltd. 's Application (Reference No. LP/44/1979) [1980] 
P&CR 369. For a discussion of section 84 see Newsom, G. H. (1972) JPL 
62. 
7 See eg., Alder, J. Development Control, chapter 6,1979. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series. 
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drawbacks in that agreements for works to be done must relate to the 
development site itself and there is no provision specifically made for 
the payment of money to the planning authority in lieu of works to be 
carried out. The scope of section 126 is complicated in that it also 
allows for agreements for `facilitating the development of that land 
[referring to the development site] or of other land in which that 
person has an interest'. It could be argued that this is sufficient to 
cover financial arrangements under an agreement provided that the 
agreement is entered for a valid purpose. 
The ability to use section 52 to cover the payment of money has 
also been denied8, although some commentators, such as Loughlin, have 
pointed out that this is not necessarily the case as section 52 refers 
to the 'regulation' as well as the 'restriction' of development and 
includes incidental and consequential provisions 'of a financial 
character' within its terms. 9 It seems, therefore, that payments of 
money and other financial arrangements would fall within its scope 
provided they appear to the planning authority to be 'necessary or 
expedient for the purposes of the agreement'. 1° This must refer back 
to the purpose of restricting and regulating the use or development of 
land and, within the context of this thesis, raises the question of 
8 See Heap, D. (ed. ) Encyclopedia of Planning Law and Practice, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, Vol. 2 p. 2758 who cites Re Nisbet and Potts 
Contract (1905) 1 Ch. 391 per Farwell LJ at 397 on the impossibility 
of restrictive covenants to include the payment of money. 
9 Loughlin, M. Development Control: The Importance of Social 
and Economic Considerations, 1977. University of Warwick, LL. M. 
thesis, p. 62. 
10 See the note on section 52 agreements in DOE circular 22/83 
Planning Gain, Appendix A. 
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whether an agreement to secure planning gain is entered into for such 
a purpose. 
Section 52 agreements were originally used to enable local 
planning authorities to restrict and regulate the use of land before a 
development plan had been prepared, but since 1968 the number of 
such agreements has increased dramatically. Also, since 1965 local act 
powers to enter into positive and negative covenants have spread 
throughout the country" and in 1974 the GLC obtained such local 
powers on behalf of all London boroughs. Under section 16 of the 
GLC (General Powers) Act 1974 `any undertaking or agreement' made 
with developers will be binding on successors in title but there must 
be an underlying requirement here also for it to fall within the powers 
of a local authority. 
Some indication of the scope of section 52 can be gleaned from 
the debates preceding the Housing Act 1974. In the Sheaf Report 
published in 1972 the scope of section 52 was specifically considered. 
It was acknowledged the use of the section included the imposition of 
obligations on developers to financially contribute towards 
infrastructure costs, but went on to suggest its amendment to include 
positive obligations to remove any doubts. 12 The Government White 
Paper that followed encouraged local authorities to require developers 
to contribute towards the costs of services which make housing 
11 These powers are not standardised but may vary considerably 
from one area to another. eg. Leicestershire County Council Act, 1970, 
s. 6(1) compared to Coventry Corporation Act 1972, s. 15 which details 
such forms of regulation as the developer conveying an interest to a 
third party to carry out the works, dedication of public rights of way 
and open space, carparking and maintenance of open space. 
12 Report of the Working Party on Local Authority/Private 
Enterprise Partnership Schemes, 1972, paragraphs 49 to 52, London: HMSO. 
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developements feasible (such as the provision of roads, open space and 
schools) and which were presently provided through the public purse. 13 
It was further agreed by the government that the provisons of section 
52 and section 111 Local Government Act 197214 should be augmented 
to strengthen the powers of local planning authorities to reach such 
agreements. 15 
Housing development is frequently held up because the 
public authorities responsible for providing essential services 
cannot readily finance them as quickly as the developer 
would wish. The prospect of heavy expenditure on ancillary 
services often makes local authorities reluctant to give 
planning permission for housing on land which is otherwise 
ripe for development. This difficulty can be met by an 
agreement under section 52 of the TCPA 1971 between the 
authority and the developer under which the latter agrees to 
contribute towards the provision of the services made 
necessary by the development. Authorities are however 
generally reluctant to make such agreements as these can be 
evaded where the authority does not have local Act powers 
to bind successsors in title to the positive covenants 
involved. The Government ... will introduce early legislation 
empowering all local authorities to make agreements with 
13 Widening the Choice: the Next Steps in Housing, April 1973, 
Cmnd. 5280, paragraph 23. London: HMSO. 
14 Which reads "Without prejudice to any powers exercisable 
apart from the section but subject to the provisions of this Act and 
any other enactment passed before or after this Act, a local authority 
shall have power to do anything (whether or not involving the 
expenditure of money or the acquisitions or disposal of any property 
or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or 
incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions. " In Appendix A 
to DOE Circular 46/83 "Planning Gain" the use of this section is 
indicated to "enable agreements to be made for the payment of money 
or the transfer of assets to a local authority where this will facilitate 
the discharge of the functions of the authority. The section does not 
empower the local authority to require such a transfer, the transfer 
must be by agreement. " 
15 Parliamentary Debates, Commons. Written Answer. Vol. 867 
col. 3745, cited In Jowell, "Bargaining in Development Control " (1977) 
JPL 414-433 at p. 417 and In Loughlin, Development Control: The 
Importance of Social and Economic Considerations, 1977. University of 
Warwick, LL. M. Thesis at p. 68. 
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developers under section 52 binding on successors in 
title. " 18 
There was, then, at this stage an acceptance and encouragement 
of the use of the provisions in general legislation to allow local 
authorities to seek contributions from developers for infrastructure 
occasioned by the development. 17 Towards the end of the 1970's 
there was a reasonable amount of academic interest in this area's and 
Hawke carried out a three year research study of the use of `planning 
agreements' by 328 local authorities. By this time 'planning 
agreements' was a term of art used to refer to agreements expressed 
to be made under all or some of the various pieces of general 
legislation19 and the appropriate local legislation and which, as a 
shorthand expression, carries with it an aura of validity as a legal 
concept. In fact much of the literature does not define the term at all 
or question the use of it to describe such agreements. 
16 supra note 13 at paragraph 23. 
17 The Dobry Report also encouraged increased use of section 
52 agreements to enable planning permission to be granted where it 
would otherwise be refused. Review of the Development Control 
System, Final Report by George Dobry QC, 1975. London: HMSO. 
18. See eg., Grant, M. "Planning By Agreement " (1975) JPL 501; 
Aves, M. "Enforcing Section 52 Agreements " (1976) JPL 216; Jowell, J. 
"Bargaining in Development Control " (1977) JPL 414; Suddards, R. W. 
"Section 52 Agreements: A Case for New Legislation " (1979) JPL 661; 
Byrne, S. "Conditions and Agreements: The Local Authority's Viewpoint 
" (1979) JPL Occasional Paper, Development Control: Thirty Years On; 
Hawke, Dr. J. N., "Section 52 Agreements and the Fettering of Planning 
Powers " (1980) JPL 386. 
19 In addition to those mentioned above the Highways Act 1959, 
s. 40 allows agreements for the dedication of lands for road purposes 
and under s. 278 Highways Act 1980 a highway authority proposing to 
do works can enter into an agreement with a devleoper to do them in 
a particular manner or complete by a particular date for the benefit of 
a developer in return for a contribution by the developer towards the 
costs. 
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Hawke's study, published in 1981 concluded that the use of 
planning agreements fell into eight, at times overlapping, categories21, 
namely occupancy; the abrogation, restriction or modification of land 
uses; the regulation of the future development of land; the regulation 
of complex development; sewage and drainage requirements; the 
attainment of planning gain; pollution control and enforcement. The 
agreements were sometimes used to reinforce a planning permission 
condition and at other times to avoid the uncertainty or, less often, 
the known constraints of the enforcability of conditions. 22 Overall 
the study found that the principle reason for using the agreements 
was for enforcement and did not go on to question the legality of the 
agreements. 
Although local planning authorities sometimes use an 
agreement in order to achieve a measure of development 
control which would otherwise be clearly impossible, eg. by 
reference to the legal limits of planning conditions, it seems 
to be more frequently the case that an agreement is 
resorted to either in order to avoid the uncertainties of 
planning law or in order to reinforce development control: 
particularly conditions. Furthermore, there seems to be a 
feeling in practice that there is a greater likelihood that a 
developer will comply with an element of development 
20 Hawke, Dr. J. N. "Planning Agreements in Practice " (1981) 
JPL, 5-14 & 86-97. 
21 Jowell (1977) op. cit. supra note 15 divides agreements to 
secure planning gain into 9 categories namely specification of use; 
public rights of way on the developer's land; dedication of land for 
public use; extinguishing existing user; provision of community 
buildings; rehabilitation of property; provision of infrastructure; gift of 
site or building for residential use; commuted payments for carparking. 
22 Jowell, in his research, cited supra note 15, involving postal 
questionnaires sent to 106 of the 370 local authorities (including all 
London Boroughs) in 1975 and interviews with 20 of the sample 
randomly selected, found a similar split in the use of the agreements, 
although he does not state whether more or less were used to avoid 
uncertainty or to cover situations where conditions would be clearly 
unenforceable. 
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control which is incorporated in a formal, legal 
agreement. "23 
The courts have not adequately clarified the relationship between 
section 52 agreements and the imposition of conditions. In Tarmac 
Properties Ltd. v Secretary of State for Wales and Another24 Douglas 
Frank QC, sitting as a deputy judge, did not explore this issue on an 
application under section 245 TCPA 1971 which raised the relationship 
between conditions and section 52. The Secretary of State had 
confirmed a refusal of consent for a development following an Inquiry 
at which the Inspector had indicated the grant of permission if a 
section 52 agreement was entered into to secure potential rights of 
access over part of the site. He had indicated that a section 52 
agreement was the appropriate way to secure such a right and no 
evidence was presented on imposing a condition to reach the same 
result. The parties did negotiate on such an agreement but it was not 
executed and the Secretary of State issued a decision agreeing with 
the Inspector, and dismissing the appeal as no section 52 agreement 
was forthcoming. 
The Inspector recommended that, in the absence of a 
section 52 agreement, the appeal be dismissed. The 
Secretary of State agrees generally with the Inspector's 
conclusions and accepts his recommendation. He makes no 
comment however on the question of a section 52 agreement 
since this, and the details of any condition which may be 
imposed on any subsequent issue of planning consent, would 
be matters for consideration by the local planning authority 
in the first instance ... the Secretary of State hereby 
dismisses your client's appeal. "25 
23 idid. p. 96 (emphasis in the original). 
24 [1976) P&CR 103. 
25 Quoted ibid. at 106-107. 
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Douglas Frank QC refused to quash the decision of the Secretary of 
State, saying that there was no evidence that he had failed to take 
account of his powers to impose conditions. 
A similar situation came before Sir Douglas Frank QC two years 
later in Brittania (Cheltenham) Ltd. v SSE and Tewkesbury Council26, 
where, between an appeal being lodged and the Secretary of State 
making his decision, section 52 agreements were entered into for a 
children's play area and a social/shopping centre, thus making the 
housing development proposals acceptable to the planning authority. 
The Secretary of State refused to take account of the agreements as 
their content could not, in his view, be included as valid planning 
conditions as they did not form a part of the application submitted. 
Sir Douglas stated that this view was too narrow and that the content 
of the agreements amounted, under the factual circumstances, to 
ancillary development and therefore relevant to the application. He 
went on to find that most aspects of the agreements could be 
contained in conditions, distinguishing Hall & Co. v Shoreham-by-Sea 
UDC27 on the basis that the conditions included no aspect ublic 
dedication. 28 The right to public access was dealt with in the 
26 [1978] JPL 554. 
27 [1964]1 All ER 1; [1964]1 WLR 240. 
28 Distinguishing Hall & Co v Shoreham-by-Sea in this way is 
not very convincing as to divorce public use from the facilities being 
provided would make the conditions meaningless. Also there were 
cases - eg. Penwith DC v SSE [19771 JPL 371 - to indicate a 
movement away from using the extent of interference with private 
property rights as an indicator of validity, prefering a test of whether 
the interference was so gross as to make the condition totally 
unreasonable and outside the scope of planning. See (1968) JPL 558 for 
discussion. 
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agreement, without which there would have been a condition to 
provide 'public' space with no way of ensuring public access. 
In a later case Sir Dougla Frank QC did state that a planning 
authority should still impose conditions even if they are difficult to 
enforce, but he did not go on to comment on unenforceable conditions 
or the alternative of using a section 52 agreement. 
It was said that, at the inquiry, the Board [as local planning 
authority] had averred that the disputed conditions would be 
difficult to enforce and that the matters would be better 
dealt with by an agreement under section 52 of the Act of 
1971. I think it important to draw a distinction between 
conditions that are unenforceable (they will usually also be 
difficult or impossible to comply with) and those that are 
difficult to enforce; I do not think it anything to the point 
that a condition otherwise desirable should not be imposed 
because it may be difficult to enforce. As to the point on a 
section 52 agreement, the short answer is that no such 
agreement has been made. "29 
The Court of Appeal30 has recognised the use of section 52 
agreements as a method of enforcement to cover the gap between the 
imposition of conditions and the local planning authority's lack of 
power to enforce them. However, the extent to which this could be 
taken was not explored. For example, the Court of Appeal did not 
examine whether a local authority could enforce the content of 
conditions through this device where those conditions, if attached to a 
planning permission would have been considered ultra vires . Such an 
interpretation is probably still possible, particularly as the courts and 
29 Peak Park Joint Planning Board v SSE and Another [1979] 
P&CR 361 at 385. 
30 Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v Brandrose 
Investments Ltd [1983] P&CR; [1983] JPL 574. 
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the Department31 have reasserted the standard freedom of contract 
arguments as to the choice of a developer to enter into such a 
contract. 32 
In Bradford City Metropolitan Council v SSE and Another33, 
however, the Court of Appeal did attempt to narrow the gap between 
a valid condition and a valid section 52 agreement. The case 
concerned an application to build a development of 200 house on the 
outskirts of Bradford. The planning authority was prepared to give 
consent but the highways department objected on the grounds that the 
road adjacent to the site was inadequate and required widening. The 
Council then entered into negotiations with the developer ('as is not 
unusual'34) and the plans were amended to allow for the widening to 
take place. A permission was issued with a condition requiring the 
houses not to be occupied until the road widening was complete to the 
satisfaction of the Council. Shortly afterwards the Highway Authority 
turned down proposals by the developer for the road to be widened at 
31 In Circular 22/83 the DOE make the point that a condition 
cannot be used to require a section 52 to be entered into; it must be 
done out of choice. 
32 This argument Is given more force if the general trend of 
the courts to reassert freedom of contract over other considerations is 
taken into account. For example, the recent case of D&F Estates v 
Church Commissioners (1988) The Times LR, July 19th, where freedom 
of contract challenged the extended use of tort to impose liability. 
Support for this approach could also come from the more restrictive 
use of equitable concepts to mitigate the effect of contracts, such as 
penalties and forfeiture. See eg. The Scaptrade [1983] 1 ALL ER 301; 
Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 
301; Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Panapadopoulos [1980) 2 All 
ER 29. The government has also legislated towards privatisation and, 
therefore, against state interference with freedom of contract in areas 
such as landlord and tenant and the control of women's working hours. 
33 [1986] 1 EGLR 199. 
34 idid. per Lloyd, LJ at 200. 
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the expense of the authority and the developer appealed against the 
condition on the consent. 
The Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal by the Council against 
the decision of the Secretary of State who found the condition invalid 
(upheld in the Queen's Bench Division), held that the condition was 
ultra vires as part of the land upon which the road was to be widened 
was not under the control of the developer and the remainder would 
require cession of land by the developer, and so fell foul of circular 
1/85, paragraph 63: 
No payment of money or other consideration can be required 
when granting a permission or any other kind of consent 
required by a statute, except where there is specific 
statutory authority. Conditions requiring, for instance, the 
cession of land for road improvements or for open space, or 
requiring the developer to contribute money towards the 
provision of public car parking facilities, should accordingly 
not be attached to planning permissions. Similarly, 
permission cannot be granted subject to a condition that the 
applicants enter into an agreement under section 52 of the 
Act or other powers. However, conditions may in some cases 
reasonably be imposed to oblige developers to carry out 
works, eg. provision of an access road, which are directly 
designed to facilitate the development. " 
The Secretary had gone on to state that the condition was unlawful 
and the planning authority should have either refused the development 
outright or negotiated a section 52 agreement. This was taken up by 
counsel for the planning authority who argued, inter alia, that the 
developers had voluntarily agreed to the condition, as they would 
under a section 52 agreement, and thus they were not being required 
to do anything. Counsel for the Secretary of State asked the Court 
of Appeal to say that a condition requiring the developer to carry out 
or fund a public function is always unlawful, regardless of the degree 
of acquiesence of the developer. 
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Consequently, the Court of Appeal addressed itself primarily to 
the effect of acquiesence to a condition, but also remarked on the 
possible alternative use of a section 52 agreement by putting them 
both in the context of 'manifest unreasonableness' as used in Newbury 
District Council v SSE. 35 As far as the condition was concerned, they 
held that a manifestly unreasonable condition, which by applying Hall 
& Co. v Shoreham-by-Sea UDC36 they considered this one to be, 
remains ultra vires even if it is suggested or agreed to by the 
applicant. 37 Lloyd LJ (with whom Connor and Croom-Johnson LJJ 
agreed) went on to state that in the case of a commercial transaction 
the parties themselves are the best judge of what is reasonable, but in 
the case of a planning decision the 'public interest' was also 
concerned, thus taking the applicant and the planning authority out of 
the usual situation produced by a commercial contract. 
" ... the analogy with an ordinary commercial transaction is 
not complete. The 'parties ' to a planning application are 
not in the same position as the parties to a commercial 
contract. For in addition to the interests of the 'parties ', 
there is the public interest in securing the fair imposition 
of planning control as between one developer and 
another. "38 
(HL). 
35 [1978] 1 WLR 1241; [1979] 1 All ER 243 (CA); [1981] AC 578 
35 [1964] 1 All ER 1; [1964] 1 WLR 240. It is interesting to 
compare this finding with that of Sir Douglas Frank QC in Brittania 
(Cheltenham) Limited v SSE discussed above, where a condition 
requiring provision for open space was considered valid and Hall & Co 
was distinguished on the grounds of there being no reference to its 
dedication to the public within the condition. The present case could 
be distinguished on the basis that the planning authority acknowledged 
the need for the road to be widened as it was below standard, rather 
than purely as a result of the housing development approved. 
37 This principle has also been incorporated in Circular 1/85, 
paragraph 35. 
38 [1986] 1 EGLR 199 at 202H. 
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Having made this point the Court of Appeal were free to suggest 
constraints on the use of section 52 agreements, although they did so 
only after making clear that their comments were obiter dicta and 
without the benefit of extensive argument and after describing the 
subject as raising questions 'of considerable difficulty and importance'. 
In their view, a section 52 agreement would also be invalid if its 
terms were manifestly unreasonable. This was interpreted to mean 
that if the section 52 agreement imposed an obligation similar to that 
included in a manifestly unreasonable condition, it too would be 
invalid, but if it satisfied the requirements of circular 22/83 on 
Planning Gain39 it would be reasonable. 
I propose to confine myself to two observations, one general 
and one particular. The general observation is that the 
practice under section 52, convenient and beneficial though 
it undoubtedly is, may have gone beyond what the strict 
language of the section justifies. We were told that such 
agreements are now very common, much commoner than they 
used to be. It may be that in some future case it will be 
necessary for the court to consider the extent of powers of 
planning authorities to enter into agreements under section 
52. I am aware of course that such agreements are 
frequently entered into under combined powers ... 
The particular observation is that I do not accept ... 
that the present condition would have been lawful if 
incorporated in a section 52 agreement. If the condition was 
manifestly unreasonable, and so beyond the powers of the 
planning authority to impose it, whether or not the 
developers consented, it must follow that it was also beyond 
the powers of the planning authority to include the 
condition as 'an incidental or consequential provision' of an 
agreement restricting or regulating land under section 52. 
That is not to say that this might not have been a 
case for a more limited agreement under section 52. A 
contribution towards the cost of widening (the road) might 
well have been reasonable, due to the increased use of the 
road resulting from the development, and the benefit to the 
occupiers of the residential development: see Circular 22/33 
... But I need not pursue that consideration 
further. For 
there is all the difference in the world between a provision 
of a section 52 agreement requiring a contribution from a 
developer towards the cost of widening the highway and a 
39 Discussed above under Official Responses to Planning Gain. 
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provision which requires the entire works to be carried out 
at his risk and expense. "40 
Thus the suggestion by Lloyd LJ is that the central issue in 
determining the validity of an agreement is not the nature or the 
quality of the covenants, but its reasonableness, and that should be 
judged with reference to the circular on Planning Gain. This approach 
is different from that taken in the Queen's Bench Division by 
Farquharson J. on this point who considered that if the content of the 
condition had been included in a section 52 agreement, that agreement 
would probably have been valid as the terms of the section are 
specifically addressed to expenditure on associated works. After 
hearing argument on the use of section 52, in which it was argued by 
counsel for the Secretary of State that any sale of planning permission 
however disguised should be unlawful, Farquharson J. resolved that 
different considerations apply where the developer makes a commercial 
decision to enter into an agreement with the planning authority. 
It is repugnant to any lawyer that money or indeed any 
other consideration should be extracted from an applicant or 
a developer as a price for granting planning permission, a 
task which is entrusted throughout the country to local 
authorities to be given or withheld according to the 
intrinsic merits of the application itself. Particularly is this 
so, of course, when the consideration required would be for 
the benefit of the authority which is vested with the right 
to grant or withhold planning permission. 
Put like that, of course, it sounds like a statement of 
high principle, but the principle in the context of this 
legislation adopts a rather battered look when one is 
referred, as I have been, to the terms of section 52 of the 
1971 Act. That section, as was noted by the minister in his 
decision, makes provision whereby in circumstances akin to 
the present the developer and the planning authority can 
come to some agreement whereby the expenditure involved 
in what one might describe as associated works can be 
apportioned. In fact I am told ... that as a matter of 
practice the effect of such an agreement almost invariably 
40 [1986] 1 EGLR 199,202L-203B. 
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is that the developer is required to do just that which he 
was required to do by the condition imposed in the present 
case. So although it is contended that the principle would 
exclude a condition being imposed under section 29 of the 
Act, one arrives at precisely the same position when the 
parties come to an arrangement within the terms of section 
52. '41 
The difference in approach essentially lies in an opposing view of 
the role of a local planning authority. The Court of Appeal 
concentrated upon the duty of a planning authority to act in the 
interests of the public and presented the role of the court as 
controlling and confining its operations to those justifiable as 
reasonable under the Wednesbury principles. It also reasserted that the 
court is the appropriate body to decide the application of those 
principles to the question 'of considerable difficulty and importance' 
presented by the use of section 52 agreements. The effect of this 
being not to allow the authority to impose 'public' obligations on a 
private developer, as they interpret 'public interest' as a duty to 
ensure that conditions are imposed fairly from one developer to the 
next. 42 They extend this approach to support a restrictive use of 
section 52 by distinguishing the position from that of an ordinary 
commercial transaction, thus enabling the court to intervene in the 
'public interest' so defined. 
In concentrating on the reasonableness of the obligation upon the 
developer the court did not assess the validity of such an agreement 
in the context of proper planning objectives, an approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal in cases where section 52 agreements have been 
41 [1985] 1 EGLR 268, at 270. 
42 [1986] 1 EGLR at 202H. 
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specifically considered. 43 Rather they were saying that it may be 
justifiable to enter into an agreement with a developer to do 
something, but such a weighty obligation as the one suggested here is 
unfair. Indeed, Lloyd LJ does distinguish a more limited obligation, 
such as a contribution towards infrastructure, as probably a valid use 
of section 52. Thus, the approach was not to preclude the developer 
from entering into an arrangement to achieve a planning consent, but 
to ensure that the local authority does not seek obligations which 
would provide too heavy a burden on the developer. 
The lower court, however, while accepting that the principle of 
controlling potential abuse of powers is a valid one in so far as the 
authority must comply with the legislation and consider each 
application on its merits, introduced market forces into the equation. 
Farquharson J. appeared to accept that the commercial realities of the 
planning process involve a weighing up by the developer of what he 
can afford to do in order to meet the policies of the planning 
authority. If, in order to overcome obstacles to his application, the 
developer is prepared to enter into a contract so as to apportion the 
costs of works associated with his development, then it is within the 
scope of section 52 for the authority to make such an agreement. " 
43 See L. A. H. Ames v North Bedfordshire Borough Council [1980] 
EGD 895; 253 EG 55, where the Court of Appeal held a section 52 
agreement which prevented the developer from commencing a housing 
development until improvements to the sewerage system were under 
contract to be valid on this basis; and Abbey Homesteads 
(Developments) Ltd v Northamptonshire County Council et. al. [1986] 
JPL 683 where an agreement restricting the use of land to a school as 
part of a housing development was held to be a permanent restrictive 
covenant for the purposes of valuation as it was executed to ensure 
proper planning of the area. 
44 This approach has been adopted by other decisions in the 
Queens Bench Division. See eg., Rv SSE. John Mowlem and Co. Pic.. 
LDDC ex garte GLC [1986] JPL 32, where Glidewell J, in assessing 
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He was prepared to take this view, even where the authority 
benefitted directly, at least partly because that was presented as 
common practice. The Court of Appeal seemed to be prompted by that 
same piece of information to try and restrict the use of such 
agreements. 
The practical effect of the Court of Appeal decision is difficult 
to assess particularly in view of the language used in introducing their 
opinion as obiter dicta. Lloyd LJ does not deal with other legislative 
provisions enabling authorities to enter into agreements and does 
suggest in his judgement that the effect of the condition could 
possibly have been achieved through negative wording. Consequently, 
the judgment appears more as a provocative warning than as a weighty 
precedent, although it certainly does cast doubt upon the scope of the 
use of section 52 agreements, something which the lower courts have 
not done and which Ministerial decisions have also left largely open- 
ended. 45 
whether controls on Air Traffic Movements to and from the Stolport 
airport under consideration should be included in a condition stated "If 
these controls are legally acceptable as planning conditions they should 
be attached to the planning permission granted. If not, planning 
permission should be withheld until a section 52 agreement is amended 
accordingly. " 
45 See eg., Appeals against decision of Cardiff City Council to 
refuse (1) residential development on land at Merthyr Road. 
Tongwynlais ... August 22.1985 
[1986] JPL 855 where the SSE 
permitted development subject to a prior opportunity to allow the 
developer to complete a section 52 agreement for the provision of 
public open space (not included as a condition) to ameliorate the 
effect of the development; Appeal relating to an application for 
planning permission to erect. 6 indoor bowling rinks and associated 
accomodation at Sun Printers Sports Ground. Bellmont Wood Ave. 
Watford ... October 31.1986 
[1987] JPL 222 where an agreement to 
build tennis courts on another site to replace those lost by the 
development was considered desireable but not essential to the scheme; 
Note in the Estates Times, June 25 1982 on an appealed housing 
scheme In the East Midlands where the Secretary of State, contrary to 
the Inspector's report, concluded that the scheme could be built 
190 
Certainly the use of planning agreements has not often been 
challenged in the courts as being ultra vires the planning authority. 
As the forerunners to section 52 required ministerial endorsement the 
likelihood of blatantly ultra vires provisions was unlikely46 and so 
they did not encourage challenge. Also, developers would have been 
discouraged from challenging a section 52 agreement which was 
required as a condition because the courts had, in 1969, decided that a 
planning permission would fail if the nature of an ultra vires condition 
was such as to show that consent would not have been given without 
it. 47 This left the court with a discretion to determine the validity of 
a consent where a planning agreement was entered into without the 
use of a condition but as a precondition to theat consent. This could 
be taken as adding an extra (and potentially expensive) element of 
uncertainty to the outcome of any determination by the courts on the 
validity of a section 52 agreement. 
An alternative course of action for a developer who was 
dissatisfied with the terms of his consent would be not to appeal 
against the conditions themselves but to seek a judicial declaration 
through the Divisional Court as to the validity of the exercise of 
power of the planning authority in imposing the particular conditions. 
provided the developer entered into an agreement to contribute 
towards the cost of a drainage system for nearby land which would be 
flooded as a result of the development. 
46 In this regard Jowell (1977) and Loughlin (1977) op. cit. supra 
note 15 point out that between 1964 and 1968 only 8 out of 542 
agreements were not approved and, according to the DOE, approval 
was only withheld where there was a technical legal (rather than 
policy) objection [the categories of objection are made by the works 
cited]. 
47 Kingsway Investments v Kent County Council [1969] 1 ALL 
ER 601. 
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The discretion of the court, however, is framed in such a way as to 
expect a developer to exercise any remedy available under the relevant 
legislation. This is indicated very clearly in Ministerial Circular 
54/1967 and Development Control Policy Note No. 548 which concerned 
the practice of requiring contributions from developers towards 
carparking facilities, where on-site standards are impractical. The 
Ministers did approve the practice provided that it was entirely 
'voluntary' on the part of the developer, but added that should the 
planning authority make unreasonable demands the developer should 
appeal to the Secretary of State who would grant permission free of 
the condition requiring payment and without internal caparking 
standards being met. 49 
However, the courts have allowed parties to a section 52 
agreement to pursue remedies for breach of contract before such 
statutory remedies have been exhausted. 50 In Avon County Council v 
Millard and Another51 a section 52 agreement had been entered into 
which was conditional on the grant of permission to operate a mine 
for two years. The agreement stated that the use would not continue 
beyond the two year period but could do so if the applicant obtained 
another permission which would not be forthcoming unless they 
constructed at their own cost a new access road between the mine and 
the A36 road. The two year period expired but no permission had 
48 appended to DOE circular 23/1969, later replaced by 26/1979. 
+9 A not dissimilar clause appears in circular 22/83 "Planning Gain". 
50 See Beaconsfield DC v Gams (1974) 234 EG 749. Discussed at 
(1976) JPL 732,738; Grant, M. "Planning by Agreement" (1975) JPL 501; 
Levings, A. P. "Planning by Agreement - the Beaconsfield Case" (1975) 
JPL 704. 
51 [1985] P&CR 275. 
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been granted and the access road had not been built. The Council 
applied to the court for an injunction to restrain the breach of 
contract occasioned by the continued use of the mine. At first 
instance the application was refused on the grounds that it was 
premature as the statutory remedies provided by sections 87 and 88 of 
the TCPA 1971 (enforcement notice and appeal) had not been 
exhausted. 52 No appeal had been lodged against refusals for the 
continuance of use and an appeal against an enforcement notice issued 
by the Council was still pending. On appeal Fox and Dillon L. JJ. held 
that the judge had misdirected himself as nothing in section 52 
prevented the parties from pursuing remedies for breach of contract at 
any time, indeed, in their view, section 52(2) specifically preserved the 
right to do so. 
The central issue on an assessment of the validity of using 
section 52 agreements for the purposes of enforcing a planning gain 
arrangement is whether they are intra vires the purpose for which 
they have been used. There is some judicial recognition of the use of 
section 52 agreements to secure planning gain. In McLaren v SSE and 
Another53 the court found a decision of the Secretary of State to be 
inadequate because he failed to take account of planning gains 
included in a section 52 agreement which may have been sufficient to 
balance the disadvantages of the proposed development. In that same 
case it was considered 'perfectly proper' for the Secretary of State to 
52 Relying upon Stafford Borough Council v Elkenford Ltd. 
[1977] 1 WLR 324; [1977] 2 All ER 519; 75 LGR 337, CA, a case 
concerning Sunday trading in breach of the Shops Act 1950. 
53 QBD, 10 December 1980 noted 370 SJ 79, transcript: Barnett, 
Lenton. The facts of this case are given above in Official Responses 
to Planning Gain. 
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suggest, after an inquiry, that should a section 52 agreement (in the 
form of one produced at the inquiry) be entered into within a 
reasonable time so as to balance the disadvantages of the proposal, 
permission would be granted. This 'machinery of an administrative 
nature' would, consequently, allow permission for a development which 
would otherwise be refused. 
The relevant question then seems to be: Is the planning gain 
included in the agreement there to restrict or regulate the use or 
development of land ? As already established, the GLDP54 and various 
borough office policies refer to the attainment of planning gain in 
connection with certain aspects of office developments. A local 
authority is required under the TCPA 197155 to have regard to the 
development plan when determining applications and to 'other material 
considerations' which is likely to cover non-statutory policy 
statements. This has been reinforced by section 86(3) of the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act 1980 which requires planning 
authorities to seek to achieve the general objectives of the structure 
plan for the area in determining applications. Thus it could be argued 
that in order for the courts to take the view that agreements which 
relate to such policy objectives fall outside of the ambit of a planning 
agreement they would have to view the particular gain as something 
which no reasonable person, properly acquainted with the facts, would 
regard as a 'gain' or 'advantage'. Alternatively, they would need to 
demonstrate that agreements for securing the objective of these 
policies were not for the purpose of restricting or regulating land. 
54 Paragraph 4.15. 
55 Section 29. 
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The first possibility calls for an assessment of the role of 
planning, who it is who should benefit and a definition of the criteria 
which must be satisfied in order for any particular provision to 
amount to a `gain'. For example, in Tower Hamlets SHPRS regard the 
only acceptable gain in Spitalfields to be housing, whereas the 
planning authority regarded the restoration of Christ Church to be a 
gain as it represents an historic building of national importance which 
would contribute to the character of the locality and provide the 
community with self-respect. Both may be justifiable, but the 
justification relies upon a particular definition of `gain' which is not 
provided by the development plan. It is true that the Christ Church 
agreements did recite policies in the GLDP which encourage the 
restoration of historic buildings as a basis for treating it as planning 
gain, and such restoration is listed in the GLDP as an example of 
gain, but the choice of the actual gain on each application is left to 
the planning authorities. There is no definition in the GLDP, only a 
list of six examples of planning gain. 
It would also be necessary to show a sufficient nexus between 
the content of the gain and the development itself: does the gain 
proposed mitigate or counterbalance the loss, in planning terms, 
produced by allowing an office block to be built ? For example, can 
the planning authority produce evidence to show that office 
development within a conservation area is disadvantageous but not 
fatal to the objectives of the area and can be neutralised by the 
provision of this particular, or one of these particular, planning gains? 
In order to pursue the second possibility it would be necessary to 
go on to show that the gain involves the restriction or regulation of 
land. As indicated above the terms of section 52 do cover some 
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obligations which are positive in nature, where they achieve the 
purpose of restricting or regulating the use or development of land. 
Also incidental and consequential provisions considered necessary or 
expedient for the purposes of the agreement are valid. Again this is a 
matter of interpretation but it clearly covers physical infrastructureM 
for the site but also accommodates arrangements which are intended to 
achieve wider planning objectives. Referring back to the above 
example, if the office development is, by means of a valid policy, 
linked with the restoration of Christ Church as compensation for the 
disadvantages it produces is the planning authority not regulating the 
use of land ? And is the payment of money to facilitate that 
restoration not incidental to such regulation ? Or, stated more widely, 
if the planning authority has a planning objective to balance the mix 
of uses in an area, is it not regulating the use of land by agreeing 
that the developer has a responsibility to provide such a mix in that 
area ? Again the essential elements are what amounts to a valid 
planning objective and what is included in a balanced mix of use, 
which can only be assessed in the light of a clear view of what 
planning is. 
Following the Court of Appeal decision in Bradford City 
Metropolitan Council v SSE discussed above, these considerations must 
be looked at in the light of `reasonableness' not only in terms of 
whether it is reasonable for the authority to require a planning 
56 See eg. LAH Ames Ltd v North Bedfordshire Borough 
Council, Court of Appeal, 253 EG 55, [1980] EGD 895,23 October 1979, 
where an agreement to prevent commencement of development until 
improvement works were carried out to the drainage system were 
under contract was held to be valid. See also DOE Circular 15/84 Land 
for Housing, Annex A, paragraph 9, which encourages the use of 
section 52 agreements to avoid refusals for development on the basis 
of infrastructure Inadequacies. 
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advantage, but also whether the extent of that advantage is itself 
reasonable. The major difficulty here is in determining the basis for 
such an assessment, and while the Court of Appeal couched its 
decision in the language of `public interest' its interpretation of that 
phrase was clearly concerned not with the needs of the area as 
expressed in planning or other policies, nor with the political 
objectives of an elected local council, but with the uniformity in 
obligations imposed on developers generally. The centralist approach 
adopted in this case reinforces the government line on decreasing local 
autonomy in the public sector and attempts to override the local 
effects of central economic policies57 as well as the professional view 
of local planning. 
THE FETTERING OF DISCRETION 
This in turn raises the issue of the ability of the planning 
authority to fetter its own discretion by using such agreements as well 
as the purpose of the actual content of the agreement itself58, 
particularly as the most obvious consideration which the planning 
authority may provide is the grant of permission. 59 As a general rule 
57 For a discussion of this relationship see Loughlin, 
M. "Municipal Socialism in a Unitary State " IN: McAuslan, P. and 
McEldowney, JF. (ed) Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, pp. 82/106, 
1985, London: Sweet & Mawxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series. 
58 This is explored in relation to Tower Hamlets agreements in 
chapter 8.. 
59 There has been a longstanding debate as to whether 
consideration is necessary under section 52, although the point is 
usually avoided by making the agreement under seal. In Windsor and 
Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v Brandrose Investments Ltd. [1983] 
P&CR 349 the Court of Appeal appeared to assume that consideration 
was required: "It follows that an agrreement made pursuant to section 
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a public body with statutory powers cannot enter into a contract or 
otherwise act in a way which is incompatible with the exercise of 
those powers or inhibits the discharge of their duties. 50 Three cases 
on planning agreements61 entered into under legislation which did not 
include section 52(3)62 reaffirmed this approach by making broad 
pronouncements against the legality of planning authorities entering 
into any agreement which purports to fetter their powers. 63 For 
example, in Ransom & Luck Ltd. v Surbiton BC Lord Greene, MR asks 
of section 34, TCPA 1932 
Is it likely that Parliament, in a section falling under the 
head I have mentioned ['Supplemental Provisions with 
Respect to Schemes'], and without express words to that 
effect, would do anything so unusual, so explosive, as to 
enable a planning authority to do something which all the 
principles laid down and observed by the courts and the 
legislature in regard to statutory duties of this kind forbid, 
namely, to tie its hands and contract itself out of 
them ? "" 
52 before planning permission has been granted, as the relevant 
agreement in this case was, may become irrelevant if planning 
permission is not granted or ineffective if conditions are imposed 
inconsistent with the agreement because circumstances may change 
before the time when the local planning authority comes to perform 
its public duty of determining a planning application. " stated at 354. 
60 See eg., Birkdale District Electricity Supply Company v 
Southport Corporation [1926] AC 355. 
61 Ransom & Luck v Surbiton BC [1949] 1 All ER 185, [1949] 
Ch. 180; Triggs v Staines UDC [1969] 1 Ch. 10, [1968] 2 WLR 1433; 
Stringer v MHLG [1970] 1 WLR 1281. 
62 The first two cases listed in note 6labove concerned s. 34 
TCPA 1932 and the last concerned local legislation. 
63 But see also Attorney General v Barnes Corporation and 
Ronelagh Club Ltd. [1939] Ch. 110 per Luxmoore J. for a statement of 
the court's reluctance to limit exercise of powers under section 52 and 
section 126. 
64 [1949] 1 All ER at 189. For a discussion of Ransom & Luck v 
Surbiton BC see (1975) JPL 704. 
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This extreme approach could not be right, as local authorities in 
order to carry out their duties need to enter into contracts and these 
contracts will necessarily have some effect on their statutory powers. 
There will often be situations where a public authority must 
be at liberty to bind itself for the very purpose of 
exercising its powers effectively "155 
Some cases in areas other than town planning have acknowledged some 
circumstances in which bodies with statutory powers can limit those 
powers through entering into contracts6, but there have emerged no 
clear guidelines. 67 Some suggest a test of whether the contract is 
compatible with the functions of the body in question68, whilst others 
have only found a contractual provision to be invalid where it 
blatantly conflicts with the policy behind the empowering statute. 69 
The courts have to an extent isolated the situation where there 
are several related statutory powers so that the exercise of one will 
necessarily restrict the operation of some, or all, of the others. In 
65 Wade, H. W. R. Administrative Law (4th ed. ) p. 325. 
as The leading case in this area is Ayr Harbour Trustees v 
Oswald (1883) 8 App. Cas. 623; 10 R. (HL)85 which has been interpreted as 
demonstrating the incapacity to fetter the use of powers (eg. York 
Corporation v Henry Leetham & Sons [1924]1 Ch. 557 per Russell J. ) but 
see also Birkdale op. cit.; Paterson v Provost of St Andrews (1881) 6 
App. Cas. 883; British Transport Commission v Westmorland County 
Council [1958] AC 126. For discussion see Rogerson, P. "The Fettering 
of Public Powers " (1971) PL 288. 
67 See Young, E. and Rowan-Robinson, J. "Section 52 Agreements 
and the Fettering of Powers " [1982] JPL 673-685 for a discussion of 
these cases. 
68 Eg. Birkdale District Electricity Supply Company v Southport 
Corporation [1926] AC 355. 
89 Eg. Blake v Hendon Corporation [1962] QB 283. 
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Dowty Boulton Paul Ltd. v Wolverhampton Corporation70 the local 
authority had granted certain rights over a municipal airfield to a 
private company. At some later time the local authority wished to 
develop housing on the airfield and, at first instance, the court 
allowed the agreement to be overridden as It represented a fetter on 
their exercise of powers as a housing authority. On appeal the 
agreement was held to be a valid exercise of powers and Pennycuick 
V-C distinguished this case from Ayr Harbour Trustees on the grounds 
that this case was concerned with the position after a valid exercise 
of another statutory power, rather than the fettering of powers in 
advance. 
Obviously where a power is exercised in such a manner as 
to create a right extending over a term of years, the 
existence of that right pro tanto excludes the exercise of 
other statutory powers in respect of the same subject 
matter, but there is no authority and I can see no principle 
upon which that sort of exercise could be held to be invalid 
as upon the future exercise of powers. "71 
This approach was applied directly to agreements under section 
52 in 1981 by Fox J. in Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough 
Council v Brandrose Investment Ltd. Under a section 52 agreement 
Brandrose Investments had been granted planning permission involving 
the demolition of certain buildings and three years later the planning 
authority purported to extend an existing conservation area to cover 
these properties. The local authority sought a declaration from the 
88. 
70 (1971)1 WLR 204. See comment by Evans, J. M. (1972) 35 MLR 
71 Ibid. at 210. 
72 [1981]1 WLR 1083; [1981] P&CR 327. See Young and Rowan- 
Robinson (1982) "Section 52 Agreements and the Fettering of Powers 
[1982] JPL 673/685 for a discussion. 
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court to the effect that the buildings could not be demolished and 
they also sought an injunction to restrain the intended demolition. An 
ex parte injunction was allowed but lapsed and the court refused to 
extend it after an inter partes hearing and the buildings were 
demolished. The declaration was pursued and Fox J. analysed section 
52(3) to determine whether parliament had intended to enable a 
planning authority to limit the future exercise of its powers by 
entering into a section 52 agreement. 
He concluded that they had so intended and, in the absence of a 
development plan or a direction from the SSE, the section 52 
agreement limited the authority's power to prevent demolition and 
prevented them from extending the conservation area to achieve that 
end. 
It seems to me that the only sensible construction of the 
wording of paragraph (a) (of section 52(3)] is that an 
exercise of the authority's power is not preserved, contrary 
to provisions of the agreement, save to the extent that the 
exercise is in accordance with the development plan or a 
direction of the Secretary of State in relation to the 
contents of the plan. The language of paragraph (a) seems 
to me to be quite inconsistent with a general saving of the 
authority's right to exercise its powers contrary to the 
provisions of the agreement "73 
Fox J. also interpreted section 52(3)(b) to mean that the planning 
authority could bind itself, in an agreement, as to the future exercise 
of its powers provided that any subsequent exercise of powers remains 
in accordance with the development plan or any direction of the SSE. 
Consequently, powers could be exercised against a developer entering 
into a section 52 agreement if that exercise accorded with the 
development plan for the area. 
73 [19811 P&CR at 333. 
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In construing the section in this way Fox J. allowed a planning 
authority to fetter its powers quite substantially. Other 
interpretations of the section have not been so generous; some have 
regarded section 52(1) as being too narrow to allow the fettering of 
statutory powers at all and have treated section 52(3) as merely a 
mechanism for preserving the importance of the development plan. 74 
Even accepting that the section does envisage the planning authority 
committing itself to a future course of action in exercising its powers 
by entering into an agreement, there remain ambiguities in section 
52(3) as to when such fettering of powers can take place. For 
example, it refers to the restriction of 'powers' alone and it would be 
valid to argue that it is unlikely that parliament intended also to 
include the restriction of positive duties. 75 Yet the distinction 
between the two is not always clear76 and Fox J. in Brandrose 
suggests that by implication a planning authority is enabled by section 
52(3) to restrict the execution of a duty which is associated with or 
subordinate to the exercise of power. 77 Does this mean that by 
predetermining the grant of planning permission when the agreement is 
signed the planning authority may disregard representations made by 
the public at the time of approval or received after the agreement is 
executed ? May the planning authority also disregard the principles 
74 See eg. the narrower interpretation suggested but not 
adopted by Hawke, J. N. "Section 52 Agreements and the Fettering of 
Planning Powers" (1980) JPL 386. 
75 See Stringer v MHLG [1970]1 WLR 1281; [1971]1 All ER 65. 
76 See eg., Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) 
Ltd. [1961]2 WLR 806; [1962]1 QB 416; [1961]2 All ER 46 where Lord 
Parker refers to a duty to "exercise a free and unhindered discretion". 
77 This point is explored by Young and Rowan-Robinson (1982) 
op. cit. supra note 71. 
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of natural justice by allowing itself to be biased in reaching decisions 
related to the agreementm ? 
The decision in Brandrose was appealed79 and the Court of 
Appeal, in light of the ambiguities in section 52, took a restricted 
view and concluded that whatever that section did mean, it was not 
clear enough to sanction the fettering of statutory powers. Although 
on that level the decision is understandable (the section is badly 
drafted), as the comment by Michael Purdue on the case80 points out, 
the section does seem to state that the planning authority can bind 
itself to grant consent as long as that consent accords with the 
development plan. 
The Court of Appeal to some extent took the opportunity 
presented by this case to restate the role of a local planning authority 
in determining applications. Lawton, LJ commenced his judgment by 
indicating that the planning authority appealed the decision, knowing 
their claim had no merit, to correct Fox J. 's interpretation of section 
52 which would have a serious effect on the administration of the 
planning legislation if left as a precedent. On this basis the Court 
agreed to state the limits of the section (although they exercised their 
78 In Fairmount Investments Ltd v SSE [1976]1 WLR 1255 at 
1263 Lord Russell stated that unless the contrary was indicated, 
parliament intended statutory powers to be exercised in accordance 
with the principles of natural justice. J. J. Steeples v Derbyshire 
County Council [1981] JPL 582 quashed a decision of the planning 
authority, on the application of a group representing local interests, to 
grant consent in accordance with an agreement on the grounds that it 
defeated the principles of natural justice and created bias. Brandrose 
(Chancery Division), cited supra note 71, however suggests that in the 
case of section 52 agreements the principles of natural justice could 
be overridden, although this point was not explored in depth. 
79 [1983] P&CR 349; noted [1983] JPL 574. 
80 [1983] JPL 376. 
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discretion not to make a declaration), and they did so on the basis of 
it providing an enforcement device, and as such could not be used to 
impede the public duty performed by planning authorities under the 
legislation when they decided upon an application. 
Section 29 is the linchpin of this part of the Act. When 
exercising their powers under it a local planning authority 
are performing a public duty. They cannot bind themselves 
in advance as to how they will perform it, nor can they do 
more than what the Act says they can do. They can impose 
conditions upon the grant of planning permission but they 
have no power under section 29, nor any other section, to 
make an appplicant comply with their conditions: but if he 
fails to do so his planning permission will lapse. An 
applicant, however, may be willing to undertake to comply 
with the conditions. He may indicate his willingness in 
negotiations with the local planning authority before making 
an application, as may happen when a large-scale 
development is being planned; or he may do so when he 
learns what conditions the local planning authority intend to 
impose. Section 52(1) empowers a local planning authority to 
make agreements to achieve ends which it could not achieve 
without the consent of an applicant for planning permission. 
It does not empower a local planning authority to grant 
permission otherwise than as provided by sections 26 to 29 
of the Act. "81 
The decision is an important one as it not only restates the 
restrictive approach to the ability of a body with statutory powers to 
fetter itself in the future, but also gives an account of the 
development control system in which section 52 agreements play an 
integral part. No distinction is made between valid and invalid 
conditions and the only prerequisite of the contract is that the 
developer is willing to enter into it. The role of negotiation is 
acknowledged to extend to pre-application discussions and, as long as 
the local planning authority does not grant permission without regard 
to the development plan and other material considerations, they have 
81 [1983] P&CR 349 at 354. 
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the ability to use agreements under section 52 to enforce their 
requirements on the development once permission has been granted. 82 
The overall result appears to be a licence to the local planning 
authority to enter into contracts to enforce conditions it wishes to 
impose, with the proviso that the court will not enforce such 
contracts against the planning authority if they amount to a fettering 
of powers. This, it seems, puts the developer in the position of 
contracting with a body who can enforce the contract, but which can 
breach that contract if it interferes with its statutory powers or 
duties83 even if they are exercised contrary to the development 
plan. M By reiterating principles of freedom of contract in relation to 
section 52 agreements, the court takes no account of the fact that 
one party is a body with statutory powers; whilst in considering the 
effect of the agreement so entered the court is emphatic that such a 
body cannot fetter its exercise of power. Thus, while the above 
extract seems a realistic account of the development control system, 
Lawton L. J. takes no regard of the ramifications of his public law 
82 The practical effect of this must be to phrase the section 52 
agreement as being conditional upon the grant of permission, rather 
than covenanting in return for a grant of permission. 
83 The situation has been further complicated in the New 
Zealand case of Devonport Borough Council v Robbins [1979]1 NZLR 1, 
where the planning authority's powers were not fettered by an 
agreement with the respondent but damages were awarded against the 
planning authority as the development plan was amended with the 
ulterior motive of repudiating that agreement. 
84 Fox J. in the Chancery Division had adopted the judgment of 
Walton J. on the hearing of the injunction proceedings on this point: 
"the situation now is, when a developer enters into a section 52 
agreement, he must be taken to know that any powers ... may properly 
be exercised against him, provided that they are in accordance with 
the provisions of the development plan. " See [1981] P&CR at 334. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal does not refer to such a proviso. 
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decision for the private law concepts within which he frames his 
judgment. 
Consequently, rather than clarifying the meaning of a section 
which is said to 'bemuse' the Court of Appeal85, this decision 
perpetuates the confusion by failing to acknowledge the effect of the 
overlap between public and private law. The court could have taken 
the opportunity to explore the particular considerations which should 
apply to such administrative contracts as these, but instead it uses 
freedom of contract to explain entering into agreementsB6 and 
concepts of administrative law on their effect. 
Clearly local planning authorities cannot fetter their discretion in 
an open-ended way, but on the other hand 'within certain general 
limits' it is 'highly desirable' that a local planning authority can 'first 
of all, contract not to exercise its statutory powers in the future, or 
secondly, contract as to the manner in which it will exercise its 
statutory powers in the future'. 87 For example, although it would be 
unacceptable to allow a local planning authority to bind itself to grant 
future planning permissions in uncertain terms, it would be completely 
artificial to suggest that an agreement to secure planning gain 
85 (1981 1 P&CR at 355. 
86 This is not novel: the courts have often used principles of 
frreedom of contract to explain their non-interference with discretion. 
For discussion see Gabel, P. & Feinman, J. M. "Contract Law as Ideology 
" IN: Kairys, ed. The Politics of Law, 1982 Pantheon. For the courts 
unwillingness to interfere with discretion under section 52 and section 
126 see Attorne. y General v Barnes Corporation and Ronelaah Club Ltd. 
[1939] Ch. 110, per Luxmoore J. 
87 Walton J. in Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council 
v Brandrose Invettments Ltd at the inter partes hearing of the 
injunction, quoted by Fox J., [1981] P&CR at 334. 
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provisions did not envisage the permission which was the subject 
matter under negotiation. 
The Court of Appeal in New Zealand has taken a broad and 
realistic view of these issues. In the 1979 case Devonoort Borough 
Corporation v Robbins88 they were faced with an agreement between a 
developer and a local authority made in 1971 which was politically 
unacceptable to the subsequent council membership following elections 
in 1974. The agreement was made under a section in an Act passed to 
facilitate the reclaimation and development of the harbour site which 
enabled councils to enter into deeds to provide for the carrying out of 
the development and it was accepted that this agreement fell within 
those terms. The agreement itself indicated that the Council regarded 
development of the harbour site involved to be in the public interest 
and they had a policy to promote that development, together with the 
sanction of the abovementioned Act. The content of the agreement 
provided for the grant of a development licence if the developer 
fulfilled a list of conditions which would make the content of the 
scheme for the site acceptable to the aims of the council. The list 
included the provision of public amenities within the site. 
The Court of Appeal held that the developer had a right to a 
development licence if the conditions in the contract were fulfilled 
and the Council could not escape the terms of the agreement simply 
because the newly elected membership were against development of the 
site. 
As no one now suggests that the deed is outside the powers 
conferred by the 1970 Act, it must follow that the Council 
of 1971 acting on behalf of the Borough Corporation, 
entered into a contract lawfully fettering the discretion of 
N [1979] 1 NZLR 1. 
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their successors, a result inevitable from time to time when 
contracts are validly made by Governments, local bodies or 
other corporations. After all it was the Corporation of the 
Borough of Devonport, not the Council for the time being, 
that was the contracting party. "89 
The Court implied into the agreement a term that there would be 
reasonable co-operation and discussion between the parties, as it would 
be impossible for them to decide upon a scheme acceptable to both 
parties in the absence of negotiation. Thus the Council were under an 
obligation to consult with the developer before making major decisions 
affecting his scheme. The Council were clearly in breach of their 
contractural obligations when they rejected the scheme because they 
were opposed in principle to the development of the site, but were 
also in breach when they adopted policies affecting the density of the 
development site and took other steps to obstruct finalisation of the 
scheme. 
This case was an unusual one in that the development of the site 
involved was, according to statute, in the `public interest'. The 
agreement was also unusual as it essentially amounted to giving the 
developer preferential treatment by insuring that his investment of 
time, effort and finances in pursuing a scheme for the site would not 
go to waste, provided the scheme covered certain points the Council 
regarded fundamental. This business element of the agreement was 
influential on the Court of Appeal. 
The developer would be totally at the mercy of the Council 
of the day if they were free to say that, although he might 
have designed as good a housing development as reasonably 
possible, with admirable provision for a boat harbour, 
reserves and other public facilities, they rejected the basic 
concept of alienating public land and abandoned any idea of 
such a project. A developer could well have been 
89 ibid at 22. 
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discouraged from the expenditure and effort needed to 
satisfy the specific conditions if the deed had left 
everything at large. The 'business sense' of the contract 
may be a helpful guide to its true meaning "9 
It Is nevertheless Instructive. The Court was prepared under these 
circumstances to allow the Council to lawfully fetter its powers within 
prescribed limits. The agreement was not interpreted as fettering 
discretion so as to prevent the Council from taking into account the 
merits of the scheme in deciding upon the application, and the Council 
were still free to impose any necessary conditions on the consent. 
What is interesting is that the developer's interest was the one being 
protected and, the 'public interest' was regarded as being reflected in 
the statute rather than in the local preference for councillors who 
were opposed to such a scheme. Thus in relying more on the private 
law concept of freedom of contract the Court effectively excluded the 
influence (local opposition. The issue was decided for the purpose of 
awarding damages for breach of contract and, while the decision did 
not mean that an unapproved scheme was forced to go ahead, it did 
have an impact on local government coffers, probably making them 
less able to supply the facilities envisaged by the agreement. 
A useful test for evaluating the relationship between section 52 
agreements and the fettering of local powers has been suggested by 
Young and Rowan-Robinson. 91 They suggest that the validity of a 
section 52 agreement could be examined from the point of view of 
whether `there is a real likelihood that the contract would seriously 
conflict with some essential function of the contracting authority'. 
90 ibid. at 22. 
91 (1982) op. clt. supra note 71. 
209 
Under this test a `mere possibility' of conflict is not enough92 and the 
appropriate time for evaluating the question would be when the matter 
was litigated rather than at the time of contract. Consequently, if 
the agreement incorporated the grant of planning permission in precise 
terms at a time after the local planning authority had approved the 
grant subject to an agreement, it would certainly be valid and 
enforceable. The authority would not have tied its hands before 
objections to the application were heard and would not have precluded 
consideration of the development plan and other material 
considerations. 93 
This type of test, however, while allowing the planning authority 
to fetter its discretion within reasonably narrow confines, does not 
answer many of the broader problems raised by the Court of Appeal 
decision in Brandrose. Most specifically, neither approach attempts to 
interfere with 'freedom to contract', but rather accepts that the 
content of the agreements only require scrutiny at the point of 
litigation, as opposed to the time of creation. Inherent in this is a 
decision not to scrutinise the context of the agreement: only the 
isolated issue of whether the form of agreement represents a fetter on 
powers and duties to be exercised at a future date. This decision not 
to control, or attempt to control, this mechanism of enforcement at 
92 They cite British Transport Commission v Westmorland 
County Council op. cit. in support. 
93 In McLaren v SSE and Another unreported QBD noted (1979] 
SJ 370/9 (transcript Barnett, Lenton) the developer, acting on the 
advice of leading counsel, suggested entering into a section 52 
agreement and included within it a package of gains to counter- 
balance the Council's objections to the scheme. The Council were 
persuaded and accepted the agreement in principle, passing a 
resolution to have it executed, but when they came to consider the 
application itself local residents objected on several grounds. As a 
result permission was refused and the agreement was not signed. 
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the stage of inception allows the networks of power and secrecy 
operating at grass roots level to continue. 
It could be argued that this represents a recognition of the role 
of bargaining in the development control system, and of the role of 
planning as something concerned with broader considerations than 
physical land use. Certainly there is an acceptance within the case 
law of the use of agreements to secure planning gain, and to make 
developments, which would otherwise be refused, acceptable. The 
courts have gone so far as to declare such an agreement to be 'in the 
public interest' where it was used to preserve an accepted policy94 
and have referred favourably to their use as part of an administrative 
machinery to enforce requirements outside of formal conditions. 95 As 
a result of this type of approach the relative autonomy of planning by 
agreement is left intact as the domain of planners and of politics. 
However the strength of this argument has been brought into 
question by more recent developments in the Court of Appeal, as 
exemplified by the case of Bradford City Municipal Council v SSE 
discussed above. By suggesting in this case that the reasonableness of 
an obligation imposed on a developer is the essential factor in 
determining whether an agreement is `incidental and consequential' to 
the development, the court has intimated a willingness to interfere 
94 Beaconsfield District Council v Gams (1974) 234 EG 749; see 
for discussion Grant, M. "Planning By Agreement" (1975) JPL 501; 
Levings, A. P. "Planning By Agreement-The Beaconsfield Case" (1975) 
JPL 704; and (1976) JPL 732 and 738 for comment. In this case the 
policy in question was the protection of a green belt: See McAuslan, 
P. The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980, Oxford: Pergamon Press at 
pp. 163/4 for discussion of judicial attitudes towards green belt 
policies, as an amenity consideration which may accomodate both 
public interest and private property ideologies. 
95 . See McLaren v SSE and Another supra. 
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with the extent of obligation considered to be valid. It seems from 
this case that the desire to interfere has been prompted by the growth 
in the use of agreements as perceived by the court, and the purpose 
of the interference is to ensure that local authorities are controlled to 
the extent of avoiding encroachments upon the development industry. 
That is, as long as the agreements are acceptable to the developer 
they may be upheld, but where the 'risk and expense' goes beyond 
what the court considers reasonable to expect they will not be upheld. 
What is clear from this judgment is that the assessment of what is 
reasonable is not a matter for the parties alone, but, by recognising 
the inappropriateness of using concepts of freedom of contract where 
a public body is involved, the 'public interest' is also at stake. 
Interestingly, although not surprisingly96, the Court of Appeal in 
assessing the 'public interest' did not address itself to the needs of 
the area as expressed in local policies and conditions or as affected by 
national economic policies, but expressed it in terms of ensuring the 
like treatment in the development process from one developer to the 
next. The Court of Appeal thus indicates the central concern to be 
fairness to the developer, rather than to the recipients of central and 
local policies. 
96 See McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980 Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, Urban & Regional Planning Series, Volume 22. 
PART III : TOWER HAMLETS' STUDY 
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS OF STUDY 
214 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the data obtained in Tower Hamlets on 
schemes attracting planning gain before the policy became part of the 
Borough Plan. They are presented alphabetically for the purpose of 
allowing the reader to access readily the material in this chapter from 
other parts of the thesis. The details which appear here are drawn 
upon throughout the thesis and are regularly referred to in footnotes. 
This type of arrangement was also chosen to help minimise the effect 
of my subjective view of the material. The reader is provided with 
the data in this form so that the arguments which are made drawing 
upon it in other chapters can be scrutinised from alternative 
standpoints. For example, it would have been possible to present the 
schemes within a framework of those attracting minimal gains, 
substantial gains or no gain at all. To do this, however, would have 
involved organising the schemes in accordance with my perception of 
gain. It may be that my perception arguably possesses more 
objectivity than the perceptions of a person actively involved in the 
process, but is also sure to differ from other equally detached views 
of those approaching the issue from a different standpoint. 
In view of the arguments stated above on methodology I there are 
problems in taking this approach, and certainly biases which may have 
crept in at the stage of collecting and synthesising the data cannot be 
eradicated. It could be argued that as a researcher my purpose should 
be rather to commit myself to the underdog and argue for the less 
powerful interests in society and thus turn my partisan perceptions to 
I chapter 1. 
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good use. However, I have the taken the view that this data should 
appear in its purest possible form so that it may be drawn upon by 
others interested in the field and may be analysed from other 
standpoints. The other chapters in this thesis perform a different 
function as they draw upon this bank of information in the context of 
my own theoretical framework. 
Thus, the information which follows is largely descriptive and 
detailed and aims to give a precise picture of the process of planning 
gain by highlighting the effect of negotiation on the content of the 
schemes. The headings for each scheme include an indication of the 
actual location of each scheme within the Borough so that the reader 
has an idea of which of them fall within the same ward. There is 
also an indication of those schemes where an appeal was lodged or 
heard and the amount of time the file on any scheme was active 
before the scheme was fulfilled or abandoned. By fulfilled is meant 
that building commenced or any planning agreement was discharged. 
The overall result is a valuable and unique collection of material which 
may be readily accessed and should assist in understanding the aims 
and the practical impact of conducting a planning gain policy. 
Chapter 8 then discusses the use of planning agreements in Tower 
Hamlets, their form and their content. 
THE CASE STUDIES 
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ALLE STREET, No. 24 
WHITECHAPEL 
1974/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State, July 1975 
An Application in respect of a derelict 3 storey building to be 
converted to 3 floors of offices (2970f2) with a basement flat (850f2) 
below was made in October 1974 and refused in the following October. 
Previous to this, a scheme involving this building was agreed upon in 
which it was linked to the renovation of a house in Princelet Street 
for residential use. This scheme would have been approved but the 
developers decided it was uneconomic and submitted the revised 
application to keep the matter alive. A further application by a 
different developer was submitted for the building with larger 
floorspaces, 2970f2 for offices and again a basement flat (905f2). This 
application was also refused (November 11,1975) on the grounds of 
insufficient planning advantages : the ratio being only 7: 2 rather than 
1: 1. It was also argued that the residential element would certainly be 
used as ancillary to the offices rather than providing housing for the 
Borough. 
This refusal was successfully appealed to the Secretary of State 
on the basis that the scheme represented an environmental 
improvement by converting a derelict building using a design 
sympathetic to the adjacent properties. The Secretary of State 
considered this to be sufficient to satisfy the office policy of 
requiring planning advantages. A permission was issued in March 1976 
but was not implemented. A further scheme was approved in 
December 1982 for the building to be used in a similar way, 3228f2 for 
offices and 968f2 for a basement flat. The report to the Planning 
Committee recommended approval in view of the previous decision of 
the Secretary of State and the one residential unit provided. 
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ARTILLERY LANE, No. s 36/40 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1980/1983 
Appeal to the Secretary of State. August 1982 
Applications for listed building consent to demolish these mainly 
industrial premises and to erect a mixed office (8,866f2) and 
residential (2108f2) building were refused by the Development Sub- 
Committee on April 13,1982. The recommendations for refusal were 
made on a number of grounds : (i) loss of industrial floorspace, (ii) 
contrary to Tower Hamlets Office Policy and the GLDP to allow office 
use which does not improve the area and has insufficient planning 
advantages, (iii) unacceptable design, (iv) it involves the demolition of 
unlisted but attractive buildings in the Artillery Lane Conservation 
Area and (v) it would set a precedent for redevelopment in that 
Conservation Area. 
As far as the planning advantages are concerned, the scheme 
would demolish structurally sound buildings, forming part of an 
attractive 19th century terrace (presently used for 60% industrial and 
40% warehousing uses) and replace them with a6 or 7 storey glass 
and metal clad building to be used for 81% office purposes and 19% 
non-self contained residential use. Thus not providing a substantial 
residential or other 'beneficial' element and at the same time 
representing a loss of industrial space and loss of buildings which 
could be renovated. 
The appeal was dismissed in July 1983, after a local inquiry, on 
the basis of failure to conform to office policy, loss of industrial 
floorspace and a presumption of conservation as against redevelopment. 
The Inspector considered evidence on the economic viability of 
schemes which would renovate the buildings for use as offices but 
with a substantial residential element and concluded that demolition on 
economic grounds was not justified. He did not comment on the 
acceptability of the Council's requirement of planning benefits. 
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ARTILLERY LANE. No. s 37-41 AND GUN STREET, No. s 51-53 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1979/1983 
Application for Appeal to the Secretary of State, dated August 2.1983 
In 1979 Royal Insurance Company Ltd applied to demolish No. 41 and 
to erect a5 storey office building (17,500f2) on the complete corner 
site that this demolition would produce. In 1976 they had entered into 
a planning agreement for a mixed office and residential scheme which 
identified this site, except for No. 41, for the residential element. This 
part of the scheme was never completed. 2 The developers now refused 
to negotiate and a development refusal was issued on January 19,1983 
on the grounds of non-compliance with Tower Hamlets Office Policy 
and the GLDP. Listed building consent to demolish an unlisted building 
in a conservation area was also refused. No. 41 had previously been 
used for retail use (it still has its shuttered shopfront) with residential 
above, but had stood vacant since 1976 and was, by 1983, delapidated. 
The residential part had been unoccupied for 25 years and not fit for 
human habitation. A permission had been issued in 1979 to use the 
lower 2 floors as offices with light industrial use above but this was 
not taken up. The Council were then endeavouring to get this 18th 
century building listed3 and made efforts on behalf of the third party 
who owned it, who was willing to sell to the highest bidder, to find a 
buyer willing to do the required renovation work. An inquiry was 
scheduled to be heard in October 1983 and was to deal specifically 
with the issue of the legality of refusing permission on the grounds of 
insufficient planning advantages but the appeal was withdrawn. 
2 This was the only case where by the end of the study period 
a developer entered into a 5.52 agreement and categorically failed to 
realise the gain element : see below under B. A. G. S. Scheme (West). 
3A number of the consultative organisations on historic 
buildings, such as the Georgian Group and London Archaelogical 
Society, supported the Council in their application to the Department 
of the Environment. 
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ARTILLERY LANE, No. s 52 & 54 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1971/1973 
In November 1971 the Council approved a scheme on No 54 alone for 
mixed office (3061f2, later increased to 3320f2) and residential (473f2) 
use. The bottom 2 floors were already in use as offices and this 
consent added a 3rd floor of office accommodation and a 4th of 
residential. The resulting building exceeded the plot ratio for the site 
by 1,252f2 of offices, but the planning officer recommended approval 
because it conformed with office policy, the additional storeys made 
the building match the neighbouring property and the actual plot ratio 
was close to the neighbouring zone of 5: 1. 
This scheme was not implemented but was followed by one which 
included No 52. In November 1972 a consent was issued for 3,520f2 of 
offices and 2 self-contained flats (337 and 384f2) plus a shop and 
showroom (not ancillary to the offices). This consent was taken up, 
although slightly modified in May 1973 to include a basement for 
storage for the shop. 
No agreement was entered into and the details of both elements 
were included on the planning permission issued. 
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ARTILLERY LANE, No. s 56 & 58 
ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1971/1974 
In November 1971 agreement was reached with the developer to 
renovate and improve these two Grade I listed buildings as planning 
gain together with the Improvement of three residential units. The 
scheme included No. s 20/24 Frying Pan Alley and the existing uses of 
all the buildings amounted to 6,200f2 residential, 2,200f2 commercial 
and 3,000f2 light industrial. No. s 56 & 58 occupy an important 
position on Artillery Lane on a corner site, set back from the road at 
a point where the road narrows. The buildings are of significant 
architectural and historic interest and the Council considered the 
extensive renovation of these dilapidated buildings to be of primary 
importance in any scheme in which they were included. The use of 
the premises was to be mainly offices (13,606f2 in total) although the 
improved residential units amounted to 2088f2 and the ground floor of 
No. 58 was restricted to light industrial use by a scalemaker (428f2) in 
accordance with its original usage. There was further agreement with 
the Council for the developer to rehouse existing tenants and to give 
the Council options on the residential units. The tenant of the offices 
was also specified on the planning consent, and this name was later 
changed by a further consent in late 1973. A further amendment was 
made in January 1974 to extend the amount of office space to 
17,412f2. 
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ARTILLERY LANE, COSMART HOUSE 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1981/1983 
This was an unusual scheme for this area as it involved no 
requirement for residential space to be included (seen as an 
inappropriate use in this building) and the planning agreement was 
designed to ensure that the developer relocated the existing industrial 
occupier, a printer. The application was for 2,500f2 of offices and a 
shop of 1,700f2. The gain was described as the renovation for retail 
use, the relocation of the printer and environmental improvement in 
the Artillery Lane area. The decision notice was issued 11 months 
after the Committee approved the scheme partly because of delays 
over the planning agreement and problems with finding suitable 
relocation premises. During the interim the shop space was increased 
to 2,200f2 making it more like a 50; 50 split between the uses. 
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ARTILLERY PASSAGE, No. s 1-4 & 9A 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1973/1975 
This was a mixed use scheme permitted in August 1973, involving the 
renovation of listed buildings and the replacement of a modern 
building with one more in keeping with the surrounding properties. 
The upper floors of No. s 1,2 and 3 were for office use (2977f2) and 
the remaining developments were classified as gains. These were the 
provision of shop and restaurant on the ground floor and basement of 
No. s 1,2 and 3; residential and landscaped garden at No. 4 and 
residential at No. 9A with an extension. Also included in the 
calculations was the renovation of buildings of special architectural 
and historic interest (No. s 2,3,4 & 9A) and the replacement of No. 1. 
In floorspace terms the scheme involved an increase over the existing 
office use of 1040f2, increased residential of 575f2 and an extra 1180f2 
of open space. 
The content of uses at No. s 1-4 was revised in March 1975 on 
the grounds of viability of the scheme. No. 4 was changed so that 
the ground floor and basement would be used as a shop with storage. 
No. 1 would now have the ground floor and basement used as a 
showroom with storage and No. s 2&3 had a restaurant/wine bar on 
the ground floor and basement. The alteration in floorspace as a 
result was not dramatic, although the residential element was 
increased, but the individual properties became more marketable as 
commercial premises with ancillary housing. This latter scheme was 
implemented. 
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B. A. G. S. SCHEME (EAST) 
SPITALFIELDS : PROPOSED EXTENSION TO ARTILLERY PASSAGE 
CONSERVATION AREA 
1974/1977 
All of the B. A. G. S. Schemes were negotiated with the same developer, 
Central & City Holdings Ltd, who owned all of the properties involved 
(and were financially assosciated with the Royal Insurance Group) and 
the schemes were interconnected through the balancing of gains 
against office space. This element included properties on Gun Street: 
No. s 46-50 to be used for offices (727m2, including 252m2 existing use) 
and No. 10, a warehouse, extended and refurbished for use as a 
homeless women's hostel (591m2 accomodating 48 women in 
dormitories). The ratio of office to residential use on B. A. G.. S. (West) 
and (East) together was 36% (1386m2) to 64% (2316m2). Taken 
individually they did not reflect this same ratio. The Committee gave 
approval in November 1975 and a consent was issued in June 1976 
after a planning agreement relating to B. A. G. S. Schemes (East) and 
(West) had been signed. This consent recited a condition, mirrored in 
the agreement, prohibiting the developers from applying internal 
finishes to the office building until either the residential element was 
complete or a contract was entered into for the freehold or leasehold 
(of at least 10 years) of No. 10 to be transferred to Tower Hamlets, 
the GLC, a housing authority or other body approved by the Council. 
At an early stage, September 1975, the planners suggested a lease on 
No. 10 be offered at low cost to the Providence Row Centre, a housing 
association active in Spitalfields catering for single homeless men and 
women. The intention was to convert the warehouse into bedsitter 
accommodation for single women so that their other adjoining centre 
could be used purely for single men. In 1976 No. 10 was sold to 
Providence Row at low cost and they were given permission to 
demolish the warehouse to erect a five storey building containing 24 
bedsitters for single women. The basis of this being the financial 
constraints on Providence Row in refurbishing the warehouse. The 
work at No. s 46-50 was completed to produce 9000f2 of office space. 
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B. A. G. S. SCHEME (NORTH) 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE & FASHION STREETA. s 
1975/1977 
This scheme was not finally implemented but illustrates another 
potential scheme emerging from negotiations with Central & City who 
were trying to develop their landholdings in Spitalfields. It relates to 
a proposed four storey office development at Brushfield Street, No. s 
28/38 and 6 Steward Street (a corner site, opposite Spitalfields 
Market) which would also require listed building consent to demolish 
the unlisted buildings at 6 Steward Street (vacant storage building) 
and No. s 28/32 (storage shed for fruit and vegetables). Originally the 
application for this development included no element of gain and was 
refused for non-compliance with office policy in December 1976. This 
seems to be the result of a failure to manipulate all of the uses 
within the proposals on the (East) and (West) schemes so as to 
produce a surplus of gain. From the correspondence it was originally 
intended to treat all three together but the (East) and (West) schemes 
were agreed before the Brushfield site was finalised. 6 Steward Street 
was originally destined for renovation works costing the developer 
£60,000 and lease or sale to a housing association or other body 
approved by the Council but was finally deleted from the (West) 
scheme4 by adding additional residential floorspace at 10 Gun Street. 
Following the refusal the Council wrote to the developers saying 'the 
scheme would be acceptable if a there was a suitable level of planning 
benefit tied to the offices by legal agreement'. The developers then 
entered into further negotiations to produce an acceptable scheme 
outside of the (East) and (West) parts, expressing a willingness to 
enter into another planning agreement. The final scheme which was 
approved by the Council in May 1977 (only 2 months after the 
application was submitted) was for a building with wholesale uses on 
the ground floor (233m2), so as to accomodate traders using 
Spitalfields Market, with 3 floors of offices above (912m2). This was 
linked with the renovation for residential use of the vacant industrial 
building at 13 Princelet Street (374m2), a Grade II listed building in 
4 The S. 52 Agreement was amended accordingly on November 2, 
1977 
226 
Fashion Street Conservation Area. The gains in floorspace terms only 
represented 30% of the development but the planners saw the proposal 
as acceptable because development was needed in Brushfield Street as 
was renovation in Princelet Street, even though the demolition of 
buildings in Brushfield and Steward Streets required listed building 
consents. The scheme was to be subject to a planning agreement but 
the developers were unable to negotiate the purchase of 13 Princelet 
Street and the consent was never issued, although the developer 
intended to find a substitute gain. The draft consent included the 
same formulation in the conditions as appear in other Central & City 
schemes with regard to implementing both elements of the proposals. 5 
5 See B. A. G. S. (East) and (West). 
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B. A. G. S. SCHEME (WEST) 
SPITALFIELDS : EXTENSION OF ARTILLERY PASSAGE C. A. 
1974/1981 
In June 1975 Central & City applied for permission to develop a 
negotiated scheme involving the renovation of a largely vacant fur 
traders warehouse at 1/2 Steward Street (including 35 Artillery Lane) 
as offices (909m2) with a new seven storey infill building (1377m2) for 
residential use at 51/53 Gun Street (including 37-39 Artillery Lane) 
and the renovation of 6 Steward Street as residential (348m2). This, 
together with B. A. G. S. (East), would lead to mainly renovation of 
several warehouses close to Spitalfields Market for either office or 
residential use, the former being confined to 1/2 Steward Street and 
46/50 Gun Street (a fruit store with some office use). The single 
storey fruit warehouse at 51/53 Gun Street was to be demolished and 
the site leased for 80 years to the Peabody Housing Association (at 
low cost) who would build 24 flats. 6 Steward Street was considered 
unsuitable for family use because of its size and design and several 
possibilities were investigated including its use as bedsitters for single 
Bangladeshi men or as an Asian community centre by the Spitalfields 
Project (estimated cost to the developer being £60,000). The most 
concrete proposal was to use the property as flats for young Asian 
women, to be ran and paid for by the Wayhome Project. In November 
1975 the Committee approved the scheme and consent was issued on 
June 18,1976 subject to a planning agreement signed the same day. 
Both of these documents contained a provision to prevent the internal 
finishes for the office development from being applied before the 
residential development was completed or, in effect, before the 
developers had disposed of the sites to organisations in a position to 
complete the residential content. A Supplemental Agreement in 
November 1977 removed 6 Steward Street from the scheme because of 
difficulties in finding a user and proposed increases in floorspace on 
the Peabody development.? On June 1,1978 Royal Insurance Company 
entered into a Building Agreement with Peabody which gave them a 
6 Later reduced to 16 one & two bedroom flats 
7 Overall there was still a shortfall of 67.22 s/m at this 
stage, even though 10 Gun St was estimated at 872 s/m 
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licence to enter the site and construct flats within 3 years, unless 
that period was extended by the Royal, at which time Royal would 
grant Peabody an 80 year lease on a £10,000 premium and at 
peppercorn rent. The Council approved Peabody as an appropriate 
body, but due to financial constraints they were unable to complete. 
The Council had issued 3 further consents for the site on the 
application of Peabody because of problems they were having in 
obtaining finance for the project from the Department of the 
Environment. In December 1976 the number of flats was reduced to 
14 (947m2) and office permission was given for the ground floor 
(167m2) as the DoE had a policy against financing ground floor 
residential use. Use of the offices was restricted to academic, 
educational, social ... charitable use and the consent continued to link 
it with the rest of the scheme. The restrictions on this consent as to 
user and the links with the rest of the scheme were deleted in March 
1977. These changes were again necessary to obtain finance. The 
office use was extended to the ground and first floor in August 1979, 
with the original restriction on user reinstated, and the number of 
flats reduced to 11 again to raise further loans. On Counsel's advice 
the Council agreed, in October 1981, that the requirements of the 
planning agreement had been satisfied. By this time Peabody had 
abandoned the development and this site then became the subject of 
an application for a new office building. 8 Central and City completed 
the offices at Steward Street. 
8. See ARTILLERY LANE, No. s 37-41 and GUN STREET, No. s 
51-53 above 
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BETHNAL GREEN ROAD, NO. s 455/463 
BETHNAL GREEN 
1976/1977 
This was an important scheme for the Council as it represented the 
only possible route for providing a community and sports centre in the 
northern part of the Borough. The aplication (dated September 10, 
1976) involved the rehabilitation of a large vacant building, formerly 
used as a bakery, as speculative offices (88,000f2) and sports and 
community facilities. The development committee agreed to grant 
permission on October 27,1976 subject to a planning agreement. The 
developer submitted a draft planning agreement which restricted the 
application of internal finishes to the offices until works on the 
community centre were complete, and provided that the developer 
would be released from this once a contract was entered into with the 
Council. The Consent was issued on February 17,1977 and a planning 
agreement was signed the same day. The release was to given if the 
community centre was disposed of at any stage of its construction to 
a body approved by the Council. This covered the situation feared by 
the Finance Department that the developer would not be able to fully 
equip the centre and the Council would need to step in. The report of 
the Director of Development to the committee on July 13,1977 states 
that the developer proposed the following terms: to carry out the 
works at his expense in according to specifications to be agreed and, 
on completion, to give the Council a lease for 125 years at a 
peppercorn rent. The same report indicated the agreement of the 
legal community services and finance departments and asked the 
committee to give its formal approval so negotiations between the 
developer and all departments on the lease and specifications could be 
finalised. The developer was unable to find a tenant for the proposed 
offices and two further schemes were considered in July 1982 : one, 
refused, for offices (87,963f2) a 31,204f2 community centre, the other, 
permitted, for offices (29,939f2) and 21,500f2 of industrial units. 
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BLACK LION YARD 
SPITALFIELDS : 31-95 WHITECHAPEL ROAD 
1977/1979 
The proposal to redevelop this site for office and industrial use was 
approved in principle in September 1977 and in April 1978 the 
development sub-committee deferred the scheme to the main committee 
recommending its approval subject to conditions and a planning 
agreement. The scheme was for a seven storey (7,432m2) office 
building and a four storey light industrial and (1161m2) and 
warehousing (3485m2) building for occupation by small firms (15 small 
firms were already occupying the premises and would be displaced). 
There was also provision for a public walkway between Old Montague 
Street and Whitechapel Road. The main committee gave its approval 
and a decision notice was issued when the planning agreement was 
executed on April 11th, 1979. The agreement required the development 
to be fully completed and the industrial building could only be used 
for non-industrial purposes with the consent of the Council. It went 
on to require the industrial building to be completed first, although a 
release would be given as soon as the developer entered Into a binding 
contract for the development of the industrial/warehousing element. 
The consent made no reference to the planning agreement nor to the 
order of completion of works, although it did require the pedestrian 
walkway to be a part of the development. This was implemented with 
one slight amendment and that was the provision of a betting office 
on the ground floor for the use of an existing tenant. The planning 
agreement had to be amended (October 10,1980) as it only allowed 
for industrial units on the ground floor. The GLC took over the 
management of the industrial/warehousing building when it was 
completed under the name of the Technology Centre. 
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BLOSSOM ST, NO. s 1-4 & 19-27 FOLGATE ST 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
1976/1977 
A new office building (2230f2) was proposed by Central & City (with 
Royal Insurance) for the sites on Blossom Street and this was linked 
in an application made in June 1986 (after several meetings) with a 
basement sports, recreation and restaurant area, plus renovation and 
refurbishment for residential use of the offices and workshops in a 
partly listed terrace at 19-27 Folgate Street (1246m2). The developer 
was also to clear the unlisted buildings at the rear of the offices and 
Folgate Street and provide landscaped gardens. The Office 
Development Permit issued for Blossom Street on June 28,1986 
required the residential works at Folgate Street and the basement 
recreational facilities totalling not less than 13,407f2 to form part of 
the scheme for office space of not more than 24,000f2. A planning 
agreement was executed on February 18,1977 which required the 
development to be completed and for the developer not to apply 
internal finishes to the offices until either the residential and garden 
element was complete or the developer disposed of the Folgate Street 
properties, by sale or at least 10 year lease, to a body approved by 
the Council. The consent, on the other hand, required the residential 
works, landscaped gardens and the basement recreational facilities to 
be completed before the application of internal finishes to the offices. 
This scheme was implemented to produce 11,589f2 (1075m2) residential 
floorspace in the form of flats and 13,487f2 (1250m2) of officespace. 
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BRUSHFIELD STREET NO. s 16/18 & FOURNIER STREET NO. 31 
SPITALFIELDS : FASHION STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
1981/1982 
An application was submitted by Central & City in October 1981 to 
change the use of the Brushfield Street properties from a cafe and 
industrial use to offices, and to renovate and covert 31 Fournier 
Street for residential use. The Council approved the scheme subject 
to a planning agreement which was signed on March 23 1982. The 
consent required the Schedule of Works on Fournier Street to be 
completed before the internal finishes to the offices were applied and 
under the planning agreement the developer was to enter into an 
agreement with the owner of 31 Fournier Street before the Consent 
was issued. Thereafter the agreed works of restoration and conversion 
would be completed before the application of internal finishes, unless 
the Council was satisfied that completion was prevented by reasons 
outside thq developer's control. This proviso was added at the request 
of the developer who was concerned that the internal finishes clause 
threatened the viability of the project by requiring building work to 
stop in the event of delays at Fournier Street, including those beyond 
his control. The `Fournier Agreement' was signed the same day as the 
planning agreement and involved the payment of £10,000 to be made to 
the owner towards the costs of the scheduled renovation works (costed 
at £9736.32) and the owner agreed to hold the money on trust for that 
purpose. 
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BUCK & HICKMAN SITE 
WHITECHAPEL : NON-ADJACENT SITES 
1978/1983 
The content of this scheme really falls into two parts. Firstly, a 
change of use and extension of a warehouse at 60/66 East Smithfield 
and 42/42A Dock Street for offices (2630m2), which was linked to a 
partly refurbished and partly new industrial unit development (5200m2) 
in Dock Street and Royal Mint Street. Secondly, a conversion of a 
warehouse to offices (5630m2) in Mulberry Street (known as Buck & 
Hickman site). The first part was concentrated around Dock Street, 
close to the Tower of London, and the second part was on a site 
bounded by Whitechapel Road and Adler Street, over 600m away. The 
industrial element included the refurbishment of 16,18,24 and 30 
Dock Street and 63 Royal Mint Street and there seems to have been 
some existing industrial uses in these buildings. The two parts of the 
scheme were owned by different companies, one the subsiduary of the 
other and both of them were parties to the planning agreement. The 
application in respect of the Buck & Hickman site was made in August 
1978, followed two months later by separate applications for the office 
and industrial developments and the refurbishment around Dock Street. 
All of these were later referred to together as 'the development'. The 
agreement merely states that the development will be carried out and 
will be in accordance with a schedule of works approved by the 
Council and includes no specific covenant to complete the industrial 
part first. The schedule of works was approved by the Council on 
September 1,1983 and allowed completion of the Buck & Hickman 
offices after most of the refurbishing and building work had been done 
on the industrial element but only allowed completion of the Dock 
Street/East Smithfield offices after completion of the industrial works. 
This plan was not adhered to by the developer as work on the Buck & 
Hickman offices commenced before the industrial element was started. 
The developers ran into difficulty with the demolition of buildings 
standing on part of the site intended for the new industrial building 
because of legal action commenced against them by one of the tenants. 
Meanwhile, they had tenants waiting for the office buildings and none 
for the industrial elements. At the time the study was complete no 
enforcement action had been taken by the Council. 
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CAMPERDOWN HOUSE, BRAHM STREET 
WHITECHAPEL : ART GALLERY RESTORATION 
1980/1982 
In relation to an application made by Wingate Investments in January 
1981 to construct a new glass-clad office building (8058m2 including 
storage of 1206m2) the developers agreed to finance the modernisation 
and extension of the nearby Whitechapel Art Gallery. The Committee, 
in April 1981, gave its approval subject to a planning agreement to 
ensure that £500,000 was paid to the Trustees of the Gallery as 
community benefit. A draft of planning agreement was sent to the 
Legal Department by Wingate's solicitors (Linklaters & Paines) in 
March 1981 and was finally executed on October 30th. During this 
period the form of the agreement was revised so as to make the aims 
of the Council, as expressed in their office and other policies, the 
subject of the document while relegating the details of achieving them 
to arrangements between the developer and the Trustees. Thus the 
payment of £500,000, which in the original draft activated the planning 
permission, was replaced with a requirement on the developer to 
comply with the Gallery Agreement. The clause then goes on to 
explain that under that agreement the developer will make a payment 
which will enable the Trustees to carry out certain works of 
improvement and extension to the Gallery on the developer's behalf. 
The recitals having previously set out the office policy and the 
Council's acknowledgement of the developer's participation in 
improvement works on the Gallery as constituting a planning 
advantage. The concern of the Council appears to be ensuring that 
the works can be carried out rather than that money changes hands. 
On the other hand, from the correspondence the concern of the 
developer appears to be to get an acceptable consent at an acceptable 
cost. 
Our clients must be quite clear before they sign the Gallery 
Agreement that they are going to get a planning permission for 
the development of the site subject only to conditions which 
make the proposal viable. It is not acceptable to them for the 
Agreement to state that the planning permission, when granted, 
will be 'subject to whatever conditions (the Council) deem 
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appropriate'. Could you please let us have a copy of the 
proposed planning permission as soon as possible. "9 
The Council agreed to attach a copy of the permission to the 
planning agreement and to grant it on execution of that agreement, 
with the developer covenanting not to implement until the Gallery 
agreement was complied with. 
This scheme was further complicated by the fact that the 
developer was negotiating to buy some land from the GLC on which 
part of the development was to be built, and was also making a 
payment to the English National Opera, the tenants of Camperdown 
House, to terminate the tenancy and relocate. All of these agreements 
had to be exchanged on the same day as all parties were not 
prepared to commit themselves until the stage was fixed for the 
scheme to go ahead. At the end of November the £500,000 was paid 
and the consent activated. The Gallery Agreement provided for works 
to be done in accordance with plans for extension and renovation first 
conceived in 1977 but there had been no available finance. Works on 
this and the office development were both implemented. 
The office policy had earmarked Camperdown House as a 
community building which would remain in use as such and not be 
displaced by office development. The agreement, therefore, had to 
provide a gain which satisfied those likely to object to the removal of 
the English National Opera. Interestingly, the Chairman of the 
Development Committee was personally interested in the Arts and had 
been approached by the. Whitechapel Art Gallery for funding. The 
question arises, however, whether the renovation of an Art Gallery 
provided a 'community benefit'; clearly it may be beneficial to the 
Letter dated 10th September, 1981 from Linklaters & Paines 
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borough generally to have a successful gallery within its boundaries to 
attract tourists and other gallery visitors into the area, it may also be 
beneficial if the 'community' is one which is comprised of a high 
proportion of gallery visitors. Otherwise, it could be argued that it 
plays an educationaLfunction in that it encourages those living in the 
vacinity to learn to appreciate Art. This, however, is a far more 
political issue and raises problems as to the purpose and function of 
Art in a society. As an example, if the Art displayed amounted to a 
form of propaganda for or against the government or some particular 
class or interest group, then to say that local residents 'benefit' from 
it, is too simplistic. Even if the Art in question is not of any 
particular type and reflects a diversity of views it is still not clear 
that exposure to it is necessarily beneficial, unless it is argued that a 
knowledge and appreciation of Art is in itself beneficial. An 
alternative construction is that Art largely represents the status quo 
or an organised reaction to the status quo, and consequently affirms 
distributions within society. Even if it is argued that Art represents 
revolution, it still does not follow that it is a 'benefit'. Rather in 
order to ascertain its real significance it must be assessed in the 
context in which it arises, which necessarily includes the nature of 
the local population and the priorities of needs within that population. 
For example, is funding of the Arts a benefit when funding could have 
been provided for housing instead ? This type of question cannot 
attract a meaningful response without an assessment of the complex 
relationships and economic considerations which play upon the 
Council's determination of what amounts to a 'gain'. 
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CARRON'S WHARF 
ST. KATHERINES : DOCKLANDS JOINT COMMITTEE 
1976/1982 
This application was originally made to the Council before the London 
Docklands Development Corporation took over as planning authority. 
The first application for development submitted for the site was in 
1976 for 111,000f2 of office space, showrooms and warehousing. This 
consent lapsed and in 1978 a further scheme was negotiated which 
included 57,673f2 of offices, 56,048f2 of residential in the form of 46 
flats and maisonettes (partly housing association, 50% of which 
(probably 12 one bedroom flats) would be for Council nomination, and 
partly luxury private use), carparking, a riverside walkway, 
refurbishment of the jetty and a communal hall or lounge. The 
developer stressed the need for the quantity of officespace to make 
the entire scheme commercially viable and the Office Development 
Permit allowed 65,000f2 with a restriction that the scheme includes at 
least 54,824f2 of residential space. The Council gave its broad approval 
of this scheme to the Docklands Joint Committee but called for 
further details regarding the communal hall and required a planning 
agreement. In doing this the Council considered the fact that the area 
was not identified as a Preferred Office Location, was zoned for 
residential use and would considerably block the view of the Thames 
currently enjoyed by the GLC estate on St Katherines Way. They also 
took account of objections received from GLC tenants and The 
Employment Working Group to such a scheme. The DJC resolved to 
grant permission but as negotiations continued the developers 
reassessed the commercial viability of the scheme and found it both 
unfundable and unprofitable to retain the housing association element 
238 
and any S. 52 requirement to complete the residential part first. 
Amended applications were submitted in June and July 1980 deleting 
the housing association element but maintaining the provision of a 
clubroom for neighbouring GLC estates residents (250m2) and a public 
walkway. The Council did consider suggesting refusal purely on office 
policy grounds but on the basis of residential content, albeit private, 
and the clubroom the scheme was agreed. There followed protracted 
negotiations between the Council, the GLC, tenants associations and 
the developers over the siting of the clubroom and finally, in August 
1981 the Consent was issued and required the completion of the 
residential and clubroom elements ahead of the offices. The planning 
agreement then required completion of the clubroom ahead of both the 
offices and residential and a further agreement to be entered into 
with the Council within 12 months as to the construction of the 
clubroom. This period of time was extended but the company went 
into receivership in September 1982. 
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C. H. A. M. P. S. SCHEME 
WHITECHAPEL : CAMPERDOWN STREET, HALF MOON PASSAGE. 
ALIE STREET & MILE END ROAD 
1973/1982 
This Central & City scheme was discussed for many years and was 
under negotiation at the same time as BAGS and the Folgate Street 
developments. A permission was first given in respect of No. 25 
Camperdown Street (#25) in May 1975, following an enquiry from 
Central & City over two years earlier. This Consent allowed for the 
reconstruction of the existing vacant and derelict office building 
(190m2)1° to match and enhance the listed buildings on nearby Alie 
Street, plus an additional floor of light industrial use as planning gain. 
Following this, several schemes were drawn up for discussion with the 
Council and a Consent was issued in December 1976 for the erection 
of a building at #9/25 Camperdown Street, with a frontage in 
traditional materials and style, comprised of 1,167m2 offices (including 
190m2 existing office use) and 305m2 light industrial use. This was 
modified in early 1977 to take account of the landowner's need for 
direct access to the rear of 31/37 Alie Street which had become 
known during negotiations to acquire the site. The result was a 
building with reduced floorspace (1,375m2) and thus the industrial 
element was deleted (it was considered contrary to `good planning 
sense' by the GLC and the Council planners") and the renovation of 
two Grade II listed residential buildings (496m2) in Alie Street (#17 & 
10 This represented only a 10% increase in office space over that 
stated on a S. 53 determination. 
11 Refer however to the scheme later approved for Marshall 
Walker which included mixed office and industrial use on this site 
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19), together with the incorporation of some vacant land at the rear 
(#19 & 42 Half Moon Passage), was substituted as the gain. The 
provision of a loading bay for 31/37 Alie Street and the consequent 
reduction in traffic congestion on Alie Street was also put forward as 
a benefit and the consent required its completion, together with that 
of the residential renovation, before the application of internal 
finishes to the offices. The consent did not require a planning 
agreement. None of these schemes were implemented and discussions 
continued until a further application was made in January 1979 for the 
construction of an office building (21,303f2) at 9/15 Alie street with 
some external restoration works to Iberia House (38 Half Moon 
Passage) change of use of 27 Alie Street to storage and the use of 
#25 as a carpark. The Committee approved the scheme subject to a 
planning agreement requiring the developer to assist in the acquisition 
of a Chapel at 213 Mile End Road and to construct a new building 
both to relocate the Half Moon Theatre who were occupying 27 Alie 
Street. The proposed development would have led to the closure of 
that theatre without these arrangements being made. At this stage 
the developers owned #25 and 9/15 Alie Street. On November 9,1979 
the developer signed an agreement with The Half Moon Theatre which 
recited details of the above permission, Council policy on office 
development and GDP policy on recognising the importance of 
promoting and preserving theatres before providing for the payment of 
£40,000 (within 12 months or on the day development started, 
whichever was earlier) towards the cost of purchasing, renovating and 
reconstructing the chapel as a theatre to a standard approved by the 
Council. On November 14th a planning agreement was signed between 
the developers and the Council which contained similar recitals and 
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recognised the participation in the renovation and re- construction of 
the chapel (as agreed between the developer and the Theatre), and 
thus its rescue from closure, as a valid planning advantage. The 
developer agreed to enter into an agreement with the Theatre on or 
before signing the planning agreement under which they would 
covenant to participate in the works described. They went on to 
covenant with the Council not to implement the 1975 and 1976 
consents on #25 and 9/25, not to commence the development until an 
agreement with the Theatre was executed and not to occupy the 
offices until restoration work at Iberia House was completed to the 
satisfaction of the Council. The consent was issued on November 20th 
and £40,000 was paid to the Theatre early in 1980, but the offices did 
not go ahead because a fire substantially damaged Iberia House which 
was to be restored as part of the development. Consequently a further 
application was submitted in June 1981 12 to do certain refurbishment 
works at 17/19 (listed buildings), 23 & 27 Alie Street, to construct office 
buildings with ancillary storage and retail use and carparking on the 
rest of the site (9/15,25,29 & 31/37 Alie Street, Iberia House and 9/25 
Camperdown Street) and to do works on the chapel, Including the 
construction of an auditorium on the adjacent vacant site. At this 
stage the Theatre still) occupied 23,25 & 27 Alie Street but had 
purchased the chapel and were doing reconstruction works. It was 
anticipated that Central & City would enter into another planning 
agreement containing essentially the same recitals and clauses as the 
previous one, plus an agreement to use their best endeavours to 
12 In October 1980 an application by another developer to 
convert 17/19 Alie St. and 19 & 42 Half Moon Passage to offices 
(5,060s/f) was refused. 
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complete 17/19 within 2 years. It was also to contain recitals as to 
the developer conforming with the previous Half Moon agreement and 
the account taken of this in agreeing to grant permission on this 
larger development. The counterpart agreement with the Theatre 
detailed two payments: £40,000 against the architect's certificates 
issued in respect of a schedule of works on the chapel (First Works), 
and £220,000 (to be paid 12 months after the consent was issued or on 
commencement of the development) again against certificates in 
respect of a second schedule of works to construct the auditorium. 
These agreements were not executed following a request by Central & 
City to divide up the development into different elements which could 
be hived off under the name of another company under whose 
ownership part of the site was held, Western Heritable Land, for the 
purpose of saving on Development Land Tax. 13 Consequently separate 
Theatre agreements, planning agreements and planning permissions 
were drawn up, details of which appear below. The development also 
entailed the closure of Half Moon Passage, an historic public walkway 
and the developers further agreed to provide limited public access to 
the courtyard and passage to Alie Street, which was part of the design 
of the new development, before a closure order was made. 14 
13 Letter dated March 24,1982 from Central & City's solicitors 
to Mr Dempsey of the Legal Department reads :"... my clients have 
now received a Report from their DLT Surveyors and some further 
Advice from Counsel. As you will recall, my clients have always 
reserved the right to re-jig their proposals in the light of DLT advice. 
In order to protecct their own position and to be in a position to 
arrange proper funding for the proposed Development, my clients 
would now like to proceed on the basis that the Development be split 
into 4 separate recognisable projects. " 
14 Letter to the developers solicitors from the Legal Department 
dated October 9,1981 stated " The effect of such an agreement could 
well be that if objections were received to the closure of Half Moon 
Passage, the Council would be able to show objectors an agreement 
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Definition of Site 
Western Heritable Land 
Part of 23,25,27,29, 
31/37 Alie St. & 
9/25 Camperdown St. 
Part of 23,25,27,29, 
31/37 Alie St. 
Development Consent attached Theatre 
A reem 
Company (125,175f2 offices) 
construction of 17&19 Half Moon Pa. £220000 
offices; carpark 9/25 Camperdown St. 
( East Block ) 
construction of 
offices; pu blic 
house & offices; 
wine bar, offices; 
Demolition of 
listed building 
( South Block ) 
29/37,25 Alie St £ 40000 
23 Alle St. 
27 Alie St. 
25 Alie St. 
Central & City Properties (123,173f2 offices) 
9/15 and part of 17/ construction of 9/15 Alie St. £ 40000 
19 Alie St. & Iberia offices 42 Half Moon Pa. paid re 
House ( West Block ) Iberia House 9.11.79 
Restoration of agreemt 
17/19 Alie St. 
The agreements were executed in July 1982 (13 months after the 
application was submitted) and were intended to ensure that the money 
was paid and restoration work within the development completed 
before the offices were occupied. Consents were issued in August 1982 
and this scheme was fully implemented. 
which had been reached which would enable the public to have access 
during these limited periods and this may well make all the difference 
to the matter of whether the road closure would be agreed. " 
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CHRIST CHURCH HALL 
SPITALFIELDS : HANBURY STREET, NO. 22A AND BUXTON STREET NO. s 31-33 
1975/1979 
In March 1975 outline permission was given to build a youth club at 
31/33 Buxton Street. It was anticipated that this, together with 
monies paid towards the restoration of Christ Church, Spitalfields, 
would be planning gain for office development at 22A Hanbury Street, 
the existing church hall and youth club and a consent was issued to 
this effect in May 1976. The covenant of the hall required its 
proceeds of sale to be used for 'christian purposes' and the Church 
Council intended to sell it and relocate the club elsewhere: a new 
building at Buxton Street would have fulfilled this intention. No 
planning agreement was executed as it was discovered that Christ 
Church itself was not in need of further renovation monies. In 1978 
interest in developing the church hall revived and a further consent 
was issued in July for 7,900f2 of offices with a youth club and 
recreation facilities (9,500f2) at Buxton Street. Again the intention 
was for the Church Council to apply the sale proceeds of the hall to 
the new development. The developer interested in the church hall 
failed to go ahead with the purchase after the consent was issued so 
the youth club did not go ahead. 
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CHRIST CHURCH, SPITALFIELDS SCHEMES 
1977/1979 
A number of schemes were negotiated with different developers to 
raise money for the restoration of the Grade I Listed Hawksmoor 
church which stands on the corner of Commercial Street and Fournier 
Street in the centre of the conservation areas of Spitalfields. It is 
considered to be of national historical importance and a major example 
of European Baroque architecture aswell as the obvious community 
facility and focus of certain community events in East London (such as 
an annual music festival). In 1977 the cost of restoring the church 
was estimated to be £675,000 for works alone, excluding maintenance 
and upkeep. The following schemes produced £415,000 for this work, 
excluding interest, over a period of 14 months : 
Address developer annxfz amount date paid 
1/5 Frying Pan Alley Chaselea 30,000 £130,000 1.3.1979 
15/17 Sandys Row 
Rear 9A Artillery Pa. 
87/93 Mansell Street Hill Samuel 25,000 £ 30,000 27.11.1979 
38,39,40 Prescott St. Providence £ 30,000 27.11.1979 
60 Commercial Rd 0. C. L. 25,100 £100,000 31.12.1979 
27/33 Artillery Lane Western 19,000 £125,000 9.5.1980 
2/6 Fort Street Heritable 
1. CHASELEA 
In 1975 two schemes had been approved linking this site with 
renovation of buildings for residential use but neither had been 
implemented. An application was made for a six storey office building 
in the Artillery Passage Conservation Area in January 1978, the 
proposed planning gain being a shop on part of the ground floor and a 
contribution to restoration works on Christ Church. On May 31st the 
consent was issued and a planning agreement executed which stated 
the office policy and that participating in the restoration of Christ 
Church or any other Hawksmoor church in the Borough was a planning 
advantage. Under this agreement compliance with clause 1 of a 
Conservation Agreement entered into with the Friends of Christ 
Church was as a prerequisite to implementing the office consent. The 
Conservation Agreement of the same date in turn provided for the 
payment of £120,000 in connection with an attached schedule of works 
within six months, failing which the developer would pay an additional 
£10,000. £130,000 was paid 10 months later. In March 1979 the 
development was taken over by Reeshurst Ltd and the Conservation 
246 
Agreement was assigned to them. In January 1981 a further document 
was executed to vary the agreement so as to allow The Friends to 
invest the money paid and use the interest to establish a fund for the 
general repair and upkeep of the church. The variation also allowed 
the Friends to substitute other works, if necessary, for those 
originally scheduled. 
2. HILL SAMUEL LIFE & PROVIDENCE LIFE ASSURANCE 
Appeal lodged against a section 53 determination in 1979 
In 1964 a permission had been issued in respect of Eastgate House, 
87/93 Mansell Street to erect an eight storey building with mixed 
retail, office, factory and warehouse uses. In 1973 there was an 
application to extend office use but the Council refused to grant 
permission and the ensuing appeal was withdrawn in 1976. In 
November 1978 an application was made for a Section 53 determination 
on the uses within the building as Hill Samuel had taken a lease to 
use the whole area as offices to which the Council objected. The 
Council refused to carry out such a determination as it is only 
relevant where development is contemplated and Hill Samuel issued a 
writ requiring a declaration as to existing uses. The Council's position 
was that only half the floorspace could be used for offices without 
further permission, and any further use would require compliance with 
office policy. Hill Samuel also appealed to the Secretary of State. 
Since the writ was issued the plaintiff's solicitors (Gouldens) instituted 
settlement negotiations. They first suggested that the Council grant a 
personal consent to Hill Samuel to allow them to use the premises for 
the purposes they took on a lease without conferring the benefit of an 
office consent on the freeholders. The Council later suggested that 
Hill Samuel could provide some planning gain on other land owned by 
them in the same area and consent would then be forthcoming. 
During the course of this dispute the Council had received advice from 
Counsel that their case was not a strong one and that any section 52 
agreement could be problematic in establishing the planning purpose 
for entering it if the office use was already valid. Finally agreement 
was reached between the parties actually at the door to the court on 
the basis that office use would be granted for all of the building 
(50,000f2) provided the developer entered into a planning agreement 
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and a Conservation Agreement with the Friends (the church being over 
800m from Eastgate House). Both agreements were executed on 
November 27,1979 and the planning agreement contained the same 
recitals and clauses as above. 
3. OVERSEAS CONTAINERS LIMITED (O. C. L. ) 
Complications arose in this instance because of the form of the 
scheme, in so far as it involved a payment to a third party. In 
January 1978 the sub- committee agreed to grant permission for the 
change of use to offices and one non-ancillary flat subject to a 
planning agreement for a contribution to the restoration of Christ 
Church. The draft consent made no reference to a planning agreement 
nor to planning gain and the planning agreement required compliance 
with clause 1 of a Conservation Agreement with the Friends. The 
insurance company who held the lease was suspicious of this 
arrangement and endeavoured to persuade the Council to accept the 
payment themselves, pointing to the practice of requiring similar 
payments in lieu of carparking spaces. The Solicitor to the Council 
refused to do this on the grounds that the Council would be acting 
ultra vires. Some further discussions continued but little progress was 
made and in January 1979 the company appealed to the Secretary of 
State on the grounds that the application had not been determined 
within the statutory period. Around this time the company were 
negotiating a lease to O. C. L. and O. C. L. were prepared to resume 
discussion on the planning agreement. It was finally agreed that the 
payment would be made under a Conservation Agreement. That 
agreement, signed in November 1979 recited the office policy, allowed 
the Friends to invest the money and use the proceeds to restore the 
church and stated that the participation of O. C. L. was a material 
consideration in determining the application. The content of the 
Agreement was to pay £100,000 to the friends before January 1,1980, 
subject to the grant of a planning permission satisfactory O. C. L. and 
to O. C. L. being granted an underlease on 60 Commercial Road. The 
payment was made and the appeal withdrawn. 
4. WESTERN HERITABLE 
See under F. A. B. S. Scheme below. 
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COMMERCIAL STREET, NO. s 92/96 & PUMA COURT, NO. s 1/6 
SPITALFIELDS : -FASHION STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
1974/1975 
This was a scheme to replace existing delapidated properties with the 
same distribution of mixed uses over a total of 22,000f2. The 
application included 5,400f2 of office space, a commercial building and 
16 residential units (only six were occupied because of the poor state 
of the building) in two almshouses administered by the Norton Folgate 
Trust15, the developers In this scheme. The Committee approved the 
scheme subject to a planning agreement to ensure completion of the 
residential units before the application of internal finishes to the 
office building. This agreement was executed on April 7,1976 and the 
decision notice contained conditions imposing similar obligations on the 
developer together with a limit on the office floorspace within the 
development to that which already existed. Any increase in office 
floorspace required at least an equal increase in residential content. 
15 The chairman of this Trust Is Eric Stride, the Rector of 
Christ Church. 
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'CONGO' SCHEMES 
SPITALFIELDS : PARTLY FASHION STREET & ARTILLERY PASSAGE C. A. 's 
1973/1981 
Another Central & City scheme involving the renovation of listed 
buildings in the heart of a conservation area, namely 4/6 & 14 
Fournier Street and 16 Artillery Passage (all classified as Grade II), as 
planning advantages for office development at 36 Spital Square and 
5/5A Sandy's Row on the fringe of the other two conservation areas 
in Spitalfields. The immediate background of the buildings was as 
follows : 
14 Fournier Street 17.4.83 
20.9.73 
27.2.74 
2.8.74 
5A Sandy's Row 28.4.74 
36 Spital Square 
4/6 Fournier Street 27.8.75 
Change of use: light industrial to residential 
refused. Sale to Eric Eslob followed 
Change of use to residential approved 
Listed building consent for rehabilitation 
Details approved 
S. 53 determination: Existing office use 100mz 
Also commercial and industrial uses 
Commercial Use 
Listed building consent for use as 2 dwellings 
The negotiated scheme put to the Committee on July 2,1975 was 
to provide 1,075m2 residential space in the three Fournier Street 
houses and a flat at 16 Artillery Passage, plus 812m2 of offices, a 
split of 57% residential and 43% offices which reduced to about 50: 50 
when existing uses were taken into account. 's The refurbishment of 
all of the buildings and the demolition of industrial outbuildings behind 
the Fournier Street properties with replacement landscaped gardens 
were also identified as gains. The tenant of the shop at Artillery 
Passage objected to the scheme 
... It is virtually impossible in these inflatory 
(sic) days of mad 
development and crazy rentals to find another premises in this 
area which would be suitable at a rent I can afford. " 
The Committee agreed the recommendation to approve the scheme and 
a decision notice was issued in April 1976 after a planning agreement 
was signed with the developer and Mr Elstob. Sandy's Row and 
Artillery Passage were to be developed as one unit containing offices, 
showroom and a flat and this was linked to 14 Fournier Street. Spital 
Square was linked with all of the Fournier Street properties. The 
internal finishes could not be applied nor the offices occupied until 
16 Planning Report to the Development Sub-Committee July 2,1975 
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the residential works were completed, outbuildings demolished and 
gardens prepared for planting. The novelty of this agreement was Mr 
Elstob, as the developer was agreeing to fund the work on his 
property, including damp-proofing, repairing walls, re-wiring, building 
kitchen and bathrooms, painting the exterior and providing central 
heating and a refrigerator. 
The corresponding condition on the consent linked the properties 
differently 
4. The residential and landscaping works at 4/6 and 14 
Fournier Street and 16 Artillery Passage shall be completed prior 
to the application of internal finishes to, and occupation as 
offices of 5/5A Sandys Row and 16 Artillery Passage and 36 
Spital Square.... the meaning of `internal finishes' shall be as 
agreed in writing with the Council. 
The reason for this was simply given as compliance with office policy. 
A number of amendments were made to the scheme in October 1977 
because of difficulties in completing the residential elements. In the 
case of No. 4 Fournier Street the developers were unable to find a 
residential occupier even though they offered it to over 40 charities, 
housing associations, the GLC, Tower Hamlets Council and other bodies 
on a 99 year lease at peppercorn rent. The reason appears to be that 
it was too large for single occupancy and had too awkward an interior 
for conversion into flats. The amendment involved, first its change of 
use to library, meeting room and book-shop for the Council for British 
Archaelogy plus one unit of residential accommodation and, finally, Its 
sale to the Spitalfields Trust. Both were acceptable as planning gain. 
No. 6 also was problematic because renovation works were likely to 
continue over a long period so the restoration requirement was confined 
to a flat for an existing tenant and the disposal of the house, by way 
of a 99 year lease, to another tenant who would then complete the 
restoration was added. This was superseded by the sale to the 
Spitalfields Trust. Sandys Row had been altered by a permission 
granted by the planner under delegated powers to move the flat to the 
third floor (from ground and basement) and the replacement of the 
showroom with a shop. A revised agreement was signed on October 
12,1977 acknowledging the changes at Sandys Row and the completion 
of works at No. 14. Finally it released the developers from the first 
agreement upon the transfer of No. s 4/6 to Spitalfields Trust, which 
was duly done. Both Agreements were discharged from the Land 
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Registry in December. In November 1979 the Committee agreed to 
change the use of the basement of 36 Spital Square to offices, subject 
to a planning agreement. The first agreement had specifically 
restricted the size of office space at 36 Spital Square until 4/6 
Fournier Street was completed and Spitalfields Trust still had not 
commenced the work, but the later agreement had released the 
developer from all obligations relating to 4/6 Fournier Street. For 
this reason the Committee resolved to take no enforcement 
proceedings against the occupation of Spital Square as offices. 
There are various floorspace figures on the file but a comparison 
can be drawn between those given on the detailed proposals for the 
1976 scheme and those appearing around the time of the amendments. 
offices residential other use 
1976 Sandys Row/Artillery Passag e341 108 112(store/shop) 
(revised) 36 Spital Square 534 124 (store) 
4/6 & 14 Fournier St. 964 
- ------- ------------------- --------------------------- --------- 
875(45%) 
- - 
1072(55%) 236 
Less Existing 101 309 ? 
------------------- --------------------------- 
Increased floorspaces (m2) 
--------- 
774(50%) 
---------- 
763(50%) 
- ------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 
With Sandys Row/Artillery Passage359 
--------- 
94 108 (shop) 
Amendmts36 Spital Square 534 ? (showroom) 
ancillary offices, apprx. 120 
4/6 & 14 Fournier Street 
----- - 
964 
---------- ------------------- --------------------------- -- - 
1013(49%) 1058(51%) 
Less Existing 101 
- 
309 
---------- ------------------- --------------------------- 
Increased floorspaces (m2) 
--------------------------- 
-------- 
912(55%) 
--------- 
749(45%) 
---------- ------------------- 
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C. W. S. SCHEMES 
--ST. KATHERINES 
1977/1984 
By the late 1970's, as a result of changing patterns in the marketing, 
demand and competition for consumer goods, CWS had a number of 
vacant buildings and sites in Tower Hamlets. After going through a 
period of decline the CWS had approached Tower Hamlets to agree a 
scheme of comprehensive redevelopment of several of the sites to 
assist their strategy of regeneration which involved using these sites 
for the banking and computer parts of their business, while other sites 
were sold on for development. Resulting planning gains were put into 
planning agreements and the whole package was considered in the 
light of potential employment opportunites and the desire to keep the 
operations of CWS in the Borough. The sites were not in a Prefered 
Office Location which led to a directed refusal from the GLC on one 
of the applications made (63-65 Prescot Street), but this was appealed 
and the approach taken by the Borough was affirmed. 
LEMAN STREET, No. s 53/73,75/89 and 99 
In 1977 the National Westminster Bank, the leaseholders from CWS, 
applied to change the use of part of 53/73 and all of 75/89 Leman 
Street from industrial to office use (60,000f2) and the conversion of 99 
Leman Street from office to industrial use and flatted warehouse units 
(61,000f2). The office use was to be restricted to Centrefile, a 
subsiduary of CWS. In 1973 the Council had entered into a planning 
agreement with CWS which had provided that in the event of 53/73 
Leman Street and 33/37 Goodman's Yard being used as offices, 99 
Leman Street and 41/42 Goodman's Yard would only be used for 
warehousing and the office use at these premises would cease. A new 
planning agreement was executed in February 1978 reciting the above 
details and office policy, releasing CWS from the first agreement and 
requiring the whole development to be carried out in accordance with 
an agreed schedule of works. It was further agreed that 99 Leman 
Street would only be used for light industrial purposes. The consent 
issued on February 8,1978 limited the occupation of offices to 
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Centrefile and also required a schedule of works to be agreed. 17 This 
agreement was further amended in May 1982, despite objections by 
National Westminster, so as to allow Ian Mikado M. P. to use Unit 1 of 
No. 99 as offices with use restricted to the Tower Hamlets Centre for 
Small Businesses. The whole of this scheme was implemented. 
PRESCOT STREET, CHAMBER STREET and 2/8 FAIRCLOUGH STREET. 
Appeal to the Secretary of State, decision issued March 1985. 
CWS undertook to refurbish its old butter store in Fairclough Street 
for use as small industrial workshops units as planning gain on three 
separate office schemes, as follows, in Prescot and Chamber Streets 
(both designated for commercial use) about 325m away. 
offices Fairclough Street Approved by LBTH 
86/94 Chamber Street18 2972 Phase I: 1393 11.10.1982 (consent) 
17/19 Prescot. Street 2183 Phase II : 4570 21.7.1982 (sub-c'ee) 
63/65 Prescot Street 3900 Phase III : 1050 21.7.1982 (sub-c'ee) 
9065 m2 7013M2 
The last scheme was refered to the GLC in their capacity as Strategic 
Planning Authority, 19 and their response was to direct a refusal on 
17 The reason for this was stated as follows: " To ensure the 
completion of the development including the industrial and warehouse 
use, because office development alone on these sites would not have 
been acceptable to the local planning authority and planning 
permission is granted in view of the inclusion of a substantial planning 
benefit in the scheme which makes a positive contribution towards the 
acheivement of the planning aims for the area. " 
18 An extension to 110 Leman Street required by CWS to be 
refurbished to accommodate their expanding banking activities. 
19 Under Regulation 4, Town and Country Planning (Local 
Planning Authorities in Greater London) Regulations 1980 the GLC had 
the capacity to give directions on all applications involving over 280m2 
of office space or a developmnent within 67m of a category A 
metropolitan road. Where the amount of offices exceeded 2785 m2 the 
GLC became the Strategic Planning Authority for determination of the 
application. 
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the grounds of non-compliance with office policy as the site was not 
within a Prefered Office'Tocation. CWS appealed with the support of 
the Council and an Inquiry was held in August and November 1984. 
The GLC argued that the Prescot Street premises should be refurbished 
for industrial use, that the location was unsuitable for offices and to 
allow the scheme would lead to an unacceptable increase in office 
accommodation in this part of the Borough. The Inspector rejected 
each of these grounds on the basis of renovation in Prescot Street not 
being viable, the existence of other office developments in the 
immediate vacinity, the lack of oversupply of offices, the contribution 
of offices and industrial units to employment opportunities, the 
existence of a transport interchange barely outside the required 
distance (440m) and the provision of an 'adequate planning gain' by 
increasing the overall industrial floorspace. He specifically considered 
that by allowing the scheme the developer could afford to provide the 
industrial space but without the offices such a development could not 
be viable. Some objections were made on the basis of the land being 
better used for residential purposes but this was considered irrelevant 
as there was no evidence of such a development taking place. The 
use of planning agreements linking the schemes was acknowledged and 
such agreements had been executed requiring the developer to comply 
with an agreed schedule of works before internal finishes could be 
applied to the offices. 
110/118 LEMAN STREET (CO-OP BANK LONDON S. E. HEADQUARTERS) 
In 1980 planning permission was granted for the change of use of part 
of 110 Leman Street to offices for the Co-Operative Bank (7200m2) 
with planning gain in a residential development on South Tenter Street 
(2800m2). A planning agreement was executed on October 27,1980 
which required the developer not to apply internal finishes to the 
offices until the residential element was completed or the site was 
disposed of to an approved body. By this stage the Council were 
additing an extra sentence to this previously used clause allowing them 
to check that the body approved was in a position to complete the 
development. As a result of the financial problems experienced by 
housing associations at this time no tenant could be found for the site 
and the Council amended the agreement in August 1981 to allow CWS 
Bank only to occupy the offices provided the developer continued to 
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use his best endeavours to find a tenant. The Council continued to 
remind CWS of this bbfigation and the Council did receive an 
application from Oxford House housing association for a loan of 
£300,000 to carry out the development. 
24/26 PRESCOT STREET 
See under Prescot Street below. 
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ELDER STREET : BRITISH LAND SCHEME 
ELDER ST C. A.: ELDER ST, FLEUR DE LIS ST/FOLGATE ST, 
COMMERCIAL ROAD 
1972/1979 
This scheme involved three different elements, all in close proximity 
to each other: the demolition of an old police station on Commercial 
Street to be replaced by a new office building; new residential 
developments in Fleur de Lis Street, Folgate Street and Elder Street; 
the renovation of existing eighteenth century houses in Elder Street 
for residential use (including the change of use of two of these 
houses). 
In 1971 the Council agreed a policy for the Elder Street Conservation 
Area (designated in 1969), including a resolution to seek Building 
Preservation Notices for any non-listed buildings threatened with 
demolition. This was done for No. s 1&3 Elder Street in 1971 as a 
proposal for office and residential redevelopment submitted by 
Armcroft Ltd required their demolition. They were both interesting 
early eighteenth buildings with later-added timber facades intact, and 
at this stage were capable of renovation and were listed in May 1972. 
The remainder of that side of Elder Street was already listed, mostly 
owned by Armcroft Ltd (together with the vacant site at No. 25) and 
vacant, all except No. s 19,21 and 23. In July 1973 British Land 
acquired all the properties owned by Armcroft including 9/10 Fleur de 
Lis Street and 31/33 Folgate Street, in addition to the police station 
which they had recently bought from the GLC (and were discussing 
development of that site for mixed office and residential use with the 
Council), and effectively took over the negotiations with the Council, 
merging them with their plans for the police station. 
The Armcroft proposal, by 1973, had included the renovation of 1/23 
Elder Street for residential use, with new mixed office (16,900f2 net) 
and residential (3,550f2) developments at 9/10 Fleur de Lis Street and 
31/33 Folgate Street. In July 1973 Napier Properties, a subsiduary of 
British Land, submitted a new application for the properties they 
owned (which excluded 13,19 & 23 Elder Street) which followed the 
same model and produced 1870m2 of offices, 1925m2 of new residential 
and the renovation for residential use of the properties in Elder Street 
(1860m2). The development committee In November 1973 received 
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information on the application for this mixed development and stated 
that they were very concerned about inadequate protection against fire 
and vandalism given the listed buildings in Elder Street. A further 
application was made by British Land to demolish the police station 
and No. s 9& 10 Fleur de Lis Street (which had also been listed in 
September 1973) at the end of 1973 and the report recommended 
approval in the light of the substantial residential gain to be included 
in the scheme. Amendments were made following negotiations to join 
the police station proposals for offices (1860m2) to the scheme and to 
erect new buildings at Folgate Street and Fleur de Lis Street for 
residential use alone (1925m2). After receiving no directions from the 
GLC20, approval was given in November 1975 subject to a planning 
agreement being agreed. However consent was not given to develop 
until September 1976 as a result of protracted negotiations over that 
agreement. When it was issued it covered office development at the 
police station site, new residential at Fleur de Lis, 25 Elder Street and 
Folgate Street and renovation at 1-11,15,17 & 21 Elder Street. 
In the interim consent to demolish the police station and the premises 
In Fleur de Lis Street had been issued even though they were listed 
buildings because of the `planning and conservation benefits of the 
total scheme'. 21 Various notices were served on the developer as to 
the deterioration of some of the listed buildings. As a result of non- 
compliance and continued delays No. s 1&3 were demolished by the 
developer in 1976 shortly ahead of the grant of consent on grounds of 
their unsafe state. Their demolition weakened the also very 
delapidated No. s 5&7, the roof of the former being removed shortly 
after the demolition of No. 3, and the developers applied for their 
demolition also. As a result the application for detailed consent, 
submitted jointly by British Land and Newlon Housing Association in 
August 1976, was withdrawn at the request of the Council and 
replaced by one which included new residential buildings at 1/3 Elder 
Street. 
20 Required under section 4(1)(d) & (k) Town & Country 
Planning (Greater London) Regulations 1965 due to the size of the 
office development. 
21 Letter from GLC Historic Buildings Board to LBTH, 11 June 1974. 
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Finally it was also decided, despite many objections, to allow the 
demolition of 5/7 Elder' street because of the detrimental effect it was 
having on No. 9. The excessive cost involved prevented the Council 
itself from renovating the building, and once demolished it was to be 
replaced by new residential. The Council were strongly criticised for 
the manner in which this exercise was conducted, particularly as the 
first meeting to decide the application was held before the statutory 
notice period had expired. A member of the Tower Hamlets Society 
noted of this meeting the lack of information given to the Members by 
the officers. 
No background information was supplied to the Members of 
the Committee, except the bare fact that a Dangerous 
Structures Notice had been served. The Committee were not 
even told that Elder Street was part of a larger 
development scheme involving the main part of the 
Conservation Area (the fact that it was in a Conservation 
Area was not mentioned) or that the statutory period for 
objections still had nine days to run ... the last fact was 
announced verbally at the Committee meeting by the Head 
of Planning, who noted that objections had been received 
'today', and so the matter was deferred. Yet when the 
development sub-committee met a week later on 3 November 
(two days still left before objections to be received) the 
application was again pressed forward by the Planning 
Department with a recommendation for demolition. "22 
The letter goes on to state that the views of the Conservation Areas 
Advisory Group against demolition were not made known to the 
Committee in contradiction of their terms of reference. A new 
agreement was drawn up and signed to cover the alterations to the 
scheme produced by the demolition. 
The final result was to be a new housing development of flats at each 
end of Elder Street, acquired by a housing association with funding 
from the DoE, under section 29 Housing Act 1974 and the renovation 
of several properties as single dwellings along the east side of Elder 
Street. The new flats were for one or two persons and built as replica 
of the architecture of the street with landscaped garden areas and 
some carparking. Details of the various housing proposals are given 
overleaf. 
22 Letter to Peter Shore dated 4 November 1976. 
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6.8.76 Full Planning Applic. 
British Land & -Newlon 
H/A. 
29/33 Folgate St 35 new flats 
1/3 Elder Street 
9/10 Fleur de Lis St 
23.9.76 Conditional Consent 
26.10.76 Full planning Applic. 
22.12.76 Conditional Consent 
26.1.77 Details Consent 
Police station site 
9/10 Fleur de Lis 
31/33 Folgate St 
1/11,15/17,21 Elde 
1,3,5,7 Elder St 
9/10 Fleur de Lis 
as above 
office building 
St new residential 
r St Rehabilitation 
32 new flats: in 
St 4 storey b'ing 
29/33 Folgate Street 15 new flats 
land at rear Elder St landscaping 
18.3.77 DOE approval to H/A Fleur de Lis St 47 dwellings 
Elder St Estimated cost: 
Folgate St £617,329 
Some further revisions did take place in 1977 as a result of the newly 
formed Spitalfields Trust23 personally intervening to save No. s 5& 
724, which they described as eighteenth century silk weavers' houses 
with delightful interiors surviving almost intact. They purchased these 
two houses for £4000 to renovate as single family dwellings (after 
paying British Land and Newlon £16000 for abortive work done on 
schemes including these premises) and Newlon reduced the number of 
flats from 47 to 35, with the approval of the DoE. The Trust was 
largely funded in this exercise by the Historic Buildings Council. The 
Council made no objection to this move, even though it meant an 
overall reduction in the amount of housing association accommodation 
available (No. s 5 and 7 would be sold in the private sector in October 
23 A registered charitable trust incorporated for "the purposes 
of preserving the architectural heritage of the area by acquiring and 
repairing buildings and by helping and encouraging others to do so. " 
3rd Annual Report of Council of Management, Spitalfields Historic 
Buildings Trust Ltd, June 1980. 
24 See "Spitalfields Grace " AJ 17 October 1979,819; Sunday 
Telegraph December 2,1979. 
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1979 for around £60,000 each) as in planning terms the change was of 
no consequence. 25 
Full consent was approved for the office element in 1979. The Council 
made representations to the GLC against allowing demolition to go 
ahead at the end of 1980 until a new owner and development scheme 
were ready to proceed on the grounds of the noise generated by the 
loss of this building for the occupiers of the new housing development. 
At this stage much of the renovation work was still not complete and 
No. s 9,11.15 and 17 were, by late 1978 severely delapidated. Works 
on No. 21 were completed in early 1980, and No. 17 was also finished by 
1982. Numbers 9/11 and 15 were not completed by the developer, but 
were transferred to purchasers in 1982 who covenanted to complete 
the works. The new residential element had been transferred to 
Newlon in 1978 for £28,000 and was completed. 
u This was the reason given by the chief planner at a meeting 
with the GLC, DoE, British Land, Newlon, Spitalfields Trust, Housing 
Corporation, 22nd September 1977. The council infact gave a grant of 
£250 towards the works (Development Committee decision 22 November 
1978) 
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ELDER STREET. No. 6 
SPITALFIELDS -: -ELDER STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
In November 1981 the Committee refused an application to convert this 
building from industrial to office use (5,500f2) on the grounds of loss 
of industrial floorspace and non-compliance with office policy. No 
appeal was lodged. 
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ELDER STREET, No. 30 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
Before the area was designated as a conservation area permission 
had been given, in 1969, to change the use of this building from 
residential to office use and to add toilet facilities. In 1971 
permission had been given to change the use from multiple dwellings 
to a single dwelling and to carry out repair and reinstatement works. 
In 1973 an application was made to renew the 1969 consent, which 
now conflicted with office policy, for a period of 5 years. Following 
Counsel's opinion to the effect that the 1969 consent had not been 
displaced so office use did exist on the premises the application was 
allowed, conditional upon its implementation within nine months. 
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ELDER STREET, No. 34 
SPITALFIELDS : -ELDER STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
1969/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State. Decision letter issued September 
1981. 
In compliance with a policy in existence at the time, consent was 
given in 1969 to use this property as offices (1800f2), the intention 
being to ensure the preservation of historic buildings in Elder Street. 
The property had in fact been renovated for residential use but an 
application was made in 1976 to renew the office consent. The owner 
did not want to lose the benefit of the office use, and the consequent 
enhancement of value, and intended to sell the house for office use if 
the Council refused to renew. If a renewal was given he would 
continue to live in the property knowing that it could be sold at some 
later date as offices. A consent was given in March 1977 for a further 
3 years and in 1980 another application was made, with the same 
reasons given in support. Circumstances had changed, most 
specifically the east side of the street had been renovated for 
residential use. A refusal was issued in March 1981 on the grounds of 
loss of residential space and the proposal being contrary to office 
policy. An appeal was lodged in June 1981 and another application 
was submitted but still no planning gain was included. In July 1981 
another refusal was issued. In September however the Inspector 
directed consent to be given. His reasons were that lack of planning 
gain was not a valid ground for refusal and moreover planning gain 
had been provided in the form of restoration of the property in 1969. 
He added that the circumstances were exceptional as the grant of an 
office consent would prolong residential use. The Council appealed to 
the Divisional Court but were dismissed. 
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ELDER STREET, No. 35/37 
SPITALFIELDS : -ELDER STREET CONSERVATION AREA 
1974/1981 
Negotiations began in 1974 and the Council Issued its first decision, a 
refusal, in July 1975. This scheme involved 7350f2 of office use and 
eight residential units in a new rear extension to the building with 
landscaping. The reason given was non-compliance with office policy 
as the residential element was insufficient, poorly located and had no 
separate access. A year later a larger scheme (9000f2 of offices), 
which included the rehabilitation of 25 Fournier Street and 13 
Princelet Street for residential use (9000f2), was accepted In principle 
subject to a planning agreement for prior completion of the residential 
element. No progress was made with this as the developer could not 
acquire the residential element. Negotiations revived and in July 1978 
an application was made for offices on three floors of the property 
restricted to use in connection with fruit and vegetable wholesaling, 
the present use of the ground floor. In view of this restriction and 
previous attempts to comply with office policy a consent was issued. 
A further attempt was made for an office consent on the whole 
building without the restriction but this was refused in June 1980 on 
the grounds of non-compliance with office policy and no provision of 
planning gain. Five months later the same application was made on the 
grounds that the restriction made the property unlettable but was 
again refused on office policy grounds. In the interim the Council had 
agreed to allow office use on one floor of the building (1250f2 with 
1250f2 storage) so that it could be let to a tea packer and blender. 
This consent was personal to the applicants and the report refers to 
the possibility of skilled and semi-skilled non-office employment 
(estimated at four persons) that would result from the consent being 
given as making the application exceptional. It was not taken up. 
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F. A. B. S. SCHEME 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1971/1981 
This scheme relates to a site within the conservation area which was 
negotiated by one developer, the site was cleared and then further 
negotiations took place first with the same developer and then with 
the second developer who finally implemented a different scheme. It 
was intended that the scheme be put out to tender after the site was 
cleared but significant changes were made to the amount of office 
space after the site was sold. To aid the description of events the 
proposals appear below in tabular form : 
Site 
27/33 Artillery La. 
36/37 Steward St. 
20/26 Brushfield St. 
8/12 Fort Street 
27/33 Artillery La. 
38 Steward St. 
2/6 Fort St. 
27/33 Artillery La. 
27/33 Artillery La. 
developer offices gain' date 
Northleigh 2100 1250 residential 16.8.72 
Investments 557 community hall 
490 carparking 
net total 1326 1430 (55%) 
Northleigh 375 1257 residential & 18.8.72 
375 carparking (63%) 
(warehouse) 
Northleig h 
Northleig h 
net 
excess of offices on 60X; 40% 
27/33 Artillery La. Northleigh 
2/6 Fort St. 
750 882 residential 29.4.76 
375 youth club 
1257 (63%) 
1754 168 residential withdrawn 
518 church club in 1977 
1 9-5 686 
466 = £20,000 restoration of Christ 
Church 
1754 168 residential 25.1.78 
518 church club 
restoration of Christ Church 
Bounded by Fort St, Western 6317 £100,000 Christ Church 25.4.79 
Artillery La,. Heritable £ 20,000 church club 
Brushfield St. & 4970 net 
Steward St. 
The 1972 consent obtained by Northleigh was amended after the site 
was cleared to replace the warehousing and basement carparking with 
offices and a church youth club for the use of young people working 
in the city. As at this time it was the GLC's policy to discourage 
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underground parking the revisions were seen as an improvement on the 
original scheme. The ämöunt of offices was still within the 40%: 60% 
ratio required by the existing office policy guidelines. On April 30, 
1976 a planning agreement was executed to provide for the completion 
of the church youth club and residential elements before internal 
finishes were applied to the building. The revised scheme submitted in 
October 1977 for a larger office content was later amended to 
reorganise the distribution of uses into a5 storey office building on 
the site with an adjacent attached building to house the youth club 
and 2 residential flats. During the negotiations preceeding this 
application the Council pointed out the excess of office space and 
suggested the shortfall in gain be made up with a contribution to the 
restoration of either Wilton's Music Hall or Christ Church, using the 
Half Moon Agreement (see CHAMPS scheme above) as a precedent. 
Calculations were done on the basis of excess office space in the 
development and the scheme was agreed26 subject to an amended 
planning agreement requiring the developer to enter into and comply 
with a Restoration Agreement to covenant a contribution to Christ 
Church in respect of an agreed schedule of works. The consent made 
reference to the completion of the residential and youth club element 
before application of internal finishes to the offices but did not refer 
to a planning agreement nor to the restoration works. The 
development sub-committee considered this application at the same 
time as two other potential schemes (neither of which were 
implemented as they were superceded during negotiations) contributing 
towards the restoration works, and indicates the novelty of three 
separate developments being connected to one restoration project but 
explained it in terms of necessity due to the enormity of the project. 
It also alluded to an article in the Journal of Planning Law which 
shows other authorities participating in similar projects. 
26 Letter from Northleigh's Architects dated attached to the 
application dated October 11,1977 states "... this does appear to be a 
viable scheme and certainly, both from our Clients' and the church's 
point of view, a more attractive one. It is important for our Clients 
that we make progress... I know I can count on your co-operation in 
trying to reach a decision on this revised application as quickly as 
possible. We are always available for further discussion on details if 
you so wish. " 
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The other two schemes were as follows 
60 Commercial Rd Kensington 2322Recently built warehouse/ 12.7.77 
Commercial office building with 1 flat 
1-5 Frying PanAl. Norbilt 2787 6 storey new office block 23.9.77 
15-17 Sandys Row Homes Ltd. and 4 small shops (203) 
The agreements with Northleigh were not completed because of the 
successful negotiations27 by Western Heritable (subsiduary of Central & 
City) to build a larger glass-clad block, with a 70 feet atrium amd 
glass wall-climber, on the site without community facilities but with a 
much larger contribution to Christ Church towards renovation and 
youth club facilities in the Crypt. Draft copies of the planning and 
the two Restoration Agreements for Christ Church and the Crypt were 
sent to the Council by the solictors of Central & City (at that time 
Robert Gore & Co) in June 1979 and the latter two were executed on 
November 30th (payments under them being made in the following 
May) with the planning agreement following on December 12th. The 
Restoration Agreements were essentially the same apart from the sum 
of money concerned and both recited the importance of the GLDP 
policy on the attainment of planning advantages (contribution to Christ 
Church having been approved as such by the Council) In discussing the 
contents of the planning application. The planning agreement 
contained a similar recital and went on to state that the developer 
agreed to contribute to the restoration and will, on or before signing 
the planning agreement, enter into further agreements with the 
Friends detailing the extent of contributions. On entering those 
agreements the Council undertook to issue a planning permission in 
the annexed form and the developer covenanted not to apply internal 
finishes to the offices until clause 1 (as to the payment of money) of 
each agreement was complied with. The consent then recited details 
of the office and crypt developments and required the social centre to 
be complete prior to the application of internal finishes, no reference 
being made to the other restoration works. By late 1983 the office 
building was completed but only one floor was under offer. 
27 It was at first intended that Western Heritable would take 
over the Northleigh scheme and a draft covenant to the Friends was drawn up but not executed 
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FAIRHOLT HOUSE, WHITECHAPEL HIGH STREET Nos. 102/105 
SPITALFIELDS 
1981/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State, decision made September 26,1982 
Since 1974 the first floor of this building had been used as offices 
ancillary to the student's union activities within the other floors. In 
September 1981 an application was made for a permanent office use 
(860m2) of the same area but the Council, while granting an extension 
until March 1985, refused the application as contrary to office policy. 
In February 1982 an appeal was lodged which was granted, after 
consideration of written representations, in September. The bases on 
which the appellants succeeded were the existing mixed use, the fact 
that temporary consents had been given for 20 years and there was no 
loss of industrial, housing or shopping uses. In March a development 
brief had been approved for the north side of Whitechapel High Street 
in which the Council earmarked the site for small office suites. The 
Inspector was not satisfied that there was a shortage of such uses in 
the area and commented that a larger operation was more likely to 
provide junior office jobs which could be regarded as a significant 
planning gain. While agreeing that there are strong reasons for 
exerting strong control over office developments he also commented 
that those policies requiring developers to provide other uses such as 
residential, industrial and leisure as being aimed at the comprehensive 
development of new sites. 
269 
FIELDGATE STREET, NO. 42 
-- WHITECHAPEL 
1979/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State, decisions : June 5,1981 & April 27. 
1982 
In June 1979 permission was given to Abbeymade Ltd to build a four 
storey industrial building on this site with a carparking area alongside. 
In October the same year the same company applied to build a five 
storey office building with ground floor parking over the area 
originally intended as a factory carpark. The company argued that the 
offices were necessary to their increasing expansion which would 
create employment and the technical problems on plot ratio (it was 3: 1 
rather than the usual 2: 1), daylighting infringements and traffic 
hazards were overcome in a revised sheme submitted in January 1980. 
A consent was issued for a four storey office building (579m2) with 
ground floor parking after the GLC agreed to give no direction on the 
application. A condition was attached making the offices ancillary to 
adjacent factory use to avoid conflict with office policy. In April a 
further application was lodged for a larger five storey office building 
(857m2) on the basis of the future needs of the company and consent 
was given (but not recommended) conditional upon use ancillary to the 
factory and restricted to Abbeymade. The company appealed against 
this latter condition and it was deleted by the Inspector on the 
grounds that making the use ancillary was sufficient to avoid 
speculation. In September a revised application was made to delete 
the ancillary use. It was refused in November and the company 
appealed. The site was not within a preferred office location and was 
440m from an underground station in an area designated for industrial 
and residential use, and the company put forward the Wearwell 
development at 81/91 Commercial Rd as a precedent to permission 
being granted to office development in the vacinity. The Inspector 
allowed the appeal principally on consideration of the fact that if 
refused Abbeymade would be forced into liquidation and 80/100 jobs 
would be lost. 
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FOLGATE STREET, No. s 5/7 AND WHITES ROW, No. 5 
SPITALFIELDS : ALL 3 CONSERVATION AREAS 
1972/1977 
This scheme by Consortium Commercial Developments Ltd involved the 
renovation of listed buildings, residential space and open space and 
went through a number of permutations before it was implemented. 
The properties involved were as follows : 
Existing Use 
5/7 Folgate St. commercial 
5 Whites Row commercial/residential 
29 Fournier St. shop/store/residential 
69 Brick Lane shop/store 
36/38 Hanbury St. commercial/residential 
77 Commercial St. commercial 
Status 
unlisted 
listed, Artillery Pass. C. A. 
listed, Fashion St C. A. 
unlisted, Fashion St. C. A. 
listed 
unlisted 
And the following permissions were issued before 1976 (all figures 
aref 2) 
1972 
1973 
6.7.1973 
11.12.1973 
5/7 Folgate St. offices residential above 
residential (4095) 
renovated residential (3218), 
landscaped garden (948) 
5/7 Folgate St. 
5 Whites Row 
5/7 Folgate St. 
5 Whites Row 
5/7 Folgate St 
5145 
6500 
4592 
5 Whites Row 3220 
77 Commercial St 1796 
29 Fournier St - 
36/38 Hanbury St - 
69 Brick Lane - 
Overall increases 9083 
residential (1160) 
renovated for residential 
use (approx. 1800 increase) 
(basement commercial use 1710); 
Residential (1160) 
Residential & garden(2580) 
Residential & garden(4687) 
Residential (3873); shop on 
ground floor (289) 
residential 646, open space 
206, renovations 
28.3.1973 69 Brick Lane 5 flats, shop & storage, 
rebuilding walls (4670) 
A draft planning agreement was drawn up for the 1973 scheme 
but was not executed. Negotiations continued and In January 1976 a 
new scheme was approved which simply re-worked the December 1973 
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version by changing the uses at 5/7 Folgate St (6672f2 offices with 
1385f2 residential on the $rd floor and landscaped open space at the 
rear) and deleting 77 Commercial Rd from the scheme. 28 This 
produced an overall increase of 9562f2 of office space and 7225f2 of 
residential, with 450f2 increased open space. The consent linked 
Hanbury Street with Whites Row, and Brick Lane and Fournier Street 
with Folgate Street so as to require completion of the residential and 
garden element before the occupation and application of internal 
finishes to the offices. A planning agreement, completed on February 
4,1976 to bring this into effect, also refered to commercial use In the 
basement of Folgate Street. The sequence of events avoided the 
planning problems which this could have created. The agreement 
provided that the sale of the residential properties to a housing 
association approved by the Council would release the developer from 
the restrictions on use and occupation of Folgate Street and Whites 
Row. A contract for sale was duly executed with Newton Housing 
Association stating a purchase price of £1 and making the sale 
conditional upon the vendors obtaining, on completion, a release from 
the Council to include an additional 500f2 of office use at Folgate 
Street. The draft agreement did contain a further condition requiring 
an unconditional planning permission to use the extra 500f2 as offices, 
but this was deleted when a permission was issued in December 1976 
allowing conversion of part of the third floor of Folgate Street to 
offices, linking it to a further residential extension at Hanbury Street. 
A supplemental planning agreement was drafted but was not executed 
because of the transfer of Hanbury Street to Newton. The release was 
given at completion on March 21,1977 and it merely recited the 
removal of restrictions on use and occupation of the two office 
buildings and an undertaking to remove the agreement from the Land 
Charges Register. In 1980 Folgate Street was ready for office use 
before Hanbury Street was completed and this conflicted with the 
December 1976 consent which included the usual condition on 
residential completion first. The Council reaffirmed that condition. 
26 This was done by Order of Modification dated July 1,1975 
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FOLGATE STREET. NO. s 10-14 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER-STREET OUTSTANDING CONSERVATION AREA 
1981/1982 
The application here was for the erection of an office building (696m2) 
on the vacant site at No. s 12 and 14 and the conversion and 
refurbishment of No. 10 for residential use. The consent contained 
conditions requiring the residential works, including the layout of a 
rear garden, to be completed before internal finishes were applied to 
the offices and requiring full particulars on materials to be used and 
elevations at No. s 12 and 14. The design of the offices was to be in 
sympathy with No. 10 and was to include a landscaped area at the rear. 
A planning agreement was executed on February 17,1982 which 
allowed the application of internal finishes either on completion of 
residential works or on the disposal of No. 10 by sale or lease of at 
least 10 years to the Council, the GLC or a body approved by the 
Council. That approval not to be unreasonably withheld provided the 
Council were satisfied that the purchaser could complete the works. 
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FOLGATE STREET, NO. s 13-17 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER STREET OUTSTANDING CONSERVATION AREA. 
1974/1976 
In 1954 permission had been given to erect a four storey office 
building at No. s 13/15, a site used for private carparking, and since 
then modifications had been permitted including use of the basement 
as a restaurant. In 1974 an application was made to enlarge the 
office space in the building (9720f2), use the basement as a restaurant 
(2520f2) and renovate the large, vacant and delapidated early 18th 
century Grade II listed building next door (No. 17) for residential use 
(17 flats). The scheme also included the demolition of a vacant 
factory building at the rear of No. 17 to provide landscaped gardens. 
The consent required the gain elements to be completed before the 
application of internal finishes to, and the occupation of, the office 
building. Listed building consent for No. 17 was issued in March 1975 
and the developer lodged an appeal against the conditions relating to 
the details of the renovation works. This appeal was withdrawn in 
November after a planning agreement was executed October 28th under 
which the developer agreed to carry out the development at No. s 13/17 
in accordance with any consents issued and not to apply the internal 
finishes to No. s 13/15 until the works at No. 17 were complete to the 
satisfaction of the Council. No permission was annexed and the 
recitals were merely premised by the phrase 'in the event of 
permission being granted'. This scheme was later modified to form 
part of the Newlon Housing Scheme (see below). 
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GARDINER'S CORNER 
-- WHITECHAPEL 
1978/1982 
In 1978 the GLC offered a bombed site on an island at Gardiner's 
Corner (a preferred office location under GLDP, paragraph 4.14), on 
the western edge of the Borough, for sale In three parts for 
redevelopment. This was an important site as it stood at the main 
traffic entrance to Tower Hamlets and the redevelopment was put up 
for competition. The Development Committee on July 3,1978 
considered various proposals, and rejected all of them on the grounds 
that none contained a sufficient shopping content. At that time the 
island site was designated for a large shopping and leisure complex for 
the Borough, with a substantial content of single person 
accommodation. The proposal submitted by Wingate Investments and 
Wimpey Ltd included offices, shopping, leisure/conference centre and 
multi-storey car park and the GLC, in January 1979, advised the 
Borough that they should have accepted this scheme in principle and 
they should investigate moving plans for a large shopping centre to 
the north side of Whitechapel High Street. Major road realignment 
plans produced because of the severe congestion around the Gardiner's 
Corner site had reduced its size and a consultation report, 'Planning 
in West Stepney' was published, stating that a new reduced scheme 
incorporating shopping and leisure facilities, offices and improved 
subways was the most feasible use. 
In August 1979 Wingate submitted an application for outline planning 
permission for the three sites. The major one closest to the City was 
to be occupied by an eight storey office development (335,860f2, 
31,215m2) with lower ground floor shopping facilities (41,490f2, 
3,855m2) linking the existing pedestrian subways and Aldgate 
Underground station to the island site. The offices were to be 
occupied by Bland Payne Insurance Group who had recently 
amalgamated with Sedgwick Forbes and needed to expand their existing 
offices opposite the isalnd site, within the City. It was estimated that 
the company would employ an additional 2000 office workers In the 
new building. They joined Wingate in the development and the same 
architect was used to design the new building in sympathy with their 
existing offices. The air-conditioned shopping mall, modelled on an 
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American plaza development, was to be the showpiece of the sites. 
On the adjoining land the developers would build a leisure/conference 
centre with a multi-purpose sports hall, six squash courts and a 
conference centre/theatre to accomodate 600 people. The remaining 
site was for a multi-storey public car park. 
The Council concentrated their negotiations on ensuring public access 
to the sports and theatre facilities and the agreement referred to a 
'public' sports hall with concessionary rates and a priority booking 
system for local residents, a 'public' theatre and a 'public' carpark as 
planning gain. Arrangements were also made for participation in the 
management of these facilities by setting out the composition of the 
management committee to include local and council representatives. 
This was of primary importance to the Council largely because there 
was no prospect of them building such facilities because of lack of 
funds. 
But for a policy of attaining 'community benefits' this area 
would be developed almost exclusively for offices with 
leisure facilities being limited to purely commercial facilities 
such as private squash courts and wine bars. There can be 
little prospect of local authority expenditure on construction 
of leisure facilities during a period of economic restraint. 
Thus the achievement of theis Council's planning aims must 
be based on a close collaboration between the local planning 
authority and private developers to achieve viable office 
development with acceptable community benefits. "29 
Although the theatre was originally suggested as planning gain by the 
developer during negotiations, the mechanisms of ensuring public 
access took many months to agree, mainly because of the cost to the 
developer of managing and staffing the arrangements. The developer 
originally suggested that the Council make an annual payment to the 
company to cover part of the cost of concessionary rates but this was 
dropped during negotiations. It was also suggested that If the leisure 
centre should prove commercially unviable public access should cease 
but this was rejected by the Council as undermining the purpose of 
the agreement. Bargaining on this point continued with a*suggestion 
from the Council that facilities could be withdrawn if no reasonable 
29 Rule 6 Statement, submitted in respect of appeals against 
refusal for development at 35/45 Whitechapel High Street, para. 36. See 
below. 
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local authority would continue to run them without an unreasonably 
high level of subsidy. 30TFie issue was finally resolved by including 2 
clauses in the agreement, the first allowing use as public facilities to 
discontinue where use was so low as to make continuance unreasonable 
taking into account and subsidy received from the Council, and the 
second enabling the developer to offer the Council at any time a 21 
year lease at peppercorn rent. The other major problem area related 
to the requirement not to apply internal finishes to the offices until 
the gain elements were complete. The requirement was modified so as 
to only relate to the sports hall being substantially completed and a 
release clause was added to the agreement in the event of delays 
produced as a result of road closure orders affecting the area of the 
site upon which the leisure centre was to be constructed. In this case 
construction work on the sports hall must have commenced within 
twelve months of the road closing orders being issued and before 
internal finishes could be applied to the office content. If the orders 
were not issued or were refused the developer would be released from 
the agreement to build the leisure facilities,. as it would be impossible 
to do so without the road closure. The GLC in its contract of sale 
with the developer had included a clause requiring an additional 
payment of a million pounds from the developer for the two sites if 
the third site became unavailable due to the lack of a road closing 
order. The Council would then endeavour to seek compensation from 
the GLC for the resulting lack of planning gain. The details of the 
agreement31 were circulated to the Chairmen of the Development 
Committee, the Amenities Committee with copies to the Vice-Chairmen, 
the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Council, and the Chief and 
Deputy Whips. The road closure orders were made and the scheme 
was been fully implemented by late 1983. 
30 In this regard the Council solicitor pointed out that the 
developer could claim an abatement of DLT for providing the facilities 
so economic viability on a commercial scale was not an adequate 
reason for closure. Letter dated 21 November 1979tothedeveloper's sollcitors. 
31 It is interesting that the letter originally sent included 
reference to £1 million but was then substituted with "sum of money 
on the report later made to the Development and Amenites Committees 
on the scheme. 
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GOODMAN'S YARD SCHEME 
--ST KATHERINES 
In October 1978 the development sub-committee approved, subject to a 
planning agreement, a negotiated scheme with O. C. L. Ltd for a vacant 
site bordering on The City of London and Mansell Street. The scheme 
included offices (30,790m2) with ancillary carparking, 48 residential 
units, four squash courts and a public house. Originally it was to be a 
condition of the consent that one office building, comprising two- 
thirds of the office space, be occupied as the headquarters of O. C. L. 
(a company already resident in the Borough) for at least 5 years and 
the other let to a London firm. A separate building would house the 
residential units and the squash courts. The restriction on occupation 
was later removed and this development formed part of the package 
for the Wingate Centre (see below). A planning agreement32 was 
completed in September 1979 providing for the completion of the 
residential and squash court building, or the entering into of a 
contract with an approved body for the lease of the residential units 
for at least ten years as a prerequisite to applying internal finishes to 
, the offices. The Council agreed in July 1982, due to the advanced 
state of works on the residential units, not to enforce the agreement 
against the developers and internal finishes were applied to the 
offices. The residential element was completed in November 1982 and 
the squash courts early in 1983. By late 1983 around half of the 
offices were let. 
32 Linklaters & Paines were the solicitors for the developers 
who were referred to in the Agreement as Stellwood Investments, a 
company comprised of Wingate and Wimpey Property Holdings Ltd. 
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HAMLET MOTORS SCHEME 
WHITECHAPEL : WHIT FIAPEL RD.. FIELDGATE ST. & PLUMMER$W 
1979 
In June 1978 Hamlet Motors applied to develop this carparking site as 
a four & five storey building of speculative offices (1653m2) with a 
vehicle maintenance workshop (2136m2) and car showrooms (920m2). 
The site was not within a Preferred Office Location and the GLC had 
twice unsuccessfully advertised the site for sale for industrial 
development. As the applicants were a local expanding company the 
application was approved subject to a planning agreement to ensure 
completion of the industrial element. An agreement was drafted but 
the scheme was not pursued. 
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LEMAN STREET. NO. 120 
ST KATHERINES 
1979/1981 
An application was submitted in mid-1979 for the change use of 120 
Leman Street to offices (1200m2) with the renovation of that part of 
the building known as 8/12 Imperial Warehouses for industrial use 
(800m2). The committee approved the scheme subject to a planning 
agreement ensuring that a schedule of renovation works on the 
industrial element was agreed before the development was commenced 
and that the internal finishes were not applied to the offices until 
those works were complete. The property was sold in August 1980 and 
negotiations continued with the new owner. A planning agreement in 
the above terms was executed on March 30,1981 but was not 
implemented. 
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MARSHALL WALKER SCHEME 
WHITECHAPEL : ALIE ST. No. s 31/37. CAMPERDOWN ST. No. s 9/23 & 
HALF MOON PASSAGE. No. 15 
1974/1980 
The developers here owned all of the above properties and 
submitted applications to develop at the same time as the CHAMPS 
scheme was active with Central & City. In May 1978 they applied to 
develop 22,500f2 of offices at Alie Street (a vacant factory, warehouse 
and showroom existing and occupying 8,000f2) with an Industrial 
building fronting Camperdown Street (12,000f2 factory, with 3,200f2 
warehouse). At this stage the latter site was vacant, the houses that 
had stood there having been demolished in 1973 and the workshops in 
1976. After further negotiations it was agreed to include 25 
Camperdown Street, already owned by Central & City, in the scheme, 
hoping to exchange that property for the two cottages at 17 & 20 Alle 
Street. The Committee were prepared to issue a consent subject to a 
planning agreement to ensure completion of the industrial element. A 
draft consent and agreement were drawn up but were not executed as 
the developer failed to acquire #25. Instead a revised application was 
submitted which was further negotiated to produce 20,500f2 (1904m2) 
of offices and 15,200f2 (1412m2) of industrial space. A decision notice 
was issued in August 1980 with no requirement for a planning 
agreement. 
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MIDDLESEX STREET NO. s 96/98 & STRYPE STREET, NO. s 6/8 
-- SPITALFIELDS 
1981/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State lodged in February 1982 
This mixed use building (1550m2 industrial, 983m2 storage, 770m2 
retail) was the subject of an application for change of use which 
slightly extended the industrial and retail uses (to 1691m2 and 902m2 
respectively) and converted the remainder to office use (710m2). The 
Council refused the application for non-compliance with office policy 
and the developer lodged an appeal which was withdrawn following 
negotiations to produce a satisfactory scheme. This latter scheme, 
approved in July 1982, had an increased office content (886m2) but 
176m2 of office space was in the form of small units for the use of 
accountants, solicitors and others who could serve the Increased 
industrial component (2061m2) which was to be divided into thirteen 
small workshops. Some of the retail space was retained (356m2) and a 
new off-street parking bay was included. The report to the Committee 
stated that the case on appeal was not strong and the mixed uses 
proposed were appropriate to that western edge of Spitalfields. 
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MINORIES CARPARK & RISING SUN SITE 
'ST KATHERINES 
1979/1982 
Appeal to the Secretary of State lodged February 20,1980 
This site was partly owned by the GLC and the City of London and 
occupied a position opposite the Tower of London, which made it an 
important development site. Most of the area had been used for 
public coach and lorry parking, a multi-storey carpark, a City 
engineers depot and Rising Sun public house. Negotiations for 
developing the site were conducted with Greycoat London Estates Ltd 
who intended to accomodate existing uses while erecting new office 
and hotel buildings. Some earlier proposals were made for the site but 
were not acceptable to the Council: 
1969 4 storey carpark and 2 10 storey Secretary of State directed 
Halls of Residence for a post- refusal after an inquiry fol- 
graduate Business Centre on the lowing objections by the GLC. 
Rising Sun site Permitted the building on the 
Rising Sun site(22m high) 
1975 Twin towered hospital (42m high) 
Greycoat put forward a number of schemes 
1979 offices (13157), twin towered hotel 
(14025,5 &7 storeys), public car 
park (385 spaces + 29 coaches), 12 
office and 50 hotel parking spaces 
& public house (446) 
Development C'ee objected on 
basis of height, plot ratio, 
design, traffic increase. 
and these are listed below: 
Refusal as contrary to office 
policy, excessive officespace 
& too dominant hotel towers, 
hotel development contrary to 
GDLP, no planning gain. 
1980 offices (11503), twin-towered hotel 
(14025,4 &5 storeys), public car 
park (450 spaces inc. 91 office & 
hotel use), public house (446), with 
400 non-office jobs, improved layout 
and pedestrian subway as gains 
1981 hotel (24025) 
Feb. 3 
Sub-committee agreed to 
permit subject to details on 
design & materials and S. 52 
agreement for subway. 
Consent issued in outline 
1981 offices (11510,9544 being in LBTH) Consent issued in outline, S52 
Dec. 12 and public subway executed 
1982 offices (12077,25.2m high) Detailed approval 
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Negotiations on the scheme were complicated as that part of the site 
which fell within the Cify was to be used for the hotel building and 
the City Council became locked in negotiations with the GLC to 
apportion the ground rent on the whole development (including the 
offices) between the two Councils rather than restricting their 
entitlement to the hotel ground rent alone (a much smaller sum). The 
City did issue a consent for the hotel in December 1979 and continued 
to negotiate with the GLC, seeing Tower Hamlets' planning gain 
discussions as subsequent to the resolution of this issue. Meanwhile 
the developers wanted to avoid the use of planning agreements in 
connection with the scheme because of the negative effect they could 
have on funding for the offices and the hotel (those involved in the 
funding of the hotel specifically refused to continue if the hotel were 
linked in any way with the offices). For its part Tower Hamlets 
required a planning gain on the offices within its Borough and 
accepted that the employment opportunities created by the hotel and a 
proposed pedestrian subway between the Minories and Royal Mint (to 
be constructed by the developer and thereafter maintained by the 
GLC) constituted adequate gains. The problem faced by the Council 
was how to secure that the hotel and subway were completed without 
a planning agreement linking their completion with works on the 
offices and without the support of the City who were still arguing 
with the GLC over ground rents. As far as the hotel was concerned 
the legal department wrote to the City, putting forward a suggestion 
made by the developers, that the hotel operators enter into a 
conditional contract with the City to purchase the site subject to 
funding being made available. In correspondence between the City and 
Tower Hamlets it could then be made clear that the City understood 
its neighbour's position on planning gain and, in the event of this 
hotel development not going ahead, would consult with Tower Hamlets 
on the future use of the site with a view to producing a scheme 
which would provide non-office employment or other community 
benefits. In this way the Members at Tower Hamlets would be 
satisfied and the City would not be restricting the future development 
of the site in a legal agreement. As for the subway, additional 
problems presented themselves as the GLC stated in October 1980 that 
they did not agree that such a subway was needed at all. At this 
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stage a draft planning agreement relating to the subway was in 
circulation and represented what the Council thought was the 
culmination of difficult negotiation sessions between the developer, 
themselves, and on some occasions the GLC, following the lodging of 
an appeal against the refusal issued by Tower Hamlets in September 
1979. The developer had agreed to withdraw the appeal in the belief 
that the subway met the objections on their failure to provide 
adequate planning advantages. After correspondence between the 
Council and the GLC which pointed out the delay and other problems 
an appeal would cause, they agreed that an extension to an existing 
subway in the area would be acceptable (particularly as they had 
approved a development brief on the Royal Mint site which required 
such a subway to be included in any development) provided no costs 
were incurred by the GLC on its construction and the adaptation of 
existing public crossing facilities. The developers were willing to 
enter into a planning agreement on this basis and requested that two 
separate consents be issued on the hotel and the office and subway 
elements. They withdrew their appeal in April 1981. The final result 
was a consent on the hotel which referred to an agreement with the 
GLC over the subway and an office and subway consent which made 
no reference to the hotel development. A planning agreement was 
entered into by the Council, the GLC and the developer on December 
10,1981 which recited the application for office and hotel development 
and that consent had been issued on the latter whereas the former 
was to be issued as per the attached draft on completion of the 
agreement. It went on to explain the content of what had been 
agreed in the event of the development as a whole being commenced 
(defined as a 'specified operation' under S. 43 TCPA 1971), that is that 
the subway would be completed to the satisfaction of the GLC, 
dedicated for public use after the offices are complete and would 
thereafter be maintained by the GLC. The agreement prohibited the 
application of internal finishes to the offices before the hotel was 
commenced (or earlier if the Council was satisfied that arrangements 
had been made for the future construction of that hotel). In this 
context 'commenced' was defined as 'the carrying out of any relevant 
works forming part of or in connection with the construction of the 
said hotel' and a letter from the Director of Development was stated 
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to be conclusive that this had taken place. `Relevant works' was 
defined so as to include alterations to the existing depot and carparks 
to allow construction of the hotel as well as works on the foundations 
and column starters. 
By the time the study was completed this scheme had not been 
implemented. 
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NEWLON HOUSING SCHEME : FOLGATE ST. NO. s 13/27 & BLOSSOM ST. NO. s 1/4 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER STREET OUTSTANDING CONSERVATION AREA 
1975/1980 (See under Blossom Street for details on consents and 
agreements) 
The development sub-committee in November 1975, after informally 
considering proposals to transfer existing office uses on properties in 
Folgate Street (No. s 19/27) to a new office building to be erected in 
Blossom Street and to convert Folgate Street to residential use by a 
housing association, confirmed such a scheme would conform with 
office policy and the aims of the conservation area. Calculations done 
by the Borough Planner produced residential space of 1246m2 
(including 169m2 existing use) and sports facilities in the basement of 
the office building of 240m2 which would allow 2,230m2 (including the 
957m2 existing use) of office space to be built. An application was 
submitted in early 1976 on these figures together with proposals to 
demolish outbuildings at the rear of Folgate Street and provide 
landscaped gardens. The scheme was approved and consent issued in 
February 1977 after a planning agreement was signed. In July that 
year the scheme was extended to include a modified version of an 
office and residential scheme at 13/17 Folgate Street (see above) so as 
to use 13 and 15 as offices (938m2) with 17 renovated as a house 
(122m2) with basement sports and recreation facilities (214m2). The 
details of the scheme went through a number of changes but produced 
1250m2 of offices and 1076m2 of residential space, including two 
houses, eight flats, five bedsitters and landscaped gardens. The 
planning agreement allowed the developer to be released from the 
obligation to complete the residential works if he entered into an 
agreement with a housing association or other approved body to 
dispose of the residential element by sale or at least ten year lease. 
They completed an 80 year lease at peppercorn rent after payment of 
a £10,000 premium with Newlon Housing Association in September 1979 
and the office building was completed shortly afterwards, although it 
was still unlet at the end of 1980. The housing works were complete 
in March 1983. 
287 
NORTON FOLGATE. NO. s 1-3 
--SPITALFIELDS 
1974/1976 
Appeal to the Secretary of State on written representations. March 
1976 
Offices were proposed for this petrol station site by Philstock 
Securities in 1974 and the Council attempted to negotiate the inclusion 
of planning advantages. No changes were made and the Council 
refused the application for 425m2 of offices and showrooms in October 
1975 on the grounds of the proposal being contrary to office policy. 
An appeal against refusal was dismissed in March 1976. The Inspector 
considered the IDP designation of the area for commercial uses and 
the modified GLDP (not at this time in force) which identified the site 
as within the prefered location for offices in the Liverpool 
Street/Spitalfields area and the Council's view that offices would not 
be encouraged on the site. The representations in support of the 
appeal pointed out that the GLC had no policy objections and that 
planning advantages were provided in small office suites, improved 
layout and design, employment opportunities and improved traffic flow 
and, further, other office uses had been permitted in the vacinity. 
The Inspector concluded that there was no sufficient planning gain 
within the scheme for it to accord with the Council's office policy. 
... the principle consideration 
is thought to be the Council's 
policy for office development in this area, and whether 
there are special circumstances, for example by way of any 
planning advantages that the proposal would bring about, 
such as to justify an exception to that policy. Having 
examined the written representations in support of the 
proposal, including those relating to planning gains which it 
is claimed to provide, the conclusion formed Is that the 
proposal has no special or unusual features which could be 
regarded as such substantial planning advantages as to 
justify setting aside the Council's policy, bearing in mind 
particularly that the benefits claimed for the development 
could for the most part be attained by the implementation 
of the permission granted by the Council, which does not 
conflict with their planning policy for the area. " 
The consent referred to by the Inspector allowed offices as ancillary 
to showrooms on the site. 
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PARADISE ROW, NO. s 3-6 
BETHNAL GREEtT GARDENS CONSERVATION AREA 
This development involved the conversion of existing vacant houses 
which were designated as buildings of special architectural interest and 
last used for residential purposes. No. s 3 and 4 were to be converted 
to offices and No. s 5 and 6 to be rehabilitated for residential use. 
Listed building consent and planning consent were issued in October 
1975, eleven months after the application was submitted and the latter 
consent included a condition requiring the residential element to be 
completed before the offices were occupied. The reason given for this 
was to ensure that the development is carried out within the terms of 
this permission'. It seems from the file that when this development 
was first referred to the GLC for directions on listed building consent 
only the office element was under consideration. 
This scheme was implemented. 
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PEABODY BUILDINGS SCHEME 
SPITALFIELDS : ELDER STREET OUTSTANDING CONSERVATION AREA 
1978/1981 
This scheme concerned a Grade II listed building In Commercial Street 
(No. s 135/153) known as the Spitalfields Estate and valued in the 
Borough as the first of the Peabody Buildings, designed by the 
Victorian architect H. A. Darbishire (renowned for his work in the East 
End), to be constructed in 1864. It had stood vacant for eight years 
and deteriorated to the extent of renovation costs being estimated at 
£1,200,000 in 1979. The application linked the renovation of this 
building as forty non-family private residential units and ground floor 
shops with an adjacent six storey office development (1421m2) at 45 
Folgate Street. The retention of retail uses in the Peabody Buildings 
was for the purpose of servicing the community of residents and was 
therefore considered as planning gain. The application was made by 
the Peabody Trust who also owned the unattractive single storey 
warehouse at 45 Folgate Stret which would be demolished to make way 
for the new building. It was stated in the development report to the 
sub-committee that any profits made on the scheme would be used for 
the Trust's `other philanthropic activities'. The scheme involved no 
increase in residential floorspace but did bring the Peabody Building 
back into use and the units would be sold at what was considered by 
the report to be `a cheap enough' price of £10,000 per flat. There 
was loss of industrial floorspace at No. 45. A consent was issued in 
November 1979 (6 months after the application was made) which 
included a condition not to apply the internal finishes to the office 
building until either the residential renovation works were completed 
or the Peabody Buildings had been disposed of (by way of freehold or 
leasehold of 75 years or more) to a housing association or other body 
approved by the Council. A planning agreement was signed on the 
same day and included a similar requirement except that the leasehold 
term was stipulated as ten years minimum and the Council and the 
GLC were specifically named as suitable bodies. In January 1980 Pearl 
Property Ltd was approved by the Council as a body suitable to 
undertake the residential refurbishment and the scheme was 
implemented. The consent had suggested that grants may be available 
from the Council to assist with the works as the building was within 
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the outstanding conservation area but its not clear whether any such 
grants were applied for. Tn spring 1981 a number of permissions were 
issued in respect of the ground floor retail units changing the use to 
small offices and wholesale due to problems in finding tenants. One 
of these was accompanied by a planning agreement requiring the 
applicant, a Bank, to relocate a grocer within the same parade of 
shops. 
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PRESCOT STREET. NO. s 24.25 &26 
--ST KATHERINES 
1971/1982 
In July 1982 permission was given to CWS, subject to a planning 
agreement, for the demolition of existing buildings to erect new 
offices (4,900m2) on the site with a community centre (500m2) and 
some residential space (300m2) for the Oblates of St Mary Immaculate. 
The GLC, after a Member level meeting, agreed to this, although they 
were reluctant because of the loss of residential space and failure to 
comply with office policy. Consent to demolish the Grade II listed 
buildings was issued in October 1982. Up until this time the planning 
history of these buildings had been dominated by their preservation, 
being considered by the GLC to be of historic and architectural 
importance as representative of housing patterns in the post 1666 fire 
Tower Hamlets. In 1971 the GLC refused listed building consent for 
the demolition of No. 25 to build increased warehousing space and 
ancillary offices. In 1980 the Oblates of St Mary applied to convert 
the vacant No. 25 and 26 to offices and construct new offices and a 
community centre to the rear to be linked by a walkway. This would 
create 3950m2 of offices and walkway, with 500m2 of community 
centre but ensured the restoration of derelict No. 25. In 1981 a 
revised application was submitted, on the grounds that the proposed 
works were unviable because of the costs of the restoration and 
conversion, which involved the demolition of No. s 24 (the convent), 25 
and 26 (the latter was not listed) and the construction of a new office 
block (5580m2) and community centre. The viablility of this scheme 
was in terms of it enabling the nuns and the occupants of No. 26 to be 
relocated (to some extent within the development) while providing an 
income for the adjoining Church of the English Martyrs also run by 
the applicants. The architectural worth of No. 24 was not considered 
very highly by the groups consulted while most of them did object to 
the demolition of No. 25. The GLC finally offered no direction after 
CWS had taken over the scheme. 
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QUAKER ST., NO. 41, GREY EAGLE ST., NO. S 27-41 & CALVIN ST. NO. S 20-23 
--SPITALFIELDS 
1971/1975 
Appeal to the Secretary of State lodged in June 1972 
A number of applications were made on this site during the above 
period which attempted to bring office use into this light industrial 
building. The application usually involved office use in conjunction 
with showrooms or storage uses and the Council issued two refusals in 
1972 on this type of scheme as being contrary to land use allocations 
in the IDP. An appeal was lodged against the first of these and while 
it was pending an alternative scheme, also for offices(790m2) ancillary 
to showroom use (2370m2) but including four residential units (372m2), 
was approved in outline. The reasons for recommending approval were 
stated in the development report as compliance with the Spitalfields 
study which encouraged mixed light industrial and commercial uses 
where the proposal included a residential gain. The earlier appeal was 
withdrawn and details on the outline approved scheme were also 
approved in June 1973. In 1975 a revised application was submitted 
deleting residential use and the sub-committee agreed that such a use 
was in fact unsuitable on the site, particularly as it would be situated 
above warehousing. In these circumstances ancillary office uses were 
allowed but limited to 23% of overall floorspace. Similar consents 
were given in 1978,1979 and 1980. 
ft 
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RODWELL HOUSE, MIDDLESEX STREET 
SPITAL IELDS : ACTION AREA 
197911981 
Appeal to the Secretary of State lodged in June 1980 
In December 1979 a refusal was issued for an application to convert 
the ground floor carpark in this existing office building (which also 
had basement parking) to office use (1115m2) on the grounds that the 
offices were speculative, no planning advantages were included and the 
proposals involved a loss of carparking space. The developer had 
submitted that the improvement to the external appearance of Rodwell 
House, the creation of employment opportunities and the increase in 
rateable value were adequate benefits. The present users of the 
carpark, Trumans, had objected to the loss as had Technical Services. 
Six months later the developer lodged an appeal but negotiations 
continued and culminated in a revised scheme which included the 
construction of five single storey shops (235m2) with frontage on 
Frying Pan Alley (to replace a disused carpark ramp), a private and 
gated landscaped courtyard with public access during working hours (to 
replace a featureless paved plaza) and an external carpark for twelve 
cars (to replace some of the 28 lost). The intended result of these 
revisions was to improve the external appearance of Rodwell House, 
complement new developments in Frying Pan Alley and significantly 
widen that public pedestrian way, as well as to provide the additional 
retail and public space. The sub-committee approved the scheme on 
March 18,1981; the appeal was withdrawn on March 23rd and the 
Inquiry scheduled for April 28th cancelled; the agreement was then 
signed on July 17th and the decision notice followed on August 3rd. 
The consent did not address itself to the enforcement issue but the 
planning agreement required the developer to enter into binding 
contracts for the shop construction and landscaping works before the 
offices were fitted out and to allow public access to the landscaped 
areas during working hours subject to the developers power to remove 
anyone causing inconvenience. 
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SANDYS ROW, NO. 7 
SPITALFIELDS : ARTILLERY PASSAGE CONSERVATION AREA 
1977/1981 
The report on the application for office use in this building states 
that the space involved was too small to warrant the need for 
planning gain. There already existed 140m2 of office space and the 
application to alter the building did not show an increase greater than 
about 10m2. 
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SPITAL SQUARE. NO. 37 
SPITALFIELDS 
1972/1981 
In 1972 an application was submitted for a change of use of a rear 
extension to this Grade III listed building from light industrial and 
commercial to offices (557m2) and residential use (93m2). Shortly 
afterwards the application was amended to increase the residential 
content (to 185m2) and reduce the offices (to 177m2) so as to make it 
acceptable to the committee. Consent was given but the changes were 
not implemented. In 1981 an application was submitted for No. 37 itself 
for use as offices (236m2 net). It included 93m2 of existing office use 
and the remainder was warehousing space. Consent was given without 
any requirement of planning gain beyond the internal renovation of a 
listed building but it was personal to the two charities occupying the 
building except for one floor (95m2) which was given unrestricted 
temporary (ten years) office consent to allow those charities some 
rental income. An alternative scheme was also granted consent later 
the same year. This transferred the existing office use to one floor 
thus removing the ten year limit while converting a further 257m2 to 
ofice use personal to the charities. This was accompanied by the 
conversion of the basement of the building for use as an archive and 
library (146m2) and the Council treated this, together with the 
internal renovations, as sufficient planning gain. 
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ST. CLARE STREET. NO. 9 
ST KATHERINES 
1982/1983 
Messrs Adlers (solicitors) occupied the four floors of offices (1200m2) 
in this building and applied in December 1982 to demolish it and 
construct a new seven storey office building (2000m2) with two 
residential units (190m2) on the ground floor and basement. 
Objections were received from tenants of the Guiness Trust Estate 
adjacent to the proposed development mainly based upon loss of 
privacy and disturbance during the period of construction. As a result 
a site visit was made by the Members of the Council at a time when 
the noise was at its worst. During this meeting with residents of the 
Estate and representatives of the developers the latter suggested a 
planning agreement to restrict the hours of construction work and 
thus minimise disturbance. The sub-committee meeting that followed 
was extremely animated and the Councillors were 7: 1 in favour of 
granting consent subject to a planning agreement to protect the 
interests of the tenants. The Chairman requested to see the draft 
planning agreement as soon as possible. 
A number of remarks were made by the tenants present at the meeting 
referring to that part of the Borough as 'a jungle of ugly office 
buildings, monsters we are surrounded with'. The Vice-Chairman of 
the Wingate Centre Tenants Association said that being barraged with 
building work caused physical and psychological harm and asked 'in 
the name of humanity' not to approve the development. The Chairman 
pointed out that the Guiness state was itself built as planning gain 
and had brought enormous benefit to the Borough. This application 
was not resolved by the end of the study period. 
297 
TARN AND TARN SCHEMES 
-- SPITALFIELDS 
Tarn & Tarn are a long-established firm of estate agents and 
surveyors located in Bishopsgate who were responsible for a number of 
sites and properties in Spitalfields and had been committed to 
demolishing old properties in Spitalfields. Over a period of several 
years they engaged in negotiations with the Council over possible 
schemes in the Fashion Street Conservation Area, none of which were 
completed. They are considered together as they involved juggling 
properties warranting restoration as residential units with those which 
the Council considered could be sacrificed for offices with the aim of 
renovating and gentrifying this historic part of London. Some of the 
sites in question were already vacant lots, whereas others had 
buildings which were either already listed as being of architectural or 
historic interest or were under consideration for such listing. Some of 
the sites intended for office developments had buldings on them that 
did not fall into either of these categories and this Is indicated on 
each individual project. 
The area in which these schemes were located was one which the 
Council was anxious to return to its former glory. In 1979 it was 
designated by the Council as a Conservation Area and further 
designated in 1976 as Outstanding. The GLDP also located the area 
within a proposed Action Area. The area is particularly acclaimed for 
its early 18th century terraces of four storey buildings, such as those 
constructed as part of the Michell & Wood Estate on Wilkes Street 
and Fournier Street. The architectural and historic importance of 
these houses Is enhanced by their proximity to Christ Church, 
Spitalfields. Many of the houses had been used for multiple occupancy, 
light industrial uses and the zoning for the area in the IDP for 
Greater London had been for light industrial use. As the history of 
Spitalfields shows the area had been the home of the various waves of 
immigrants to England over the previous two centuries, and there is 
evidence that the attics of some of the buildings were originally 
constructed for industrial use. This use however was characterised by 
the operation of handcraft looms by persons resident In the house 
rather than by light industry by todays standards. By the time of 
these applications the area had gone through a number of ethnic 
changes, from being the home and workplace of huguenot artisans, 
through to the centre of Jewish clothing Industry to the now 
prominent Bangladeshi sweatshops. Land use surveys carried out by 
the Council in 1971 show no remaining occupied residential 
accommodation in Wilkes Street, though vacant accommodation exists 
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and some houses In Fournier Street, Puma Court and Princelet Street 
continued to be occupied for at least part residential purposes. 
However outside of this 18th century core of the Conservation Area 
there remained a substantial residential population. 31 
As a result of the use to which the properties were put and the 
lack of money spent on their upkeep, many had deteriorated and a 
number were subject to Closing Orders as they were unfit for human 
habitation. The philosophy behind the designation of the area as a 
Conservation Area was to return the area to its former identity by 
restoring the 18th century historic buildings to mainly residential use, 
to reduce the intensity and density of uses in those buildings and 
their gardens and to disturb as little as possible the 19th century 
commercial part of the area. 32 
The aims of conservation are to ensure that the listed 
buildings are repaired and maintained to a high standard so 
that future generations may continue to enjoy both their 
individual quality and homogeneous character of the area ... 
The intensification of light industry in particular has led to 
the over-use of the properties, the loss of rear gardens, 
over-loading of floors and severe damage to the 
interiors. "33 
The Council then linked the policies for this area with those of 
the GLDP on the limitation of office use, the requirement of planning 
advantages and the retention of residential accommodation. On the 
other side was the threat of continued delapidation of the buildings 
and the vandalising of the interiors of those which were empty due to 
closure. Also vacant sites in the area provided a further problem as 
31 In 1971 it was estimated that there were approximately 180 
households in the Conservation Area. LBTH Land Use Survey. 
32 s. 64 Policy for the Fashion Street Conservation Area 1977. 
This policy document was not intended to represent a change of 
approach by the Council, but rather clarification and explanation of 
policies in operation since 1969. 
33 Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields Interim Report 1976, 
Volume 1, paragraphs 5.5.6 and 5.5.7. These remarks were made with 
reference to the Fahion Street Conservation Area and the document 
was a consultation report setting out the Council's policies as they 
had developed since 1969 and the problems that still remained. It was 
based on extensive consultation. 
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they became used as rubbish dumps and consequently a fire and 
vermine risk to nearby houses. There was also the problem of 
unauthorised entry and occupation of a number of these houses and all 
of these points were raised by Tarn & Tarn as reasons for granting or 
expediting applications for planning consents for office use. 
1. THE FOUR MAIN SCHEMES :A CHRONOLOGY 
1973 
May 
Applications submitted for the following schemes: 
A. 9/13 Fournier Street, 1 Wilkes Street, 23/25 Wilkes 
Street and 25 Fournier Street; 
B. Ashford House, 10 Puma Court and 19/31 Fournier 
Street; 
C. 2,5 and 7 Wilkes Street, 8,9 and 11 Puma Court and 
12,15 and 19 Wilkes Street. 
July 
Application submitted for a residential scheme at 7 Fournier Street. 
1974 
January 
The Committee approved schemes A, B and C with 19 Wilkes Street 
deleted. 
The scheme at 7 Fournier Street amended to an office development. 
March 
Committee approved the scheme at 7 Fournier Street as amended. 
1975 
7 Fournier Street tied to 19 & 21 Wilkes Street. 
1976 
January 
Listed Building consent to demolish buildings in scheme A and at 7 
Fournier Street refused. 
1977 
Jul 
Schemes B and C amended to delete the residential elements from 
both. 
September 
Refusals issued on schemes B and C. 
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2. PUMA COURT 
On May 11,1973 Tarn &Tarn submitted two planning applications for 
schemes within the Fashion Street Conservation Area of Spitalfields on 
sites opposite each other and fronting Wilkes Street, E. 1. The 
accompanying correspondence clearly sets out the office space applied 
for and the corresponding planning gain In a ratio of 1: 1 in terms of 
square feet. At this stage the two schemes looked like this : 
(i) 3,5 &7 Wilkes Street and 8,9 & 11 Puma Court (the 
South Site) : an office building of 9,902f2 with the 
rehabilitation of 12,15 and 19 Wilkes Street for residential 
use (10,469 sq. ft). The excess residential planning gain of 
567f2 was to be carried over for use on another scheme. 
(ii) 10 Puma Court and Ashford House site (the North Site) 
: an office building of 7,196f2 with the rehabilitation of 19 
& 31 Fournier Street for residential use (6829f2). The 
excess office space was to be deducted from one of the 
later schemes. 
From the correspondence it seems that these two applications 
were the result of negotiations between the Council and Tarn & Tarn 
over at least the previous twelve months. The first letter on file, 
dated 24th March 1972 and from Tarn & Tarn to the Council, makes 
reference to meetings held and suggests a package including planning 
gain in the form of renovation of listed buildings in the conservation 
area as residential units. The Borough planning officer responded with 
the following statement of the Council's policy : 
Although the present zoning of the area is for light 
industrial use, its designation as a Conservation Area has 
made the type of scheme Involving combined office and 
residential development more acceptable, as explained in our 
meeting of 14th March. The erection of a new building on 
Wilkes Street in the vicinity of Puma Court coupled with 
the renovation of a number of separate listed buildings, and 
providing an overall additional residential content equal to 
the total additional office floorspace, is therefore 
appropriate in relation to this Council's policies for 
conservation areas and office development. As you 
appreciate the extact location of the residential element in 
the scheme and the extent of true 'residential gain' are 
matters which will be settled in future discussions with this 
department. " 
Following this correspondence an application made to the Department 
for the Environment for an Office Development Permit for 33,250f2 on 
301 
the total area south of Puma Court (which included 1/7 Wilkes Street 
and 7/13 Fournier Stree! 34)and the Ashford House Site. The Permit 
was refused and a further offices only scheme was put forward by the 
developer on the same area. This received further re-statements of 
office policy from the Council and a suggestion that a number of 
separate schemes could be put forward for the sites around Puma 
Court, each having smaller areas of office space (and therefore more 
in keeping with the office policy) but this would require them to be 
held under separate freehold ownerships. 35 
By late 1972 Tarn & Tarn had submitted another application for 
an Office Development Permit on the basis of a mixed office and 
residential scheme, again for the same area. The Architect to the 
GLC in response to a call for comments on the application wrote 
positively to the Department of the Environment emphasising the 
importance of restoring architectural continuity to the Fournier Street 
area even if it involved demolishing some buildings due for listing. 
It is the Council's policy in conjunction with London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets to secure the return of the best 
of the listed buildings in Fournier Street and other 
important groups in the Spitalfields Conservation Area to 
residential use, extinguishing the existing light use. It is 
hoped that this will be achieved by offering small scale 
office uses in other Iwss important buildings within the area 
or in the locality. Messrs Tarn & Tarn's application is 
broadly in accordance with this policy and subject to the 
submission of satisfactorily detailed scheme is in my view to 
be encouraged. With regard to the proposed demolition of 
no. s 7-13 Fournier Street and No. 1 Wilkes Street I note that 
these buildings are included in the draft statutory list ... The Council would not normally acceed to the demolition of 
statutorily listed buildings but I think that the possibility 
ought not to be completely excluded in this instance... " 
This brings the history of the application for planning permission 
into perspective and goes some way to explaining how the application 
came to include the anticipated residential gains. By the time the 
applications were made the total site intended for offices had been 
24 1 Wilkes Street and 7/13 Fournier Street were later listed as 
Grade II buildings within the Fashion Street Outstanding Conservation 
Area. 
35 Thus to avoid them being defined as " related developments 
under S. 75(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. 
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divided up as detailed above, with a residential element added. 
Further schemes were devised for the site occupied by 7/13 Fournier 
Street and these are discussed below. It is also clear that by 
submitting the application the relationship of negotiation was not 
brought to an end. For example, in a letter dated 16th July 1973 Tarn 
& Tarn write to the Borough Planner 
We would confirm once more, that if the Listed Buildings 
are to be saved and restored, then the Office Consents, 
upon which this restoration will depend, must be granted 
without delay, or there might be nothing left to save, as 
the properties in question are deteriorating rapidly. " 
The Grade II Listed Buildings which were put forward as the 
residential element for the South Site had themselves been put forward 
in 1972/3 as a mixed office and residential scheme. After various 
discussions36 Tarn & Tarn submitted an application, on January 26, 
1973 for change of use of the vacant 19 Wilkes Street from industrial 
to residential purposes together with the conversion of 12 and 15 
Wilkes Street from light industrial workrooms to offices. Again the 
floorspaces were computed to balance office use with residential. 37 
On July 11,1973, after receiving the comments from the GLC Historic 
Buildings Division, the Director of Development wrote to Tarn & Tarn 
indicating the undesirability of converting No. 15 to offices because of 
the value of its interior and suggesting using No. s 12 and 15 as 
residential elements in other schemes or being granted only a consent 
of a limited period. The latter course was clearly of little use and so 
the application to convert to offices was withdrawn on July 16 and 
they were attached to the office scheme on the South Site. 
36 Referred to in a letter from Tarn & Tarn to LBTH dated 26 
January 1973. 
37 No. s 12 and 15 were to provide 5,794 s/f of offices minus 
1,121 s/f carried over as credit from an application submitted on 
November 7,1972 in respect of 24 Hanbury Street and 45/55 
Commercial Road. Residential use at No 19 amounted to 3,401 s/f plus 
Amenity Gain (landscaped garden area ) of 1270 s/f at No. s 12 & 15. 
This produced in total 4,673 s/f office space and 4,671 s/f residential. 
These figures appear on correspondence from Tarn & Tarn and it is 
interesting to see that a planning officer has written on the same 
document " But they owe us 1127 s/f ". This issue is not resolved on 
the file. 
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In the Development Committee held on January 30,1974 both 
schemes were approved arT the recommendation of the planning officer, 
subject to the signing of a planning agreement. At this stage there 
had been some revisions to the schemes : 
(i) office space reduced to 8506f2 and the residential gain 
to be limited to 12 and 15 Wilkes Street (7068f2) 
(ii) office space reduced to 6702f2 and the residential 
rehabilitation remaining the same. 
Similar suggestions being made to set-off the excess on each scheme 
against other proposals pending with the Council. 
These amendments were the result of changes made to the amount of 
site area the Council would permit to be covered and a rejigging 
exercise on matching office space with residential gains. The GLC had 
raised no observations on the office policy Issue and did not consider 
the schemes to represent a substantial departure. Their views however 
did reiterate to Tower Hamlets the importance of Spitalfields as an 
area of historic interest and of this conservation area In particular as 
containing 'one of the most substantial areas of early eighteenth 
century domestic estate development now surviving in Greater London. ' 
The letter goes on to remind the Council of the declared policy of 
both the GLC and Tower Hamlets to end the multiple Industrial and 
other detrimental uses of the old buildings in this area and to restore 
them for domestic occupation, adding that this is subject to the 
assumption that 'the office/residential balance achieved between these 
related applications is considered satisfactory by Tower Hamlets within 
the terms of their special office policy for Spitalfields'. 
Following the decision of the Committee Tarn & Tarn refused to 
sign the planning agreements. This refusal began by a suggestion that 
as Tower Hamlets were about to gain from the schemes formalities 
should not present a problem, and indeed involving lawyers would 
merely complicate matters. By January 1976 the content of the draft 
planning permissions and the draft planning agreements were being 
discussed between the parties in some detail. The office permissions 
themselves were to include a condition linking them to the residential 
element. On one of the schemes the condition appeared as follows : 
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4. The residential accommodation at Nos. 19 and 31 Fournier 
Street shall be completed suitable for occupation to the 
satisfaction of the local planning authority before any work 
on the office development is begun. Thus written 
permission shall be obtained from the local planning 
authority before work on the above office development is 
commenced. 
And a similar condition appeared on the draft for the other scheme. 
The reasons for the condition being imposed were straightforward 
4. Office development on the above site would not have 
been acceptable to the local planning authority and planning 
permission is given due to inclusion of a substantial 
residential element in the scheme which makes a positive 
contribution towards the achievement of the planning alms 
for the area. 
The draft planning agreements were brief and simply recited the 
parties, the ownership and location of the site and the fact that the 
developer and Council had agreed to make provision for ensuring that 
the developments were completed. The developer was then to 
covenant under S. 52, S. 16 of the Greater London Council (General 
Powers) ACT 1974 and S. 126 of the Housing Act 1974 in the event of 
planning permission being granted to (a) carry out the development, 
(b) not commence the office development until the residential element 
is complete to the satisfaction of the Council and (c) to restrict the 
use of certain of the buildings to residential only. 
The developers endeavoured to persuade the Council (through 
correspondence and meetings with the Solicitor to the Council and the 
responsible planning officer) to grant the permission without the pre- 
requisite of an agreement. They argued that Condition 4 should be 
deleted from the permission and that the objectives of the Council 
could be realised by then inserting a condition requiring them to 
enter into a planning agreement before the offices are occupied. The 
Council would not agree to granting permission in advance of a 
planning agreement because of the problems of enforcement this would 
create and this seems to have been the major cause of negotiations 
breaking down. 38 
38, The following paragraph appears in a letter dated 26th 
February 1976 from Tarn & Tarn to the Solicitor to the Council :" 
Until such times as the Town Planning Consent in respect of the 
office buildings have been implemented, our clients are not prepared to 
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As far as the draft agreement was concerned the developer 
objected to a covenanf which required them to carry out the 
development and to completing the whole development. Clause (c) they 
argued was superfluous and, more interestingly, they objected to the 
recital describing the existence of an agreement between the parties : 
'This is not correct and this Section 52 Agreement is a condition made 
by your Council. ' 
The breakdown in these negotiations led the developer to make 
an amended application deleting all of the planning gain from the 
schemes and putting forward the argument that the previous proposal 
was not practical and that development of the sites alone constituted 
planning gain to the Council. The sites were both vacant as a result 
of unauthorised demolition of old buildings and did present a problem 
to the Council in that they were used as rubbish dumps. They were 
unsightly and did detract from the image of the vicinity as a 
conservation area. 
The application went before the Committee on 15 September 1977 
and the officer's recommendation to refuse was accepted. The reasons 
for refusal were solely non-compliance with office policy and an 
appeal was lodged in the following March with regard to both the 
South Site and the North Site, together with an appeal against a 
further refusal for office development alone at 14 & 16 Wilkes 
Street. 39 All three appeals were heard together at a public inquiry 
held in May 198040 and were all refused on the basis that the 
Council's office policy was not complied with. 41 
enter into any agreement to restrict or regulate the development or 
use of land. Following from [this]... you would appreciate that our 
clients are not prepared to enter into any agreement that your Council 
can enforce or register against the title of any property until such 
time as the Office Consent has been implemented. " 
39 See below. 
40 The reasons for the delay came from both sides in that there 
was industrial action at the Council during 1979 so a proposed date 
had to be cancelled, joining the 3 appeals together also caused delay 
and another suggested date had been unacceptable to the appellants. 
41 This appeal is discussed in the section covering the appeals 
in Tower Hamlets on office policy during the study period. 
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3.7, FOURNIER STREET 
From the foregoing-description 7, Fournier Street was initially 
proposed as part of a large office development covering the whole 
corner site of Fournier Street and Wilkes Street. By early 1973 Tarn 
& Tarn were discussing with the Council a number of smaller office 
schemes, linking each part with some residential gain. On July 6th 
1973 a planning application was submitting proposing the demolition of 
7, Fournier Street and the construction of a new house on the site. In 
December 1973 this application was amended to make the new building 
offices rather than a house. Initially it was suggested that no 
additional planning gain was needed because of surplus gains on other 
schemes which amounted to the requisite number of square feet. 42 
After further negotiations the scheme was again altered to an 
office building (2859f2) and the rehabilitation of existing houses at 10, 
19,21 Wilkes Street and 13 Princelet Street for single family 
residential use. By September 1973 conditional planning permissions to 
change the use from industrial to single family unit had been approved 
on all of the residential elements, a number of which had previously 
been put forward as elements in other schemes. 43 Listed Building 
42 In aletter from Tarn & Tarn dated 10 December 1973 It Is set 
out as follows : 
office floor space for planning gain purposes : 2,564 s/f 
Surplus on other schemes : 
26/28 Hanbury St (letter 25.1.73) 311 s/f 
24 Hanbury St & 45/55 Commercial Rd 
(letter 7.11.72) 1,121 s/f 
24 Hanbury St & 45/55 Commercial Rd 
(letter 19.4.73 substituting 21 Wilkes St) 393 s/f 
24 Hanbury St & 45/55 Commercial Rd 
(letter 19.7.73 substituting 19 Wilkes St) 736 s/f 
Available space for offices in Conservation Area 2,561 
43 For example, 10 Wilkes Street was the subject of an 
application to demolish and to an application for change of use to 
offices in 1971. Both were refused, the latter on the grounds of non- 
compliance with office policy. The same property was then discussed 
as part of a scheme Including Its renovation as an office building and 
the renovation and conversion of other buildings, either in Spitalfields 
or elsewhere in the Borough, to residential use. Subsequently It was 
put forward as a house for residential use in connection with offices 
at 44/45 Commercial Rd before it reached the scheme presently being 
discussed. A similar type of history surrounds 19 Wilkes Street. 
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Consent to demolish 7, Fournier Street had also been applied for in 
June 1973 and was finafTy refused on January 13th 1976. 
This Council considers that the building should be retained 
as it is one of a group of buildings of special architectural 
and historic interest which makes an important contribution 
to the character of the Fashion Street Conservation 
Area " 44 
There remains on file a draft planning agreement and a draft 
planning permission for an office building on the site of 7, Fournier 
Street, linking it with the residential properties listed above. 
4. The residential accommodation at No's 13 Princelet 
Street and 10,19 and 21 Wilkes Street shall be completed 
suitable for occupation before the office development is 
begun. Written permission shall be obtained before work on 
the office development commences " 
As for the draft planning agreement, it required the developer to 
covenant to carry out the development and not to apply internal 
finishes nor occupy the office building until such time as the 
residential element was completed. The Council on its part covenanted 
not to take enforcement action in respect of any breach of planning 
condition not to commence the office development until the residential 
accommodation was ready for occupation. This difference between the 
consent and the agreement was a departure from previous Council 
policy. Accordingly there is a letter on file from the Solicitor to the 
Council to the Director of Development indicating that authority for 
the departure would have to be obtained from the Council members 
before the agreement was submitted to Tarn & Tarn. The change was 
brought about by negotiations between the planners and Tarn & Tarn 
so as to allow work to be done on the offices before the residential 
work was completed without the threat of the Council taking 
enforcement action. The new provision prevented the application of 
internal finishes to the offices and was drafted to ensure that the 
developer did not fail to complete the residential element. 
Once again the agreement was never signed and eventually the 
refusal for listed building consent to demolish was issued. 
44 Reason given for the refusal 
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4.9/13 FOURNIER STREET45 
The intention here was to demolish the buildings at these 
addresses and construct a new office building (9,592f2) on the site. 
The planning gain was to be provided by renovating three other 
houses in the vicinity as single family residences: namely 23 and 25 
Wilkes Street (3,360f2 and 3,399f2 respectively) and 25 Fournier Street 
(3,872f2). The excess planning gain of 1,039f2 was to be used against 
other schemes contemplated in that same area. Almost all of these 
buildings had been previously used for commercial purposes, including 
a small amount of office space. There was also a small amount of 
residential use at 1 and 25 Wilkes Street but it was derelict and unfit 
for human habitation at the time of the application and consequently 
disregarded in the calculations. Planning applications were made in 
May 1973 to put this scheme into effect, and this included applications 
for Listed Building Consent to demolish No. s 9 to 13 Fournier Street. 
Consequent to other negotiations between the Council and Tarn & 
Tarn, the latter party also applied in June 1973 to renovate and 
convert 23 and 25 Wilkes Street for mixed office use, linking this with 
25 Fournier Street. The effect of this would have been as follows : 
25 Fournier Street Industrial Use to Residential Use 
3,872f2 3,872f2 
23 Wilkes Street Industrial Use to Office Use 2,696f2 
2,370f2 
Residential Use Amenity Use* 664f2 
990f2 
25 Wilkes Street Industrial Use to Office Use 2,717f2 
1,845f2 
Residential Use Amenity Use* 682f2 
1,554f2 
* refers to landscaped areas 
By disregarding the existing residential areas because they were unfit 
and closed and by treating the 'Amenity Use' areas as gain, the 
calculations produced 5,413f2 of offices and 5,218f2 of gain. Further 
45 13 Fournier Street is the building on the corner of Wilkes 
Street and Fournier Street, and includes the building also known as I 
Wilkes Street. 
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deductions were made for office areas carried over from other schemes 
(311f2) bringing the office : residential ratio within the office policy. 
The Historic Buildings Section of the GLC expressed a preference 
for residential use at 23 and 25 Wilkes Street and suggested that any 
office permission on those premises should only be for a fixed time 
'until less sensitive premises became available for office use. ' In 
August this scheme was withdrawn on the basis that a limited 
permission was unacceptable and an office consent on 9/13 Fournier 
Street would be forthcoming. 46 
Planning permissions for the use of 23 and 25 Wilkes Street and 
25 Fournier Street as single family residences were granted on 
September 20,1973 and in January 1974 the Committee agreed to grant 
listed building consent for the demolition of the four listed buildings 
at 9-13 Fournier Street and 1 Wilkes Street. As it turned out this 
decision was made without consulting the national organisations 
concerned with buildings of historic and architectural interest47 and 
when their views were canvassed they objected to the proposed 
demolition. The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings stated 
its views categorically : 
The Society is strongly opposed to the demolition of these 
buildings not only because of their charm but also because 
it would result in a serious loss to the conservation area in 
which they are situated, and which has already suffered 
considerable erosion. It is particularly important that this 
corner should be retained as it is so close to the Church. 
The Society has no hesitation in saying that these buildings 
could and should be retained and repaired, and hopes your 
Council will refuse listed building consent. " 
The Royal Fine Art Commission, The Tower Hamlets Society and the 
Georgian Society raised similarily strong objections as did the GLC, 
whose approval the Committee's consent was subject to. The Royal 
46 Letter from Tarn & Tarn to the Borough Architect dated 
10th August 1973. 
47 At this time the list of consultees on historic buildings were 
Ancient Monuments Society, Council for British Archaelogoy, Georgian 
Group, Society for thr Protection of Ancient Buildings, Victorian 
Society, Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, The London 
Society, Metropolitan Public Gardens Association, Tower Hamlets 
Society, River Thames Society, Greater London Industrial Archaelogical 
Society, Spitalfields Historic Buildings Trust Ltd. 
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Fine Art Commisssion went so far as to comment on the Council's 
approach to historic buildings in the conservation area generally. 
(The Commission) appreciate the trouble that has been taken 
by your Borough to save this area by balancing conservation 
against some measure of commercial development; they 
nevertheless believe that if a serious attempt is to be made 
to re-establish the original quality of Fournier Street then a 
more fundamental approach to the solution must be explored. 
They think, for instance, that the policy of removing 
existing buildings, particularly when these are not 
structurally unsound, and replacing them with Georgian 
pastiches, is an unfortunate one: they also find the proposed 
new infill buildings well below the quality which they think 
could be expected in a conservation area. " 48 
In view of all of this, the Committee which met in December 1975 
raised no objection to the GLC decision not to approve the consent. 
Refusals were issued on 13 January 1976. 
This Council considers that the building should be retained as it 
is one of a group of buildings of special architectural and 
historic interest which make an important contribution to the 
character of the Fashion Street Conservation Area " 
It is clear from the correspondence that the Director of Development 
was aware, as early as June 11,1973 that the demolition of these 
buildings was unlikely to be approved by the GLC. Earlier in 1973 the 
buildings at 9/13 Fournier Street had been added to the Statutory List 
of buildings of special architectural and historic buildings and the GLC 
were reluctant to continue negotiations with the developer on the 
basis of their demolition. 
Negotiations have recently taken place on the broad 
assumption that these buildings (which were not at the time 
listed) might be demolished and the site redeveloped in 
connection with a major scheme which envisaged a domestic 
rehabilitation of most of the houses on the west side of 
Wilkes Street49 and a new office building on the corner of 
Wilkes and Fournier Streets with a facade appropriate to 
the generally early 18th century character of these two 
48 Letter from RFAC to the Director of Development at the 
Council, dated 10 June 1975 
49 It seems that this is a reference to this scheme plus the 
other " live " Tarn & Tarn schemes which appeared to be going ahead, 
ie. those on either side of Puma Court discussed above. It seems that 
they were all being dealt with in the same negotiations and would 
together have led to the rehabilitation of 12,15,23 & 25 Wilkes 
Street and 19,25 & 31 Fournier Street as single family residences. 
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streets. The spot listing of these buildings has introduced a 
new consideration and it can no longer be certain that 
consent would be forthcoming for demolition. I would wish 
to seek the views of the Historic Buildings Board on this 
question before proceeding further with the negotiations but 
I am sure they would be unwilling to consider an application 
for demolition which was not related to the scheme for 
redevelopment and rehabilitation. "° 
Negotiations did continue and at the end of July Tarn & Tarn were 
under the impression that the only obstacle to consent being granted 
was the lack of agreement on elevations to the office building 
proposed. 51 Indeed, they proposed at this stage to have conditional 
office consents issued so that work could commence on the restoration 
of the houses in the scheme in order to halt their deterioration and to 
reduce the danger of damage caused by vandalism. 
The development was approved by the Committee on January 30, 
1974 subject to the signing of planning agreements and draft decision 
notices and agreements were drawn up. At this stage three of the 
main Tarn & Tarn schemes were being dealt with together, namely the 
ones on either side of Puma Court and this one and all of the drafts 
are similar. The consent on this scheme recited the details of both 
the office and residential elements including requirements for 
landscaped areas and external appearance of all the elements. The 
individual elements were linked together by condition 4, requiring the 
works on 23 and 25 Wilkes Street and 25 Fournier Street to be 
completed before work on the office building could commence. The 
draft planning agreement took up this point by reiterating that work 
could not commence until the Director of Development confirmed in 
writing that the residential work had been completed. The planning 
agreement also required the developer to complete the whole 
development once work on any part was commenced. 
Tarn & Tarn raised objection to the content of both the draft 
consent and the draft planning agreement on the same basis as 
discussed above. The draft agreement was never signed and 
50 Letter dated 8 June 1973 ( received on 11 June ) from GLC 
Department of Architecture to the Director of Development. 
51 Letter from Tarn & Tarn to Director of Development dated 
26 July 1973 
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consequently the permission was never granted and this finally led to 
the refusal of listed bDTlding consent to demolish 23 & 25 Wilkes 
Street. 
In November 1976 Tarn & Tarn applied for a change of use on 
the then vacant 2nd and 3rd floors of 23 Wilkes Street. The building 
had been the subject of a Closing Order in June 1972 which allowed 
restricted use of the basement, ground and first floors only. This 
application would mean a change of use from residential to the zoned 
light industrial use, and permission was granted for a period of two 
years subject to a requirement of some restoration works to prevent 
further deterioration of the building. Tarn & Tarn appealed the time 
limit52 and the Inspector agreed to extend it to five years while 
affirming the condition relating to repair works. 53 
5.24 HANBURY STREET and 45/55 COMMERCIAL ROAD 
The background to this scheme involved some of the earliest 
negotiations with Tarn & Tarn on planning gain other than the 
provision of carparking space. The file opens with an application for 
outline permission on a mixed office and residential scheme, dated 
October 27,1971. The covering letter refers to the fact that Tarn & 
Tarn's clients at that stage could not be certain whether the scheme 
would be financially viable because of all of the renovation and 
rebuilding work anticipated, hence the request for outline permission 
only. The scheme involved four listed buildings at 24 & 26 Hanbury 
Street (both Grade III), 18 Wilkes Street and 13 Princelet Street (both 
Grade II) together with 28 Hanbury Street which was unlisted. It was 
proposed to renovate three of the buildings as residences (8,176f2) and 
the remaining 26 and 28 Hanbury Street as offices (8,904f2). Previously 
the properties were mainly used for industrial purposes with a small 
amount of existing office space at 18 Wilkes Street and 28 Hanbury 
52 Appeal under S36 and Schedule 9 Town and Country Planning 
Act 1971 by the Executors of the Estate of L. Tarn deceased, dated 12 
April 1978. Application No. TH/4709/8372/AD/MH. 
53 This was done on the grounds of a useful period of time to 
allow industrial use and did not reflect upon the merits of the 
Council's policy of conservation and retention of residential use in this 
area. 
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Street. The final ratio being 7,984f2 increased office space and 
8,904f2 residential. -- 
This scheme was welcomed by the GLC in view of the 
Conservation Policy and the provision of planning gains and the 
Committee in February 1972 approved consent subject to an agreement 
under S. 37 Town & Country Planning Act, the precursor of S. 52 TCPA 
1971. In June the file was forwarded to the Solicitor to the Council 
while discussions continued over the actual details of the scheme. It 
came to light in August that the developer did not own the land and 
buildings concerned but only the lease and any planning agreement 
would consequently not be binding on the freeholder as he was not a 
person deriving title from the developer. Finally, in February 1973, a 
permission was issued without a planning agreement covering all of the 
properties involved, with a simple condition that the residential part 
should be completed suitable for occupation before the offices were 
occupied. 
It seems that this part of the proceedings went ahead without 
consultation with the Solicitor to the Council and the later problems 
with the scheme led to some changes in the approach of the Council. 
Most evidently, the Council became much more concerned about the 
need for care and precision in drafting the consent and ensuring an 
agreemnet was signed before the consent was issued so as to avoid 
enforceability disputes as far as possible. 
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TRINITY SQUARE. NO. s 41-42 
ST KATHERINES : TOWER OUTSTANDING CONSERVATION AREA 
1981/1983 
In 1982 a scheme which involved the demolition of No 41/42, while 
retaining the facade, and the construction of an office building 
(2600m2) had been agreed in principle by the sub-committee subject to 
the agreement of the GLC and a suitable planning gain, such as the 
replacement of lost residential space. An application made In 1981 had 
been refused on the grounds of loss of residential hostel space by its 
conversion to offices. The GLC, however, recommended a refusal for 
the demolition of this listed building on the grounds that it was an 
unwarranted loss of 18th century buildings. Other objections were 
received and a refusal was issued. In 1983 a new proposal was 
submitted which retained and renovated most the buildings (demolition 
of a listed rear extension and an unlisted building was required) and 
converted No. 42 into a parish house with a winebar in the basement. 
The displaced TocH hostel had been relocated by the developer in 
premises in Newark Street already refurbished (at the cost of 
£80/100,000 to the developer) for the purpose and including two social 
centres. The office element (1824m2) was to be contained in a six 
storey reflective glass building to be constructed at the rear of No. 42 
which in turn would be connected to another office building within 
The City (for which consent had already been obtained) by means of a 
retained listed passageway. Some objections were received from the 
Red Cross who would be displaced from No. 42, from three occupiers of 
No. 41 on the grounds of loss of daylight and from the City on 
elevations. The scheme however was agreed subject to details and a 
planning agreement to ensure the completion of the Parish House and 
the re-housing of the hostel before the office building was completed 
by the application of internal finishes. The agreement also provided 
for the site to be made available for the purposes of archaelogical 
investigations on the Roman Wall before development commenced. 
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WEARWELL LIMITED SCHEMES 
ST KATRERINES & WHITECHAPEL 
1978/1982 
Wearwelt Limited were a public company who had operated in the 
Borough for many years and were at this period expanding rapidly 
through the acquisition of two other public companies in the garment 
industry. Thus they provided the Borough with significant employment 
opportunities. A major consideration in dealing with their applications 
was the importance of keeping them in the Borough and the potential 
loss of jobs involved if they went elsewhere. 
1. COMMERCIAL ROAD, NO. s 81/91 
Wearwell wished to develop this vacant site designated for residential 
use as offices. The application made in 1978 contained no specific 
planning gain element and a later application increased the office 
floorspace to a six storey building. Negotiations did take place but at 
sub-committee what was emphasised was the need to keep Wearwell in 
the Borough. Consequently it was decided to grant consent subject to 
a condition and a planning agreement to limit the occupation of the 
offices (4895m2) to Wearwell for the first five years of occupation. 
Twelve months later an agreement was signed to this effect and a 
consent issued. Later that year another application was submitted for 
office use at the same site (4895m2) but with improved design and 
removal of the condition resticting occupation to Wearwell because of 
financing difficulties. A further planning agreement was entered into 
containing the same restriction on occupation. In 1981 a third 
planning agreement was signed to revoke the 1979 version and revise 
the 1980 version so as to allow Barclays Bank to use the ground floor 
and part of the basement for the following five years while reserving 
the rest of the office use to Wearwell for the same period. No gain 
requirement was made on this change of occupant. 
COMMERCIAL ROAD. NO. s 153/157 
As with the above scheme no specific gain was negotiated on the 
conversion of this industrial building to offices but the company had 
recently acquired a large amount of industrial floorspace elsewhere in 
the Borough (see under Prescot Street below) and were considered to 
be a major local employer. The planning agreement dated February 4, 
1982, limited occupation to Wearwell for five years and made a further 
requirement that any occupier within ten years following the date of 
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first occupation would have at least 59,976f2 (5572m2) of industrial 
floorspace elsewhere in thts Borough. This was done to ensure that the 
offices would be used to assist the prosperity of the Borough so as to 
justify the displacement of Industrial use. 
PRESCOT STREET. NO. s 41/42 
The first application on this building was to add four storeys and 
change its use from industrial to offices without a specific gain. In 
June 1982 the sub-committee refused the application on the grounds of 
it being contrary to office policy as it lacked planning advantages and 
involved loss of industrial floorspace, excessive plot ratio and 
excessive scale of development. A month later the sub-committeee 
approved an alternative scheme which reduced the scale by adding only 
a two floor extension, subject to a planning agreement and an 
application for industrial development elsewhere. By September the 
scheme involved office use at 41/42 (2331m2) and a new industrial 
building (10,500m2) in Eastern Dock, Wapping Lane for the 
manufacture, storage and distribution of textiles and the storage of 
fresh fruit and vegetables. The loss of industrial floorspace at 41/42 
was only 1786m2 and the developer also wanted a proposed office 
development (with loss of 2785m2 industrial floorspace) at 38/40 
Commercial Road (two floors of which had consent in September for 
use as a Clothes Marketing Centre) to be linked with Eastern Dock. 
Wearwell had also agreed to layout and landscape an area of public 
open space (1800m2) which adjoined a proposed footpath and canal link 
between Shadwell Basin and Western Dock as part of the Eastern Dock 
proposals which had been granted permission by the LDDC in 
September 1982. The concern over this proposal was the precedent 
that would be created for those with industrial interests in the 
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Borough to rely on less expensive industrial space in Wapping and 
other eastern areas to support applications for offices in industrial 
buildings on the City fringe. This was particularly so as the office 
policy and draft borough plan specifically discouraged loss of industrial 
floorspace. It was agreed to grant consent on Prescot Street subject 
to a planning agreement to ensure completion of the Wapping Lane 
development, but the Commercial Road proposals were deferred pending 
further information on the developers plans for the properties owned 
by the company. THe legal department expressed reservations over 
using a planning agreement in these circumstances particularly as the 
connection between the two sites was minimal and one of them was 
outside the Council's planning control. Technical problems also seemed 
inevitable as the offices were largely change of use while the 
industrial element involved construction works, so to link the two In 
terms of completion of the latter would probably be unacceptable to 
the developer. On further investigation it seemed that the 
negotiations to purchase the industrial site were only just begining 
and the holders of the lease had advanced negotiations with another 
party. At the time this study was complete no agreement had been 
d rafted. 
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WHITECHAPEL HIGH STREET, NO. s 35/45 & DRUM ST. NO. s 1/9 
WHITECHAPEL : TRIANGULAR SITE 
1979/1981 
Appeals to the Secretary of State lodged 2 January and 12 August 1980 
On October 19,1979 the liquidator of Gardiner's Corner Property Co. 
Ltd. applied for planning permission to erect a five storey office 
building (2300m2,24760f2) on this vacant site. There had been no 
successful negotiations between them and the Council as they 
maintained that redevelopment of the site and the provision of ground 
level landscaping beneath the offices constituted sufficient planning 
advantages to satisfy paragraph 4.15 of the GLDP. The planner's view 
was that the level of gain was far too low compared with other 
schemes in the area and that the site should include public facilities 
to complement the Gardiner's Corner development on the adjoining site 
and so advance the planning aims for the area as 'a major focus for 
leisure and recreational facilities'. 54 Consent was refused on the basis 
of non-compliance with the GLDP and the Council's office policy In 
providing no acceptable planning gain, It was a piecemeal (the site 
formed part of a larger triangular site bounded by Whitechapel High 
Street, Drum Street änd Commercial Road) development and made no 
positive contribution to the area. The developer appealed and a public 
inquiry was due to be heard in October 1980. The Council continued 
to negotiate and, in June 1980 a revised application was submitted for 
a five storey office development of similar size with accommodation 
for use by the Tower Hamlets Centre for Small Businesses (120m2, 
1300f2) and Tower Hamlets Educational Advice Centre (55m2,600f2). 
54 Development Sub-Committee Report November 14,1979. 
319 
This was refused on the same grounds, although the wording was that 
the advantages suggested were inadequate, rather than none that were 
acceptable. It was indicated at the Sub-Committee, by the planner 
recommending, refusal that granting consent would prejudice 
discussions with another developer for comprehensive redevelopment of 
the larger site, and no mention was made of the fact that this 
application was intended as the first phase of a comprehensive 
development if the remaining land became available. This decision was 
also appealed. Negotiations continued after this decision was made. In 
October the developers requested the DoE to adjourn the appeal until 
January 1981 on the basis of agreement having been reached with the 
Council, and on April 22,1981 permission was issued for a similar 
scheme which included accommodation (740m2,8000f2) for the City of 
London Polytechnic for use as a library for the Fawcett Collection. 
This collection was described by the Polytechnic as 
an asset to the East End, attracting international scholars 
and professionals to Tower Hamlets who would otherwise be 
unlikely to come here and enriching local culture and 
extending educational opportunities ... The library 
Is a 
centre for all those who are interested in Women's Studies, 
and those who visit it not only enjoy access to one of the 
world's finest collections of source material in the field, but 
make contact with a lively and interesting group of people, 
academic and non-academic ... 
"ss 
This use was put forward by Tower Hamlets as a community benefit in 
its appeal statement because of its prestigious character and its use as 
an information centre on equal employment opportunities and the 
problems of Asian women. An agreement was entered into to ensure 
that both parts of the development were completed once construction 
began. It prevented the developer from applying tenants fitting out 
works to, or occupying, the offices until they had entered into a 
ss Letter to the Council in support of the application, dated 3 
October 1980. 
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lease, approved by the Council, with the Polytechnic or other occupier 
approved by the Council- for the ground floor and basement to be 
used for educational, academic or other purpose, again approved by the 
Council. The agreement was purposely drawn in broad terms as, by the 
time it was executed, it was clear that the Polytechnic would be 
unable to occupy the premises due to financial constraints. This fact 
was not included in the Committee report. A few days after the 
agreement was signed solicitors for prospective purchasers of the site 
wrote to the Council asking for amendments to be made to the 
agreement because, as it stood, the offices could not be occupied until 
the community element was let, rather than simply built. This 
restriction made the development of the site uneconomical for the 
developers who were content to build the two floors in question but 
not to take the risk of being unable to let the offices because of a 
requirement beyond their control to satisfy. Tower Hamlets on the 
other hand, while `always prepared to be flexible to try to help 
developers'56 did not want offices built with an empty shell beneath. 
An amendment to the agreement was agreed by the Sub-Committee on 
June 9,1981 which allowed the developer to apply finishes to the 
offices if six months after their completion the Council were satisfied 
that the developers had used their best endeavours to find an 
occupier. Thereafter the developers would continue to look for a 
tenant for such a lease as described in the original agreement. It 
was suggested by another prospective purchaser that he be released 
from the agreement and be allowed total office use on the site if he 
paid £250,000 to the Polytechnic so that they could relocate the 
Fawcett library elsewhere. The planner responsible for the site 
considered this unacceptable as it would not satisfy the planning aims 
for the area to make it a centre of recreational and leisure facilities. 
The Council were also Investigating the possibility of using this 
planning gain as an interim public library by taking out a lease from 
the developers. This would allow them to sell/lease the existing library 
building, also in Whitechapel, for redevelopment partly as offices with 
the provision of a public library within the new building as gain. 
sa Letter from the Solicitor to the Council to Frere Cholmeley, 
solicitors for the purchasers, dated 1 May, 1981. 
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WHITECHAPEL HIGH STREET. NO. s 115-118 
-- WHITECHAPEL 
1981 
The sub-committee considered a proposal to develop this site as offices 
(7340m2) with a community centre (240m2) and educational use for the 
City of London Polytechnic (1345m2) and were prepared to grant 
consent subject to a planning agreement but the scheme did not 
proceed. 
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WHITECHAPEL ROAD. NO. s 238/240 
-- MILE END 
1976/1978 
This site was a disused paint factory with existing industrial (625m2), 
retail (220m2), storage (555m2) and ancillary office (75m2) uses. In 
1974 when the property was vacated a scheme had been Informally 
considered by the Council who found it contrary to office policy as it 
involved a joint enterprise between Barclays Bank, who had occupied 
the adjacent premises since 1896, and a private developer to build 
partly speculative offices with no replacement of industrial space lost. 
In October 1976 an application was lodged by Barclays Bank which 
involved the construction of a three storey office building (1394m2) on 
part of the site and refurbishment of one of the existing buildings for 
industrial use (438m2). The Bank also proposed they enter Into an 
agreement to relinquish existing office use rights at No. 234 (790m2) 
which would free that property for industrial use. The site was 
considered to be unusable for industrial purposes in its present state 
and the relinquishment of office uses and the increased employment 
and public service provided by the Bank were treated as persuasive in 
the committeee report. It was agreed to issue consent subject to a 
planning agreement. On November 3,1978 the agreement to relinquish 
existing office uses on completion of the new building was signed and 
five days later a consent was issued with conditions to restct use of 
the new building to banking purposes and to require the completion of 
the industrial element prior to the application of internal finishes to 
the offices. Meanwhile the Bank had applied to replace the restriction 
on use with a condition limiting use to Barclays Bank for a period of 
five years. The Council agreed to this and a new consent was issued 
on June 21,1979. The Bank had not completed its purchase of the site 
and signed a planning agreement to enter into a further agreement to 
restrict the use of the offices once they owned an interest in the site. 
This was done on September 11,1979. 
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WINGATE CENTRE. HEYDON SQUARE 
-- WHITECHAPEL 
Negotiations first began for this scheme in the early 1970's and 
Wingate Investments had first taken a lease on the site, previously a 
British Railways goods yard, in 1968. The project was carried out 
jointly by Wingate and Wimpey Property Investments. It was approved 
in 1973 and as planning gain 195 residential units were constructed by 
Wimpey for the Guiness Trust housing association within the Borough, 
on a site adjoining the City of London and fronting onto the Minories. 
This scheme was done in partnership with the City and most of the 
office space fell within their land. Tower Hamlets, the City and the 
GLC were all involved in the negotiations and what resulted was a 
complex of offices (161,000f2 total office floorspace) occupied 
principally by Bain Dawes Insurance Company (6540m2) with housing, 
landscaped gardens and a bus station almost opposite Aldgate 
Underground Station. 
CHAPTER 8: PLANNING AGREEMENTS IN TOWER HAMLETS 
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INTRODUCTION 
Negotiations for planning gain at Tower Hamlets essentially fell 
into two quite separate phases: the first to determine the gain and the 
second to determine the method of achieving the gain through an 
adequate method of enforcement. This clear distinction is not 
maintained in most of the literature on planning gain which tends to 
confuse the content with its enforcement' and thus fails to isolate the 
issues raised by each stage of the process. By the time the latter 
stage is reached the content of the scheme has been negotiated and 
the planning sub-committee has been made aware of the proposals and, 
in many cases, has approved the scheme subject to an agreement to 
enforce the planning gain element. 
This division has been considered by the courts as an acceptable 
method of dealing with section 52 agreements, particularly as it is not 
possible for the planning authority to use a condition on a consent to 
require a planning agreement to be entered into under any of the 
enabling Acts. 2 In Stringer v MHLG3 it was held to be ultra vires the 
local authority to enter into an agreement which discouraged 
development in certain locations, as it amounted to an agreement to 
disregard material considerations on future applications. In 1985 the 
process of finalising the agreement after a development committee had 
I The arguments are explored in chapter 2: Definition of 
Planning Gain. 
2 Circular 1/85 states in paragraph 63 "permission cannot be 
granted subject to a condition that the applicant enters into an 
agreement under section 52 of the Act or other powers" and this is 
reasserted in Appendix A to circular 22/83 on Planning Gain. 
3 (1971 11 All ER 65; [1970] 1 WLR 1281, discussed above in 
chapter 6. 
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approved in principle the particular scheme, but before a consent was 
issued, was litigated in Rv West Oxfordshire DC ex parte Pearce 
Homes Ltd. 4 Woolf J. held that the development committee, by 
agreeing to grant consent subject to a section 52 agreement, did not 
bind itself to issue such a consent unless the agreement was executed. 
By informing the applicant of the decision the Council were merely 
indicating that the planning requirements for the scheme would be 
satisfied provided the agreement was made; without such an agreement 
they could refuse to issue consent because they had valid planning 
grounds for doing so. 
By thus requiring an agreement as a precondition of the 
permission, the planning authority can validly achieve the same result 
as imposing a condition on the consent, although the latter, if done, 
would be invalid. The Secretary of State has taken a similar approach 
to his ability to allow a section 52 agreement to overcome the reasons 
for refusing an application at the appeal stage. 5 For example, in a 
decision to refuse an application for a housing development in Cardiff 
which was remitted back to the Secretary of State by the Divisional 
Court, the Secretary of State agreed to grant consent subject to an 
opportunity for the developer to enter into a section 52 agreement to 
provide public open space. 6 
4 QBD, Woolf J. December 6,1985, noted in [1986] JPL 523. 
5 This has also met with judicial approval. See Tarmac 
Properties v SSE [1976) P&CR 103 (QBD, Douglas Frank QC) discussed 
above. 
6 Appeals against a decision of Cardiff City Council to refuse 
(1) residential development on land at Merthyr Road. Tongwvnlais ... 
August 22.1985 Reference: P/71/834 & 835. Noted at [1986] JPL 855, 
discussed in the same issue at p. 832. 
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In both of these cases the authority and the Secretary of State 
avoided issuing a refusal on the potentially invalid7 grounds of the 
development failing to include the content of the agreement, by 
introducing this additional stage in the process, phrased in positive 
language. This is Interesting when viewed from a 'freedom of 
contract' perspective, in that the courts have showed themselves 
willing to overlook the effect on the developer's choice in entering an 
agreement when faced with an indication by the authority that consent 
will follow if he does so. 
Many planning gain schemes in the Borough were brought about 
without a planning agreement being entered into at all. 8 Some 
involved the imposition of conditions on the permission; others were 
simply the result of an amended planning application, or, if 
negotiations took place before any application was submitted, an 
acceptable planning application. Phasing of the development could be 
controlled through conditions, as could requirements of landscaping, 
and restoration of parts, or all, of the development. Thus the use of 
agreements was limited to Instances where the planning objectives of 
the Council could not be secured through conditions or where a 
prompt and more effective method of enforcement was required to 
reinforce appropriate conditions. 
The agreement, its form and content, was essentially the 
responsibility of the legal department, rather than the planning 
7 See Westminster Renslade Ltd v SSE [1983] 48 P&CR 225 (QBD 
Forbes, J. May 9,1983) and London Borough of Richmond upon Thames 
v SSE and Hutchison Locke and Monk [1984] JPL 24 (QBD Glidewell J. 
May 9,1983), both discussed above, under Official Responses to 
Planning Gain. 
8 As an example see 3/6 Paradise Row. 
f 
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department, and although there was a great deal of communication 
between the two on the types of gain that could be enforced, they 
operated relatively independently. More precisely, the legal 
department would normally be sent a memorandum by the planner who 
had negotiated the scheme which would set out the address of the 
development site, the office content and the type and location of the 
gain element. This memorandum would conclude with a request to 
draw up an appropriate agreement. If the legal department considered 
that no agreement was necessary, or that the type or extent of gain 
appeared unenforceable there would be discussion or correspondence 
between the departments and sometimes with the developer. Usually, 
however, the legal department would prepare a draft which would then 
be submitted to the developer or his solicitors and the content would 
be negotiated between them alone, with the planner being informed of 
developments. 
With some developers9 and some solicitors firms, 1° it became the 
practice for them, rather than the Solicitor to the Council, to draft 
the agreement. This would then form the basis of the negotiation. 
Although over the years some clauses within the agreements became 
standardised, the legal department were prepared to alter the form to 
accommodate the wishes of the developer, provided they were satisfied 
that the problem of enforcement was overcome. Other clauses were 
altered so as to avoid problems which had become apparent through 
the operation of earlier agreements, and sometimes to strengthen the 
9 Notably Central & City, Northleigh and Wingate Investments. 
10 Particularly, Linklaters & Paines, who were instructed both 
by Central & City and Wingate Investments as well as by other 
developers active in Tower Hamlets. 
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Council's position in case of appeal. On the more unusual or 
pragmatic schemes, such as those relating to the conservation of 
Christ Church, the legal department would obtain Counsel's Opinion on 
the form of the agreement, again with particular reference to 
enforceability. 
THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENTS 
In examining the form of the agreements developed at Tower 
Hamlets at least three particular characteristics are apparent overall. 
Firstly, all of the agreements were made under the several legislative 
provisions enabling local authorities to enter into agreements with 
developers: none were expressed to be made under section 52 alone. 
Second, all of the agreements involving the payment of money 
specifically spelt out in some detail the policy justifications for 
entering into the agreement, " so as to include not only paragraph 
4.15 of the GLDP and the office policy itself, but also other policies, 
within the GLDP particularly, which related to the gain achieved. 
Third, none of the agreements executed during the period of study 
involved the receipt by the Council of any direct benefit, in the form 
of money, local authority housing, dedicated community facilites or 
land. All of the housing provided was for Housing Association or 
private use, money which changed hands did so between the developer 
and a third party as a method of implementation, and land or facilities 
11 Some of the other agreements also did this, namely the 
agreements relating to Gardiner's Corner, the Minories car park and 
14/20 Alie Street: the former two were concerned with ensuring public 
use of facilities and the latter involved sites some distance apart after 
the circular was issued. 
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available to the public may have come under the management of Tower 
Hamlets at a later stage, but the agreements usually relate only to its 
provision and maintenance by the developer or a body approved by the 
Council. 
These characteristics of the agreements were developed 
deliberately by the Council to guard against the possibility of 
challenge to enforceability of the gains negotiated by striking down 
the agreement itself. The inclusion of policy justifications was a 
measure to demonstrate the relevance of the planning advantage to the 
development proposed, so as to establish a sufficient nexus to amount 
to a restriction or regulation of the development or use of land which 
was `incidental or consequential' to the principal development. The 
additional provisions under section 126 of the Housing Act 1974, 
section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 
and section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 were included to 
act as a saving device should there be any doubt as to the obligation 
falling within section 52.12 
By insisting that the Council itself were not seen to benefit from 
the agreements, other than in achieving proper planning objectives, 
they hoped to answer objections raised on the grounds of using 
planning controls to require the private sector to fund or provide 
public facilities or services. That is, by requiring a particular use or 
particular works to accompany an office development, the Council were 
concerned, not with discharging its public duties as housing authority, 
education authority, community service authority or transport 
authority, but purely as planning authority by ensuring a balanced land 
12 This is discussed in chapter 6. 
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use mix according to stated policies. Also by detaching itself from 
the scheme, and by linking it with such planning objectives, the 
purpose of the agreement to regulate or restrict the use or 
development of land was reinforced. This in turn provided a 
framework flexible enough to allow the Council to link separate sites 
on the basis of land use mix provided they could be shown to relate 
to the planning objectives for the same area. 
The extent to which these characteristics achieved their aim is 
difficult to assess on a general basis, as much depends upon the actual 
nexus established between different sites and the relevant planning 
objectives. The validity of the gain as a proper purpose for a 
planning agreement again is dependant upon the actual gain provided, 
both its character and its extent, in the context of the reasonableness 
of requiring it. These questions are necessarily political and cannot 
simply be answered through the application of principle, whether those 
principles are categorised as 'legal' or 'planning'; rather they require 
value judgments to be made. 
None of these agreements have been tested by the courts, 13 but 
the vast majority of them have been implemented successfully: in that 
the gain element has been built or completed ahead of the offices 
being occupied. This may represent one possible basis for 
interpretation of the agreements as being both reasonable and 
concerned with regulating the development of land. It is also possible, 
13 In the course of some of the appeals discussed below in 
chapter 11 planning agreements were produced as examples of the 
Council's approach to planning gain or, in the case of the CWS 
schemes, a demonstration of the benefits agreed to by the developer. 
None of the decisions commented upon the validity of agreements 
produced in evidence and the CWS decision (63/65 Prescot Street) 
tacitly approved their use to link sites some distance from each other. 
See Results of Study, chapter 7. 
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however, to argue that their implementation merely affirms the 
purpose of the agreement to be a compromise between the developer 
aiming to realise an acceptable margin of profits and the planner, who 
is prepared to moderate competing policies to reach a reconciliation. 
On this analysis the agreement does not represent the enforcement of 
a reasonable negotiated community gain approved through the 
application of policy, but an amalgam of planning losses and gains 
which may result in an unacceptable use of land producing profits and 
benefits for some sectors but providing inadequate compensation for 
many others. In this way, while it may still be concerned with the 
regulation of land, the purpose of the agreement ceases to be the 
enforcement of a 'planning gain' for the 'community', or other 
approved planning purpose but is, overall, an unreasonable exercise of 
power. 
A selection of agreements are discussed below in more detail in 
order to illustrate their use and what they have actually achieved in 
Tower Hamlets. Each type of agreement raised different problem areas 
and consequently they have been divided into categories reflecting the 
result they were intended to achieve. This form of categorisation has 
been used partly out of simple convenience, and partly to reinforce 
the view of planning agreements as means of enforcement to achieve 
pre-determined ends, rather than as part and parcel of those ends 
themselves. 
Agreements Involving the Payment of Money 
All of the agreements under this section followed the same 
pattern, in that the developer entered into a planning agreement with 
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the Council which recited the policy justifications for the requirement 
of an advantage in the form of the conservation, conversion or 
extension of the building involved, and a further agreement with the 
body, or individual, responsible for the works for a payment of money 
towards the cost of necessary works. The agreements were linked by 
a clause in the planning agreement identifying the execution of a 
conservation agreement as a method of ensuring that the planning 
advantage was in fact provided. 
The first of these schemes was produced in relation to the 
conservation of Christ Church, Spitalfields, 14 a Grade 1 listed building 
by Nicholas Hawksmoor and considered to be of national importance, 
being one of the most important churches of its class in the country. 
Its restoration was recommended to the Committee as planning gain 
because of its national and local significance and as a centrepiece for 
community activity in Spitalfields. The agreements accordingly state 
that the Council and the developer in discussing the application had 
regard, inter alia, to paragraph 4.15 of the GLDP and the attainment 
of planning advantages through the restoration of listed buildings and 
through the provision of special benefits in the form of buildings and 
other facilities for public use. The parties to the agreement then 
agreed that the resoration of Christ Church or any other Nicholas 
Hawksmoor church in Tower Hamlets constituted a planning advantage 
which the Council considered sufficient to justify permission being 
granted. 
This essentially raises two questions: firstly, is the conservation 
of Christ Church planning gain ? And secondly, is an agreement which 
14 See Christ Church Schemes in the Results of Study chapter 
above. 
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contains provision to secure that objective an agreement to restrict or 
regulate the development or use of land ? It is trite planning law to 
say that individual neighbouring owners do not have the right to 
enforce planning policy for their own benefit, and this is taken as a 
basis for maintaining that planning is concerned with the welfare of 
the community. It also appears acceptable for a local plan to include 
positive policies directed towards recreating a balanced mix of uses 
within a geographically and logically defined area. On these two 
premises it can be argued that the objective to restore a living 
community environment in Spitalfields, or more particularly, in the 
Fournier Street Conservation Area in which the church stands, is a 
`proper planning objective'. By restoring Christ Church the area 
would have increased in value, 15 in terms of accommodating one of 
the most important churches in England (and possibly in Europe) 
within its boundaries, and in terms of providing a focal point for 
social life and activity in the area. It could also be seen as an 
encouragement to regeneration of the area and to promoting 
`community life'. In this regard the conservation would be both 
compatible with planning policy's and a gain for the 'community'. 
On the other side of the coin, it could also be argued that such 
a conservation is not a gain, or not a sufficient gain to counter- 
balance the intrusion of offices into the heart of Spitalfields. SHPRS 
considered the conservation to be of little or no local significance, but 
15 In real terms as well as in terms of quality. 
16 The Council did officially refer to the restoration of Christ 
Church as a planning aim and as a conservation aim for the area, even 
outside of the office policy, eg. in their appeal statements relating to 
the industrial use appeal on 23 Wilkes Street (DOE Reference 
T/App/5031/A/77/8194/G6) 
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only of national concern. That area of Spitalfields was the home for 
a predominantly Bengali population and suffered extreme housing 
deprivation problems. 17 There was a movement towards the 
gentrification of Fournier Street as the 'Covent Garden of the East 
End'18 and a number of houses were being renovated and restored as 
single family units. Consequently, a major concern for the area was 
loss of low-cost single residential units, and any land or buildings used 
for offices in the area represented a loss of potential residential 
floorspace. Increases in the value of land and property in the area, 
on this view, represented a disbenefit because of the effect it would 
have on commercially or residentially low-value uses, making them 
even less likely to be available or affordable. 
Yet the very success of the gentrifiers holds the seeds of 
its own destruction. The first pioneers in the 1970's were 
attracted to Spitalfields for its qualities as a bohemian 
backwater of history. What they now fear is that each new 
arrival who comes to escape the horrors of suburbia 
threatens to raise the tone of the area ... with 
refurbishment pricing property out of the reach of home 
buyers, tenants buying their homes and cashing them in, and 
gentrifiers moving on, Spitalfields 300 year role as a refuge 
for the poor and dispossessed seems to be over. "1s 
The aims of the Rector and the Friends of Christ Church were 
expressed to be the conservation of the church for worship by the 
local congregation, but also for the use of the church as a centrepiece 
for the Spitalfields Festival and a venue for music recitals and other 
cultural activities. This could be interpreted as a 'gain', but the 
problem here again is for whom the gain is intended; which 
17 See Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields, London: LBTH. 
18 See Games, S. "The Battle for the Soul of Spitalfields" (1983) 
The Guardian, June 8th, p. 13. 
19 ibid. 
1 
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`community' stands to gain ? The reaction of SHPRS was that it 
represented another part of the process of gentrification which was 
increasing property values In Spitalfields and making low-cost 
residential development less viable. 
The opposing arguments here are impossible to reconcile as they 
are based on differing conceptions of the role of planning and the 
economics of land use. The officers at Tower Hamlets were convinced 
that, on the basis of precedents provided elsewhere in the Borough 
and elsewhere in London, 20 office development would be allowed in 
Spitalfields on appeal. It was within one of the preferred office 
locations for office development within the GLDP and was under 
pressure from the City as the natural area for expansion. To the 
Council, the choice was not between offices or no offices, but offices 
with gain or offices without gain. Accepting this argument, the issue 
as to choice of gain remains unresolved: with some groups active in 
the locality viewing the church as a definate gain, 21 while others22 
regard it of peripheral importance compared to the other demands of 
the residential population. 
20 See chapter 11: Official Responses to Planning Gain, Appeals 
in Tower Hamlets. The GLC policy of restraint on offices had produced 
a number of large office blocks in Tower Hamlets unaccompanied by 
planning gain, by refusing the applications without negotiation. This 
had occured on sites for which the GLC had been the planning 
authority, specifically the Minets Insurance Building and the OCL 
building on Braham Street. Both had been refused and both appealed 
successfully on the basis of increased employment and contributing to 
the export drive. Southwark had also operated a hard policy of 
restraint and as a result had lost a number of appeals on, amongst 
others, waterfront sites to office development unaccompanied by gains. 
21 Such as the Spitalfields Trust and Tower Hamlets Society. 
22 Such as SHPRS and JDAG. 
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The further issue is whether the conservation of Christ Church 
can be related to the development permitted as a method for 
compensating or mitigating the disbenefits of the office content. If It 
cannot then it is at least arguable that the conservation works merely 
represent the price of the planning permission being sold, making the 
agreements unlawful. In order to establish that the content of the 
agreement is such as to relate to the development itself it would be 
necessary to show that the conservation of the church is incidental or 
consequential to the permitted development. There Is nothing within 
section 52 which requires this relationship to be purely physical, that 
is on the same site, or an adjoining site, so as to exclude the 
relationship being founded on broader planning objectives, 23 at least 
as long as they remain within the bounds of reasonableness. 24 
The recitals in the agreements go some way towards establishing 
a connection, by the Council treating the conservation as a planning 
advantage as required within the terms of the GLDP to mitigate the 
effects of office development. The Tower Hamlets office policy 
document and, later, the Borough Plan could also be prayed In aid to 
support the concept of balancing the disadvantages of the office 
content with advantages provided, which in Spitalfields Includes 
23 Beaconsfield DC v Gams (1974) 234 EG 749 also goes some 
way to support this view by holding that a covenant to secure 
compliance with a planning policy was in the public interest and 
therefore enforceable. See also Alder, Development Control 1979. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series., chapter 6. 
Abbey Homesteads (Developments) Ltd v Northamptonshire CC et. al 
[1986] JPL 683 is a Court of Appeal decision which confirms the use 
of section 52 agreements to ensure proper planning of an area, 
although the actual dispute involved land reserved for a school on the 
same site as a housing development. 
24 See above discussion on the issues of legality in chapter 6: 
Bradford City Metropolitan Council v SSE, Court of Appeal decision. 
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conservation and restoration. In addition, the planning applications on 
these schemes were generally amended or submitted to include 
reference to the conservation, the aim here being to show that the 
disadvantages of office development could be compensated for by the 
developer helping to ensure that other objectives for the area were 
met. 
To successfully establish a sufficient nexus must, to an extent, 
depend upon the location of the office development in relation to 
Christ Church. There must be a limit to the area within which the 
policy objectives can be achieved across sites and the most accessible 
dividing line is distance or, more generically, the boundaries of a 
neighbourhood. While two of the office developments were close to 
the church and within a conservation area within Spitalfields, none 
were actually within the Fournier Street Conservation Area, and two 
were in Whitechapel, 25 on the opposite side of Whitechapel Road from 
the church. These latter two schemes would certainly be Impossible to 
justify under the circular on planning gains and require a very broad 
interpretation of concepts of balancing the mix of uses in an area, 
25 One of these was Eastgate House. In that scheme the 
applicant had taken a lease on a property which they believed had a 
valid office use and, faced with an enforcement notice preventing such 
a use, they applied for a section 53 determination. The planning 
history for the site was complex and they wished to settle with the 
Council ideally by entering a section 52 agreement under which the 
Council would not issue an enforcement notice until their lease 
expired. The legal department questioned the vires of such an 
agreement (see Davy V SDelthorne BC Ch. D. 126 SJ 837 which later 
found a similar agreement to be ultra vires) and requested a planning 
gain against an approval for office use, suggesting the applicants 
provide it on other land they owned in the locality. They were not 
prepared to do this and the Christ Church scheme represented a 
compromise for both sides reached literally at the doors of the High 
Court. 
26 See chapter 11 below. 
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where the physical location of both parts of the agreement are 
unrelated in terms of neighbourhood. Thus, while it could be argued 
that the planning authority does regulate the use of land or 
development by allowing a certain level of offices only on the 
condition that some other aspect of the locality stands to benefit, and 
whilst this argument could probably be applied to the office 
developments in Spitalfields, it would be difficult to establish that the 
authority can afford to allow offices in one area where the planning 
objective of restoring the church is being secured in another. 
The agreements went on to state that, in order to ensure that 
the planning advantages are provided, the developer had agreed to 
enter into an agreement, approved by the Council, with the Friends of 
Christ Church under which they agree to participate In the 
conservation of that building in accordance with a schedule of works 
(the conservation agreement). This agreement to be entered into on or 
before the execution of the planning agreement. The Council in return 
agreed to issue planning permission, in the form annexed to the 
planning agreement, upon the execution of both agreements. The 
developer then covenanted (1) not to implement that permission until 
clause 1 of the conservation agreement was complied with and 
evidence of such compliance had been supplied to the Council and (2) 
to enforce the covenants in the conservation agreement against the 
Friends of Christ Church upon the Council indemnifying them as to 
costs incurred. These covenants were later expanded so as to include 
a covenant to as far as practicable carry out the development as 
approved, or as later amended and approved. The first covenant 
detailed above was also amended to allow the permission to be 
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implemented but to ensure that the office development was not 
occupied for office purposes. 
This part of the agreement raises a number of issues on 
enforceability and on the vires of the agreement itself. Firstly, the 
Council appear to be binding themselves to issue permission in the 
form annexed to the agreement. Some of the planning agreements did 
use the safer formula which premises the covenants by the developer 
with `in the event of planning permission being issued by the Council', 
and indeed this was used in the agreement on Christ Church entered 
into with OCL Ltd in connection with 60 Commercial Road. 27 
However many developers were not prepared to negotiate on this basis 
and required to know the content of the permission before any 
agreement was signed. 28 In view of the above remarks as to the 
circumstances in which these agreements were entered into, that is 
after the application had been advertised, considered and decided upon 
27 There were problems with negotiations on the form of the 
agreement in this case. The company involved were Initially reluctant 
to pay money to a third party and wished to pay It direct to the 
Council. The legal department refused to consider this and Insisted 
upon the provision of a planning advantage, explaining that the 
payment to the trustees was only one method of doing this; the 
Council would consider any other method which produced a gain rather 
than a cheque. The company then disputed the vires of the Council 
agreeing to issue a permission, citing Stringer v MHLG (discussed 
above) as authority. The legal department disputed the relevance of 
that case but agreed to an amendment to the form of words. See 
chapter 7. 
28 For example, in correspondence between Linklaters and 
Paines and the legal department in relation to Camperdown House it 
was stated "Our client must be quite clear before they sign the 
Gallery Agreement thay they are going to get a planning permission 
for the development of the site subject only to conditions which make 
the proposal viable. It is not acceptable to them for the Agreement to 
state that the planning permission, when granted, will be `subject to 
whatever conditions (the Council) deems appropriate'. Could you please 
let us have a copy of the proposed planning permission as soon as 
possible. " 10th September, 1981. 
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by the Council, and taking account judicial confirmation that the 
provision of planning advantages is a material consideration29 it is 
unlikely that they would be held to be a fetter on discretion. 
There remains, however, the problem of the potential bias created 
by the existence of the negotiated gain before the Council at the time 
the application is decided upon. It was suggested in J. J. Steeples v 
Derbyshire CC30 that a Council entering an agreement should do so 
either after the planning decision had been made, or before provided 
it was subject to a release from liability if planning permission were 
not issued or was made subject to the grant of consent. In the case 
of the Tower Hamlets agreements the Council would argue that the 
agreement was only entered after the decision had been made subject 
to the completion of a section 52 agreement, and that the decision 
itself took into account all material considerations. To establish the 
existence of bias at the earlier stage when the Council were not under 
a legal obligation to the developer is difficult and in the Steeples case 
the Council faced, as a term of the agreement, a payment of damages 
if no permission was granted. Tower Hamlets on the other hand did 
not stand to gain anything from the grant of permission nor suffer 
loss by refusal. Payments accrued for the benefit of the 'community' 
through the conservation of the church, and even if it was not 
considered as a benefit the payment still went to a third party 
unassociated with the Council. 
It is trite contract law that a person may not enforce a contract 
to which he is not a party, nor can he, in practice, claim substantial 
29 See Westminster Renslade v SSE QBD 48 P&CR 225; The 
Times 9 May 1983 discussed below in chapter 11. 
° [1981] JPL 582. 
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damages for breach of a contract which causes him no loss. 
Consequently, the planning agreement and the conservation agreement 
had to be linked so as to allow the Council to enforce an obligation 
which seemed to benefit a third party. This problem was compounded 
by the fact that clause 1 of the conservation agreement required the 
developer to pay a sum of money to the Friends of Christ Church 
within 12 months or on the date development was commenced, which 
ever occured first. A number of techniques were used to overcome 
the problem. The planning agreement only referred to the 
participation of the developer in conservation works to the church, 
and not to the payment of money. This limited the interests of the 
Council to something which fell clearly into the ambit of planning, and 
was defined by reference to a schedule of works attached to the 
conservation agreement. 
The conservation works were described in both agreements as 
planning gain and the justifications were recited. The conservation 
agreement made reference to the planning agreement in Its recitals 
and put the Friends of Christ Church under an obligation to apply any 
monies received to those conservation works on behalf of the 
developer. Furthermore, the Friends received the money as trustees 
for a charitable trust specifically created to carry out conservation 
works on the church. The Council in the planning agreement made 
provision for the developer to enforce performance of the conservation 
works against that trust if the monies were not applied to the 
intended purpose. Thus, taken together the agreements provided for 
the attainment of planning gain, upon which basis permission was 
given for an office development. The payment to the trust was simply 
an administrative mechanism for bringing about that gain, and was not 
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the gain itself. In receiving the payment from the developer the 
trustees adopted the role of a sub-contractor to perform works31 to 
realise the gain which the developer was obligated to provide. 
Copies of the draft planning permission were attached to both 
agreements, were examined by the developer during negotiations on the 
form of the section 52 agreement and made no reference to the 
restoration of Christ Church. Where any reference to a planning gain 
was made, for example within the FABS scheme where the Crypt to 
the church was to be restored and converted for use as a social hall32 
(in addition to a contribution to restoration of the church itself), its 
prior completion was required as a condition on the consent. This 
would be accompanied by a stated reason which included reference to 
the attainment of planning advantages as a method of achieving the 
planning aims for the area. 
5. The social centre shall be completed suitable for 
occupation to the satisfaction of the local planning 
authority prior to the application of internal finishes to the 
office part of the development. 
Reasons 
5. Office development alone would not have been 
acceptable to the local planning authority and planning 
permission is granted in view of the inclusion of 'substantial 
planning advantages ' in the scheme including the social 
31 The agreement provided for the substitiution of works other 
than those listed in the schedule to the agreement with the approval 
of the Council. 
32 This restoration was included in a separate agreement with 
the Trustees and again involved the payment of money to carry out 
the agreed works. It was executed the same day as the Conservation 
Agreement for the church itself and was referred to in the planning 
agreement with the Council as "participation in the restoration and 
provision of a social hall within the church in accordance with the 
schedule of works attached to the 'Crypt agreement' with the 
Trustees. " 
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centre which make a positive contribution towards the 
achievement of planning aims in the area. "33 
Conditions were included in this way where the gain formed a 
part of the development application, and they only related to the prior 
completion of the gain and sometimes to landscaping or restoration 
requirements. The reason given for the condition was always stated in 
terms of achieving planning objectives rather than simply for the 
purposes of attaining gain, or for some extraneous purpose. The 
validity of these conditions were never questioned on appeal to the 
Secretary of State, but should the Council have argued for their 
enforcement their wording at least make it likely that they would be 
upheld simply as phasing of development conditions. 
The same model of agreement was used to enforce gains 
negotiated to extend and modernise Whitechapel Art Gallery, 34 to 
relocate and to extend and convert new premises for the Half Moon 
Theatre35 and to renovate some individual listed buildings for 
residential use in Spitalfields. -* The same Issues were raised by all of 
these cases, although the Half Moon Theatre is additionally 
interesting37 as it began as a single office development connected with 
33 Conditional Permission, The crypt of Christ Church 
Commercial Street and site bounded by Fort Street, Artillery Lane, 
Steward Street and Brushfleld Street, El., dated 12th December 1979. 
34 See Results of Study, chapter 7, Camperdown House. 
35 See Results of Study, chapter 7, Champs Scheme. 
35 See Results of Study, chapter 7,16/18 Brushfield Street. 
37 It also recited as a policy justification for the gain 
paragraph 7.9 of the GLDP which states that planning policy in 
London should continue to recognise the importance of theatres, and 
their protection and development should be the responsibility of local 
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various relocation, extension and renovation works and was negotiated 
as such; yet, at the request of the developer, and in order to create a 
larger Development Land Tax saving the scheme was divided into four 
parts. A planning agreement and a planning permission were drawn up 
for each section and the development was split between two related 
companies: each permission attracted a planning gain requirement, 
three in the form of the system described above, and one for 
renovation works to be carried out by the developer. 
These agreements were executed in July 1982 and advice issued to 
the Board of Inland Revenue3s shortly after the Development Land Tax 
Act 1976 came into effect, had permitted all expenditure under a 
section 52 agreement which contributed towards infrastructure to be 
allowed against Development Land Tax liability. 39 Specifically included 
in this were contributions to off-site roads, off-site sewerage and 
drains and neighbourhood community facilities. In 1981 amendments to 
the legislation made a substantial residential component in a 
development into a tax advantage by allowing the developer to off-set 
150% of the costs against the value of the Improvements created by 
the development. Taking these elements of the system into account 
Grant concludes that the impact of planning gain on a developers 
overall profit margins was likely to be insignificant on a large office 
development. 
... the tax 
background lends support to the view that 
planning gain under Development Land Tax may in some 
boroughs. 
38 Board of the Inland Revenue, Advice, Development Land Tax, 
DLT 2, paragraph 52.1976. 
39 For an account of Development Land Tax see Pinson, B. On 
Revenue Law, 1981 (14th ed), pp. 369/394. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
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cases have been a comparatively small investment for 
developers for a substantial return in the form of a 
planning permission which would not otherwise have been 
forthcoming. "° 
Certainly, the developers were sufficiently concerned about the 
Development Land Tax savings on this, and other, 41 schemes to take 
tax advice on the most beneficial result which could be obtained from 
providing a planning gain. The Council showed no objection to 
reworking the scheme for this purpose, and no attempt was made to 
alter the content of the gain to take account of this saving by the 
developer. 
The Council in all of these schemes does not seem to have been 
involved in determining the actual amount paid under the agreements 
with the respective bodies. The schedule of works and the assessment 
of costs of those works were discussed between the developer and the 
body concerned, and the Council did not brief them as to an 
appropriate amount. Whitechapel Art Gallery certainly, and maybe the 
others, used 'will the Council think that is sufficient contribution ?' 
as a negotiating tactic to help double an original offer of t. 1/. million 
from the developer. 
None of the Reports to the Development Sub-committee on these 
schemes include the amount of money concerned and all present this 
type of scheme as a valid planning gain of undoubtable value to the 
community. On the Christ Church schemes for example, one report 
40 Grant, M. "Planning and Land Taxation: Development Land 
Tax and Beyond -1& 2" (1986) JPL 4/19; 92/106. 
41 There are some indications on file that developers wished 
certain obligations to be included in section 52 agreements for this 
purpose. 
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minimises the problems raised by the proposals, and presents them as a 
popular occurence. 
This Council's office policy is based upon the Greater 
London Development Plan policy and it is clear the planning 
advantages do not have to relate to the particular site of 
the proposed offices. 
The Council therefore has for some years operated a policy 
of permitting offices where developers can rehabilitate some 
historic building ... It is interesting that a recent survey of 
the operations of planning gains in the Journal of Planning 
Law shows many authorities are applying similar principles 
to the consideration of developments where some balancing 
of private and public gain is considered necessary. These 
three schemes are unusual in that they are separate office 
developments linked to one historic building - Christ 
Church. However, this is necessary because of the magnitude 
of the expenditure involved. The building itself is of great 
importance and in my opinion its restoration will be of 
great significance to the Borough and provide considerable 
community benefit. "42 
Of course it is impossible to determine the extent of oral information 
demanded at the committee meetings on these particular schemes, 
although it does appear from the files that officers were, on occasion, 
asked for figures. It is also clear that a number of the Members were 
active in promoting some of these projects both inside and outside the 
Council chamber. 
42 Undated Development Subcommittee report Tower Hamlets. 
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Agreements Involving Community Benefits Without the Payment of 
Money 
The subject of off-site gains was most usually either housing or 
industrial development, and the sites were linked through the 
agreements and through the planning permission issued to cover both 
the office and other development. None of the housing provided was 
for Council nomination, and most was for housing associations while 
the remainder served the private market. Examples of each will be 
examined in turn. 
a) Housing 
The Council had a firm policy base for requiring housing as a 
planning advantage, particularly in Spitalfields. Not only did the 
GLDP list the provision of residential space as an example of a 
planning advantage in paragraph 4.15, but the office policy and draft 
Borough Plan also isolated it as a gain. The need for housing In 
Tower Hamlets was unchallengeable as It had a severe housing 
shortage43 and all of the interest groups active in the Borough 
perceived it as an important, if not the only, valid planning objective 
for the area. The policy of attempting to retain housing in the 
Borough was longstanding and had been assisted by Government 
43 This has been supported by evidence given at appeals in 
Tower Hamlets, such as in relation to the Tarn & Tarn Appeal 
discussed below in chapter 11 and in the appeal on 23 Wilkes Street 
against a limited industrial use permission. See Results of Study, 
chapter 7 under Tarn & Tarn. 
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Circular 94/5244 in so far as it indicated an acceptance by the 
Minister that local authorities had the power to take into account 
current housing needs throughout their area when deciding upon an 
application for development. 
Most Inner London Boroughs had suffered a population decline 
since the middle of the century and Tower Hamlets, in the period 1961 
to 1971 had experienced the second highest losses in all of London45 
due to the shortage of housing and employment opportunities. The 
problems in the Borough were exacerbated by the large number of 
households lacking basic facilities, the number of persons sharing 
accommodation on the Council waiting list and those living in 
designated slum clearance areas. *5 There was a particular need for 
smaller accommodation with the resident population of largely elderly 
and single persons resulting from an outmigration of principally young 
married couples. 47 Overall the need to retain housing and to Increase 
housing stock was reflected in the GLDP48 and in the housing and 
planning policies of the Borough. 49 
44 DOE Circular 94/52 Town & Country Planning (Housing 
Accomodation) Direction, 1952. London: HMSO. 
45 The population fell from 206,000 to 165,000, Census 
Reports, 1971. 
46 The Council estimated at the end of 1977 that there were 
5000 more households than dwellings in the Borough, taking into 
account vacancies and concealed households as well as shared 
accommodation. At that time the housing list numbered 5596, 
increasing by 200 per month, with 4000 more on the transfer list. 
47 Over half those on the waiting list for housing in 1977 
required two or less habitable rooms. 
48 See, eg. section 3.37, Written Statement. 
49 See eg., Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields, 1976. 
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Consequently, there is a sound basis for arguing that the 
provision of housing in the borough did represent an advantage to the 
'community' but the type of housing provided and its locality must 
also be taken into account. The need for small, low-priced 
accommodation was recognised by the Council and was addressed by 
some of the schemes which involved local housing associations, 50 but 
other schemes provided for the renovation of houses in private, one- 
family ownership51 and for private prestige housing developments. 52 
Also it could be argued that housing provided in areas predominantly 
used for commercial purposes, such as the Guiness Trust flats provided 
as planning gain on the Wingate Centre Scheme, produce undesirable 
housing conditions53 because of noise and the emptiness of the area 
after the workers go home. 
In addition the conservation area policies for Spitalfields 
encouraged a return to residential use for listed buildings and 
50 See eg. Results of Study, chapter 7: BAGS (East), Newton 
Housing Scheme. There is an assumption made at the time a number of 
these schemes were negotiated that housing association accommodation 
was equivalent to public sector housing, but this has been criticised 
and the housing associations have been aligned more with private 
landlords. See eg. Merrett, S. State Housing in Britain, 1979, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; Hughes, D. Public Sector Housing Law, 1987, 
London: Butterworths for discussion. 
51 See Results of Study, chapter 7: Congo Schemes. 
52 See eg. Results of Study, chapter 7: Goodman's Yard. 
53 It should be added that the residents of these particular flats 
have expressed their pleasure in the accommodation they have and any 
complaints relate only to problems with the environment. eg. the 
residents strongly objected to a proposal to develop St Clare Street 
adjacent to their housing because of the building noise as they had 
already been subjected to over 12 months of such noise from 
developments in Mansell Streeet and Goodman's Yard; they also voiced 
complaint at this time of traffic noise, fumes and general disregard for 
residents in this essentially non-residential area. See Results of Study 
chapter 7: 9 Clare Street. 
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promoted sympathetic infill developments also for residential use. 
Under this policy the nineteenth century buildings were to remain in 
commercial use and investment in restoration and rehabilitation 
programmes was to be encouraged, partly through the planning gain 
policy. It was acknowledged by the Council that these policies 
involved a long term, consistent approach in order to bring about the 
projected restoration and regeneration of the conservation areas. The 
aim was not only to create housing, but to alter the pattern of land 
use and promote the character of these areas in pursuance of the 
traditional planning ideology of the neighbourhood. The underlying 
assumption being that the preservation of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century architecture is a an undeniably desirable goal, as is the 
physical improvement of an area to produce a reasonably low-density 
'community'. These 'common sense' assertions form a basic part of 
the profession of pianning54 and as such add to the appearance of the 
political neutrality of these 'planning policies'. 
The agreements themselves, 55 however, did not recite the policy 
justifications underlying them but simply stated, after detailing the 
content of the scheme, that the developer and the Council had agreed 
'that there should be provision for ensuring that all the constituent 
parts of the Development should be completed to the reasonable 
satisfaction of the Council'. Most of them followed the same pattern 
in that they included covenants by the developer, in the event of 
54 See above, chapter 5: Negotiation, The Planners. 
ss They related to the following schemes detailed in chapter 7: 
Bags Scheme (West), 1/4 Blossom Street, 92/96 Commercial Street, 
Congo Schemes, Elder Street British Land Scheme, 5/7 Folgate Street, 
10/14 Folgate Street, 13/17 Folgate Street, Goodman's Yard Scheme, 
Peabody Buildings Scheme. 
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permission being granted, to complete the development in accordance 
with plans submitted and to complete the residential element (either 
construction or rehabilitation) before the internal finishes were applied 
to the offices. 56 Some of the agreements57 went on to provide a 
release clause operating in the event of disposition of the residential 
sites, by sale or lease of at least 10 years duration, to a housing 
association, the GLC, the Council or any body or agency approved by 
the Council. This clause was developed by the Council as an 
incentive for private developers to dispose of property into the public 
sector. 
Alterations were made to the drafting of these release clauses in 
agreements involving residential development by a housing association 
as a result of the changes in funding patterns between central 
government and the Housing Corporation. By the late 1970's the grant 
of an authorisation by the Housing Corporation for a housing 
association to undertake a project was no longer a guarantee that 
funding for the works required would be forthcoming. The problems 
this produced for Tower Hamlets were exemplified by those 
experienced in Artillery Lane with an office scheme linked to a 
residential infill building. 58 The agreement, dated June 18,1976 
56 Some of the earlier draft agreements provided for completion 
of the residential before the offices were commenced, such as the one 
negotiated with Tarn & Tarn on the Puma Court developments in 1975. 
The developer however found this completely unacceptable, as he did 
the clause requiring the development to be completed and negotiations 
eventually broke down mainly because he refused to sign an agreement 
before consent was issued. See the discussion of the appeal below in 
chapter 11: the decision makes no comment on the evidence given on 
the agreement. 
57 Eg. BAGS (west), 5/7 Folgate Street, Goodman's Yard, 
Peabody Buildings Scheme, all of which are detailed in chapter 7. 
58 See Results of Study, chapter 7: BAGS Scheme (West). 
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provided, as was usual, for the completion of the residential element 
prior to the application of Internal finishes to the office development 
but also added a release clause. The developer entered into a 
building agreement with the housing association giving them a licence 
to enter the site with an option to build a residential building within 
three years, unless the period was extended by the developer. By the 
end of the three years the housing association had withdrawn from the 
scheme as they had inadequate funding and, despite various 
amendments made to the content of the residential building to include 
some offices, were unable to secure a loan. The DOE Initially 
considered advancing funds but would only do so if there was no 
ground floor residential use. Amendments were made to the permission 
but the DOE did not produce a sufficient advance. 
The developer, for his part, considered that he had fulfilled the 
agreement by entering into a contract with a body which had been 
approved by the Council at a time when the problems of housing 
associations were not visible. They were released from the agreement 
and, consequently, the residential element was not completed. The 
clause was amended for futue use so as to give the Council more 
protection. A requirement was added for the Council to be satisfied 
that the body put forward was In a position to complete the 
development without undue delay. ' 
These problems with housing association funding has been cited 
by SHPRS as a major factor militating against the usefulness of a 
59 Such a clause was Included In the 10/14 Folgate Street 
Scheme and in CWS Scheme: 110/118 Leman Street. See the latter as 
described in chapter 7 for the stalemate produced by Its use. 
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planning gain policy in the borough when the agreements used to 
enforce it include release clauses. 
The local authorities have not produced housing. Planning 
gains, though better than nothing, are not a sufficient 
guarantee of the supply of rented housing because of the 
release clauses in the agreements: developers have taken 
their offices and discharged their duty to provide housing 
by selling or leasing to housing associations, and many of 
the expected schemes have not been built. "° 
This approach to the issue is muddled in that the merits of planning 
gain are judged only in the light of the enforcement mechanism which 
was largely undermined by economic circumstances beyond the control 
of the Council. It is also inaccurate, as the local authority had 
produced housing through planning gain schemes61 and very few 
schemes were not built because of the release clauses. 52 There were, 
however, certainly difficulties with their use which could have 
frustrated the policy objectives of the Council. 
For example, the Council were prepared to negotiate on the 
release clause in one case where no housing association was 
involved. 63 Central & City had agreed to renovate a listed building In 
00 Evidence of SHPRS at the public inquiry on appeals by 
Manwin Properties, Bishopgate Managements and Tarn Estates against 
refusals issued by LBTH relating to Puma Court held on 12/16 and 20 
May 1980, as recorded in the report made by Inspector Stephen Marks. 
See chapter 11, Tower Hamlets' appeals. 
61 See eg. under Results of Study: Wingate Centre, Elder Street 
British Land Scheme, Goodman's Yard, Newton Housing Scheme. 
However it does not follow that the type of housing produced was of 
a kind required by local people, eg. there were proposals to convert 
the housing accommodation built by Newton in Elder Street into 
prestige accommodation to serve as second residences for those 
working in the City. See SHPRS "What's Happening In West 
Spitalfields ?" May 1980, London: SHPRS. 
82 But see also Results of Study, chapter 7: CWS Scheme: 
110/118 Leman Street. 
63 16/18 Brushfield Street. 
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private ownership as planning gain on an office development. The 
usual release clause was not included in the draft agreement submitted 
by the developer, but was added by the Council. The developer asked 
for it to be removed on the grounds that the development was small, 
could be more readily controlled by the Council and, if the clause was 
required, would threaten the commercial viability of the development 
because of the possible need to stop work on the offices. The 
Director of Development was reluctant to approve this, but after 
meeting with the developer did agree to the addition of a proviso to 
the release clause which stated that the Council would waive the 
requirement if it were reasonably satisfied that the works on the 
residential element could not be completed for reasons wholly outside 
the developer's control. This was done, at least partly, because of the 
history of Central & City with the Council in completing planning gain 
projects elsewhere in the Borough. 
A more complicated scheme was included in the agreement for 
the Elder Street British Land SchemeM dated 22 September 1976. It 
involved the building of offices and new residential space and the 
rehabilitation of houses in a conservation area. It did not specifically 
link the sites, which were in very close proximity to each other, or 
mention the planning gain policy. The release clause was specific and 
was negotiated to satisfy both parties respectively on enforceability 
and economic feasibility of the scheme. 
The agreement was related to an application for development 
which included all aspects of the scheme and was entered into 'in the 
event of planning permission being granted'. The developer 
64 See Results of Study, chapter 7. 
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covenanted under seal to carry out the development in accordance 
with plans submitted and a construction programme annexed to the 
agreement which allowed for the completion of all the residential 
elements before the office development was occupied. A covenant on 
the conditions of occupation of the offices was included and gave the 
developer the option of either completing the new residential element 
first, or entering into a contract for a freehold or leasehold interest 
in the properties for new residential development with the Council, the 
GLC, a housing association or other body approved by the Council 
together with the completion of specified renovation works to the 
existing houses. It was further provided that the developer after 
completing specification A (essential works to the external and 
internal fabric of the building) in respect of the works on these 
houses could be released from the remainder of the works if he sold 
his interest to any person who had covenanted to carry out those 
remaining works (relating to the internal fabric of the building only). 
This part of the agreement was specifically included in a development 
sub-committee decision a year before the agreement was actually 
signed65 but after a substantial period of negotiation with the officers 
of the Council. It was also provided that the developer would provide 
monthly architects' certificates on the progress of all aspects of the 
development. 
The negotiations over this agreement were protracted, mainly as 
a result of the initial requirement of the Council for the office 
development not to be commenced until the residential element was 
completed. The agreement was to provide that the developer made the 
65 Development Sub-committee 5 November 1975. 
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houses `suitable for occupation' but this was unacceptable to the 
developer consequently, specifications A and B were drawn up. It was 
also considered to include phasing provisions within the conditions on 
the consent66 and remove the need of a section 52 agreement, but this 
was decided against on the grounds of doubtful enforceability and the 
possible adverse effects on the funding of the development. e7 The 
end result68 was a planning permission with a condition, inter alia, to 
carry out the development in accordance with a development 
programme to be approved by the planning authority69 and a section 
52 agreement to deal with the mechanics of that schedule of works. 
No reference was made to the prior completion of the offices in the 
consent issued, at least partly, because the developer intimated that 
such a condition which prevented the application of Internal finishes 
66 A suggested condition was "A development programme shall 
be submitted to and approved by the local planning authority before 
any work is commenced on the site. The programme should include the 
completion of the residential part of the scheme prior to the 
commencement of the office part. The development should be carried 
out in accordance with the approved programme. " 
67 The developer considered that conditions phasing the 
development which restricted the building and completion of the office 
component would discourage investment and so wished such 
requirements to go into a section 52 agreement. They were prepared to 
agree to conditions restricting occupation of the offices until the 
residential element was substantially complete but anything more than 
this they considered impractical and would make the development 
uneconomical. Letter from Covell Matthews Parnership, (architects to 
the developer) to the Council, dated 6 June 1975. 
68 Various forms of planning conditions were discussed between 
the parties before a compromise was reached. 
59 The reason given for this was that office development alone 
would have been acceptable and the programme was necessary to 
ensure the completion of residential works Included and which made a 
positive contribution to the authority's planning aims for the Elder 
Street Conservation Area. Permission dated 23 September 1976, 
Ref. TH. 11900/4549A/ID Application received on 23 March 1973 (as 
amended 20 December 1973 and 20 October 1975). 
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to the offices70 would require interruption of building works and thus 
effect the economics of the development. 
It is acknowledged in the correspondence between the Council 
and the developer that the concern of the Council in the negotiations 
was to ensure they could enforce the gains already agreed, and that 
this was the cause of the delays. For the developers part, the 
problem was in ensuring that the permission and the section 52 
agreement would not make the development either impractical or 
uneconomic. Consequently, much of the discussion concerned the use 
of either a condition on the permission or a section 52 agreement to 
secure the desired result, as well as the form they would take. 
We appreciate your Council's anxiety to ensure a fully 
beneficial development for all concerned; indeed part of the 
planning proposals incorporated a willing acceptance on our 
part to preserve the heritage of the famous but dilapidated 
buildings in Elder Street and to ensure their retention for 
restoration. Furthermore, an additional provision of new 
housing has beeen incorporated in our development plans 
and these two factors represent a considerable planning gain 
in land use, with social and economic terms to the benefit 
of the Borough. Equally your Council's willingness to 
approve a new but limited office development is 
acknowledged ... we instructed our Architects with regard to 
our willingness to co-operate further with your Council but, 
subject only to fair, reasonable and practical limits being 
incorporated in an agreement with you. "» 
The agreement72 reached was complied with by the developer, by using 
the release clauses within it to dispose of the land for residential 
70 The Council used this formula because of the difficulties in 
enforcing and monitoring a condition which related to delayed 
occupation of premises which had been completed. 
71 Letter from British Land to the Council, dated 23 June 1975. 
72 As amended by two further agreements altering the 
description of the development as a result of certain of the houses 
being demolished, or threatened with demolition, due to their neglect 
by the developers. See Results of Study, chapter 7. 
359 
development to a housing association and by obtaining covenants from 
the purchasers of the houses within Elder Street after specification A 
works were complete. This was not, however, complete until 1983 
because of problems with the developer completing the works required, 
at which date offices had not been built on the police station site. 
b) Industrial Use 
A number of the agreements securing the completion of industrial 
space followed the same model as the housing agreements. 73 The aim 
of both was essentially the same in that the Council wanted to see 
the whole development completed and the gain completed ahead of the 
more lucrative offices. Also, the borough had included in its office 
policy the provision of industrial space as a gain in certain of the 
designated areas; the distinguishing feature was that the GLDP did not 
include industrial development as an example of a planning advantage. 
This factor is relevant in assessing the purpose of the agreement, 
particularly on schemes which involved an industrial use some distance 
from the office development: if the industrial use included in the 
development did not amount to a gain it would be difficult to establish 
that the agreement was made for the purpose of regulating or 
73 For example see Results of Study section: 120 Leman Street 
and Buck & Hickman schemes. Both of which required compliance with 
a schedule of works and completion of the industrial element ahead of 
the offices; the Black Lion Yard agreement also included a release 
clause in the event of a binding contract with a third party to 
develop the industrial element; 56/58 Artillery Lane linked the 
preservation of a light industrial use of historic significance, the 
restoration of the premises and the provision of some residential space 
with office use. 
360 
restricting the use or development of land forming the principle part 
of the application. 
As indicated above in relation to Christ Church, the question of 
assessing what amounts to a gain is a necessarily political question, 74 
largely dependant upon the aims and values of the participants in the 
process. The decision of the planners and the Council to treat the 
provision of industrial space as a benefit capable of mitigating the 
disadvantages of office development did receive ministerial approval in 
the appeal relating to 63/65 Prescot Street, 75 on the basis of the 
employment opportunities it represented. Certainly the borough's topic 
paper on Employment which preceded the Borough Plan shows an 
increase in unemployment in the Borough above the national and 
London averages and a decline in industry. It isolated a shortage of 
small industrial units and a need to encourage and generate new 
industrial interest in the borough, while preventing the loss of existing 
industrial floorspace through redevelopment. SHPRS also supported 
these findings in its studies in Spitalfields. 76 
Consequently, it is clearly possible to argue, and has been done 
so successfully, that industrial floorspace amounts to a planning gain. 
Developers have provided small units or workshops, 77 have agreed to 
74 The basis for this assertion is clarified above in chapters 4& 
5 dealing with the Context of Decision Making and Negotiation. 
75 This is discussed in some depth in chapter 11: Official 
Responses to Planning Gain. The Inspector stated in his decision letter 
of 4th March 1985, paragraph 13, "I consider that the refurbishment 
scheme for industrial units amounts to an adequate planning gain". DoE 
Ref: T/APP/E5900/A/84/10874/P7. 
76 See eg. What's Happening in West Siptalfields? London: 
SHPRS. 
77 See eg. Black Lion Yard. 
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abandon existing use rights on office buildings and converted them for 
industrial use, 78 and have even agreed to do works not requiring 
planning permission79'in the event of permission being granted' for an 
office development. The opportunity to confirm a nexus is there, by 
relating the developments through the office policy and the planning 
objectives for the area (although none of these agreements recite what 
they are intended to achieve), as is the opportunity for construing 
their provision as a gain. 
There were, however, some schemes in Tower Hamlets which were 
at least accepted in principle, if not finally pursued by the developer, 
which would be difficult to justify in planning terms mainly because of 
the distance between the offices and the gain. The clearest example 
of this is Wearwell's proposal to change the use of an industrial 
building close to the City and construct an industrial building in 
Wapping, 80 an area outside of the jurisdiction of the planning 
authority. To lose industrial floorspace close to the City was not only 
contrary to published policy but also represented a precedent for 
developers to obtain their offices in the most lucrative part of the 
borough, while providing residential space in an area with lower land 
values. The Development Sub-Committee accepted the recommendation 
to approve this scheme in principle subject to an agreement with the 
Council (as freeholder of the Wapping site) to complete the Industrial 
78 See CWS Schemes: 99 Leman Street. 
79 Ibid. eg. converting an industrial building into flatted units 
and leasing those units. See also 14/20 Alie Street where the developer 
agreed to let new industrial space to specified persons, that is their 
industrial tenants displaced by the change of use to offices. In view 
of the circumstances this requirement could be justified in planning 
terms. 
AO Refer to chapter 7 under Wearwell Schemes. 
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element first, on the grounds that Wearwell were an important 
employer in the area and had 'close associations' with the borough. 
This scheme was not completed and would have created practical 
problems for the Council and the developer in phasing the two aspects; 
not to allow the developer to occupy offices requiring only a change 
of use consent, until a large industrial development was built would 
almost certainly have been uneconomic and difficult to enforce. 
Arguments based on achieving a balanced mix of uses could not have 
been sustained over such a distance, nor could the principle of 
mitigating the disbenefits of an office development unless a borough- 
wide view was taken, which tends to conflict with the principles of 
neighbourhood firmly behind the 'community benefits' policy. 
c) Shopping and other `community facilities' 
The basic models presented above were used and adapted to 
enforce gains in various other forms, both off and on the development 
site. Some, such as the agreements relating to the pedestrian walkway 
and hotel in the Minories Scheme and the leisure centre, theatre and 
car park in the Gardiner's Corner scheme, did recite the planning 
justifications for treating part of the development as a planning 
advantage. Others merely referred to an agreement between the 
parties to ensure that in event of the development commencing all 
parts were completed and made available to the public. el 
81 See, eg. Rodwell House, Carron's Wharf and 35/45 
Whitechapel High Street. The agreement relating to 455/463 Bethnal 
Green Road does not mention any purpose for the agreement. 
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These schemes present potential difficulties In their use of 
section 52 agreements and are the easiest to attack as being a misuse 
of planning powers82 in so far as their purpose usually involved 
enforcing public access, rather than the method or type of 
development works. One of the clearest examples is provided by the 
Gardiner's Corner Scheme which required a lengthy agreement relating 
to the construction of a leisure/sports centre, including a theatre, a 
shopping mall and a public carpark and to times of access, booking 
facilities and concessionary rates for local residents. The agreement 
also detailed the composition of a management committee to include 
local and Council representatives and a complex release clause allowing 
the developer to offer the Council a 21 year lease at a peppercorn 
rent should the facilities prove uneconomic to the developer. 83 
This agreement does use the GLDP as a justification in planning 
terms for ensuring the developer includes sufficient planning 
advantages through the provision of special benefits in the form of 
buildings or other facilities for public use, although, unlike the 
agreements involving the payment of money discussed above, it does 
not go on to state how that requirement has been satisfied in the 
view of the Council. Thus the question again is whether what is 
provided does amount to a gain and whether there is a sufficient 
nexus between the offices and that gain. The additional issue here is 
one of extent: that is it may be justifiable for a planning authority to 
require community facilities in an area to ensure sufficient mix of uses 
82 See eg. Heap D. & Ward A. J. "Planning Bargaining - the Pros 
and Cons: Or How Much Can the System Stand? " (1980) JPL 631/637 
where this approach is taken. 
83 The content of this agreement is discussed in some detail in 
chapter 7 to which the reader is referred. 
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and to encourage `community life' but is it also justifiable to detail 
access to and management of those facilities84 in the name of 
'planning' ? 
This raises the issue of the purpose of planning: if it is the 
domain of planning to arrange physical form then the consequences of 
such arrangement of form should also be considered. If planning is 
also responsible for promoting a 'neighbourhood' or 'community' way 
of life then it becomes even clearer that the responsibility to control 
what is built is not enough: it must also include implementation of the 
scheme in its broader sense. To make the facilities available to the 
public will not, however, achieve the desired end unless steps are also 
taken to ensure that the public are in a position to make use of them. 
Consequently, the progression of planning into the economics and 
politics of the development seems natural, even essential, premised as 
it is upon the ideology of planning. 
This is certainly not the only view of planning, but it represents 
an apparently straightforward justification for the use of a section 52 
agreement in order to regulate the use or development of land by 
providing access for local residents to the development. The choice, 
however, in how to enforce this access involved an economic, political 
decision as to who constituted the 'local public'. It was suggested by 
a councillor that persons employed within the borough should be 
considered as qualifying for access at concessionary rates, but the 
developers were anxious to avoid the employees of competitors making 
use of their facilities. Similarily, those attending educational 
establishments in the borough were not entitled by virtue of that 
84 For another example of this see Rodwell House. 
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attendance to priority bookings as if they were local people because 
the Council feared the Polytechnic students would monopolise the 
sports hall. 
The Council further insisted that a clause be added to the 
agreement to provide for discussions with the developers to ensure 
that local residents using the sports hall would be admitted to licensed 
premises within the complex on the same terms as employees of the 
company occupying the offices. This was to avoid a two class system 
and the criticism to which the Council could thereby be subjected. To 
maintain, therefore, that 'the community' or 'the local public' are in 
any way objective criteria may suggest that the planning process is 
value-free, but the reality does not support such a view. 
Agreements Relating to the Occupation of Developments 
These agreements85 are distinct from those above in that they 
were not concerned with the process of the development, but merely 
with the occupant of the premises. They recited the content of the 
scheme including the gain element and made no reference to the 
completion of all of the elements but restricted the use of the office 
part to the developer, or other named occupant, usually for a period 
of five years. In one instance86 the agreement was made under 
section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 alone as the developer 
did not at that date own the site involved. 
B5 See 238/240 Whitechapel Rd and the Wearwell Schemes. 
86 238/240 Whitechapel Rd. This agreement dated 21 June 1979 
was superceded by a further agreement on 11 September 1979 detailing 
the same terms but under all of the usual legislative provisions. 
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The Council entered into agreements of this kind with Wearwell 
Ltd in respect of developments at 81/91 and 153/157 Commercial Road. 
In both instances the Council referred to the purpose of the 
agreement as preventing office speculation in accordance with the 
GLDP and the permissions issued contained no similar restriction on 
user. The latter agreement not only limited occupation of the offices 
to Wearwell or a subsidiary for five years, but also required the 
premises to be let to 'a company or firm occupying industrial buildings 
within the London Borough of Tower Hamlets totalling not less than 
59,976 square feet wherein industrial processes are carried out. ' 
The basis for this was that consent for office use had only been 
given because the developer had, recent to the application, expanded 
his company to acquire a large area of industrial floorspace elsewhere 
in the borough, thus increasing overall employment opportunities. The 
Development Sub-Committee therefore justified the consent on the 
grounds of the developer being an important asset to the borough but 
did not want to create a precedent detrimental to office policy which 
could open a floodgate of applications by those already owning 
industrial space in the borough. No condition was Included on the 
permissions because of the difficulties this would create for the 
developer in funding the office developments. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Restraints on public expenditure have made the aims and 
objectives of local planning authorities impossible to realise from the 
public purse alone and the courts, in their restrictive attitude to the 
validity of planning conditions, have failed to recognise the imbalance 
r 
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between the objectives considered as within the realm of planning by 
the planning profession and the feasibility of realising those 
objectives. Section 52 and the other legislative provisions which 
enable the authority to contract with the private sector provides one 
mechanism for assisting the implementation of planning policies, 
particularly as its use has not been comprehensibly circumscribed by 
the courts or by the Department. This state of affairs is not 
accidental but is a direct result of the structural interplay between 
the different parts of the development control system operating within 
a market economy. 
The nature of the process is such that the developer and the 
planner are left to negotiate a package acceptable to both in economic 
terms, and the nature of planning law (and indeed rules generally) 
allows for the result of those negotiations to carry 'the force of law'. 
By legislating a provision which bestows wide powers on the planning 
authority, and by drafting that legislation in language which is open 
to diverse interpretation, a framework is purposely created for local 
autonomy. The authority is given an additional power to use the 
threat of enforcement through the courts as a negotiating tool. The 
legislation, however, does more than simply bestow power, as it 
reinforces the position of the local planning authority to use public 
and private law to achieve its objectives. At the same time it seems to 
reinforce the separation of powers between the courts and the 
executive by injecting the ideology of law into the development 
control system and into the negotiation process. This in turn feeds 
the idea of law as a method of objective control as the enforceability 
of the agreement ultimately depends upon its legality. 
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At the operational level, however, the content of the agreement 
largely depends upon the extent to which the planning authority will 
moderate its political will and the level of profits insisted upon by the 
developer. The availability of local authority funds and the state of 
the property market are crucial factors: both the local planning 
authority and the developer have objectives they wish to achieve and 
both have financial constraints upon them. The law represents an 
additional, though no less economic, restraint by reserving to itself 
powers of intervention which have no clear limits: what amounts to a 
'restriction' on the use or development of land and an 'unreasonable' 
exercise of power is not, and probably cannot be, clearly defined. 
The relationship between the planning authority and the 
developer is consequently dependant upon maintaining a trust: the 
authority wants to avoid determinations on its actions as they will 
clarify the limits of their powers and policies and the developer is 
concerned to keep costs as low as possible. The responsibility for 
perpetuating this trust lies firmly with the officers of the Council in 
their decisions to pursue a scheme and realise its potential without 
losing the benefit of the financial and political rewards of the 
development. This is done principally on the basis of professional, 
fair and objective considerations which, consciously or unconsciously, 
mask political criteria. Public trust, as well as the trust of the 
developer, can be largely maintained through this device because 
professionalism suggests fairness as opposed to the bargaining and 
compromising according to predisposed views inherent in the status of 
'politician'. 
By this process, the planning authority and indeed the officers of 
that authority, are in a position to create and operate their own 
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microcosm of power which is both dependant upon and supportive of 
the larger system of control. It is the officers who negotiate the 
content of the gain and officers who negotiate the form of the 
enforcement mechanism. They are answerable to their members and 
are affected by the policies and political aims of that council, but 
gains and agreements are generally presented to the Development 
Committee as a completed package. The content may be subject to 
scrutiny by that Committee but this will largely depend upon the 
content of the planner's report and the trust of the Committee in the 
planner's 'professional judgement'. Consequently, there remains an 
area of control in the hands of individual officers which is necessary 
to the system and supportive of it. 
The legality of the method of enforcement adopted by the council 
is clearly of importance in perpetuating the various relationships 
within the system, yet is only one aspect which needs consideration. 
It is clearly possible to establish that powers to enter agreements 
under the law do exist, even where the purpose is to achieve planning 
gain, provided that gain is required to regulate or restrict the use or 
development of land. The extent of those powers, however, is 
dependant upon the interpretation of that proviso, which can only be 
ascertained by an assessment of whether the powers were exercised in 
a manner which was reasonable and justifiable in the context in which 
that exercise occured. 
The above discussion illustrates the fact that 'reasonableness' 
must be measured against the political grounds for exercising the 
power, and that this necessarily includes economic conditions and the 
basis upon which each and all actors play their role and make their 
decisions. It is not simply a question of determining whether the terms 
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of planning agreements satisfy 'principles' laid down in law; those 
'principles' cannot be said to exist in a vacuum and, as far as 
planning agreements are concerned, are unclear and eminently 
imprecise. These 'legal principles' effectively play a similar role as 
'planning objectives' in that they attempt to remove the political base 
from an exercise of power. This has the appearance of control 
through professionalism and serves the system by further justifying the 
role of that actor within it and does not improve the position of those 
remaining on the outside. Consequently, judges (like the Secretary of 
State or planning authorities) by making decisions as to what amounts 
to a valid condition or whether or not an agreement amounts to one 
which regulates or restricts the use of land, influence the distribution 
of uses, and thus the economic (which includes the social) conditions 
of an area. 87 They are effectively making decisions of distribution of 
resources which cannot be decided by the acontextual application of 
principle, but require a choice between competing demands. M 
The use of planning agreements is not, then, the 'evasive 
practice' suggested by Wade89 but is a necessary part of the system in 
that it supports and is a product of the context of development 
87 Research has been carried out to illustrate the role of the 
judiciary as "supermanagers" of social distribution In the US through 
decisions made on the characteristics of an area, schools and services. 
See Johnston, R. J. "The Management and Autonomy of the Local State: 
the Role of the Judiciary in the US " (1981) 13 Env. and Pl. A. 1305 
and Johnston, R. J. "Texts, Actors and High Managers: Judges, 
Bureaucrats and the Political Organisation of Space " (1983) 2: 1 
Political Geography Q. 3. 
88 See Frug, G. E. "The City as a Legal Concept " (1980) 93 
Harvard Law Review 1057. 
89 Wade, H. W. R. Administrative Law, 1982 (5th ed. ) Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
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control and of the realities of government. The operation of the 
process does not represent radicalism in local government but is an 
avenue for preserving the broad welfare responsibilities of local 
government in the unconducive climate produced by central government 
economic policy. It also represents the local operation of market 
forces and the advance of individualism, with the facility for 
developers to attain their profits merely through a different, no less 
efficient, mechanism. The interpretation of those welfare 
responsibilities remains in the hands of professionals working with the 
development industry and working within the economic structure rather 
than against either. 
PART IV: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: THE NEW SOUTH WALES 
MODEL OF DEVELOPER CONTRIBUTIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
While recognising the problems of using examples from 
comparative jurisdictions in the study of law, ' a view of the approach 
taken in New South Wales, Australia to the subject of planning gain is 
pertinent in so far as it represents one attempt at a solution and also 
demonstrates the importance of contextual considerations. It is not 
advocated that this approach is the only one or the most significant, 
but is perhaps the most accessible in that Australian planning law is 
an adaptation of the principles underlying the English system, and New 
South Wales represents one manifestation of that adaptation. 
Many jurisdictions have used the English model of town planning 
as a base, treating it as something readily transportable from one 
culture to another, but Australia is perhaps politically and 
environmentally less dissimilar from England than most. The choice of 
state was largely arbitrary but was also prompted by the experiences 
of Sydney City Council in their widely publicised and well-documented 
attempt to consistently apply a policy of planning gain. 2 
What is intended in this part of the thesis is then not a lesson 
for England to follow or reject, but an illustration of the problems 
that can be encountered when structural reforms are instituted from 
above as a method of control over the operation of a system which is 
I See the work of Kahn-Freund, O. esp. "On Uses and Misuses 
of Comparative Law" (1974) 37 MLR 1. 
2 Building Owners and Managers Association of Australia Limited 
(BOMA) v Sydney CC (1984) 53 LGRA 54 (Land and Environment Court 
No. 40084 of 1983,2 April 1984). Various articles appeared in the 
Sydney Morning Herald on the operation of this levy system, see eg. 
4th, 11th, 21st November 1980,4th, 24th, 27th February, 4th March, 10th 
April, 19th, 29th July and 28th, 29th September 1981,9th, 10th, llth 
March, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 11th, 29th December 1982,14th, 29th January, 29th, 
30th April, 6th, 23rd September 1983 and lst, 3rd, 7th April 1984. 
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a product of a distribution of power which remains unaltered. A brief 
overview of the legislative framework of planning law in New South 
Wales (hereinafter referred to as 'NSW') will be given, followed, in 
chapter 11, by a commentary on the explicit provisions relating to 
planning gain and the practical effect of those provisions on councils 
and developers in two areas of Sydney. 
CHAPTER 9: THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
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The new environmental planning system introduced in September 
1980 by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 19793 
(hereinafter referred to as 'the EP&A Act 1979') represented a 
unification of land use planning and environmental protection within 
the legal and administrative system of NSW. It was accompanied by 
four other pieces of legislation4 dealing with specific aspects of 
development control and the establishment and jurisdiction of a new 
court to act as review body and enforcement agency. These reforms 
were brought in by the Liberal Government and followed on the heels 
of federal reforms to the administrative law system intended to 
increase control of the bureaucracy through a sophisticated mechanism 
of review. 5 
BACKGROUND: PLANNING GAIN IN NSW BEFORE THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING LEGISLATION 
Before the EP&A Act 1979 it was possible for a Council to 
impose conditions on a consent for subdivisions requiring the developer 
3 This Act was amended in certain respects in 1984, see below. 
4 The Land and Environment Court Act 1979, the Miscellaneous 
Acts (Planning) Repeal and Amendment Act 1979, the Heritage 
(Amendment) Act 1979 and the Height of Buildings (Amendment) Act 1979. 
5 For a concise overview of these changes, which fall outside of 
the scope of this thesis, see Partington, M. "The Reform of Public Law 
in Britain: Theoretical Problems and Practical Considerations" IN: 
McAuslan, P. and McEldowney, J. F. Law, Legitimacy and the 
Constitution, pp. 191-211,1985, London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
e This type of consent is required by councils where land is 
to be divided into plots for development. The purpose of the 
consent is to ensure that the plots are of the requisite size and 
adequate arrangements are made for the servicing of those plots. The 
application will deal with the siting of roads, drains, gas and 
electricity pipes, overhead or underground cabling etc within the 
site. Access from external roads onto the site may also be included. 
ý` 
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not only to construct, or pay a contribution towards the costs of 
constructing, drainage and roads necessary to make the land ready for 
development, 7 but also to dedicate part of the site as a public 
reserve. 8 This power provided the basis for councils to make 
allowance for social infrastructure on new developments, and was most 
useful to those areas which had newly released land awaiting 
subdivision within their jurisdiction. In view of the rapid and 
extensive growth of Sydney towards the West of the city, these 
powers together have had a dramatic impact, particularly upon 
residential developers, and their use has been litigated in the state 
courts. As they relate specifically to applications for subdivision, they 
have survived the EP&A Act 19799 which Is mainly concerned with 
rationalising the requirement of developer contributions at the later 
stage of the development application. 10 These latter requirements 
The council has various powers in publishing plans which indicate 
the size of plots (high, medium and low density) and the positioning 
of roads and access roads. In addition the legislation recognises 
social infrastructure requirements for new developments to the 
limited extent of designating areas for public use. See generally 
Local Government Act 1919, as amended, Part XII. 
7 Local Government Act 1919, as amended, sections 328 and 333. 
See also the Land Contribution Management Act 1970. 
8 Local Government Act 1919, as amended, section 333(1)(g) 
provides that the amount of land to be dedicated as public reserve 
is a relevant consideration to be taken into account in determining 
an application for sub-division. 
9 In many cases, under local plans, development consent is not 
required after a sub-division and thus the EP&A Act will not operate. 
10 Following the enactment of the EP&A Act, the Local 
Government Act was further amended to take account of the changes 
wrought by the new legislation (see below). The new section 333 is 
now in two parts. The first (s. 333(1)) refers to the considerations 
to be taken into account where consent under the EP&A Act is 
required in respect of a sub-division and includes, inter alla, the 
proposed drains and roads for the site. The second (s. 333(1A)) 
relates to sub-divisions where no consent is required under the EP&A 
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were, before the EP&A Act 1979, developed as a part of the councils' 
discretion to take into account material considerations in determining 
a development application and to impose conditions upon development 
consent. The law developed in this area has remained relevant where 
councils have imposed general conditions requiring developer 
contributions to social infrastructure without relying upon section 94 
of the EP&A Act 197911 which specifically allows a condition to be 
imposed where the requirements of that section are fulfilled. 12 
In Ligora Pty Ltd v Leichhardt13 the Chief Judge in the Land & 
Environment Court stated that it was appropriate to deal with the 
dedication of land at the subdivision, rather than development 
application, stage in order for a more satisfactory decision to be made 
as to which area of the land should be dedicated. If left to the 
development consent stage difficulties would arise as previously 
subdivided plots would have to be interfered with or, if individual 
plots were chosen for dedication, the land may have been sold to the 
Act, and in this case the council may also consider, inter alia, the 
amount of land to be provided as public reserve. 
11 The EP&A Act 1979, section 91(3)(a) sets out the power to 
impose conditions which relate to any of the matters which may be 
taken into account in determining an application. Included in the list 
of such matters contained in section 90(1) are the provisions contained 
in plans effecting the locality, the social and economic effects of 
development, the effect the development has on local amenity, the 
public interest, the suitability of the land for development and 
whether adequate provision is made for landscaping, utility services, 
parking, roads. 
12 This section is discussed in detail below. The court has on a 
number of occasions refused to allow councils to rely upon section 91 
as an alternative to section 94 where the terms and effect of the 
condition fell squarely within the latter. See Henbury v Parramatta CC 
(1982) ELR 0003; St George Building Society v Manly CC (1982) ELR 
0228. 
13 (1982) ELR 0185. 
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house purchaser following subdivision. Thus the powers on subdivision 
not only provide part of the background to developer contributions 
under the EP&A Act 1979, but also remain relevant to the whole 
picture of local council discretion in this area. 
In Hornsby S. C v NSW Malting Co Ltd 14 the court considered 
how the council could exercise its powers in requiring a dedication of 
land for public reserve on a subdivision and suggested guidelines for 
making a decision on the sufficiency of such a contribution which 
would be 'reasonable in all of the circumstances'. Rejecting the view 
that the council was restricted to assessing merely whether the 
contribution provided adequately for those who would eventually 
inhabit the subdivided plots15, the court held that a council should 
also take into account more general needs in the community as a 
whole. These wider considerations included the council's policies on 
facilities for the area, the availability of existing public land, the 
suitability of providing public reserve for the area on the site 
suggested in the application. With regard to the industrial subdivision 
before the court, they took into account the need for public reserve 
by the workers who would be employed in the development and the 
need to make the development itself asthetically pleasing. 
When first enacted in 1919 the Local Government Act had refered 
to the provision of 'public garden and recreational space' and the 
14 (1963)8 LGRA 386. 
15 This was the view given in earlier cases, such as Forsberg v 
Warringah SC (1922) 6 LGR 80; Hanly v Hornsby SC (1954) 19 LGR (NSW) 
214. 
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subsequent amendment, in 1964,16 to replace this phrase with the term 
'public reserve' was treated as significant by the courts to further 
expand the criteria which councils could consider relevant. In 
Warringah SC v Armour17 the later phrase was interpreted as not 
requiring the council to identify any particular need or demand 
generated by the future development of the subdivided site. Any 
change in the condition of an area created by the subdivision entitled 
a council to legitimately require a portion of land, or a monetary 
contribution in lieu, 18 for new public reserve in the future or to 
improve existing public reserves. It was considered irrelevant, 
therefore, that the monetary contribution in this case was to be used 
for the improvement of existing areas rather than for purchasing land 
to meet needs generated by the development. The question as to 
whether dedication of land could also be required without actually 
identifying an increased need was ultimately left open. 
It had, however, been suggested in an earlier case that the 
requirement of a monetary contribution towards public reserve should 
be treated with more circumspection than a dedication of land. 
The levy of money as a condition of the exercise 
of a statutory discretion has always been regarded 
as suspect because it need not necessarily be 
16 Local Government and Conveancing (Amendment) Act 1964, 
section 2(e). 
17 [1972] 2 NSWLR 328. 
18 Local Government Act, as amended, section 332(2) allows a 
council to require a contribution in lieu. of a dedication of land for 
public reserve on a sub-division provided (1) the amount of the 
contribution was reasonable; (2) it was paid into a trust fund and (3) 
it was only used to acquire land for public recreation or in improving 
existing facilities. The monetary contribution in lieu provision was 
first added to the Act by the Local Government (Amendment) Act 
1960, section 2, amended by the Local Government and Conveyancing 
(Amendment) Act 1964, section 2(e)(iii). 
381 
related to the lawful exercise of the power 
conferred so-that it assumes the character of an 
exaction or tax. "19 
Yet the NSW courts had also allowed the requirement of a monetary 
contribution to be made as a condition where no statutory basis for 
such existed, that is at the stage of development consent. The Court 
of Appeal in Rockdale MC v Tandel Corporation20 held that such a 
requirement fell within a council's discretion in deciding upon a 
development application, provided the council established, not only a 
need for public reserve generated by the development, but also that 
such a contribution would be commercially feasible. 
Approving the earlier decision in Granville Developments v 
Holroyd MC, 21 the court went on to say that if these provisos were 
satisfied the Council could issue a conditional consent under which 
development could only take place after the developer acquired other 
land adjoining, or near to, the development site for use as public 
reserve. If this was not practicable, the council could impose a 
condition requiring a financial contribution from the developer 
provided (1) the monies received were held on trust so as to prevent 
them from being expended on anything other than the provision of or 
improvement to public reserves; and (2) the land used for public 
reserve was close enough to the site for there to be a reasonable 
connection with the public reserve needs generated by the development 
itself. 
19 Jumal Developments v Parramatta CC (1969) 17 LGRA 111 at 
113, per Else-Mitchell, J. 
20 (1975) 34 LGRA 196. 
21 (1969) 18 LGRA 34. 
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It seems, therefore, that the courts were trying to limit the use 
of conditions to secure a monetary contribution towards public 
reserves when imposed on a development consent. These limitations, 
however, far from discouraged the use of conditions to secure a 
monetary contribution from developers. 22 The court considered such 
use to be within the discretion of local councils and the provisos 
placed upon it were merely aimed at ensuring that those who were 
intended to benefit from such a condition, did so benefit. This 
connection between the contribution required and the needs generated 
by the development has been clearly illustrated by a large number of 
development consent cases which arose before the EP&A Act 1979,23 
requiring a physical relationship to be demonstrated. 
In Greek Australian Finance Corporation v Sydney CC24, for 
example, Sydney City Council had a Capital Contributions Account for 
building car parks which was fed by monies collected from parking 
meters and contributions from developers in lieu of on-site parking 
spaces. 25 The developer in this case paid a contribution towards 
parking and applied to the court to have it returned on the ground 
that there was no nexus between the users of the development and the 
22 In Naylor v Bankstown CC [1980] 2 NSWLR 630 approval was 
given to a requirement of both dedication of land and a monetary 
contribution, provided the total did not exceed the amount which could 
legitimately be required under either head. 
23 Culminating in the Court of Appeal case Rockdale MC v 
Tandel Corporation Pty Ltd (1975) 34 LGRA 196 which held that a 
contribution for open space must be spent in an area `proximate 
enough to the site to present a reasonable connection with the needs 
generated by the development on it. ' 
24 (1974) 29 LGRA 130 
25 This was part of a system of colllecting developer 
contributions which was operated through published planning policies, 
discussed below under Sydney City Council. 
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contribution, as Sydney City Council had no plans to build a car park 
in the vicinity. The Council explained that under their local plan all 
parking was to be confined to the edges of the central business 
district so as to reduce congestion. The court agreed that, in 
planning terms, the approach of the Council was right, but held 
themselves to be bound by precedent to require a sufficient connection 
between the provision of facilities and the parking needs generated by 
the development. 26 This requirement was missing here and the 
condition was declared void. 
The courts, in applying the test formulated in Rockdale MC v 
Tandel Corporation Pty Ltd27 have required a sufficient nexus to be 
established between the development and the contribution both in 
terms of physical proximity and causal relationship. This latter aspect 
was generally expressed in the negative by the council being obliged 
to substantiate that the development itself led to a reduction in the 
amenities for the area. This is clearly referable to the general 
position under English law, in that a condition must fairly and 
reasonably relate to the development28 and a number of the NSW 
cases explicitly refer to that requirement. 29 In Bartolo v Botany 
26 This approach was echoed in Woolworths v Ku-ring-gai SC 10 
LGRA 177 where the car parking was to be 'so situated and defined in 
such a fashion as to enable a decision to be reached that they are 
capable of being identified with or restricted to use in connection 
with the proposed development. ' 
27 supra note 13. 
28 See, for example, Newbury v SSE (1980) All ER 731; Fawcett 
Properties v Buckingham Council (1961) AC 636. Refer to Section 52 
Agreements discussed above. 
29 For examples see Rockdale v Tandel Corporation Pty Ltd 
(1975) 34 LGRA 196 at 205; Greek Australian Finance Corporation v 
Sydney CC (1974) 29 LGRA 130; Granville Developments V Holroyd MC 
(1969) 18 LGRA 34 at 38; Jumal Developments v Parramatta CC (1969) 
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MC30 the Land & Environment Court, deciding a case on the old law 
which was litigated after the EP&A Act 1979 became effective, stated 
the test in broader terms in finding against the council's requirement 
for a contribution towards public open space. 3' 
... the expected increase in resident population in the locality with the expectant resultant demand for increased 
facilities or open space [will] necessarily result in a decline 
or depreciation of the amenities in that neighbourhood. " 
Through these mechanisms local councils were able to levy 
developers for the provision of certain services. Under the Local 
Government Act the type of services involved were restricted to the 
provision of public open space, roads (usually subdivision roads only), 
drainage, water, electricity and sewerage, but conditions imposed on 
development consents were also upheld by the courts as valid, provided 
the contribution required was demonstrated to be related to the 
development. In addition, some councils also negotiated contributions 
which did not meet the criteria of either of the above, but were 
provided in order to save the time, expense and future animosity 
created by a dispute with the council. 32 
Some evidence of this type of negotiation can be found in the 
cases which were litigated before the courts where a developer had 
17 LGRA 111 at 113; Woolworths v Ku-ring-gai MC 10 LGRA 177. 
30 (1981) 2 DEP Digest 20. 
31 See also Harrison v Leichhardt MC (1981) 2 DEP Digest 17, 
Land & Environment Court, 5 Feb 1981. 
32 This point was made during most of the interviews conducted 
in Sydney during the course of this research with developers, 
councillors and planners. See also, Best, G. "Section 94-Current Trends" 
(1973), Unpublished paper presented at Workshop on Section 94 
Contributions, University of New South Wales, Sydney, July 1st 1973. 
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paid a contribution, obtained an unconditional development consent and 
then later decided to apply to the court for the contribution to be 
repaid. This was the situation in Rockdale MC v Tandel Corporation 
Pty Ltd discussed above, and the developer argued that the 
contribution was paid as a result of coercion and had been demanded 
without lawful justification. The developer had submitted an 
application which was unacceptable to the council. Negotiation took 
place and the council indicated that the scheme would be acceptable if 
certain amendments were made and a contribution was paid towards 
providing public open space. The amendments were made, the 
contribution was paid and an unconditional consent was issued. The 
Court of Appeal, in remitting the case back to the trial judge, found 
that it was open to the lower court to find that the contribution was 
paid in anticipation of the consent. Consequently, if it would have 
been valid as a condition the consent could remain, but if it would 
have been struck down the consent would also fall. 
After the EP&A Act 1979 was passed Sydney City Council, in 
February 1981, passed a resolution to require developers to pay a 2% 
levy on the granting of all applications for commercial developments 
valued at A$200,000. This levy was imposed not as a condition on 
consent, but was required as a prerequisite to consent as a voluntary 
contribution to a fund to provide public housing for low-income 
earners. 33 It became known amoungst developers in Sydney that 
development applications would not be processed unless they were 
33 In the view of both the Liberal and Labour councillors 
interviewed the levy arose as a revenue raising measure when funds 
were not forthcoming from the state housing authority to enable the 
council to fulfill the mandate upon which they had been elected, which 
included an extensive building programme for public housing. See also 
eg. Sydney Morning Herald 4 Feb 1981,27 Feb 1981,9 April 1981. 
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accompanied by a letter agreeing to pay the levy. Once the letter 
was received the development consent would include a condition 
stating that the developer had agreed to contribute 2% of the value of 
the development. The council would then not release the building 
consent necessary for construction work to commence, until the levy 
was paid. As such it was often paid before the application was 
determined and, as it also represented an often cheaper alternative to 
a valid contribution towards open space34 it was not readily 
challenged. 35 Indeed at the outset the media reported favourably on 
the policy and a number of large development companies publicly 
pledged their support for the levy. 36 
The validity of this levy was finally litigated In 1984 by the 
Building Owners and Managers Association and the court held it to be 
unlawful. 37 Cripps J. considered the contributions to be in no way 
voluntary in view of the evidence given as to the methods used to 
secure them. The effect of the council's policy was held to be the 
imposition of a condition on development consent which precluded the 
council from considering any individual case on Its merits and, 
accordingly, was invalid. However, the policy was operated for three 
years, during which time the council collected A$3.1 million from 
34 See Sydney Morning Herald 19 June 1981,29 June 1981,28 
Sep 1981 and The Australian 11 Sep 1981. 
35 130 relevant applications were made before the levy was 
challenged before the Land and Environment Court. Building Owners & 
Managers Association v Sydney County Council (1984) 53 LGRA 54. 
36 See, for example, Sydney Morning Herald 23 Oct 1980,29 Oct 
1980,4 Nov 1980 and The Australian 11 Sep 1981. 
37 cited supra note 32. 
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,u 
developers3s and the court did not make any ruling on the return of 
the contributions paid. 
This scope for negotiation has not been directly attacked by the 
EP&A Act 1979: the legislation remains silent on the prohibition of 
seeking contributions, leaving section 94 as one method, rather than 
the only method, of securing payment towards social infrastructure. 
Certainly there is no evidence to suggest that section 94 of the EP&A 
Act 1979 was intended to be a panacea for solving all of the problems 
regarding the funding of urban development. Rather, it was directed 
towards regularising existing practice so as to give statutory force to 
contributions sought and to introduce greater certainty and 
understanding of developer contributions. In doing this it also 
imposed a requirement on councils to justify the contributions sought 
by quantifying shifts in demand and by limiting contributions through 
the criteria of reasonableness, ultimately to be interpreted by the Land 
and Environment Court. 
38 ibid. per Cripps J. See also Sydney Morning Herald 6 Sep 
1983 and 4 July 1983. Many of the larger contributions were reported 
in the press and were claimed to include State controlled companies 
such as Qantas (A$78,000) and the Rural Bank (A$600,000) as well as 
Waltons Bond (A$1.2 m), Intercontinental Hotels (A$1 m) and many 
others. See Sydney Morning Herald 28 Sep 1981,2 Dec 1982,29 Jan 
1983 and Financial Review 10 April 1981 and 11 March 1982. 
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING & ASSESSMENT ACT 1979: THE 
STRUCTURE OF CONTROL 
The EP&A Act 1979 centralised planning powers by removing land 
use planning and environmental protection functions from other 
government portfolios and extended the system conceptually by the 
introduction of a three-pronged development plan, consisting of local, 
regional and state documents. The Court was endowed with wide 
discretionary powers and locus standi before it was specifically 
extended to 'any person' irrespective of whether 'any right' of that 
person was or could be infringed as a result of the breach of the Act 
complained of. 39 The Act also included mechanisms for the production 
and incorporation of Environmental Impact Statements into the process 
of planning control. 
Previous to this legislation, planning control was limited to that 
contained in town and country planning schemes produced by the local 
councils. 40 The stated purpose of these schemes was the regulation 
and control of the use of land and were based upon the type of 
zoning maps outlawed by developments in the English system. 
Developments would only be allowed if they were in accordance with 
the zoning included in the scheme. As a result thousands of Local 
Environmental Plans (hereinafter referred to as 'LEPs') covering 
individual sites within the zones had been introduced by councils to 
allow them to permit specific conflicting proposals. 41 These LEPs 
39 EP&A Act, section 123. 
40 Local Government Act 1919, section 342(G). 
41 See Environmental Law Newsletter, No. 13, September 1983: 
Official Opening by Mr Eric Bedford, Minister for Planning 
Environment of the Environmental Law Association Seminar on the 
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were so specific that they represented the permission to develop itself 
and the permit that followed often became a mere formality. The 
basis upon which development proposals would be assessed was not the 
individual merit of an application, but whether the application 
accorded with the zoning requirements of the plan. 
Partly to overcome these problems, the EP&A Act 1979 allowed42 
a local council to draw up a local plan, or local plans, for their area, 
or parts of it, after carrying out an environmental study of the land 
to which it was addressed. The Act, however, does not stipulate the 
form or structure these plans should take, other than to indicate that 
the Minister may make directions. 43 Similarly, in relation to the more 
specific Development Control Plans nothing is said to preclude reliance 
on zoning or to encourage the councils to take a broader policy based 
approach. 44 
The policy underlying the existing approach to planning was 
stated to be the 'orderly and economic development and use of land'45 
and this policy was repeated in the EP&A Act 1979 but was put 
alongside the complementary context of promoting the broader 
interests of the local population. These were described as the social 
and economic welfare of the community and the improvement of the 
First 100 Days of the EP&A Act - 12 August 1983. Sydney: NSW 
Environmental Law Association 
42 The power of the Department of Environment and Planning 
to require a council to draw up such plans is also included in EP&A 
Act 1979, section 55. 
43 EP&A Act 1979, section 71. 
44 EP&A ACt 1979, section 72. 
45 State Planning Authority Act 1963 (NSW) section 12, as 
applied by the New South Wales Planning and Environment Commission 
Act 1974 (NSW), section 18(3). 
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environment. 45 The new system of plans introduced by the EP&A Act 
1979 did require each plan to include a statement of the aims, 
objectives, policies and strategies by which it was to achieve any of 
the objects of the Act47 and stipulated that it must not conflict with 
other policies relevant to the area. However, the EP&A Act 1979 did 
not only fail to comment on the use of zones as a method of land 
use control but also remained silent on the relationship between such 
plans, which essentially control development, 48 and the positive 
objects of the Act. 
The responsible Minister did declare that where the two objects 
of controlling development and promoting the social and economic 
welfare of the community are in conflict the choice between control 
or promotion of development is a political one. The provisions in the 
46 EP&A Act, 1979 section 5 states the objects of the Act to be 
"(a) to encourage - (i) the proper management, development and 
conservation of natural and man-made resources, including agricultural 
land, natural areas, forests, minerals, water, cities, towns and villages 
for the purpose of promoting the social and economic welfare of the 
community and a better environment; 
(ii) the promotion and co-ordination of the 
orderly and economic use and development of land; 
(iii) the protection, provision and co-ordination of 
communication and utility services; 
(iv) the provision of land for public purposes; 
(v) the provision and co-ordination of community 
services and facilities; and 
(vi) the protection of the environment; 
(b) to promote the sharing of the responsibility for environmental 
planning between different levels of government in the State; and 
(c) to provide increased opportunity for public involvement and 
participation in environmental planning and assessment. " 
47 EP&A Act 1979, section 25(1). 
48 eg. EP&A Act 1979, section 26- refers, inter alia, to an 
environmental planning instrument as controlling development, 
controlling the demolition of buildings, controlling advertisements and 
"controlling any act, matter or thing for or with respect to which 
provision may be made" for protecting or improving the environment 
or reserving open space. 
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EP&A Act 1979 requiring state and regional policies and plans to be 
taken into account on a development application in his view provided 
the mechanism for the political control of planning. The Act did not 
create a hierarchy between local, state and regional instruments, nor 
did it limit the degree of detail which can be incorporated into a state 
or regional plan: consequently these documents can require not only 
the local council to take into account the government's employment or 
housing policy, but can also change the existing controls on a 
particular area or site. Their effect does, in these circumstances, 
provide a direct and effective system of control over local council 
decision making49 particularly as the Act also prohibits permits being 
issued for subdivision of land which conflict with the Act or any 
planning instrument relative to the site. SO The formula is completed by 
the inclusion amoungst the objects of the Act of one 'to promote the 
sharing of the responsibility for environmental planning between the 
different levels of Government in the State'. 51 
The purposes to which each of these three types of plan should 
be addressed are the same, that is any of the objects of the 
legislation. The objects are drawn in broad terms and it would be 
necessary to show that the instrument in question neither achieved 
nor sought to achieve any of them in order to establish its invalidity 
49 State environmental policies have been used to restrict local 
council discretion, eg. SEPP 8 (Surplus Public Land) removes all 
government sponsored development from the control and assessment 
procedures under the EP&A Act 1979 and makes the minister the 
planning authority. Thus allowing the development of public land used 
eg. areas historically reserved for open space, without local control 
p roced u res. 
50 EP&A Act 1979, section 91(2). 
51 EP&A Act 1979, section 5(B). 
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on this ground. 52 A failure to state the aims within the instrument 
does not have any legal consequence and judicial challenge on the 
grounds of procedural or formal non-compliance with the Act is 
prohibited after a period of three months from the date of 
publication. 53 Taken together these provisions make the challenge of 
the instruments difficult and the Act goes on to suggest that the 
instruments should be applied according to their strict literal 
meaning54, which limits the interpretation of those instruments both at 
the level of application and on review by the court. 
There is a duty placed upon the local council to ensure that in 
preparing a plan the aims, objectives, policies and strategies included 
within it do not conflict with the EP&A Act 1979 or with published 
state or regional instruments, or with any relevant directive of the 
Minister under section 117. There is also a positive duty to give 
effect to the aims, objectives, policies and strategies of those 
instruments. 55 The local plan does require Ministerial approval as a 
further check on its contents and the Minister may add such 
amendments as he considers fit to avoid conflict with State or 
regional plans or with Ministerial directives. Se If, nevertheless, there 
is any conflict between an LEP and a state or regional policy which 
becomes apparent on consideration of an application for development 
52 EP&A Act 1979, section 25. 
53 EP&A Act 1979, section 35. 
54 EP&A Act 1979, section 25. 
55 EP&A Act 1979, section 61(e). 
SC, EP&A Act 1979, section 70. 
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there is a presumption that the later instrument prevails, but the 
decision as to which should prevail rests with the Minister. 57 
Before a local or regional environmental plan can be prepared 
there must be an 'environmental study' which is put on public 
exhibition and affected bodies have to be consulted on its content. 
Any person may make a written submission on the study or the 
proposed LEP, which must be taken into account by the council, 515 and 
the Director of Environment and Planning may specify certain matters 
which should be considered. 59 Further, after exhibition of a draft 
LEP, any person who has made a submission may request an inquiry to 
be held. 60 The council are also put under a duty to consider the 
environmental impact of any application61 and where the content of it 
is a 'designated development'62 an environmental impact statement 
must be prepared and a public environmental inquiry held. 63 No such 
57 See EP&A Act 1979, sections 36 and 70. 
58 EP&A Act 1979, section 60. 
59 EP&A Act 1979, section 65(3). 
60 EP&A Act 1979, section 68(1). 
61 There are different levels to which this consideration extends 
and the EP&A Act 1979 is very precise as to the procedures which 
must be followed in each case. It is not within the scope of this 
thesis to consider the detail of this aspect in its complexity. For a 
summary of the provisions see Fisher, D. E. "Environmental Planning in 
New South Wales" (1982) 56 The Australian Law Journal 399/413. 
62 There are no substantive criteria for such a designation 
under sections 29 and 158 of the EP&A Act 1979. 
6a EP&A Act 1979, sections 77(3)(d) and 88(3). 
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requirement is made as a pre-condition for a state environmental 
policy. 64 
All of this adds up to a system based upon much broader criteria 
than land use alone and which represents a positive attempt to bring 
wider considerations directly into planning, particularly through 
acknowledging the political effect and basis of development control. 
Section 90 sets out a range of considerations to be taken into account 
in assessing the merits of a development application, which includes 
the social, economic and aesthetic aspects of the proposal, traditional 
planning issues and the public interest in addition to those mentioned 
above. Whether the application is given consent conditionally or 
unconditionally the development must then comply with the terms of 
the relevant instrument(s). 
The political nature of development control has been further 
acknowledged by the use made by the Minister of calling-in provisions 
included in the Act. 65 However this acknowledgement has been 
somewhat less direct (although its effect has been directly felt) In 
that the Minister has approved proposals for development which have 
met with substantial objections at local levelas, and has used the 
section to terminate appeals before the land and Environment Court. 67 
e4 This has been criticised as allowing the use of state 
environmental policies to over-ride public and environmental objections 
to developments of a certain type or in certain locations. 
65 EP&A Act 1979, section 101. 
66 eg. Gazebo Hotel v Sydney C. C. Land and Environment Court 
(1981) ELR 8. 
87 ibid. and see also Gwynville SouthDoint v Botany MC Land & 
Environment Court No. 40075 of 1982, terminated October 1,1982. 
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In 1982 the Court specifically ordered the minister not to interfere in 
local environmental planning, 68 and rezonings as a result of the call-in 
mechanism have been declared void by the Court. 69 The effect of the 
Court's activity in this area culminated in the Pagewood case7° where 
the government passed an Act of Parliament71 to allow a particular 
development, to terminate the appeal proceedings which were underway 
and prevent the court ordering costs against the council. 72 
The case73 involved the rezoning of a site for development as 
high density residential and the Department of Environment and 
Planning had declared that no environmental assessment was necessary 
for the proposals which represented the largest single residential 
development in Australia. 280 objections were received by the council 
but permission was granted and some of the objectors appealed. The 
08 Ku-ring-gai MC v Minister for Planning and Environment 
Land & Environment Court, (1982) ELR 8 (this decision was reversed 
on appeal but Cripps J. 's comments on this point were not upset: 
Minister of Planning and Environment v Ku-ring-gai MC Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeal, (1983) ELR 0416); see also Burns Philp v 
Wollongong CC (1983) ELR 0347 & 0350 which reinforced this approach. 
69 See Gazebo Hotel v Sydney C. C. supra note 66. 
70 Gwynville Southpoint v Botany MC supra note 67. 
71 Botany and Randwick Sites Development Act 1981. 
72 This procedure did have some precedent as the government 
had previously passed an Act of Parliament to override decisions of 
the Court so as to allow development of a government-supported 
stadium which had been refused following appeals to the Land & 
Environment Court, one of which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
See Waverley MC v Attorney-General (1978)40 LGRA 419; Hale v 
Parramatta CC Land & Environment Court (1981) ELR 21, Parramatta 
CC v Hale Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, (1982) ELR 0082. For 
comment on the Cumberland Oval Act which was amended so as to 
exempt proposals from the EP&A Act altogether see The Age, March 
12,1982 and Sydney Morning Herald, December 13,1982. 
73 See Ball, M. "Circumvention of Environmental Law in NSW 
(1983) Environmental Law Newsletter, 12 June 1983, pp. 21-31. Sydney: 
Environmental Law Association. 
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development was linked to an industrial development by W. D. & H. O. 
Wills, who the government were anxious to keep in NSW because of 
the employment opportunities they provided. When the appeal was 
lodged steps were taken to legislate approval of the proposals. The 
Attorney General (Mr Landa), said of the appeal proceedings 'the 
EP&A Act 1979 recognises that rezoning decisions should not be the 
subject of merit review by the court'. 74 
A number of specific remarks may be made at this point about 
the structure of the EP&A Act 1979 itself. First, it does represent a 
move to incorporate positive aspects of planning into the system of 
development control by including environmental and welfare issues into 
the considerations relevant to a development application. Secondly, 
there remains a prevailing ideology of physical determinism in that the 
control of development is seen as a method of complementing or 
improving the economic and welfare conditions of the 'local 
community'. Along with this there is a reinforcemnet of the ideology 
of the neighbourhood and the intrinsic worth of 'community living'. 
Finally there is structurally, within the EP&A Act 1979, a reassertion 
of central control and influence over local decision-making: with a 
pattern of apparent local autonomy which may be undermined by the 
channels laid down for interference by State government. The 
following chapter will go on to discuss the provisions dealing 
specifically with developer contributions and their impact in practice. 
74 Legislative Council, September 22,1982, cited by Ball (1983) 
ibid. 
CHAPTER 10: DEVELOPER CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER SECTION 94 
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THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO DEVELOPER CONTRIBUTIONS 
Within the framework described in the previous chapter the 
legislation dealt specifically with the power of local councils to levy 
contributions towards social infrastructure, in the form of a monetary 
payment and/or a donation of land, from the developer. Under section 
94 of the EP&A Act 1979 the local council was given the power to 
require such contributions as a condition of consent for any 
development which will, or is likely to, create or increase the demand 
for public services or facilities within the area. The section makes no 
reference to the location of the land donated or to the services 
provided in relation to the development site, but does make the 
identification of the demand by the council in a local environmental 
plan a pre-condition for exercise of the power. Consequently, the 
central issue is not whether one site has disadvantages which should 
be compensated for, but whether any given area will have a need for 
certain services once development has taken place. This somewhat 
mirrors the approach of dealing with planning applications through a 
system of zoning, in that individual merits are not the planning 
authority's concern as they concentrate rather upon determining 
whether the application accords with the zoning provisions for the 
site. Yet this does represents a specific shifting of welfare 
responsibilities from the public sector to the private in terms of the 
financing of those responsibilities while leaving their identification and 
management to local 'specialists' likely to be more capable of assessing 
and administering needs of residents. 
Section 94 does not specify the range of services or facilities 
that can be required: that is left to the discretion of local councils 
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when drawing up the Local Environmental Plan. This in effect places 
an additional burden on the 'expertise' of the councils in that they 
have to go beyond responding to needs identified by groups active in 
the area, and develop techniques of predicting need before 
development has taken place. If that need is not predicted effectively 
then presumably anyone could apply to the Land and Environment 
Court on the grounds that the Act has not been complied with. 
Concern for this has added to the delay, not only in producing LEPs, 
but also in considering individual applications. 
The first part75 of section 94 reads as follows: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), where a council, being the 
consent authority, is satisfied that a development 
application, will or is likely to require the provision of or 
increase the demand for public amenities and public services 
within the area, the council may grant consent to that 
application subject to a condition requiring - 
(a) the dedication of land free of cost; or 
(b) the payment of a monetary contribution, 
or both. 
(2) A condition referred to in subsection (1) shall be 
imposed only - 
(a) where an environmental planning instrument 
identifies a likely increased demand for public 
amenities and public services as a consequence of 
the carrying out of development in accordance 
with that instrument and stipulates that 
dedication or a contribution under subsection (1) 
or both may be required as a condition of any 
consent to that development; and 
(b) to require a reasonable dedication or 
contribution for the provision, extension or 
augmentation of the public amenities and public 
services mentioned in that subsection. " 
The requirement specified in subsection (2) has been met by councils 
simply including a standard statement in their local environmental 
plans. A typical example is 
75 There are eight subsections in all, the remaining ones are 
dealt with below. 
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As a consequence of the carrying out of development in 
accordance with this plan (as in force at the time the 
development is carried out), this plan identifies a likely 
increased demand for public amenities and public services 
(as specified in schedule 8) and stipulates that dedication or 
a contribution under section 94(1) of the Act, or both, may 
be required as a condition of any consent to that 
development. "75 
The remainder of the plan typically stipulates various zoning 
provisions, including those areas zoned for open space, community 
facilities, schools and other social facilities. The LEP would the 
include in a schedule the range of services and facilities» to be 
provided out of developer contributions. The above example referred 
to Schedule 8 as providing such a list and not unusually for Blacktown 
76 Blacktown LEP No. 64, printed by Blacktown City Council, 
November 1984, approved by the Minister for Planning and 
Environment, 3 February 1984, section 30. 
77 Other more central councils still included lists of 
requirements although they were not always pursued. eg. Draft LEP 
No. 53 for the City of Sydney specified public open space, public car 
parks and landscaped areas, local roads, stormwater drainage, 
construction of drainage systems, community facilities and structures 
and pedestrian facilities but were no more specific than this and, 
according to the Aldermen interviewed, were rarely required by 
operating section 94. 
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and several other suburbs of Sydney78, included a wide variety of 
possible grounds upon which to claim contributions. 
1. Community facilities. 
2. Community facilities structures; child care centres; 
community meeting rooms and halls; community arts centres; 
community libraries; community health and welfare offices; 
interim community houses; youth centres; neighbourhood 
information centres. 
3. Public open space. 
4. Embellishment, landscaping and infrastructure provision 
for public open space; routes and areas for walkways, 
cycleways and parking systems, lighting and amenities; 
active outdoor recreation facilities and structures; sports 
court facilities, playing fields, swimming facilities, sports 
grounds and facilities and amenities structures; active indoor 
recreation structures, facilities and land requirements. 
5. Stormwater drainage purposes. 
6. Construction and landscaping of drainage structures, 
including drainage swales ... 7. Roads; construction and landscaping of road works. 
8. Public car parks and landscaped areas in business centres; 
construction and embellishment of public car parks and 
landscaped areas. " 
Within the local environmental plans the councils would draw up 
development control plans for individual areas (in the Western suburbs 
these would often be specific to particular release areas) which would 
78 The outer suburbs of Sydney which were producing LEPs at 
the time of this study tended to stipulate long lists of items required. 
The use of developer contributions was particularly relevant to these 
councils as the developments in question were usually housing 
developments on newly released land and the councils mapped out the 
projected social and physical infrastructure to create a community. 
These same councils had experienced criticism because of the problems 
with large housing developments built before the EPA Act 1979 which 
lacked schools, community facilities and adequate roads and drainage 
facilities. If the developer did not provide these, capital and loan 
monies available to the councils were inadequate to simply produce 
these facilities at the time the housing was built, if at all. Source: 
The Western Regional Organisation of Councils, 4th Report on Local 
Government Finance and Commonwealth Revenue Sharing in Western 
Sydney: A Submission to the National Inquiry into Local Government 
Finance, November 1984. 
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normally specify the method of calculating the contributions. 79 These 
calculations would be done by formula relating to the area of land 
developed (in the case of roads, drainage and other physical 
infrastructure) or the number of households living within the new 
development (in the case of community facilities, open space and so 
on). The council would produce projections on the cost of producing 
the needs they identified and the land required and calculate a figure 
depending upon the extent of development and using the Consumer 
Price Index as an indicator of percentage increase over the period of 
development. 80 The valuation figures would be revised every two 
months or so and made available to potential developers. 
Section 94 required any money collected in this way to be held 
on trust by the council to be used only for the purpose for which it 
was paid, and any land dedicated was also required to be used for the 
purpose intended at the time it was acquired. 81 Beyond this the 
councils were still specifically made subject to a requirement to act 
79 The development control plans for the City of Sydney did not 
at the time of the study do this, but different considerations applied 
as the sites were normally for commercial development and the plan 
would specify the buildings required as part of the scheme rather than 
indicating levels to be paid towards the cost of providing facilities to 
be used by residents of different developments. 
8o eg. with the provision of community facilities in Blacktown 
each single allotment was assumed to accomodate 3.5 persons and if 
the development involved smaller units such as town houses or semi- 
detached houses, calculations would be done on the basis of the size 
of the buildings: less than 55m2 1.8 persons, between 55m2 and 85 m2 
2.5 persons, larger than 85m2 3.5 persons. On this basis calculations 
would be done for schools, youth facilities, community halls and so on. 
These would be costed and each developer would pay an amount 
calculated by the formula 
(total cost of construction +% increase from Consumer Price Index 
potential population) + (total area of land for building x estimated 
valuation of community facility land in $ per unit - potential 
population) x the occupancy rate as calculated above. 
81 EP&A Act 1979, section 94(3) and (4). 
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reasonably in levying for contributions and dedications of land. This 
provision allowed for the intervention of the courts along the lines of 
their previous approach to conditions which followed the English model 
as exemplified in Fawcett Properties Limited v Buckingham County 
Council82 and Pvx Granite Co. Ltd v MHLG83, later expanded in 
Newbury DC v SSE. 4 
In accordance with a well-recognised rule, cl. 40(1) ought to 
be understood ... not as giving an unlimited discretion to impose conditions which are reasonably capable of being 
regarded as related to the purpose for which the function of 
the authority is being exercised, as ascertained from a 
consideration of the scheme and of the Act under which it 
is made. This purpose may be conveniently described, in 
accordance with the expression used by Lord Jenkins in 
Fawcett Properties v Buckingham CC ... as being 
`implementation of planning policy', provided that it is borne 
in mind that it is from the Act and from any relevant 
provisions of the ordinance, and not from preconceived 
general notion of what constitutes planning, that the scope 
of planning policy is to be ascertained. "85 
With regard to developer contributions, the courts have continued 
to recognise the discretion of local councils to impose conditions 
requiring a contribution from a developer, but has added that where it 
is exacted to provide a 'public service', within the meaning of section 
82 [1961) AC 636 at 684. 
83 [1958] 1 QB 554 esp. at 572. 
84 [1981] AC 578. 
85 Allen Commercial Constructions Pty. Ltd. v North Sydney MC 
(1970) 20 LGRA 208 at 216. 
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94, it must comply with the EP&A Act 197986 and must not amount to 
a fetter on discretion. 
The ambit of its discretion is, however, to be found in the 
planning and. environmental legislation. Relevantly, it is to 
be found in s. 90, s. 91 and s. 94. In my opinion, a council may 
not adopt a rule or policy inconsistent with its statutory 
obligations and duties. Even if the policy can be said to 
relate to a subject identified by the relevant legislation, a 
council may not adopt a rule that that policy is to be 
applied in every case without regard to individual 
circumstances. "87 
The Land and Environment Court has frequently been called upon 
to assess the validity of conditions imposed and has restricted the 
ambit of both the type and manner of requiring contributions. 88 It has 
stated89 that a council may not levy for shortfalls in public services 
and amenities which existed before a development takes place and that 
there must be a reasonable method for calculating the level of 
contribution. 90 The councils must demonstrate that there is a 
continuity in local expectations which create the demand for a 
86 Thus, following Hale v Parramatta (1982) 47 LGRA 269; Kivi 
v Forestry Comission of NSW (1982) 47 LGRA 38; Kavanagh v 
Baulkham Hills SC (1983) 48 LGRA 370 and Dunlop v Woollahra MC 
(1978) 40 LGRA 218, adopting a policy or imposing a condition which 
is not authorised by the Act but is covered by its terms amounts to a 
breach of the Act even if those powers are exercised with no 
particular reference to section 94. In this case the contribution was 
not linked with an increased demand for public sevices. 
87 Building Owners and Managers Association of Australia Ltd v 
Sydney CC (1984) 53 LGRA 54 per Cripps J. 
88 As a sound example of their approach to assessing 
contributions see Revay & Scott v Leichhardt MC (1981) 2 ELR 25 
September 1981; [1981) DEP Digest 2. 
89 Revay and Scott v Leichhardt MC ibid. 
90 The above illustration of a method of calculation essentially 
adopts guidelines prepared by the Department of Environment and 
Planning produced after this judicial pronouncement. Department of 
Environment & Planning circular 23, issued under section 117 of the 
EP&A Act 1979,14 October 1981. 
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particular facility and they will not be considered to have acted 
reasonably if they levy by way of condition for a facility which has 
no historical precedent in the area, unless they can establish the need 
by research. 91 
In Liaora Pty. Ltd v Leichhardt MC the Land & Environment 
Court held that in assessing the likelihood of an increased demand for 
public services or facilities the court, like the council, could take into 
account all of the circumstances surrounding the development including 
`their experience and knowledge of the realities of land development. ' 
The demand must arise from the area in which the development falls, 
and while the councils decide the boundaries of areas they may not, 
for example, be able to take into account demands that may arise as a 
result of an adjoining industrial area development. 92 
The Department has included these restrictions in circulars and 
has gone even further by stating that councils may not levy for 
services or amenities which are the responsibility of other areas of 
government, such as health and education. Nor may they levy for 
services which fall within the ambit of federal government 
responsibilities. Moreover, contributions can only be demanded for 
capital expenditure, rather than recurring expenses on the basis that 
section 94 implies this by requiring monies received to be held on 
trust. 
91 See eg. Daniel Callaghan Pty. Ltd v Leichhardt MC Land & 
Environment Court, Cripps J. 27 January 1981; Quota Corporation v 
Leichhardt MC (1981) 45 LGRA 319; Rockdale MC v Tandel Corn n. 
Pty. Ltd. 34 LGRA 196 per Glass JA; Bartolo v Botany MC Land & 
Environment Court, 23 January 1981; Harrison v Leichhardt MC Land & 
Environment Court 5 February 1981; Revay v Leichhardt MC Land & 
Environment Court, 20 March 1981. 
92 This seems likely in view of the wording adopted by DEP 
circular 23 on this point. 
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the exact demand for recurrent expenditure rising from a 
development would be almost impossible to quantify and 
therefore difficult to justify as 'reasonable '. "3 
This interpretation of section 94 is in fact somewhat tenuous in that 
monies could equally well be held on trust to be applied to running 
costs as they could to capital expenditure, and difficulties in 
calculation could be overcome by limiting the period of projected 
costs. It is, however, in line with the general approach of limiting 
local powers under section 94, which the circular itself expresses as a 
reaction not only to the courts but also to the lobbying of developers 
as to the excessive levels of contributions required. It was clearly 
also a part of the Department's concern that demands for 
contributions were leading to an increase in the market price of 
housingM as the result of developers simply passing on the additional 
expenditure on costs. 95 
The validity of these concerns have been questioned95, 
particularly from the point of view of a direct relationship between 
, the costs of development and the price of housing. While the process 
of development control, building standards, time delays and developer 
93 DEP circular 23, paragraph 3. 
94 DEP Circular 23, paragraph 7: "The implications of the 
section for development costs and ultimate costs to the consumer need 
to be carefully evaluated. Any increase in development costs to the 
consumer as a result of contributions under section 94 must be 
weighed against the wider community concern about access to housing 
95 This was confirmed by. the developers interviewed who 
included a representative from the largest, and quasi-government, 
housing corporation, Landcom and a representative from BOMA. 
96 See "Local government and the Costs of Housing " (1982) 
Local government Bulletin, July, pp. 11-14 for a discussion specifically 
related to Sydney and section 94 contributions. 
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contributions may be connected with the cost of housing to the 
consumer, these factors also have to be placed in the context of the 
market in which they occur. When this is done the extent of the 
impact of one of those factors, namely developers contributi ons, is 
more difficult to assess. 
Certainly to insist that a direct relationship can be found 
between those costs and the ultimate price to the purchaser is too 
simplistic and there is no grounds for supposing that the removal of 
those contributions would lead to a reduction in housing costs. In 
examining the market forces at work the supply and cost of land are 
inevitably considerations affecting the overall value of land, as are the 
availability of finance, interest rates, the current demand in the area, 
the cost and availability of materials and of labour. All of these 
factors (the list is not intended as exhaustive but merely indicative of 
the complexities involved) are similarily influenced by, amongst other 
imponderables, levels of employment, foreign investment, the strength 
of the dollar and other aspects of government policy. To isolate 
developers contributions as the cause of increases to housing costs 
seems somewhat niave and short sighted. 97 
Circular 23 also stated that contributions should not be required 
for services and facilities not needed for 'a number of years'. This 
created considerable difficulties for the councils as they must only 
levy for facilities and services which are likely to result from the 
development and this necessarily involves projections as to when the 
need for that facility or service will arise in the context of the area's 
97 See ibid. for a summary of the submissions made to the 
Committee of Inquiry into the Costs of Housing, 1982, which take a 
similar approach to the Issue. 
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development. This should determine the timescale of facilities, rather 
than the time of implementation, particularly as several developments 
may be making contributions towards the same facility. 
The basis of the Department's view of `reasonable' contributions 
under section 94 is not dissimilar from the English approach to 
conditions generally98 and closely resembles the approach of the 
courts before the EP&A Act to conditions requiring a contribution. 99 
The council must demonstrate a relationship between the contribution 
and the development in terms of physical location, time of 
implementation and the needs generated. As part of this they suggest 
that it would be unreasonable to use section 94 for contributions on 
certain types of development which should be left for individual 
negotiation. 
... the section requires that the level of contribution be `reasonable', and that it be used in a way that satisfies the 
demand created by that development. This is critical in the 
location of amenities and services and the timing of their 
provision. In general, it would be 'unreasonable' if the 
service or amenity was not provided in a location that was 
related to the development or its provisions were unduly 
delayed. ... The section was conceived in the context of 
conventional development applications, and there has been 
some question of whether it is the best or only method of 
dealing with demands for services and facilities generated by 
major resource based developments. For the time being, these 
cases will need to be individually negotiated. "100 
The approach by the Department and by the Court to calculate 
contributions has been to equate the methods used for assessing the 
need for physical infrastructure with those used to determine 
responsi bl il ity for social planning. Prior to the EP&A Act 1979 local 
98 See DOE circular 26/1979, London: HMSO. 
99 See above section on the background to the legislation. 
100 DEP Circular 23, paragraphs 6 and 9. 
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councils did levy for contributions from developers under certain other 
statutory provisions, but these contributions were, apart from those 
levied for public reserve on a subdivision application discussed above, 
limited to the provision of physical infrastructure such as roads and 
drainage systems. By including within the group of legislatively 
approved conditions levies for a wide range of social infrastructure, 
the legislation has implied that they may all be treated in the same 
way. 
At one level this is correct, but it places a burden upon the 
councils which they are not necessarily equipped to deal with. Most 
significantly, the policies and plans which have been produced give no 
indication of the social planning goals sought to be achieved through 
section 94 contributions101: the classes and groups of people the 
council intends to serve, the needs of those classes, how the council 
will meet those needs and a measure by which to assess whether the 
goals have been achieved are all absent. 
The effect of this is to leave the prediction of social needs to 
the same mechanisms as have existed for predicting the physical 
requirements of a development. The cost of building the facilities and 
contributions towards those costs can be levied in the same way as for 
physical infrastructure but assessment of those needs remains ad hoc 
insofar as it represents the views of the councillors, plannners, 
developers and those groups who have a voice in local affairs through 
active participation. Consequently, those other groups and individuals 
101 eg. The Penrith chief town planner's report, given on 18 
September 1984, on section 94 contributions for a release area in the 
western suburbs known as South Werrington referred to an intention 
to provide "a blend of facilities which will satisfy a large cross 
section of the population " but no reference was made to the 
composition of the population or how their needs were expressed orassessed. 
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who are not represented are in exactly the same position as they were 
in previously unless there is a decision to target them as persons who 
should be catered for within community services. 
By restricting the types of services and facilities to those which 
have an historical precedent, unless the council can demonstrate 
through research that another type of need has been established, a 
social welfare approach is made financially and technically onerous to 
the council. Similarily, the framework of local planning has 
exacerbated this. Local plans in NSW are quite different from their 
English counterpart in that they usually cover smaller areas and are 
highly specific on land use details: they are not an expression of 
policy aims and objectives, but zoning plans with the inclusion of 
building standards, such as the requirements which must be fulfilled 
for 'medium density' housing developments. Also, since the early 
1970's there has been a policy of transference of state and federal 
responsibilities for social and community facilities to local government. 
The commitment of state and federal government to provide local 
funding for research into these 'new' functions, however, has been 
limited and intermittent. As a result the planners administering the 
system are largely inexperienced in making assessments of the needs 
of an area and the effectiveness of existing services. 
Developments in the social sciences have indicated various 
methodological approaches that could be taken to produce a social 
profile of an area. These may not necessarily produce accurate 
recipes for social harmony but they do prompt the effective collection 
of information. By producing inventories of existing facilities and 
their use and users, demographic census data, various types of 
questionnaire and discussion groups with different groups the councils 
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could amass a database from which to work. Also if this were linked 
to a definition of the interests intended to be served by the services 
and facilities and an acknowledgement of those groups who are not 
participating in the process, some progress would be made. However, 
the time, expense and skills required for such research is not evident 
within local council administrations and finance from state government 
has not been forthcoming. In this context the usefulness of a simple 
set of calculation guidelines is questionable when they are applied to 
inadequate assessments of need. 
Much of the argument for developing a set of standards as 
guidelines has revolved around the need for a convenient 
and efficient system of calculating the basis of section 94 
contributions and an attempt by the state government to 
limit the dollar value of the contribution devoted to such 
community facilities. While there is much to be said for a 
convenient system, there are obvious limitations to its 
usefulness if it does not reflect the real community needs 
that it is expected to serve. The desire to arrive at a 
simple formula before local government and the appropriate 
state government departments have had sufficient time to 
ascertain such 'real ' needs, merely undermines the 
usefulness of section 94. "'° 
Moreover, the limitations placed upon local councils by circular 
23 went some way towards actually undermining the role of the 
council to provide community and social facilities. For example, by 
the indication that section 94 could not be used to levy for recurring 
expenses it placed the financial burden of maintenance and running 
costs on the council, or an organisation running the facility or in the 
private sector generally. This would necessarily affect decisions on 
the extent of services and facilities levied for particularly as circular 
23 specifically requires the councils to take into account sources of 
102 Dalton, P. "Developer Contributions under Section 94" (1982) 
Local Government Bulletin October PP. 16-19 and November/December 
pp. 36-40, at p. 38. 
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funding. Also, by opting to restrict councils' discretion the 
Department has imposed controls in the interests of centralised rather 
than local concerns, which represents some hypocrisy within the 
system as a whole. 103 
At the end of 1982 the Department of Environment and Planning 
issued a further circular on the subject of section 94 contributions, 
for particular application to contributions towards community amenities 
and services on the subdivision of broadacres for residential 
development. 104 These guidelines imposed a maximum limit on the 
amount which could be required from a developer for these purposes 
and reasserted that such a contribution must be for capital costs only 
and for local amenities or services required within five years of initial 
settlement of the area. The maximum contribution was expressed as 
$500 per dwelling towards non-land capital costs plus the local market 
value, at the date of consent, of 4.8m2 per dwelling of serviced land. 
The circular went on to encourage the formulation of a Social 
Plan as part of the environmental study carried out for release areas, 
and this plan should identify the population, the demographic 
characteristics, expected amenities and services and the standard to 
which they should be built (which should be moderated with a view to 
keeping the level of contributions down so as to lessen their impact 
103 At the time of the study proposals for the amendment of 
section 94 were under discussion which gave the minister the power to 
specify the type and standard of facilities and services which could be 
funded by contribution, generally or in relation to specific cases or 
classes of case, which would essentially leave the local councils purely 
as collection agencies and managers. See Environmental Assessment 
and Planning (Amendment) Bill 1985, section 94A. 
104 DEP Circular 42, issued November 15,1982. 
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on the cost of housing). It also stated that section 94 contributions 
should be used to avoid perpetuating existing inequalities between 
areas and could include construction works by the developer as 
contributions `in kind'. The circular also provided a list of services 
and amenities to which contributions could be applied105, and so 
specifically isolated the use of section 94 to basic local facilities. 
THE IMPACT OF THESE PROVISIONS106 
In order to assess the effect of introducing a system of 
contributions implemented through the use of conditions and requiring 
a formalised and public method of assessment and application, two 
areas of Sydney were chosen for closer study. The basis for selection 
was the extremes which each council represented in their treatment of 
section 94 and the results may well not be transferable to other, 
perhaps more average, areas. The purpose, however, is to examine the 
actual use of these provisions, not to establish their general usefulness 
or otherwise, but to suggest their inadequacies in areas with opposing 
characteristics. 
From all the literature produced on section 94 contributions it is 
clear that the section is not systematically applied in Sydney and that 
there are wide disparities between the level of contribution and the 
105 DEP circular 42, paragraph 16 which listed community based 
activities and information, child-care programmes and activities, youth 
groups and activities, supervised play by young children and sporting 
activities. 
106 The content of this section is largely the result of a series 
of interviews conducted in Sydney in March to May 1985 with persons 
involved in the development industry, including planners, state 
government representatives, public and private developers and 
development consultants. 
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type of services and facilities levied for. 107 It is also clear that 
'negotiation' still exists within the system and that the councils 
experience high levels of uncertainty and financial difficulty. These 
conditions exist in both the areas10° selected: namely Blacktown, one 
of the western suburbs responsible for development in the urban 
release areas and making extensive use of section 94 contributions, 
and the City of Sydney where development is mainly commercial, sites 
are limited and section 94 is basically unused. 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL 
The council conducted environmental studies and produced a 
number of local environmental plans, all requiring developer 
contributions and including a fairly long list of their demands. 109 The 
power to levy contributions under section 94 effectively extended the 
types of infrastructure which could be levied for on a subdivision: 
107 This point is made repeatedly in a study undertaken by 
Martin Payne for the Local and State Governments Working Party on 
the Impact of the Urban Development Program on Local Government 
Finance in March 1985. Unpublished. 
108 Some of the mechanisms for negotiation which exist 
elswhere in NSW were not evident in the areas selected. For example, 
in Gosford, an area to the north of Sydney, the Planning Scheme 
Ordinance contains a clause which enables the council to enter Into 
agreements with developers for the payment of drainage and sewerage 
contributions. Consequently, this local mechanism is used, rather than 
section 94 presumably to avoid the constraints imposed on its 
operation. Other areas have similar provisions. See unpublished papers 
presented at the Workshop on Section 94 Contributions, University of 
NSW, Sydney, July 1983. 
109 A typical example is given above. 
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previously only drainage and open space11° were covered and by 
including community facilities, roads and embellishment of open space 
the council considered their powers had been increased. Consequently 
details were included in development control powers for the basis of 
levies on all of these new areas. 
By the time the EP&A Act 1979 came into operation local 
councils had no flexibility to determine their own local rates on 
property due to rate pegging measures introduced by state government 
in 1978. Borrowing was also strictly controlled at a high interest 
rate. In addition the Land Commission of NSW (Landcom), a 
government agency concerned with the acquisition and development of 
land to provide a non-profit making housing market"', was set-up. 
Under the legislation creating it112 once Landcom purchases land no 
local rates are payable on that land until the housing is occupied: 
consequently it represented a further reduction in local revenue. The 
extension of contributions represented a direct method of 
compensating, in part, for the reduction in local government finance at 
110 eg. Under section 333, Local Government Act 1919 local 
councils must take into account, Inter alla, provision of open space in 
assessing development applications: the usual rate to be acceptable was 
7 acres per 1000 head of population, assessed on a regional basis and 
divided for each development within the release areas to dedicate the 
land or, if impracical, make a monetary contribution. 
I" Landcom was formed in 1976 under the Labour Party 
government to try and stabilise the housing market which at that time 
was subject to dramatic fluctuations. Initially they were intended to 
have about 30% of the low-cost housing market, but infact they have 
around 90%, with very few private developers who can compete. They 
basically provide s levels of housing: low-cost which are sold around 
cost, middle-level which have a slight profit margin to allow the 
private sector to compete and full-cost which have the same profit 
margin as the private sector. Profits on the latter 2 are intended to 
subsidise and generate development at the lower end of the market. 
112 The Land Commission Act (NSW) 1976. 
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a time when responsibilities for social services and facilities was being 
shifted from state and federal government to local councils. 113 
This balancing system has not worked well in that councils, 
including Blacktown, have not been able to raise sufficient resources 
from contributions and state grants to meet their expenditure on 
release areas, particularly because of the large budget required for 
sub-arterial roads and district level community facilities, both of which 
have fallen outside of the realm of developer contributions. 114 In 
addition, Blacktown has interpreted the meaning of 'reasonable' 
contributions in a broad sense so as to keep costs of maintenance, 
which would fall on the council, as low as possible. The Department 
of Environment and Planning on the other hand has taken an 
increasingly narrow view of the term 'reasonable', as reflected in 
circular 42. 
Much of the release land in Blacktown has been developed by 
Landcom who do pass on the costs of contributions to the home 
purchaser as a part of their mandate to provide housing at the lowest 
practicable price. 115 Their interpretation of a 'reasonable' level of 
contributions has been quite different from Blacktown's In that they 
113 See WSROC 4th Report cited below at note 121 for an 
analysis of spending and funding patterns in local government. "The 
changing responsibilities of local government in Western Sydney have 
not been matched with additional sources of revenue except for 
Commonwealth revenue sharing. In fact, the last decade has been 
characterised by an increasingly restrictive financial environment" p. 51. 
114 Research to establish this was conducted as part of the 
report by Payne (1985) cited supra note 107. 
115 Landcom 1983 Annual Report, p. 12 states "Water and sewer 
contributions and contributions to local government authorities under 
section 94 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act are the 
major items increasing development costs. It has become readily 
apparent that the public will have to accept a much higher land 
purchase price, as a result of the cost increases mentioned above ". 
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were anxious to keep costs to a minimum. lla They provided 
contributions in accordance with circular 42 but they have also 
negotiated over the level of dedication of land and by offering to 
provide work in kind. As a state body Landcom are capable of 
securing competitive rates from contractors and, consequently, this 
latter device represented a substantial saving for them. On their part, 
Blacktown was only concerned with the receiving the benefit of the 
works rather than imposing a particular cost on the developer. '17 
The negotiations for these concessions were not, however, usually 
done directly but through the Department of Environment and 
Planning11s or through making submissions to the council before a 
local environmental plan was submitted. Landcom did experience 
problems with some councils withholding planning consents in response 
to their failure to pay contributions. In these instances, the delays 
and expense of litigation dissuaded them from pursuing the matter 
116 In 1976 the cost of a hosuing unit in St Clair in the 
Western suburbs developed by Landcom was around $10,000, which 
included drains, roads and open space: an equivalent unit in 1985 with 
increased contributions would be $25,000. Source: Interview at 
Landcom, 1 May 1985. 
117 Source : Interviews with Philip Turner, Technical Assistant 
to the Chairman of Landcom, on May 1,1985 and with a planning 
officer at Blacktown city Council on April 29,1985. 
118 The EP&A Act 1979 brought Landcom under the same 
procedures as private developers but conditions could not be imposed 
on a consent for a development by a public body without the approval 
of the Minister of Planning and Environment. Conditions suggested by 
Blacktown in the early days of the Act were approved but by 1985 the 
Minister would not accept any conditions which did not accord with 
circular 42. 
418 
before the Court even though the forty day limit imposed on councils 
for issuing a decision on applications had expired. 119 
Landcom had been criticised for building, prior to 1980, large 
housing developments without adequate provision for social facilities. 
These wastelands, like Campbelltown and Mount Druitt, were 
specifically addressed by section 94, but in Landcom's view the cost 
was too great to the first time buyer onto whom the burden was 
passed. Clearly the value of property in an area that has facilities is 
likely to be higher than in an area that does not so additional costs 
may be recouped on resale120, but their view was that section 94 was 
intended to benefit the community but it was being used by council's 
to make that same community suffer high housing costs. 
The main complaint was against the standard of works being done 
in that they were considered unnecessarily high to accomodate the 
financial problems of the councils themselves. For example, overhead 
power cables are unattractive and require more maintenance than their 
underground counterparts, but are substantially cheaper. This was put 
down to the high expectations and ideals of planners within council 
departments rather than actual preferences expressed by local 
residents. On the opposite side of the coin, Blacktown planners saw 
their expectations as realistic121 and were eager to avoid the problems 
119 This was perhaps particular to the time at which the 
interview was held (May 1985) as Landcom were expecting revised 
guidelines from the DEP. 
120 This of course does not address the problem of the level of 
financing available to the intended purchasers by way of mortgage, 
although the state did run some home financing schemes. 
121 Between 1979 and 1984 their total expenditure had increased 
by 69.3% and over the same period expenditure on community services 
had increased 283%, town planning by 171% and road expenditure by 
3.4% suggesting a change in spending patterns said to be the general 
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created by the backlog on community facilities amassed before section 
94 was introduced. 122 
By 1985 the conditions attached to a Landcom consent (which 
required approval by the Minister of Environment and Planning) did 
reflect circular 42, while the level of contributions assessed for other 
developers would often include matters which took them above the 
stated limits. 123 It does seem that the reasons for this disparity 
reflect the strong position of Landcom within the development system, 
rather than any differences in the needs generated by individual 
developments. 
From studies carried out by Blacktown counci1124 it is apparent 
that the level of contributions has been inadequate to meet the costs 
of providing community services and facilities. In 1984 they had 
A$12.9 million as estimated expenditure over the following 4 years for 
trend in the region. See Western Sydney Regional Organisation of 
Councils, 4th Report on Local Government Finance and Commonwealth 
revenue Sharing in Western Sydney, A Submission to the National 
Inquiry into Local Government Finance, November 1984. Sydney: WSROC 
p. 10. 
122 This was estimated at $180 million in 1982 at which time 
Landcom were planning to develop 100,000 lots over the following 5 
years so their level of contributions was significant: see "Local 
Government and the Costs of Housing" (1982) Local Government 
Bulletin, July, pp. 11-14. 
123 Payne, M. Blacktown City Council: Finance and 
Implementation Study for Plumpton, Rooty Hill and Minchinbury 
Release Areas, July 1982, Sydney: Blacktown City Council. He 
recognises 3 levels of contributions: Full (sought by the Council In 
accordance with their assessment of needs), Partial (where council is 
unsuccessful in levying for drainway land and land for district level 
community facilities) and Traditional (for land for open space, with 
basic improvements and drainway improvements plus the normal local 
subdivision roads, drains and other infrastructure provided separately 
from s. 94). 
124 Payne (1982) ibid; Blacktown City Council Report to the 
NSW Local Government Grants Commission, 1983/1984, Sydney: 
Blacktown City Council. 
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facilities associated with Landcom projects (including roads, drainage, 
open space and local - not district level - community facilities). $7.3 
million of those costs were internal to sites, and the remainder were 
external, but considered necessary. After the levy for contributions in 
accordance with circular 42 there was an expected deficit of $4 
million, and the council studies indicated that rate income would be 
insufficient to service necessary loans to meet these costs. The 
problem was exacerbated by the inability to levy for existing needs, 
making it necessary to build facilities after development due to lack of 
funds. 125 
From the data collected from the major developer in the area 
and the planners at the council, it was clear that their perspectives 
differed significantly and their view of what was reasonable was 
similarily diverse. The state of the legislation was such as to require 
contributions to be made but the method of collection and, to a lesser 
extent, the range of those contributions was determined according to 
the distribution of power in negotiating the outcome. The restrictive 
approach of the courts and the DEP affected that distribution and the 
burden of the contributions was not necessarily borne by the developer 
but by the home purchaser and the council itself through maintenance 
costs. The private development sector were also strongly opposed to 
the extended use of section 94 contributions because it made them 
even less competitive with Landcom and did not remove the 
125 Blacktown City Council Report to NSW Local Government 
Grants Commission, 1983/1984 ibid. 
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uncertainty of development because of the wide variations between 
different local councils. 126 
The amendments proposed by the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment (Amendment) Bill 1985 were tabled over a year after they 
were first proposed and were directed mainly at third party rights of 
appeal, but did deal with section 94 contributions. The most 
significant amendment gave the Minister the power to direct local 
councils on the means of calculating contributions, maximum amounts 
which may be levied and the types of services and amenities which 
may be included in the contribution. The councils could not then 
impose a condition which did not comply with these directions, thus 
giving them the force of law. The provisions regulating the type of 
contribution were also altered so as to include dedication of land in 
lieu or other 'material public benefit'. 
These proposed reforms clearly represented a compromise between 
the Minister of Planning and Environment, the Minister for Housing 
and the financial demands of local government. By the stage they 
were tabled the use of section 94 could not be removed without 
providing increased finance to local councils through other (state or 
federal) sources, but the Ministers also required increased mechanisms 
of control over their use to restrain the councils. In all they are a 
further step towards containing discretion and are addressed not 
towards the provision of the `benefit' but towards devising a 
mechanism of payment and control which will not upset the 
functioning of the market. 
126 Interview with James Dean, Chairman of the Urban 
Development Industry Association, April 1985. 
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SYDNEY CITY COUNCIL 
In 1971 the Conservative Civic Reform Council produced a 
strategy plan for the City of Sydney which was intended to herald a 
move away from physical land use planning and towards including 
other aspects of local government into the planning process. This 
plan was revised in 1974,1977 and again in 1980 as a method of 
updating its provisions although the principles remained the same. The 
plan included within it a system of incentives to include shopping, 
residential, social facilites, preservation of historic buildings, 
pedestrian walkways, open space and other `benefits' within 
development schemes and, while the 'benefits' sought fluctuated to 
some extent depending upon what the Council identified as desirable, 
the system remained intact. 
Policy 3- Give incentives for many diverse types of 
profitable development, while requiring developers to 
contribute to the provision of public facilities. ... 
3B. Prepare and adopt Floor Space Ratio and Development 
Control Code for each precinct, generally reducing the base 
ratio, but granting bonus ratios in return for action by 
developers to : 
* provide a diversity of uses most appropriate for 
each precinct 
* construct and, if required, maintain, free of 
cost to Council, specified public facilities or 
amenities to approved standards of location and 
design 
* contribute financially to Council funds for the 
provision of specified public facilities and 
amenities. " 127 
These incentives operated through floorspace bonuses: ratio codes 
were produced'28 which identified the floorspace ratio on sites in the 
127 Basis of the code cited ibid. 
128 The Council of the City of Sydney, Development Control and 
Floorspace Ratio Code, 1981. 
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city and bonuses available for each site. The developer could earn 
bonuses by including certain types of development within the scheme 
and there was a maximum overall, usually of 12: 1. Some items could 
be provided away from the development site, for example in the case 
of preservation, and the bonus earnt attached to the commercial 
building. Each bonus had its own maximum. 
Alongside this system was a car parking code, whereby each 
development had to provide a level of parking spaces. If it was 
undesirable to provide them within the building, the developer could 
pay a contribution to a car parking fund which would then be used by 
the council to build car parks in the peripheral area around the 
central business district, identified in the plan for car parking use. 
The level of contribution was assessed on the basis of a set amount'29 
multiplied by the number of car parking spaces appropriate to the 
floorspace of development. 
Negotiations would take place on these bonuses so as to provide 
a scheme acceptable to the council. Essentially it was intended that 
the environmental impact of proposals would be assessed by the 
Council and any unnecessary addition to the scheme would be deleted, 
but it seems that this rarely occured and the developer usually built 
the maximum floorspace. 130 The final scheme could also involve the 
payment of money to the council as contributions to car parking and 
129 This amount was a subsidised figure which appeared 
arbitrary but in 1985 calculations were underway to relate this figure 
to the cost of construction: it would still be a subsidised flat rate 
figure, but it would be one which had a logical basis. 
Im A technical unit was established for this purpose and it was 
used ion larger schemes but many recommendations were not adopted. 
Source: Interview with Martin Halliday of Strategic Planning Unit, 
Sydney City Council, April 3,1985. 
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the maximum floorspace ratio would form part of the planning consent, 
which would also detail the carparking and other provisions. This 
form of condition has been successfully challenged where it related to 
carparking which was provided some distance from the development, 13' 
but generally the legality has not been litigated because the developer 
merely paid the required amount and received the consent. '32 
In the two other cases, both heard in 1983, where the court has 
been called upon to examine the operation of Sydney City Council's 
car parking code, the levy was disallowed. In Ilenace v Sydney CC133 
the A$90,000 contribution towards parking paid by the developer of a 
24 two-bedroom apartment conversion scheme in 1981 was ordered to 
be repaid with interest and costs on the ground that its imposition 
was discriminatory and unreasonable, particularly as the council had no 
plans to build car parking proximate to the development. 134 The 
council had issued development `on the understanding' that the 
contribution would be paid but the conduct of the Council had 
confirmed that this was in fact a condition. In Michael Davies v 
Sydney CC135 the court went further and disallowed a parking 
131 See Greek Australian Finance Corporation v Sydney CC 
(1974) 29 LGRA 130 discussed above under Background to the 
Legislation. In a later case under section 94 a council was required to 
spend the contribution towards car parking within 80 meters of the 
site. Williams v Blue Mountains (1981) ELR5. 
132 See Sydney Morning Herald 3&5 July, 1983. 
133 (1983) ELR 0444. 
134 This decisions follows that of Woolworths v Ku-ring-gai 10 
LGRA 177 discussed above. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, 5 
July 1983, the decision to allow the consent to fall along with the 
invalid condition led to the developer later agreeing to pay a 
contribution in order to obtain a second consent. 
135 (1983) ELR 0469. 
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contribution considered meaningless on a development which was some 
distance from proposed car parking sites, 136 but allowed the 
development consent subject to a condition requiring a contribution 
towards conducting a feasibility study to determine if car parking 
could be provided. An additional condition was added which required 
a further contribution to car parking which the Council could retain if 
they provided car parking facilities to serve the development and 
other commercial entertainment centres in the vicinity. 
In 1980 the council had come under a different political 
leadership, the Labour Party. They administered the same system of 
bonuses but added a developer contribution to a low income housing 
fund. As indicated above, 137 this was done on a political platform 
and coincided with boundary changes including residential areas into 
the City jurisdiction. Until it was held invalid by the Land and 
Environment Court on the ground that there was no local 
environmental plan to demonstrate a nexus with the development, 136 
this levy was added to all developments valued at over $200,000 and 
was set at a flat rate of 2%. 
Within the operation of the bonus system the Council also 
received direct benefits from developers. For example, on one scheme 
it was suggested that certain floors within an Art Deco building in 
Sydney be leased to the Council on a peppercorn rent in return for 
136 Following Sahben Holdings Pty Ltd v Waverley MC (1982) 
ELR 0192. 
137 See section on Background. 
138 See BOMA v Sydney CC supra note 2. 
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floorspace bonuses. 139 It has also been suggested by aldermen from 
both major parties that the car park fund has been misused in that it 
has been applied to the Council's general revenue or to maintaining 
existing car parks, rather than for construction of new ones. 
At the time this study was conducted certain reformulations were 
taking place to tighten up the system of bonuses and incentives, 
particularly to establish a relationship between development sites and 
the location of car parks built with the fund contributions and to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of demands made. Car parking 
precincts were defined in the Sydney Plan which went on public 
exhibition in mid-1985 for this purpose, and it was also suggested that 
section 94 be used for administering the contributions the fund. At 
this stage, however, there was no intention to replace the floorspace 
bonus system with contributions under section 94, but rather the 
council would operate them alongside each other. The Council were 
carrying out environmental studies to help establish the content of the 
bonus system but it would remain a matter for negotiation of what 
was actually included within any particular scheme. 
The system within the City of Sydney was significantly different 
from that operated at Blacktown: the usefulness of section 94 
contributions to each area was affected by the type of development, 
the bargaining strength of the council and the historical background 
to its approach to contributions. On one level there was a degree of 
certainty in that in both areas the councils produced detailed 
indications of what would be expected on a development application: 
however, there was no uniformity between different areas and there 
139 Source: Interview with Alderman Bonthorne (Civic Reform), 
March 22 1985. 
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was an element of negotiation still present even where section 94 was 
used extensively. The legitimation of planning gain by this method in 
Sydney presented numerous problems and over the first five years of 
its operation detailed and restricting guidelines were issued on two 
occasions and steps were taken to amend the legislation itself so as to 
more effectively accomodate further restrictions on local discretion. 
Although in Sydney the issue of contributions has attracted a 
great deal of public debate, the focus has not been on the extent or 
type of facilities provided, but on the aspect of who should pay for 
them. This is partly the result of the lapse of time between 
commencing an environmental study, producing a local environmental 
plan, issuing consents on the basis of contributions and actually 
amassing sufficient funds for the council to build the facilities 
involved. Blacktown, considered to be a leader in this area, had not 
completed any community buildings by 1985. Although the concept of 
providing these facilities and services seemed to be accepted as a valid 
purpose for planning control, there was little concern for what they 
should actually be or what parts of the 'community' they should serve. 
Certainly concepts of the existence and identity of a 'community' were 
not developed, nor were the methods for ascertaining their needs. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The EP&A Act 1979 has to a large extent failed to regularise 
development contributions and it is still possible for local councils to 
negotiate a levy with developers which falls outside of the constraints 
imposed by section 94. There is little consistency between local 
councils in the range of facilities for which section 94 contributions 
are sought and this uncertainty is compounded by the obligation on 
local councils to identify future likely needs of the area. Local 
disparities in the type and extent of needs, and the cost of satisfying 
those needs, inevitably adds to uncertainty in the application of 
section 94. The requirement upon local councils to justify 
contributions has gone some way towards mitigating this uncertainty, 
particularly as methods of investigation and computation have become 
more significant. This, however, has not necessarily led to the 
fulfillment of actual local needs but has given councils a method of 
raising revenue within the limits prescribed by state government and 
the Land and Environment Court. 
In interpreting the scope of section 94, and, therefore, the scope 
of local council discretion, the court has treated it as a particular 
type of condition which may only be imposed if the requirements of 
the common law and the statute are met. Despite declarations to the 
contrary, 140 the court in doing this has built upon pre-EP&A Act 
cases and its decisions have interlocked with those earlier cases. The 
140 For example, in Ligora Pty Ltd v Leichhardt MC (1982) ELR 
0185 the Chief Judge warned against drawing comparisons between the 
earlier cases and section 94 decisions: "where it Is necessary to 
construe for the first time a section of a new statute which has had 
no counterpart in past or existing legislation, the authorities provide 
little guidance .. 
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result has been not to devise a new approach to local council powers, 
but to respond with more of the same. Thus, before examining the 
details of a section 94 condition the court will establish whether the 
condition imposed is valid and a contribution is warranted. The 
condition must be imposed for a planning purpose, must relate to the 
development and be reasonable. 141 
As far as the first of these requirements is concerned, the 
development must relate to at least one of the heads of consideration 
detailed in section 90,142 which includes any State Environmental 
Planning Policy. This clearly enables the council to take into account 
a very broad range of influences upon planning, but it also provides 
the state with an additional method of exercising control by 
restricting, or interfering with, local planning decisions. The purposes 
for which section 94 has in fact been used are mainly confined to 
contributions towards open space or the dedication of land for a 
specific use. There have been some examples of more imaginative use 
of the section, such as upgrading existing Infrastructure, 143 a traffic 
planning study, 144 the dedication of land above a car park, 143 but 
such instances are rare. 
The court's approach has also been generally conservative when 
deciding upon the relationship between the development and the 
141 See the test laid down in St George Building society v 
Manly MC (1982) ELR 0228. 
142 See note 11, above. 
143 Bryant v Wyong MC (1983) ELR 0227. 
144 Michael Davies v Sydney CC (1983) ELR 0469, discussed 
above. 
145 Frank Kolos v Wyong SC (1981) No. 10540 of 81, unreported. 
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contribution. The test for a causal nexus under section 94 does 
concentrate upon an increase in the demand for an amenity or service 
in the area of the development, but the effect is essentially the 
same146 as the pre-EP&A Act test which required a demonstration of 
a detrimental effect on existing amenities. Indeed, in some new cases 
the court has included a consideration of decline in amenities147 and 
has limited the much looser wording of the section'48 which sets out 
that the council must be 'satisfied' that the development is 'likely' to 
increase demand 'in the area'. 
The physical nexus, given statutory force by this latter phrase, 
has in some cases been construed as requiring the contribution to be 
in the immediate vicinity of the development. 149 The approach of the 
court has not consistently been so restrictive, but the need to 
establish a sufficient connection in physical terms has been stressed as 
a fundamental requirement under section 94. Circular 23 certainly 
advocated such a close connection by stating that a contribution would 
not be considered reasonable by the Department of Environment and 
Planning if it were not in a location related to the development. This 
clearly represents only one possible interpretation of the section, and 
largely reiterates the approach taken before the EP&A Act In Greek 
Australian Finance Corporation y Sydney CC. 150 
146 See, for example, Henbury v Parramatta CC (1982) ELR 0003. 
147 For example, Michael Davies v Sydney CC (1983) ELR 0469 
discussed above. 
148 See Ligora Pty Ltd v Leichhardt MC (1982) ELR 0185. 
149 For example, Letola Pty Ltd v Leichhardt MC (1981) Legal 
Digest 5, ELR11; Henbury v Parramatta CC (1982) ELR 0003. 
150 (1974) 29 LGRA 130 discussed above. 
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Certainly section 94 does require the development to cause an 
increased demand on local facilities but it does not follow that the 
actual amenities provided by the contribution have to serve the 
particular development. For example, if a new residential development 
were to place extra demands upon existing recreational space and the 
most suitable area for providing additional recreational space was some 
distance from the development the wording of the section could still 
allow a reasonable levy to be made to ease the extra demand. it 
seems, however, that the Department and the Court are reluctant to 
allow section 94 to be used in this way and have preferred to restrict 
its operation according to distance requirements between the 
development and the contribution. 151 
The court has further restricted the operation of the section by 
requiring a temporal nexus between the development and the 
contribution. Section 94(3) and (4) require the contribution received 
to be spent, or the land dedicated to be made available, within a 
reasonable time so as to ensure that local residents moving Into the 
development will benefit from the amenity provided. It also, however, 
has a dramatic effect upon councils' expenditure programmes by 
preventing them from amassing sufficient funds to build the more 
significant community facilities. By making this requirement, which 
151 For example, with regard to the provision of open space the 
court has imposed distance restrictions on the use of contributions eg. 
Tomaszewski Associates Pty Ltd v Leichhardt MC (1982) No. 10605 Of 
81, unreported, noted in EP. Case Notes 5 (contribution to be spent 
within a specified area with defined street boundaries); Morris v 
Leichhardt MC (1981) ELR2 (where open space contribution had to be 
spent within 300 metres of the development). The car parking cases 
also indicate this approach. See Michael Davies v Sydney CC (1983) 
ELR 0469; Sahben Holdings Lrd v Waverley MC (1982) ELR 0192; 
Williams v Blue Mountains (1981) ELR5 (where car parking contribution 
had to be spent within 80 metres of the site) discussed above. 
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has been fairly restrictively interpreted by the Court, 152 the ambit of 
section 94 is such that it may be prevented from playing a substantial 
role in most council's spending programmes. 
A trickle of contributions in a newly developed area may be 
insufficient to make any substantial impact, and this is exacerbated by 
the Court creating an additional order 'within the spirit of section 94' 
whereby contributions which remain unspent for a specified period 
must be returned to the developer. 153 The effect of this is to limit 
the use of such funds in the raising of loans. Where the council does 
not have adequate contributions to build a particular facility, or where 
there is no land available to be purchased with the contribution, or 
where the council has no land acquisition programme at all, they will 
simply run out of time. 
On top of this, the level and type of contribution must be 
reasonable and this point has probably attracted most attention from 
the Land and Environment Court. The complex test contained in 
section 94(2)(b) has produced widely divergent results with the 
assessment of reasonable open space contributions ranging from one 
hundred154 to several thousand Australian dollars per flat or 
townhouse. 155 As a result local assessments for open space have been 
152 The usual period is between three and five years. See 
Tomaszewski v Leichhardt MC cited ibid. 
153 For examples see Tomaszewski v Leichhardt MC cited supra 
note 151; Mamura v Leichhardt MC (1981) ELR7; Novati Design s 
Construction v Leichhardt MC (1982) 22 ELR. 
154 Warman v Parramatta (1983) ELR 0326. 
155 One of the highest being A$3,300 per townhouse assessed in 
Bartolo, Christian v North Sydney MC (1981) ELR2. 
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drastically reduced156 through the application of formula calculations 
which differ from those applied locally and by the Court allowing 
discounts for other environmental improvements brought about by the 
development, such as the replacement of a factory by housing or the 
inclusion of landscaping works within the site. '57 
Looking at the cases overall, it seems that the formula the court 
uses for assessing open space contributions takes the increase in 
population created by the development (which may be discounted by 
the number of persons presently living on the site) and multiplies it 
by the current ratio of open space per capita and the average land 
value in the area to arrive at the section 94 contribution (again 
subject perhaps to a discount for environmental improvement). The 
overall figure may be further reduced if it fails other 'tests' of 
reasonableness, one of which is that the contribution resembles a tax 
or an 'unjustifiable impost'. '58 
Moreover, the court has on occasion rejected the formula 
approach completely and has assessed, on the basis of 'experience' 
what it considers 'an objective assessment' which seems fair in all the 
circumstances. 159 In a number of the cases which deal with 
156 In Revay & Scott v Leichhardt (1981) ELR9, DEP Digest 2 
the amount sought was A$194,000 and was reduced to A$30,000; In 
Daniel Callaghan v Leichhardt MC (1981) ELR13 A$387,000 was reduced 
to A$30,000. 
157 See, for example Revay & Scott cited ibid.; Tomaszewski 
cited supra note 151. 
158 This approach was taken to the car parking contribution in 
Ilenace v Sydney CC (1983) ELR 0444. 
159 Commercial Freeholds (Sydney) Pty Ltd v Lelchhardt MC 
(1983) No. 10634 of 81, unreported, noted in EP Case Notes 3 (the 
Assessor considered it difficult `if not impossible' to accurately 
determine the appropriate level of contribution by applying a 
mathematical formula, or to find a formula which could be universally 
434 
unreasonable conditions'60 the court has taken the same approach to 
ultra vires as appears in Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham-by-Sea UDC1a1 
and Rv London Borough of Hillingdon ex Parte Royco Homes162 by 
viewing the condition as one which no reasonable planning authority 
would have imposed. 
There is undoubtedly some nervousness in the Department of 
Environment and Planning and in the Land and Environment Court as 
to the potential impact of section 94. The Department has stated both 
that the reasonable operation of the section 'is in the councils 
hands'163 and that the Department is concerned as to the overall 
costs involved. It has then gone on to specify in circulars that 
contributions should only be levied to cover capital costs and in 
accordance with the above formula. The court has further held that 
public reserve contributions cannot exceed the current public reserve 
ratio per capita for the area, and, consequently, councils in areas with 
low levels of existing services cannot improve the shortfall with 
section 94 contributions, but merely preserve the status quo. The end 
result is an interpretation and application of section 94 which is both 
restrictive and dependant upon Department circulars and judicial 
precedent. 
applied); See also Cyril Smith & Associates Pty Ltd v Woollahra MC 
(1983) No. 10266 of 83, unreported, noted in EP Case Notes 7. 
160 See especially Henbury v Parramatta CC (1982) ELR 003; St 
George Building Society v Manly MC (1982) ELR 0228 discussed above. 
161 [1964]1 All ER 1. 
162 [1974]2 All ER 643. 
163 DEP Circular 23, discussed above. 
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It is true to say that the political and economic nature of the 
process of obtaining developers contributions through section 94 was 
far more overt and public in Sydney than the practice of planning 
gain in London, but this could well be attributable to cultural and 
system differences rather than to section 94 itself. The section did 
have the effect of producing detailed information on the financial 
position of local government and its interplay with the state and 
federal coffers, and resulted in an active lobbying process between the 
varying levels. The developers themselves were also very active in 
this lobbying process and produced reports and literature in support of 
their case against contributions. This, however, can only be assessed 
against the background of the form of government in Australia and 
NSW rather than simply as a product of the enactment of section 94. 
Certainly, direct comparisons cannot be made between Tower 
Hamlets and the Sydney situation, but the similarities between the two 
are important in illustrating the problems involved with making 
institutional changes, while leaving the economic situation of the 
players untouched. The response of the Department of Environment 
and Planning and of the Land and Environment Court were predictable 
from the English experience and the model appropriate to both 
jurisdictions was one of restricting and regulating local autonomy, 
rather than promoting decentralisation. The financial basis of this was 
also evident from the reports produced in Sydney and the work done 
in England on local authority finances: and in both countries local 
government mobilised mechanisms for promoting self-sufficiency within 
the structures available to them. The existence of section 94 did not 
eradicate negotiated planning schemes, nor did it guarantee increased 
certainty or predictability as to its effect. 
PART V: THE CONCLUDING PART 
CHAPTER 11: OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO PLANNING GAIN 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter critically examines the official responses that 
planning gain in Tower Hamlets has received, through Ministerial 
circulars, planning appeals and the courts. The aim is to draw 
conclusions, in the light of the Tower Hamlets' data, as to the 'system 
view' of planning gain which may then be put alongside those which 
may be drawn from this thesis, as briefly set out in chapter 12. 
A. MINISTERIAL CIRCULAR 22/83 "PLANNING GAIN" 
BACKGROUND: THE PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, 1981. 
As indicated above' this circular was produced following a report 
by the Property Advisory Group on planning gain published in October 
1981 as a consultative document. That report took the view that 
planning gain had no part to play in the system of development 
control and is of 'doubtful legality'. This view emanated from a 
narrow approach to planning, the underlying assumption of the report 
being that planning decisions are made by balancing black and white 
criteria relevant to the particular site without regard to broader 
considerations. Thus the report draws a distinction between a 
community facility which is 'essential' to a scheme and one which is 
'desirable' and suggests that infrastructure which benefits more than 
the site itself goes beyond normal planning considerations. 
This approach leads the report to conclude that it is difficult to 
envisage how the conferment of a public benefit could validly 
1 see chapter 2 above. 
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influence the grant of a planning permission. Applying this to the 
grant of an office consent, the report proposed that it is beyond the 
realms of planning to consider the effect the development will have on 
land values, mix of uses in the area, and so on. Their approach is 
that the local planning authority should only consider the merits of a 
proposal in relative isolation2 and while the developer may include a 
community facility to aid the profitability of a scheme, he cannot be 
required to provide one even if it is necessary to further the aims of 
the planning authority as set out in a plan or brief. In an article on 
this report a solicitor and a planner actively involved In planning gain 
in Tower Hamlets point out (in their personal capacity) the fallacy of 
this approach. 
... they talk of planning 
benefits which go 'beyond the strict 
consideration of the planning merits of a proposed 
development'. This misses the point entirely. It is the view 
of those local authorities who have planning gain policies 
that consideration of the gain proposed is an integral part 
of the consideration of the planning merits of the 
development; only if you take a narrow definition of the 
word 'strict'- so as to exclude anything which the developer 
would not propose if his only objective was to maximise his 
profit - can consideration of the gain not be so regarded. "3 
The Report goes on to point out 'exceptions' to their rule against 
imposing obligations on a developer on the basis of their own 
definition, that is 'the conferment of public benefit or advantage 
which cannot be achieved by the imposition of a valid planning 
2 See the Norton Folgate Appeal discussed below for an opposite 
view of what amounts to consideration of the planning merits of a 
scheme. 
3 Comment by Mike Dempsey and Adrian Stungo on Planning 
Gain, Current Topics section (1982) JPL 1-6 at p. 4. 
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condition, or which arguably cannot be so achieved'. 4 These 
exceptions cover, first, the situation where the developer must provide 
infrastructure off the site to avoid a refusal of permission on the 
grounds of development being premature and second, mixed schemes on 
a single site which are only acceptable on planning grounds because 
all elements built together make it so. 
These exceptions, as described, essentially make up the core of 
planning gain schemes in Tower Hamlets if taken together with those 
schemes falling outside of the definition of planning gain, that is 
confering a public benefit or advantage which could be embodied in a 
valid condition. 5 
The Group would counsel local authorities to treat these 
`mixed' proposals with great caution, whether or not they 
are preceded by negotiations; and even if they result, wholly 
or in part, from suggestions made by the planning officers 
themselves. Although the authority is bound to consider the 
scheme as a whole, it ought also to examine carefully the 
planning merits of the separate elements of the application 
individually. Where the proposed scheme contains an 
element which is so far contrary to established policy or 
would be so damaging to amenity that it would, if taken in 
isolation, be refused outright, the authority should not allow 
itself to be tempted by the other collateral benefits to 
grant permission. But where there is no fundamental 
planning objection and a more even balance between the 
benefits and the disadvantages it would be legitimate for the 
local authority to look at the total effect of the scheme as 
a whole, and grant planning permission if it were satisfied 
that the proposed advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages. "e 
4 See discussion on definition of planning gain in the 
Introduction, above, for comment. 
5 Such as the requirement to not apply the internal finishes to 
one element of a development before the completion of another 
element which forms a valid condition. 
6 PAG Report para. 7.06 
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The report does go on to add two conditions on the application of this 
latter exception: the developer must be in control of the whole site at 
least until the development is completed and the local planning 
authority should ensure that the whole scheme is legally enforceable 
against the developer. 
These conditions further illustrate the lack of understanding 
inherent in the report. Section 52 specifically addresses itself to any 
person with an interest in land and his/her successors in title7 which 
makes the first condition unnecessary. The second condition merely 
reinforces the need to use Section 52 agreements rather than 
conditions on the permission itself to cover the problem of 
enforcement. 
The report, however, clearly is opposed to mixed development 
covering more than one site and any payment of money to a third 
party. The logic of this is not clear from the report itself. The 
restriction on mixed development to a single site (which is not 
defined) is not justified other than by the fear that 'if the exception 
goes beyond what is legally inescapable it will be impossible to 
prevent it from becoming the rule'. There is also an assumption that 
physical infrastructure can and should be distinguished from social 
infrastructure. 
As long as the sites are related in planning terms there is in 
fact nothing to prevent the Council from considering the merits of the 
whole scheme. 8 In Tower Hamlets it could be argued that the complex 
Section 52 (2) TCPA 1971 
8 Although it is accepted wisdom that conditions will be invalid 
if they relate to development outside of the site or of other land in 
the control of the developer, without any caselaw specifically to this 
effect. 
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land ownership patterns, the propensity of small sites, the diversity in 
age and condition of existing buildings and the range of land uses 
make it impossible and undesirable in planning terms to rely upon 
comprehensive development of single sites. Similarly if the purpose 
for which the payment to a third party is made is related to the 
development the blanket objection is not clearly justified. In this 
sense the payment of money is not the gain but is the method by 
which a gain is achieved. 9 
Without these reservations the report could have a profound 
effect on Tower Hamlets' office policy. For example, the Christ 
Church schemes, Paradise Row, the shopping centre at Gardiner's 
Corner, the improvements at Whitechapel Art Gallery funded by the 
Camperdown House development, the Half Moon Theatre scheme 
(CHAMPS) would all be excluded from the category of 'acceptable 
gains'. However, to accept the PAG report would be to support a 
narrow view of planning and of the considerations which a planning 
authority can validly take into account and to accept a generally 
negative attitude to the process. 
In 198010 the PAG identified planning gain as a 'problem' and 
this approach recurs throughout the report. It does not purport to be 
an objective assessment of the practice but a closer look at this 
practice of 'doubtful legality' so as to delimit the type of gain 
schemes that were considered to be legitimate. The process of 
9A parallel could be drawn with imposing a condition requiring 
the developer to do certain layout or lanscaping works; the developer 
may do the work himself or may pay an organisation to do It for him. 
The payment is merely a method to achieve the landscaping rather 
than being a requirement in itself. 
10 Property Advisory Group Report on the Structure and 
Activity of the Development Industry. 1980: HMSO. 
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defining planning gain in this way and seeking to remedy what central 
government sees as undesirable was a political decision which 
predetermined the approach of the report. Their standpoint excludes 
consideration of the possible benefits of planning gain to local 
authorities, developers or 'the public'. The local authorities are 
described in terms of pursuing ulterior motives without attempting to 
quantify the gains that have been achieved or how those residential 
and community facilities could be provided by other means. The 
practice is not put into the political context and is described as 'an 
ad hoc local tax not authorised by parliament'. This denouncement 
fails to consider the set-off provisions on liability for Development 
Land Tax which allow development costs (this includes requirements 
made by local authorities) to reduce the base of assessment, and so 
redirect the payment of tax rather than create an additional burden. 
THE CIRCULAR CONSIDERED 
After the PAG report and a draft circular were both distributed 
to bodies interested in planning gain as part of a consultation 
exercise, a circular was issued. This document has been criticised for 
oversimplifying planning gain and for its vagueness. Some of the 
defects of the PAG report were removed but it still reveals a lack of 
understanding of the subject and takes a restrictive attitude towards 
the practice. 
It sets out to provide a framework within which seeking planning 
advantages could be regarded as a legitimate part of the development 
control process. The circular recites the responsibilities of the 
Council in deciding upon development applications. 
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It is a matter of law as well as of good administration that 
planning applications should be considered on their merits 
having regard to the provisions of the development plan and 
any other material consideration and ... they should be 
refused only where this serves a clear planning purpose ... imposing a condition or obligation - whether negative or 
positive in character - should arise only where it Is 
considered that it would not be reasonable to grant 
permission in the terms sought which is not subject to such 
condition or obligation. A wholly unacceptable development 
should not, of course, be permitted just because of 
extraneous benefits offered by the developer "» 
It then goes on to acknowledge that it may be necessary to impose 
conditions or, if these are not an adequate method for achieving the 
planning authority's purpose, seek to enter into an agreement with the 
developer. The circular adds that the use of such agreements may 
help achieve `the best use of land and a properly planned environment' 
but does not given any indication of what either of these stated aims 
mean. 
The main body of the circular is concerned with setting up a 
series of tests to determine whether the obligations to be imposed on 
the developer are reasonable. At first instance the authority must 
consider whether what is being required falls into one of the following 
categories: 
(1) needed to enable the developer to go ahead. eg. 
provision of adequate access, water supply and sewerage and 
sewerage disposal facilities and on land drainage; 
(2) in the case of financial payments, will contribute to 
meeting the cost of providing such facilities in the near 
future; 
(3) is otherwise so directly related to the proposed 
development and to the use of land after its completion, 
that the developer ought not to be permitted without it eg. 
the provision whether by the developer or by the authority 
at the developer's expense, of carparking in or near the 
11 DOE Circular 22/83 Planning Gain, 1983 London: HMSO, para. 4 
445 
development or of reasonable amounts of open space related 
to the development; 
(4) is designed in the case of mixed development to secure 
an acceptable balance of uses. 12 
If it passes this hurdle the authority must then apply a further test. 
whether the extent of what is required or sought is fairly 
and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed 
development. Thus while the developer may reasonably be 
expected to pay for or contribute to the cost of 
infrastructure which would not have been necessary but for 
his development, and while some public benefit may 
eventually accrue from this, his payments should be directly 
related in scale and kind to the benefit which the proposed 
development will derive from the facilities provided. "13 
Finally the planning authority must consider whether it is reasonable 
for the developer to provide, or help finance, what is proposed, rather 
than it be provided out of local or national taxes or by other means, 
such as a charge on the persons using the facility. The essential 
principle here is whether what is being requested is directly related to 
the development or the use of land after development. 14 
The circular does recognise that the obligations imposed could 
affect land other than that included in the permission provided there 
is a `direct' relationship between the two sites and gives the example 
of the restoration of a nearby building as a screen for a new building. 
The conclusion to the circular states that if these tests are followed 
obligations can legitimately be imposed and local authorities should 
include guidance on planning gain in development plans. It adds that 
the applicant may appeal against unreasonable obligations and the 
appeal will be decided on the basis of the circular. 
12 ibid. para. 6, emphasis added. 
13 ibid. para. 7, emphasis appears in the circular. 
14 ibid. para. 3 
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In the planners' report to the Tower Hamlet Development 
Committee these aspects of the circular were set out and it was 
concluded that, as the office policy had required planning benefits 
with the objective of achieving a properly planned environment and 
the best use of land by ensuring an acceptable balance of mixed uses, 
the circular confirmed the validity of the practice as operated in the 
borough. 
Whilst the circular is not totally satisfactory in that it 
tends to oversimplify the issues involved and presents a 
more restrictive interpretation of planning gain than might 
otherwise be justified it still allows the Council to operate 
its planning advantage policies contained in the Borough 
Plan. However despite its shortcomings the circular does 
endorse planning gain as a legitimate aspect of the planning 
process and the guidance it contains although more 
restricted than I believe is justified does offer a clearer 
mandate to secure community benefit from suitable 
developments than has hitherto existed. "15 
Is this assessment of the circular accurate? The criteria for 
seeking planning gain included in paragragh 6 are strikingly similar to 
the type of considerations to be taken into account in imposing 
conditions on a planning permission as set out in the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government Circular 5/68: The Use of Conditions in 
Planning Permissions. That circular required a condition to achieve a 
proper planning purpose, to be relevant to the development and be 
reasonable16 in other aspects in order to be valid. '? In 1985 this 
15 Non-Confidential Report from the Director of Development to 
the Planning Committee on DOE Circular 22/83 - Planning Gain, 11th 
January 1984, LBTH. 
16 The meaning of unreasonable here is taken as the 
'Wednesbury' sense le. not so arbitrary or biased that no reasonable 
planning authority would impose it. See Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [19481 1 KB 223 per Lord 
Greene MR. 
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circular was replaced by another which required six criteria to be met, 
namely that the condition was necessary, relevant to planning, relevant 
to the development, enforceable, precise and reasonable in all respects. 
This is some indication of the continued restrictive approach of 
the Department, even though some conditions which were questionable 
had been held as valid by the courts. 1s Paragraph 11 of this later 
circular makes this plain. 
In addition to satisfying the courts criteria for validity, 
conditions should not be imposed unless they are both 
necessary and effective and do not place unjustifiable 
burdens on applicants. " 
The circular goes on to state that conditions may not be valid even if 
they satisfy the Wednesbury reasonableness test if they are onerous 
and, as a matter of policy, should be avoided. The approach to the 
relationship to planning is also narrow. 
17 This was affirmed in the last major case on conditions: 
Newbury DC v SSE [1978] 1 WLR 1241 (CA); [1981] AC 578 (HL) which 
followed Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v MHLG (1958) 1 All ER 625. As further 
examples of the restrictive approach to conditions see Fawcett 
Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council [1960] 3 All ER 503; Hall 
& Co. Ltd. v Shoreham-by-Sea UDC [1964] 1 WLR 240; Chertsey v 
Mixnam's Properties Ltd. [1964] 2 All ER 627; Hartnell v MHLG [1965] 
AC 1134; Rv London Borough of Hillingdon ex carte Royco Homes 
Ltd. [1974] 2 All ER 643 (JPL (1974) 507,660-661 for comment); David 
Lowe & Sons Ltd. v Burgh of Musselburgh (1974) SLT; Peak Park Joint 
Planning Board v SSE (1979) 39 P&CR 361. Some relaxing of the 
approach by the courts can be seen in Kingston-UDon-Thames BC v 
SSE (1974] All ER 193 (see JPL (1973) 685,709 and (1974) 87 for 
comment); Penwith Council v SSE [1977] JPL 371; Bernard Wheatcroft 
Ltd. v SSE (1980) 257 EG 934 (discussed by Leach W. A. 'The Applicant 
and the Permission' (1982) JPL 37-42) and Grampian Regional Board v 
Aberdeen DC (1984) 47 P&CR 433 (comment in JPL (1984) 590-592). 
18 See above note. In Kingston a condition had required land 
adjacent to the development to be used for carparking; in P enwith the 
conditions related to control of noise in buildings adjacent to the new 
one but on the same industrial site; in Grampian the House of Lords 
approved a condition which required the development not to proceed 
until an adjacent road had been closed on the basis of it being a 
negative condition rather than imposing an obligation. 
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It is not sufficient that a condition is related to planning 
objectives: it must also be called for by the nature of the 
development permitted of its effects on the 
surroundings. "19 
Finally in paragraph 35 the circular states that an unreasonable 
decision does not become reasonable merely because a developer agrees 
to it. 20 Reviews of this later circular have concluded that the 
Department has taken a stricter attitude to conditions than the 'courts 
and has demonstrated their reluctance to acknowledge any relaxation 
in approach. 21 
If the planning gain circular is interpreted in the same narrow 
way as valid conditions have been22 by the courts, or in accordance 
with the Department's approach to conditions then many of Tower 
Hamlets' schemes would clearly fall outside the circular. Indeed, 
paragrph 6(3) appears potentially more restrictive than the circulars on 
conditions which state that conditions must be directly related to the 
development, rather than the more emphatic 'so directly' as appears 
here. 
19 DOE Circular 1/85 The Use of Conditions in Planning 
Permissions. London: HMSO. para. 21. 
20 This was specifically addressed to a decision by an Inspector 
in which he stated that a Section 52 agreement was really necessary 
but to expedite matters he would use conditions if the developer 
agreed to abide by them. See Douglas, C. Planning News, October 
1983 for comment. 
21 See eg., Scarse, A. J. "Planning Conditions - The Law and 
Policy " (1987) JPL 323 and Douglas, C. New Circular on Planning 
Conditions " (1985) 71 The Planner No. 3,28. 
22 See note 17 above. For a discussion of the courts attitude to 
planning conditions see McAuslan, P. Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980. 
Oxford: Pergamon; for a discussion of their operation see Bear, A. and 
Booth, P. Planning Conditions and their Effectiveness In the 
Development Control Process, 1980, Sheffield Centre for Environmental 
Research. 
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The planning gain circular also is opposed to off-site gain. In 
the draft circular23 criteria 3 above merely required the obligations 
imposed to be `clearly related to the proposed development and to the 
use of land after its completion', whereas the wording in the final 
circular is far stricter. Similarly, in the section dealing with other 
land which may be affected by the obligations imposed, the word 
'direct' has been added since the draft. Thus it is no longer 
sufficient to show that the sites are related, they must have a direct 
relationship. 
The Tower Hamlets' planners' report relies heavily on the 
reference in paragraph 6(4) of the circular to achieving a balanced mix 
of uses through imposing obligations on a developer. However, the 
interpretation of this phrase in Tower Hamlets is very broad so as to 
include works on a site some distance from the development site. 24 
There is no justification within the circular for assuming that a 
similar attitude would be taken by the Department or by an inspector 
or the courts. The vagueness of the circular was put forward in the 
planners' report as a benefit25 in that it allowed a Tower Hamlets' 
interpretation of the tests laid down, but it also left the way open for 
a restrictive interpretation so as to limit acceptable planning gains to 
mixed development on a single site. 
23 DOE Draft Circular on Planning Gain, 1983, London: HMSO 
24 For one of many examples see Buck & Hickman scheme which 
involved offices around Dock Strret linked to an industrial 
refurbishment in Mulberry Street some 3/4 kilometre to the North. 
The offices were in an area near Leman Street and Mansell Street 
while the industrial element was close to Whitechapel Road, to the 
west of Gardiner's Corner and the city fringe area. 
25 The RTPI also felt that the vagueness could be an advantage. 
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The planners' report, in fact, was very similar to a press report 
made by the Chairman of the Development Committee which was 
inevitably designed to portray the Council in a favourable light. 
Certainly, as long as the Council retained credibility with developers 
in the area, projecting the idea that the Council is operating within 
the circular would continue to discourage appeals and so avoid 
potentially harmful ministerial decisions. However, the report was 
given as professional advice to the Council on the realities of a 
government circular and the effect should have been to provide 
information upon which the Council's objectives could be based. It 
seems26 that the report was heavily influenced by an approach which 
the Chairman at least wished to see adopted by the Council, that is 
not to restrict the operation of the office policy, and indicates a 
tailoring of the advice to the political will of the committee. 
There were also problems in the paragraph of the circular on 
provision of public access which could affect Tower Hamlets but were 
not drawn to the committee's attention. 
Where open space or other facilities, eg. amenity walkways, 
are provided by the developer he cannot be required to 
dedicate these to the public (though he may volunteer such 
an arrangement). If local authorities think general public 
access appropriate and the developer does not wish to 
provide it, it is for them to seek acquisition of the 
necessary rights in the land. If the developer is willing to 
donate the land to another public body (eg. a parish 
church), that body should be involved in the discussions at 
the earliest possible stage. "27 
26 This assertion is supported not only by a comparison between 
the circular and the report but also by memoranda appearing on the 
legal department file on the circular. 
27 DOE Circular 22/83 para. 10. 
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Principally, this paragraph fails to take account of the existing 
statutory provisions relating to walkways2s and fails to acknowledge 
the requirement of such a walkway as a legitimate planning objective. 
Stungo and Dempsey29 illustrate this with an example which occured 
in St Katherine's Dock. The public had been denied access to the 
river for centuries and the policy for the area stated that opening up 
public access was an aim of the planning authority. When a developer 
planned to redevelop the site, if he failed to make such a provision 
the authority would be justified to refuse permission. The local 
authority may then have to acquire rights over the walkway, depending 
on the terms of the agreement. The above paragraph does not 
contradict this sequence of events but nor does it clarify the position 
in favour of the Council seeking walkways as planning gain. 
THE EFFECT OF THE CIRCULAR ON TOWER HAMLETS 
The circular was published in August 1983 and the Borough Plan 
had been on deposit since the previous April. The Borough Plan 
included an office policy which declared that providing planning 
advantages could not justify planning consent for schemes which did 
not comply with other policies in the Plan, and would only allow 
office developments where a mix of uses was assured, industrial, 
residential, and community uses were protected and the locational 
criteria were met. The Plan was also amended to annex the RTPI 
28 Such as the Greater London Council (General Powers) Acts 
1969 and 1970. 
29 (1983) op. cit. supra note 3. 
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Code of Practice on planning gain to, inter alia, act as a counter- 
balance to the circular and retain the credibility of the office policy. 
The RTPI Code of Practice on Planning Gain 
It had been suggested by a number of the groups consulted on 
the draft circular that these guidelines be incorporated in the circular 
because of their clarity in dealing with the subject. They require 
local authorities to have published policies upon which basis planning 
gains should be sought (a planning brief may be used but only where 
the authority had not contemplated substantial development), to only 
demand gains that are related to the development in scale and in 
planning terms, to avoid delays and to consult the public on 
significant changes to applications as a result of negotiations. 
'Related' is defined as 
(a) on-site; 
(b) on a site contiguous with the development site; 
(c) on a site which is related to the development site by 
way of an approved plan, or policy statement; 
(d) off-site access, infrastructure or service. "30 
The Code itself does not include a specific list of gains that may 
be sought, although examples do appear in the appendix, but does 
provide that payment of money should only occur in exceptional 
circumstances. It suggests that payments may be made where they 
represent commuted carparking payments, contributions towards off- 
site access, infrastructure or services related to the development or 
(most permissive) contributions towards off-site infrastructure which is 
30 RTPI Planning Gain: A Code of Practice, 1982, London: RTPII, 
para. 3. 
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indirectly related to the development by means of an approved local 
plan or policy statement. 
The practice as appears from these guidelines is far more flexible 
than that envisaged by the circular. It states that a planning gain 
cannot be used as an inducement to approve a proposal which offends 
council policy for reasons other than the lack of planning gain, but it 
accepts that negotiation is a normal part of the development control 
system. Such negotiation is considered legitimate if it is for the 
purpose of satisfying planning standards or for seven other identified 
reasons: 
(1) to provide carparking or essential infrastructure; 
(2) to include more land or facilities to provide links with 
the surrounding area; 
(3) to positively improve public access or other facility 
considered by the local planning authority to be desirable; 
(4) to facilitate substitution 
a) to accept a new use or development provided 
another use or development in the control of the developer 
is abandoned, as both together would be excessive for 
planning reasons; 
b) to allow development on open land where a 
more attractive area is substituted and maintained as open 
land where this is a benefit to the area; 
(5) to secure the carrying out of works within or outside 
the site eg. in the case of mineral workings to allow for a 
reasonable rate of extraction; 
(6) in comprehensive development to ensure that the 
application is not confined only to the highly profitable 
elements leaving other necessary or desirable, but less 
profitable, elements outside the application or to be 
provided at some unspecified future time. 
(7) to secure restoration or improvement of important 
buildings when dealing with proposals to change their use or 
to develop adjacent land in the same ownership. "31 
The guidelines go on to illustrate the kinds of planning gain that 
could be reasonably achieved under these negotiations, which although 
varied and extensive do not cover the more pragmatic schemes in 
31 ibid. Appendix: Examples of Legitimate Negotiations. 
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Tower Hamlets. However, the list given does not claim to be 
exhaustive. 
(1) major road improvements where the local authority 
could not have reasonably acquired the land by allowing full 
plot ratio on a large redevelopment; 
(2) inclusion of housing or other benefit (such as 
carparking) within major developments, often conveyed to or 
made subject to an agreement with the local authority; 
(3) public use of facilities and improved linkages to an 
existing area, such as a supermarket providing carparking 
and access to an adjacent shopping centre; 
(4) extra carparking in an office development in a 
conservation area to serve other offices and improve 
provision for whole area; 
(5) extra landscaping outside of an industrial development 
to improve the townscape; 
(6) where there is an approved policy to temper the 
despoilation of open cast mining, a village by-pass, improved 
roads for heavy traffic and recreational facilities have been 
provided outside of the site; 
(7) creation of a precinct to show architectural qualities of 
a major public building or to provide a landscaped riverside 
walk way; 
(8) the redevelopment of former mineral workings to 
provide an industrial estate, a public golf-course, a district 
park with extensive sporting facilities and finance for the 
construction of a dual carriageway by-pass. " 
The code and its appendix is clearly based on a different view of 
planning than the circular or the PAG report, in that it approves 
creative use of planning powers as long as those powers flow from a 
publicly approved document. The circular on the other hand is 
reluctant to acknowledge planning as anything more than a regulatory 
and negative function which needs to be constrained. To the RTPI it 
is a function of planning to endeavour to produce development which 
is in the public interest by implementing the objectives included in the 
development plan and local policies. Thus, negotiation is a part of the 
development control process and the only issue is to ensure that 
obligations placed on a developer are reasonable and within the 
planning objectives of the authority. 
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In this way the code evidences a distinction between the receipt 
of money, or of benefits in kind, as a fund-raising exercise, or tax, 
and the attainment of planning advantages which fall within the 
reasonable planning aims of the authority. The former involves a 
sacrifice of planning standards, whereas the latter Is necessary to 
uphold those standards. The use of conditions, the issue of an 
approval, the modification of applications and the use of agreements 
under local or national legislation are all recognised as methods that 
may be used to secure planning gains, and the choice between them Is 
essentially a question of expeditious and effective enforcement. 
In order to achieve the aims of a local plan it may be necessary, 
according to the RTPI, to require off-site gains, but as long as there 
is a relationship between the two sites it may still be reasonable as 
long as it is in scale with the development. Any money paid to the 
local authority should only be used for a purpose clearly associated 
with the development itself; similarity recreational or social facilities 
must only be provided where they are directly related to the proposal 
being negotiated. Otherwise what is being provided is an Inducement 
to approve development which planning policies suggest should be 
refused (because of location or extent of development) rather than a 
planning gain. 32 Acceptance of a development cannot depend upon the 
level of planning gain provided, it must depend upon proper planning 
objectives. 
This view of planning gain represents an application of planning 
ideology to a part of the development control process. 'Proper 
planning objectives' are reasserted as defineable and ascertainable 
32 RTPI Agreed Memorandum of the Planning Gain Guidelines 
Working Party, November 1983. London: RTPI. 
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concepts which can be decided upon by professional planners, 
effectively subjected to public scrutiny through consultation exercises, 
and overseen by the appeals and court system. The case for planning 
gain is not argued on economic grounds but within the structure of 
planning and the actors within the process are portrayed as apolitical, 
acting in the public interest. 
As far as Tower Hamlets is concerned, the Code of Practice does 
give a basis for a broader interpretation of the circular. This is so, 
particularly, as it recognises that public planning policies can provide 
a link between various unrelated sites and this is sufficient for it to 
be a proper planning objective to regard the development of both as a 
single mixed use scheme. However, the Code would not necessarily 
find all Tower Hamlets' schemes to be reasonable. For example, does 
the restoration of Christ Church as planning gain on schemes to 
create office use outside of the conservation area, and even outside of 
the Spitalfields ward, comply with the RTPI definition of related sites? 
Does the increase in the amount of office space in the FABS scheme 
by over three times the amount previously approved, after an 
increased contribution to the restoration of Christ Church was 
negotiated, escape the definition of an inducement? The answer 
largely depends upon the interpretation of such terms as 'contiguous', 
'clearly associated with the development' and 'proper planning 
objectives' which remains unresolved by the Code. 
Schemes Under Consideration After the Circular was Issued 
After the Circular was issued there was a perceived increase in 
the number of applications submitted to the Council with no planning 
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advantages included. This also coincided with a reorganisation of 
officers in the planning department and those previously responsible 
for the city fringe areas anticipated that there could be changes in 
the way negotiations were conducted and the pragmatism of their 
approach. The political leadership of the planning committee, however, 
remained strongly in favour of planning gain and was anxious to 
maintain the office policy in its previous form. Bywayof 
example three schemes that were alive at this time will be considered, 
namely Alie Street, No. s 14/20, Mansell Street, No. s 41/43 and 
Artillery Lane, No. s 37/41. 
The Alie Street scheme was submitted in July 1983 after 
publication of the circular and included 1711m2 of office space. The 
premises in Alie Street had previously been used for industrial 
purposes and a vacant property in Cheshire Street was to be 
refurbished to rehouse the tenants displaced on the same terms they 
had in Alie Street. The Alie Street building was on a corner and the 
frontage to Alie Street was to be the office element and the frontage 
to North Tenter Street was to be developed to provide ten single 
person flats for a housing association. This scheme was approved by 
the committee and an agreement was signed which prevented the 
development from commencing until the firms were satisfactorily 
relocated, and internal finishes to the offices from being applied until 
the residential element was complete. The agreement also required the 
Cheshire Street property to be let to the tenants of Alie Stret on the 
same terms and, if any tenant did not accept Cheshire Street, the 
developer would use his best endeavours to relocate him or her 
elsewhere. 
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This scheme evidences little or no change in Tower Hamlets' 
policy or in what the developer was prepared to provide. The scheme 
accorded with Tower Hamlets' policy and relocating the industrial 
users could be justified on planning grounds so as to fall within 
paragraph 6(3) of the circular. It was, however, necessary to reduce 
the survey maps four times in order to have both parts of the 
development on one page. The Council would have to rely upon 
paragraph 6(4) in order to justify the requirement of residential space. 
In this instance the residential element was on the same site, although 
in an area of predominantly industrial and office use so may qualify as 
an extraneous benefit33 rather than one which enables an otherwise 
unreasonable development to be acceptable. The provision in the 
agreement which prevented development from commencing until other 
works were done would be defensible as achieving the same purpose as 
a negative condition34 but the requirements as to terms and the 
identity of the tenants, if analysed as conditions35 would probably be 
treated as unreasonable. -36 
33 In terms of a condition it could be treated as unnecessary 
and an unjustifiable burden on the developer. See DOE Circular 1/85, 
para. 11 and 21. 
34 Grampian Regional Board v Aberdeen DC (1984) 47 P&CR 433. 
35 In view of the above discussion this approach is possible 
particularly as para. 4 of circular 22/83 states that imposing a condition 
or an obligation should only arise where it would not be reasonable to 
grant permission without it. 
36 See Fawcett Properites Ltd v Buckingham CC [1960] 3 All ER 
503; Mixnams Properties Ltd v Chertsey UDC [1965] AC 735; Allnom 
London Properties v Middlesex CC [1964] 62 LGR 304. In view of 
Council and GLC policy not to displace industrial users It could be 
argued that there are sound planning reasons for controlling 
occupation but the restrictive approach of the DOE discussed above 
may not accomodate this. 
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The Mansell Street scheme was proposed by Central & City, a 
developer with a long history with Tower Hamlets and a participant in 
a number of the more esoteric schemes in Spitalfields. This 
application involved the change of use of a warehouse in Mansell 
Street to offices and the planner responsible suggested an on-site gain 
or a gain in one of the adjacent buildings. The developer considered 
the site to be unsuitable for mixed use and could not acquire any of 
the neighbouring properties. Anxious to negotiate, he suggested an off- 
site gain but the planner felt constrained by the circular and refused 
to negotiate on this basis. The application was refused on the basis 
of no planning gain being provided and loss of industrial floorspace. 
This approach was criticised by the legal department of the 
Council as it put the office policy unnecessarily in jeopardy. The 
developer lodged an appeal and there were strong arguments for him 
succeeding: the site was in a preferred location, parking restrictions 
made the building unsuitable for warehouse use, the site was on the 
corner of a major junction and so no loading bay could be 
constructed, and the proposal itself included restoration of the 
building and increased levels of employment. 
On the other side of the argument, the developer had entered 
into many agreements with the Council previously which had produced 
planning gain and if they were lawful before the circular they were 
still lawful. Under the circular off-site gain was not in itself 
prohibited, in that it did recognise the possibility of such a gain 
provided it was in accordance with a published planning policy. The 
planner was pre-empting the interpretation of this and invited a 
determination by refusing permission. There was also the problem that 
although the consideration of planning advantages had been treated by 
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the courts as a material consideration37, it had also been held by the 
Queen's Bench Division that lack of it is was not a valid ground for 
refusal. 38 
The problems raised in this scheme were taken a stage further by 
the proposals for the site in Artillery Lane. The history to this 
scheme was interesting in that most of the site was originally intended 
for residential development as part of a larger mixed scheme covering 
several properties and sites in Spitalfields. 39 During negotiations 
calculations on the amount of gain was linked across the sites40 but 
formally they formed separate schemes, subject to separate planning 
agreements. No. s 37/39 Artillery Lane and 51/53 Gun Street were to 
form one vacant lot adjacent to No. 41 which stood on the corner of 
Artillery Lane and Gun Street. No. 41 was to be left intact while the 
vacant site was used for an infill residential building as planning gain 
for the conversion of an adjacent vacant warehouse to offices. 
The whole scheme was devised by Central & City with the 
financial backing of Royal Insurance Group who purchased this land, 
among other sites, intending to demolish the single storey warehouse 
on the Gun Street side. This demolition took place and, in accordance 
with the Section 52 agreement, Royal Insurance entered into an 
agreement with Peabody housing association, approved by the Council 
as a suitable body to perform the residential development (at this time 
37 see discussion on Tower Hamlets Appeals below. 
38 Westminster Renslade Ltd. v SSE (1983] The Times LR, May 
9th, discussed below. 
39 See BAGS Scheme (West). 
40 See BAGS Scheme (East) and (North). 
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housing associations were awash with funding and the Council did not 
doubt their ability to complete). 
This agreement allowed Peabody to enter the land and build the 
residential development within three years (which period could be 
extended by the developer) at which time Peabody would be granted 
an 80 year lease on payment of x. 10,000 premium, with a peppercorn 
rent. In October 1981 the Council confirmed, after taking Counsel's 
advice, that the agreement had been complied with but Peabody had 
been unable to complete because of the lack of finance from the 
DOE. 41 Royal Insurance then applied to develop the site as offices. 
In light of the PAG report, and later the draft circular, Royal 
Insurance refused to negotiate a planning gain for the scheme42 which 
involved the demolition of No. 41, a building the Council were 
endeavouring to list. The Council tried to find a buyer for No. 41 
which was still in private hands, who would restore No. 41 rather than 
demolish it and were prepared to allow an office use as long as 
restoration works were carried out. At this time SHPRS were actively 
discouraging property owners in Spitalfields from negotiating gain 
41 This agreement is discussed above in chapter 8 in more 
detail. 
42 There is some correspondence in late 1982 between the GLC 
and LBTH to the effect that the Royal Intended to finance an 
industrial redevelopment (25,000 s/f) in Chiltern Street, some distance 
from the office site, in association with the Spitalfields Small Business 
Association who would manage the units for local businesses. The 
GLC owned this site and suggested that it would represent planning 
gain on the office scheme. They wrote on November 23rd "Obviously 
you must consider the planning application for offices on Its merits, 
but I would like to emphasise that this Council regards the Royal 
Insurance's involvement in the industrial scheme as crucial to the 
scheme's realisation, and a valuable injection of private sector money 
into the Industrial Improvement Area. " This was not however related 
to these offices by the applicants as the Industrial scheme was also a 
mixed development with an office content. No reference was made to 
it in any of the reports to the planning committee. 
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agreements because they wanted to avoid all office development and as 
part of this they advocated the unacceptability of planning gains under 
the draft circular. Spitalfields Local Committee43 also objected to an 
office scheme on this site because it was scheduled for housing and 
another housing association (the Spitalfields Housing Co-Op) were able 
and willing to build on the site. These objections, together with the 
objections to the demolition of 41 Artillery Lane received from six of 
the twelve consultative groups on historic buildings44 were detailed in 
the reports to the development committee. 
The application by Royal Insurance was finally refused in 
January 1983 and they lodged an appeal after the circular was issued 
which could have had disastrous affects on the credibility of Council 
policy. An Inquiry requested by the Royal was scheduled to be heard 
in April 1984 and the Royal were to argue the validity of refusing 
permission on the grounds of lack of planning gain as non-compliance 
with local office policy and the GLDP. They also Intended to question 
the Council's interpretation of what amounted to an adequate planning 
gain. In their view improvements to an area of poor layout and 
design were a part of the scheme and the building of offices would 
revitalise the area. 45 The Council did, however, have the previous 
43 In the report to the committee which refused consent the 
SLC was described as "a forum for the local community chaired by 
Councillor Aylmer". 
44 These were namely the Ancient Monuments Society, Council 
fo. r British Archaelogy, Georgian Group, Society for the Protection of 
Ancient Buildings, Victorian Society, Royal Commission on Historical 
Monuments, The London Society, Metropolitan Public Gardens 
Association, Tower Hamlets Society, River Thames Society, Greater 
London Archaelogical Society and Spitalfields Historic Buildings Trust. 
45 Grounds for Appeal, Royal Life Assurance v LBTH lodged 
August 1,1983. App/E5900/A/83/4383. 
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permissions on the site and the Section 52 agreements as material 
considerations to reinforce their argument for mix of use and No. 41 
was approved for listing by the SSE. Consequently, the appeal was 
withdrawn and the office policy was saved from testing. 
Conclusions 
By the time the circular was issued Tower Hamlets had 
established a practice of consistently looking at each application for 
office development on its merits and in the context of the 
development plan and office policy. The stated aims of that office 
policy mirrored the GLDP and were intended to protect the viability of 
'local communities' by providing a mix of compatible land uses, limiting 
the worst excesses of speculation in land and by making the developer 
accountable for some of the local externality effects of their action. 
The Borough Plan reinforced this approach, bringing planning gain into 
the development control system to make planning responsive to local 
needs. By incorporating the policy into the Borough Plan and by 
attaching the RTPI Code of Practice the Council's position had been 
strenthened and the issue had officially been introduced into the 
formal public participation process. 
Issuing a circular which was largely opposed to planning gain 
necessarily questioned the validity of Tower Hamlets' approach, but it 
did not change the law and may not effect the practice of planning 
gain in the Borough. The fact that its introduction coincided with a 
change in personnel within the planning and legal departments could 
make its effect more significant, as their approach to the policy and 
to developers is an essential element in negotiating schemes. The 
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level of confidence developers have in the Council clearly has an 
affect on the credibility of the policy: while it was still possible to 
argue that the Council's interpretation of a mixed use development was 
reasonable within the terms of the circular the force of that argument 
must largely depend upon the relationship between planner and 
developer and the position adopted by the planner in negotiations. 
For example, most of the schemes negotiated by Tower Hamlets 
fall within paragraph 6(4) of the circular, that is planning gain is 
necessary to achieve an acceptable balance of uses. Their 
interpretation of that phrase, however, had been very different from 
that intended by the Secretary of State who is clearly opposed to any 
off-site gain. The planner could rely upon the RTPI Code of Practice 
to continue to maintain a broad approach to the phrase and thus 
continue to negotiate pragmatic schemes; the Code of Practice does 
recognise that a published planning policy can provide a link between 
various unrelated sites sufficient to make it 'a proper planning 
objective' for the Council to regard the development of both as a 
mixed use scheme. Alternatively, as in the case of 41/43 Mansell 
Street discussed above, the planner could adopt the standpoint of the 
Secretary of State and only negotiate on-site gains. The fact that the 
members of the Council remain committed to a policy of planning gain 
would have an effect on the conduct of the planner and the advice he 
gives, but it may not be sufficient to maintain the type of negotiating 
evident before the circular. 
During the Inquiry relating to an appeal on 36/40 Artillery Lane 
heard in May 1983 a planner, during the course of his evidence, was 
questioned by the Inspector about the six storey glass-clad office 
building standing opposite a terrace of eighteenth century buildings in 
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Artillery Lane. The planner was giving evidence in support of 
planning gain and the relocation of industrial uses in the buildings 
under appeal. He maintained that decisions on applications were made 
by the Development Committee and his role was as professional 
adviser, but when asked about how the modern building opposite46 was 
approved he replied that it was recommended for approval by another 
planner; that he would not have recommended it as it was in total 
conflict with the area and was recommended with the planning gain of 
a contribution to the restoration of Christ Church which in his view 
had `nothing at all' to do with ensuring a mix of use in the area. He 
saw it as contradicting approved planning policies, whereas the report 
prepared by the planner who did negotiate it supported his 
recommendation before the committee with those same policies. 
This type of difference in approach is significant when the 
negotiations are conducted by individual planners who may adopt the 
importance of mixed uses as a valid aim of their profession, but 
interpret the meaning according to their own perceptions and 
precedents. The circular is vague on interpretation and while the 
Code of Practice is a clearer and more precise document it necessarily 
is advisory and cannot prescribe what particular approach should be 
adopted on a particular set of facts. Thus, to the planner giving 
evidence, the size and appearance of the building would have made 
that scheme unacceptable; whereas to the planner negotiating the 
scheme the planning gain did provide a sufficient balance. 
It is also evident that the standpoint of the developer Is also 
important. Central & City were enraged that the planner was not 
46 FABS Scheme, approved in the late 1970's. 
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prepared to negotiate an off-site gain for 41/43 Mansell Street as it 
meant he would have to go to appeal, waste time and risk his good 
relationship with the Council. On the other hand, Royal Insurance 
were not prepared to negotiate a gain for their proposed development 
in Artillery Lane as they considered it to be an unreasonable demand 
in light of the PAG Report and worthwhile going to appeal. These 
differing standpoints were fed by concepts of profit margins, the 
expense and delay of the appeals system, and the likelihood of 
succeeding on appeal. The latter being influenced by the existence of 
the circular, the office policy and the credibility of that policy in 
terms of precedents created by other schemes and other appeals. 
Consequently, the circular itself has an effect on the bargaining 
process, but it does not control the operation of office policy. The 
effect it has depends largely upon other factors within the process 
and how they interact with, and are affected by, directives from the 
Secretary of State. The reaction of the Council was to rationalise the 
circular and to interpret it as broadly as possibly while amending the 
Borough Plan to include a counterweight in the form of the RTPI Code 
of Practice. At the public level, the Council continued its objectives 
in the area of planning gain without any alteration, but reaffirmed the 
compliance of Tower Hamlets' policy with the circular by reference to 
its words, rather than its underlying philosophy. At the level of 
negotiation its effect could be felt more strongly: but again that 
reflects a choice of standpoint, rather than the force of this form of 
control. 
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B. THE APPEALS IN TOWER HAMLETS47 
Although a number of appeals have been lodged against decisions 
made and not made by Tower Hamlets, most were withdrawn before 
determination, normally because negotiations produced a compromise 
which both parties were prepared to accept. 48 Of those which did go 
to appeal on office policy none of them disputed the vires of the 
policy, and those which did find in favour of the applicant did so on 
the basis of what amounted to adequate gain49 rather than refusing to 
accept that a gain was required. 50 The paucity of appeals In Tower 
Hamlets has been signalled out as unusual, particularly in an area 
which forms a part of the city fringe, and a survey of office 
development in those areas attributes this, at least in part, to the 
pragmatism of the Council and the satisfaction of developers. 5' 
... planning attitudes 
in most boroughs surrounding the City 
are such as to reduce even the most reasonable agents to a 
state of incoherent apoplexy. With two exceptions, the 
planning policies of City Fringe boroughs attract comments 
which are either unprintable or libelous. The exceptions are 
the City of Westminster and the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets, which politically are as alike as chalk and cheese 
... agent after agent expresses appreciation 
of the realistic 
attitude of the controlling powers of Tower Hamlets. For 
the Borough has taken a thoroughly pragmatic view of what 
47 See chapter 7 for the backgound to each of the appeals 
discussed here. 
48 See eg., 37/41 Artillery Lane, 96/98 Middlesex Street and the 
Minories Carpark site. An appeal was also made against a S. 53 
determination which was settled at the doors of the court: See 
Christchurch Schemes, Hill Samuel and Providence Life. 
49 See 24 Alie Street, Fairholt House and Fieldgate Street appeals. 
50 For a Ministerial decision which does question the 
"requirement" of a gain see (1983) JPL 265-269. 
51 Estates Gazette, Focus on City Fringes, September 24, (1983) 
vol. 267,1142-1158. 
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is happening on its western boundary ... (they) have let development go ahead - understandably extracting some 
planning gain in the process - and as a result they have 
expanded their rate base enormously ... There is an interplay 
of politics and economics which result in some areas 
working (the non-fringe to the West; Aldgate to the east), 
while others are areas of conflict ... somehow, thanks to 
endless patience and determination, those who do want to 
see growth and renewal are getting it done, whether It be 
enlightened councils who want to see their boroughs 
enhanced or long-sighted developers who want to see their 
profits doing the same. "52 
1/3 NORTON FOLGATE, SPITALFIELDS : Decision letter dated March 
11,1976 
This was the first appeal decided on the office policy and the 
issue of planning gain was argued in some detail. The favourable 
decision was used by the Council to enhance the credibility of the 
office policy in later negotiations. Another appeal decision was not 
made on the office policy for four and a half years after this decision 
was issued. 
It was heard at a time before the GLDP was approved53 and so 
the IDP was the operative development plan, although the decision 
points out that it was out of date even then. The Appeal was dealt 
with on written representations and the Secretary of State based his 
decision upon the Council's office policy, although he also made 
reference to the GLDP. Another planning permission had been granted 
for this site by the time the appeal was heard and the existence of 
52 ibid. 1154-1158. 
53 The SSE had indicated his support for a restrictive policy on 
offices in Central London in his Statement on the GLDP October 1975. 
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this alternative scheme which did not conflict with the policy seems to 
have been influential. M 
On the issue of planning gain the Secretary of State asked the 
question of whether this scheme had anything to offer, for example, in 
terms of planning advantages, to warrant the grant of permission as 
an exception to the Council's policy. The applicants had argued that 
gains were provided as the development would replace a petrol station 
with a building of good design, would create office employment 
opportunites, would improve traffic flow and would provide small suites 
of offices. The Secretary of State found that none of these elements 
were substantial enough to justify a departure from the policy of 
restraint even though the site was in a preferred office location and 
close to public transport. 
In its appeal statement the Council, as well as pointing out 
certain design problems with the proposal, set out the planning 
objectives for the area and indicated that a number of schemes were 
in the pipeline which involved mixed use which could be prejudiced If 
this scheme went ahead without substantial gains. They stated that 
such gains were usually provided in the form of residential space, 
community facilities or the restoration of listed buildings in the area. 
This Council is attempting to retain the diversity of land 
uses in their area whilst alleviate (sic) the severe social and 
housing problems in the area. It is recognised that this is 
an area in transition which is under considerable pressure 
from office development as the office area of the City of 
London extends eastwards. This Council is not attempting 
totally to resist these pressures but sensitively to control 
the. pressure during the transitional period as the character 
of the area change (sic). It is hoped that by encouraging 
mixed-use development including offices in selected areas to 
u Appeal by Philstock Securities Ltd, under TCPA 1971, Sectlon 
36. DOE reference App/5031/A/74/9328 (J. C. Lippard authorised by SSE 
to sign) 
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avoid the damaging upheavals which have accompanied 
similar transitional periods in other parts of Central 
London. "55 
The major problem they wished to avoid was the increase in land 
values created by office development in other boroughs which would 
then exclude development for less profitable uses. 
Nowhere in the appeal decision is the basis of the policy 
questioned, nor is the validity of using such a policy for the social 
and housing purposes or for the maintenance of land values indicated. 
These issues were raised by the applicant who denounced the practice 
of negotiation as unlawful and represented 'an indirect levy' on 
developers wishing to build in the area. 
During the course of negotiations it was stated to the 
Appellant's Architect by Mr Draper, a Town Planning 
Officer of the Council, that the Appellants were unfortunate 
in that the Council did not want to locate any public 
offices or amenities on this site and that It was not 
considered to be a good or appropriate location for 
residential provision. The argument went therefore that the 
Appellant had little to trade in the way of 'public benefit' 
in exchange for an office approval. However If the 
Appellant it was suggested were to buy a listed building In 
the area and renovate it to provide housing accomodatlon 
this could be considered as meeting their social obligations 
and a bargain might be struck ... It Is submitted that the 
Council's approach is identical to that which was condemned 
by the Court in Rv London Borough of Hillingdon ex Darts 
Royco Homes Ltd ... as being an ultra vires attempt to 
require the developer to assume part of the duties of the 
Housing Authority by misuse of the planning process. "56 
The Council did respond to this by indicating that the phrase 
'social obligations' was not used in negotiations, the purpose of which 
was to achieve a mixed balance of uses in Spitalfields. The Council 
55 Appeal Statement LBTH para. 3. 
56 Appeal Statement by Philistock Securities Ltd dated 11 
December 1985, pg. 5. 
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acknowledged their attempts to retain and improve housing so as to 
alleviate the housing problems, and where a developer was prepared to 
undertake such works it could provide substantial enough planning gain 
to justify a use which otherwise would not have been permitted. 
Certainly, the analogy with Royco Homes57 is difficult to sustain in 
this instance as the Council were not requesting public housing or 
nomination rights, merely housing. Any direct benefit to the Council 
was not evident and the SSE had, in granting Industrial Development 
Permits for other sites58, made similar conditions for residential 
floorspace to be included in those schemes. 
The Council made ample use in its statements of 'well established 
town planning practise' as a justification for the approach it had 
taken, namely land-use mix, balancing the merits of the application, 
preventing speculative increases in land values which would affect 
land-use patterns. In this way, they presented their argument so as 
to demonstrate that the Council was not pursuing 'ulterior purposes' 
but only 'planning purposes'. For example, with land values they 
submitted that they were not concerned with the effect on the 
economy of increases (which would amount to a non-planning 
consideration) but with the effect those increases had on land use 
patterns. This dichotomy was not explored by the Secretary of State 
but it is in accordance with the approach taken by the courts and 
reinforces a rational view of planning so as to protect the validity of 
the Council's exercise of administrative discretion. 
57 Rv London Borough of Hillingdon ex Darte Rovco Homes Ltd 
[1974] 2 All ER 643. 
58 See eg. chapter 7: Wingate Scheme at Haydon Square and 
Goodman's Yard Scheme. 
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TARN & TARN APPEALS, SPITALFIELDS: Decision letter dated 
October 17,1980 
Three appeals were dealt with at a six day Public Inquiry held in 
May 1980 against refusals issued in 1978 for office development in 
Spitalfields by different applicants, but all of which were made 
through Tarn & Tarn. The sites and premises had been purchased by 
the appellants, or their associated companies, many years previously 
for development for industrial use. This aim had been aborted by the 
designation of the Fashion Street (later Fournier Street) Conservation 
Area in 1969. In each case the appeal was the result of the breakdown 
of protracted negotiations over the development of these sltes, 5' 
particularly in the provision of planning gain, and the grounds for 
refusal were non-compliance with office policy and, in the third 
appeal, also loss of residential space. The Inspector also heard an 
appeal against a Listed Building Enforcement Notice in respect of 
No. 16 Wilkes Street. The sites in question are all described in the 
Results of Survey chapter above and will be referred to here as Puma 
Court, South Site, Puma Court, North Site and 14 & 16 Wilkes Street. 
The Secretary of State agreed with the findings of the 
59 The problems concerned the refusal of Tarn & Tarn to sign a 
planning agreement before planning permission was Issued, but even In 
November 1979 they indicated a willingness to continue negotiations, 
although the planning gains offered at that date were clearly 
inadequate eg. in a letter dated 1st November 1979 they suggested 
public use of the courtyard in Puma Court as gain on the proposed 
office developments, whereas the gudelines for the area were 55% 
residential gain to 45% office space. 
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Inspector60 and the latter's 34 page report upheld the office policy, 
after hearing Counsel for the appellants61 and for the CouncilG2 and 
submissions by representatives of SHPRS, The Friends of Christ Church 
and the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, the 
Spitalfields Housing Co-Operative and Solon Co-Operative Housing 
Services Ltd. Most of the report was concerned with the character 
of the area, the history of the appeals and the architectural 
significance of 14 & 16 Wilkes Street, but the Inspector did describe 
and discuss the office policy and framed his decision within its 
context. 
The principal issues to be considered are the current office 
policy and its operation, the effect of the proposed 
development on the conservation area, and housing 
policy. "63 
Although the report did not consider the vires of the policy, it 
did accept its content and, to an extent at least, reinforced the 
approach of the Council. 
The office policy can only be determined by reading the 
policy documents together, ie GLDP refined by Offices in 
Tower Hamlets refined by Fournier Street Conservation 
Policy. I do not accept the appellants' contention that the 
conservation policy is an inappropriate vehicle for 
development control. Offices, which are to be encouraged in 
certain circumstances under the council's office policy, have 
a place in the conservation policy in 2 guises, in the 
periphery, where commercial and other uses are preferred 
60 Appeals by Bishopgate Managements, Manwin Properties and 
Tarn Estates under TCPA 1971, Ss. 36 and 97. DOE References 
App/5031 /A/78/02524, App/5031 /A/78/02525, App/5031 /A/78/05956 and 
App/5031/F/79/36. Decision letter dated 17 October 1980, Report by 
Inspector Stephen Marks MA, RIBA, of the Public Inquiry held 12/16 
and 20 May 1980 attached. 
61 Mr Desmond Wright QC. 
62 Mr Barry Payton. 
63 supra note 60, page 32, paragraph 131. 
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uses, and in the core, where they may be associated with 
residential in the change of use of certain properties. It was 
also explained by the Council that office accomodation might 
be allowed if circumstances justified it within new 
developments on the vacant sites: so far from undermining 
their designation for residential use it seems to me that the 
Council has demonstrated a degree of flexibility which 
should be welcomed on this point. The policy is clear that 
in all these locations for offices, office development must 
offer planning gains in the form of direct community 
benefit: offices are acceptable, therefore, only if they bring 
this benefit and are not acceptable on their own. By this 
test the appellants' proposals fail. "M 
In reaching this conclusion the Inspector had heard evidence not 
only on the content of the office policy, but also on the history of 
negotiations between the appellants and the Council, other negotiated 
schemes in Spitalfields and the use and content of the draft planning 
agreements discussed between the parties. The appellants argument 
had essentially been that they had in the early 1970's been in a 
position to bring substantial improvements to Spitalfields but the 
Council had delayed, and made such unreasonable demands, that the 
schemes became unviable. To demonstrate this they produced evidence 
of the content of their negotiations and other schemes In order to 
show the unworkable nature of the policy. 65 
The Council, for their part, relied upon the policy itself and the 
disasterous precedent this appeal would create if succesful, In terms of 
increased land values, loss of residential space, and loss of balanced 
64 supra note 60, page 32, paragraph 132. 
65 eg. they indicated that a number of schemes had been 
allowed which did not comply with the policy: 37/38 Artillery lane 
where the offices were completed but the residential element was not 
because the housing association did not have adequate funding; the 
Peabody buildings were treated as planning gain although renovation is 
not usually treated as such; 10/14 Folgate Street where residential 
floorspace was decreased and office space increased because the 
original distribution was unworkable. Inspectors Report supra note 60 
page 11, paragraph 44. 
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mix of uses in the area. They produced evidence to illustrate the 
importance of planning gain to be included in all schemes in 
Spitalfields so as to restrict offices to those developments which 
positively contributed to the objectives for the area, indicating that a 
successful appeal would reduce the possibility of negotiating such 
schemes. 
These appeals raise fundamental questions about the 
council's office and conservation policies: their future will 
be decided by the appeal decisions. The implications of 
allowing the appeals are far-reaching: planning permission 
for speculative offices either on the vacant sites or in Nos 
14 & 16 would be reflected in an increase in land value and 
would lead to other mixed schemes complying with the 
policy being placed in jeopardy; houses would be left empty, 
deteriorating the while, in expectation of office use, 
rehabilitation of existing residential accomodation would be 
very unlikely, and the reversion of other properties to 
residential would certainly not occur. It is essential now, 
for the benefit both of developers and of the conservation 
area, to dispose of the hope value which is a valid element 
of valuation: any uncertainty can only be removed by the 
dismissal of the 3 appeals. "86 
The Inspector did not comment upon the conflicting pictures 
presented of the operation of the planning gain policy, nor on the 
methods used by the Council to secure planning advantages, but chose 
to leave these areas outside of his decision. In doing this, while 
including the details in his report, he indicated an acceptance of the 
process of negotiation involved. It cannot be said that he Impliedly 
approved of it, but certainly, by agreeing with the Council's approach 
and by going on to state that the gains put forward by the appellants 
did not satisfy the policy, he affirmed its existence and facilitated its 
continuance. 
" The appellants' office development would, as they claim, 
bring about certain benefits, the development and use of the 
66 ibid. page 23, paragraph 97. 
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vacant sites and the restoration and use of 2 historic 
buildings. These would be significant gains for the area, but 
it seems to me that they can only be put to the credit of 
the office developments if no other way of achieving theses 
gains is available: I am not satisfied, however, either that 
rehabilitation of 14 and 16 Wilkes Street as houses for sale 
is uneconomic or that no other, more acceptable, form of 
development is possible on the vacant sites. Moreover, there 
are drawbacks which at least cancel these benefits, both in 
the new office developments and in the change of use of 
existing buildings ... Most seriously, permission for offices 
would increase the hope for similar developments elsewhere 
in the conservation area thus affecting land values, and 
would diminish the prospects of re-introducing residential 
use and improving dwellings. "57 
Overall, the approach of the Inspector on this appeal was very 
positive in that he took the evidence on the character of the area, 
the housing shortage and the needs within Spitalfields and saw the 
planning policies as a mechanism for achieving improvement of all of 
these elements. He then assessed the applications in the light of 
these circumstances and patently balanced the disadvantages and 
advantages of the schemes, but only in the context of the policies 
themselves without criticism of their content. 
42 FIELDGATE STREET, WHITECHAPEL: Decision letters dated June 5, 
1981 and April 27,1982 
Both of these appeals by written representations were instituted 
by the same appellant and were successful. The first related to the 
removal of a condition imposed on a consent for office devlopment on 
67 ibid. page 32, paragraph 133. 
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the site which was adjacent to a new clothing factory. " The 
appellants were the directors of that company and had applied in their 
personal capacity to build a five storey office development. The 
Council had agreed to grant permission in consideration of the fact 
that the offices were required by local industry to facilitate their 
expansion, but attached a condition making their use personal to the 
company so as to avoid contravention of the office policy. The 
permission also provided that the offices should only be used as 
ancillary to the factory and the Inspector took the view that this was 
sufficient to avoid speculation and protect office policy and deleted 
the condition on personal use. No discussion of the content of the 
office policy was included in the decision. 
The second appeal was against a refusal of consent for a building 
with a carpark on the ground floor with four floors of offices 
above. 69 The factory was still not in operational use and the 
appellants application had been for non-ancillary office use. The 
Inspector therefore had to consider the GLDP and Tower Hamlets' 
office policy as material considerations in assessing the appeal. He 
agreed that paragraphs 4.13 - 4.15 of the GLDP were relevant and, as 
the Council's office policy did not require the approval of the SSE, 
considered them the weightier document. He also took into account 
the draft borough plan but, as it was only in its early stages of 
consultation, gave it little weight. 
5 Appeal by Sidney and Abigail Lipman, under TCPA 1971, S. 36, 
DOE reference App/5031/A/80/16187, decision dated 5 June 1981 (DA 
Robinson, authorised to sign on behalf of the Secretary of State). 
69 Appeal by S. and A. Lipman, under TCPA S. 36 and Schedule 
9, DOE reference T/App/5031/A/82/260/G9, Decision dated 27 April 
1982 (J. H. P. Draper authorised to sign on behalf of SSE). 
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The Inspector took the GLDP criteria of preferred office 
location, proximity to public transport and the provision of planning 
advantages in turn and found each of them to be satisfied by the 
proposed development. The site was outside of the preferred office 
location as defined by the Council, but the Inspector noted that the 
area was not specifically limited by the GLDP and the site was only 
440m away from a site acknowledged by the office policy to be within 
the preferred location. The site was also only six minutes walk from 
an important underground interchange (Aldgate East) and was even 
closer to Whitechapel station and bus services. These specific 
considerations led him to conclude that the site could be considered to 
be within the preferred location and, even if it was not, the Council 
did specifically prohibit office development outside of those areas in 
exceptional circumstances. The draft local plan indicated that any 
office development must be within 400m of a transport interchange 
and, as this site was only an additional 40m away, it should not, he 
argued, necessarily be excluded. 
As I have shown, there is room for argument on the 
evidence presented to me whether the appeal site is within 
such a location. But even if it is not, none of the 3 plans 
contains a general prohibition of office development 
elsewhere). There are other local plans within the area of 
the GLDP which do: the District Plan for the City of 
Westminster for example). '70 
As far as planning advantages are concerned the Inspector did 
not comment on whether the policy was intra vires the local planning, 
other than saying that it was based on the GLDP, nor did he 
specifically consider if there was sufficient gain within the proposal. 
Rather, he raised the issue and made reference to the economic 
70 ibid. para. 11. 
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problems the applicants had experienced with their expanding company 
and their need for financing from an office development in order to 
operate their factory. He seemed to treat this as satisfying the 
requirement for planning gain as, if the finance were not forthcoming, 
80-100 jobs were to be lost through the non-operation of the factory 
and a new industrial building would remain vacant. On this basis the 
decision letter directed approval without any conditions restricting 
user of the offices. 
The overall approach here to the issue of office policy was 
misconceived. The decision relied heavily on the technical location 
criteria and on the possible liquidation of the company to justify 
approval. The Council's argument on creating an undesirable precedent 
in an area under pressure from office development was dismissed? ' on 
the grounds that the GLDP recognised the pressure existed and thus 
gave it some legitimacy. On the other hand, the Inspector did not 
uphold the restrictive attitude of the GLDP towards the criteria which 
must be fulfilled before permission was granted. However, the 
decision itself was not considered too harmful to Council policy 
because it specifically related the permission to exceptional 
circumstances presented by the financial condition of a company 
already providing employment in the borough, and many of the remarks 
made on preferred office locations were unsustainable in reality. The 
Solicitor to the Council summed up the position accurately in a 
memorandum to the Director of Development on this appeal. n 
71 In Collis Radio Ltd and Another v SSE and Another [1975] 
P&CR 390 it was held that precedent was a material consideration in 
determining a planning application on the grounds that uniformity was 
a valid planning objective. 
72 Dated May 4,1982. 
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It does appear that the Inspector has got round his neck 
the issue of preferred locations for office uses and his 
suggestion that Fieldgate Street is a significant area of 
passenger interchange is a conclusion that seems to me only 
possible if made by a shepherd from the Falkland Islands 
who is not used to public transport at all. On the other 
hand, however, it seems to me that these are only 
observations on matters of policy and the latter one Is so 
absurd that it could not be said to have any persuasive 
weight. " 
What is interesting, however, is that the Inspector did seek to 
justify approval with reference to the planning policies for the area 
upon which the Council relied, yet, ultimately, the decision was made 
with direct reference to the financial predicament of the applicant and 
the effect of the decision on employment. In internal correspondence 
following the appeal the Council also recognised that these factors 
were relevant to the grant of permission even though the problem of 
creating a precedent was a more significant argument. These economic 
considerations were used by the Inspector selectively, In that similar 
arguments that could have been raised, for example, as to the effect 
on land values, social infrastructure, use of the site for Industrial or 
residential purposes were not mentioned. This obviously raises the 
issue of the impossibility of pure planning considerations and the 
political decision making inherent in the selection of what amounts to 
`relevant' criteria. 
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FAIRHOLT HOUSE, SPITALFIELDS: Decision dated September 24,1982 
In this appeal73 the Inspector made a number of points which 
had a bearing on the Council's office policy, but again made no 
suggestion that the policy was unacceptable or an abuse of power. 
The appeal site, the first floor of a mixed use building, had been the 
subject of a string of temporary office permissions covering the 
previous twenty years and the appeal was against a refusal for 
permanent use. The site was in a preferred office location and the 
Inspector acknowledged that the application fulfilled few of the office 
policy criteria as it involved no environmental improvement, did not 
affect employment and provided no planning advantages. However, it 
did relate to one floor in a mixed use building and so did not, in his 
view, represent a comprehensive redevelopment and would not offend 
the planning objectives behind the office policy, that is to ensure a 
balanced mix of use in an area. 
In considering this case against that policy background [the 
GLDP, the office policy and draft borough plan] it seems to 
me that while there is a strong case for exerting firm 
control over office development many of the policies, 
especially those requiring office development schemes to 
provide other uses such as residential, industrial and leisure, 
are aimed at comprehensive development of new sites. In 
this particular case the appeal site is within a 4-storey 
building, the present uses of which are shopping with a 
strong recreational element. This reflects the mixed nature 
of surrounding land uses and accords generally with existing 
planning objectives ... The site is near Aldgate East station 
and main traffic routes which carry public transport. There 
would be no loss of housing, industry or shopping facilities 
and the proposal thus meets much of the criteria for office 
development. "74 
73 Appeal by Daxmay Properties under TCPA S. 36 and Schedule 
9, decision dated September 26,1982 DOE reference 
T/App/5031/A/82/2451/G5 (Inspector E. Green). 
74 ibid. paragraphs 6 and 7. 
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The Inspector also resisted the suggestion, made by the Council, 
to restrict the use to small suites of offices on the grounds that there 
was no evidence before him that there was a shortage of such 
accommodation and that the junior employment opportunities created 
by larger office use amounted to `a significant planning gain'. 
The site fell within an area north of Whitechapel High Strret, 
between Commercial Street and Gunthorpe Street, which had formed 
the subject of a development brief approved by the Council in March 
1982. This application had been submitted in April 1981 whilst the 
contents of the brief were being debated. An application for the 
development of a vacant area as an office building within the 
development brief had been refused on design grounds and non- 
compliance with office policy and the Council were anxious to ensure 
that this whole area achieved the policy objectives of the Council. 
The brief did not suggest that the area be cleared and rebuilt but did 
emphasise mixed uses. 
The area was in a prime position in that it was opposite 
Gardiners Corner, adjacent to Aldgate East Station and very close to 
the City boundary. It, therefore, put the Council In an excellent 
bargaining position for the attainment of planning advantages. Any 
decision in the area for offices without advantages would be likely to 
prejudice negotiations for other parts of the block and represent a 
failure to achieve planning gain in respect of the office development 
component. As the brief was to ensure mixed uses each element given 
over to office use should register a return in planning advantages. 
The Council requires any significant level of new offices to 
be associated with other specified uses that are of direct 
and obvious benefit to local households and people ... These 
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planning advantages must show substantial and realistic 
gains that are demonstrably of direct use to local 
people. "7s 
The statement submitted by the Council on the appeal made this 
reasonably clear and presented the appeal site as a part of a wider 
area on which the office policy would operate to ensure a mix of uses. 
It also pointed out that the lease by the City Polytechnic, on the 
second and third floors of the same building, was due to expire in 
March 1985, which would be a more suitable date to assess the use of 
the building as a whole. The Council were happy to grant a 
temporary consent to use the first floor as offices until that data. 
The Council had received extensive redevelopment proposals for the 
area adjacent to that covered by the brief which included a substantial 
element of gain, 76 and development of this building by other 
applicants who were prepared to offer planning advantages was also 
under discussion. 
Consequently, this appeal represented, to the Council, a piicims& 
development which was premature in light of negotiations which were 
underway and the possibility of more space becoming available In the 
building itself. The Inspector, however, concentrated upon existing 
planning policies and assessed the merits of this application against 
those policies to find no planning objection to the development. This 
approach, which is perfectly valid, reasserts a particular view of the 
planning process as a rational exercise of an essentially negative 
75 LBTH Development Brief for Land Between Commercial Street 
and Gunthorpe Street, South of Canon Barnet School, E. I. March 1982 
London: LBTH. 
75 See Whitechapel High Street, between MiddlSsex Street and 
Commercial Street in chapter 7. 
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character. The Inspector took the policies and the content of the 
application and compared the two, taking into account the objectives 
of the Council, without any real regard to the effect of the decision 
on the development of the area as a whole. This exercise was 
performed in a straightforward way, without questioning the validity of 
the policies or the Council's objectives, but construing them 
acontextually. 
As a result the office policy remained intact as an instrument to 
achieve its stated objective but only on an application by application 
basis, rather than in the context of longer term and more 
comprehensive planning. 
63/65 PRESCOT STREET, ST KATHERINE'S: Decision dated March 4. 
1985 
This appeal involved one of the many sites in Tower Hamlets 
owned and redeveloped by the Co-Operative Wholesale Society and 
arose as a result of a directed refusal by the GLC» on a scheme 
which Tower Hamlets were prepared to approve. Tower Hamlets 
supported CWS in their appeal against the GLC, who argued for a 
restrictive policy on office development and directed a refusal because 
the premises were outside of any preferred office location. At the 
Inquiry78 the GLC also put forward arguments against the development 
based on plot ratio and the insufficient level of planning advantages. 
The Council had negotiated a comprehensive programme of 
77 The application was passed to the GLC for approval as 
the 
Srategic Planning Authority on developments Including over 30.000tsof 
off ices. 
78 Held from August 21-23 and November 6-8,1984. 
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redevelopment of several CWS sites with planning advantages with the 
aim of keeping CWS, with their employing potential, in the borough 
and this particular site represented Phase 3 of that programme. 79 The 
site was to be linked by planning agreement to the refurbishment of 
large premises in Fairclough Street for industrial use as small 
workshops. The other CWS sites were also linked to this Industrial 
redevelopment so as to produce about 9000m2 of offices to 7000m* at 
Fairclough Street. 
The Inspector visited the appeal site, Fairclough Street and other 
office developments in the locality and his six page decision letter 
discussed what he considered to be the three principal issues raised by 
the appeal: whether it was practical to refurbish the appeal premises 
for industrial use; if not, whether the location was suitable for offices; 
whether the additional floorspace would produce an unacceptable 
increase in office space in that part of the borough. eO In answering 
these questions the Inspector made extensive use of evidence presented 
on the economic viablility of developing Prescot Street. Quantity 
surveyors had been used to analyse the likely costs of refurbishing the 
whole building for industrial use (as desired by the GLC) together with 
the likely profits on its development as offices. The Inspector 
concluded that the former development was not viable, whereas the 
second allowed the developer sufficient profits to also provide the 
anticipated gains at Fairclough Street. 
79 See CWS Schemes in chapter 7. 
80 Appeal by the Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd, under 
TCPA 1971, S. 36 and Schedule 9, decision dated March 4 1986, DOE 
reference T/App/E5900/A/84/10874/P7 (Inspector J. M. Loveday B. Eng., 
C. Eng., M. I. C. E. ) 
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I take the view that evaluations of development should have 
regard to the market forces which dictate the likely level of 
investments into schemes of this nature. Neither the GLC 
nor the Borough Council have any proposals to acquire and 
develop the site. I am satisfied that there is very little 
prospect of the premises being refurbished to provide 
industrial units. With over 1m. sq. ft. of vacant industrial and 
storage space on the Borough ouncil's list, as well as that 
unreported, I can find no special justification to warrant 
retaining the premises to meet the uncertain prospect of 
them being used for industrial purposes. "ei 
This approach as to what was relevant in considering the 
acceptability of a proposed development goes much further than that 
anticipated in existing caselaw on the nature of development control. 
For example, Stringer v MHLG82 significantly broadened the approach 
to material considerations for determining planning applications and is 
still treated as authoritative. Cooke J. stated that for a consideration 
to be material it must be of a planning nature and any consideration 
which related to the use and development of land (not only those of 
amenity) could be material depending on the circumstances of the case. 
In Esdell Caravan Parks ltd v Hemel Hempstead RDCR Lord Denning 
MR had listed sewerage, education, traffic, shopping, amenities and the 
effect of the development on social balance of the community as 
potentially relevant factors. Yet the Inspector here was looking 
directly at the cost and economic viability of the scheme in terms of 
likely profit yields and the potential for development actually to take 
place as relevant factors. Thus he took into account not only the 
effect of the development on the use of land but the viability of 
the 
scheme for the developer in the present economic climate as opposed 
81 Decision letter ibid. p. 2. 
82 [19711 1 All ER 65; [1970] 1 WLR 128. 
83 [1965] 3 All ER 737. 
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to the viability of alternatives, taking the evaluation of applications 
into the realm of economic decision making, rather than restricting it 
to the allocation of space. 84 
A similar attitude was apparent in his consideration of the 
availability of offices in this part of London. The GLC had presented 
figures for all of London to show twenty million square feet of offices 
in the pipeline, with a potential further thirty million square feet on 
sites where consent would in principle be granted, producing sufficient 
offices to meet requirements until the end of the century. The extra 
restraints adopted by the GLC, in its proposed amendments to the 
GLDP, were given little weight by the Inspector in view of the 
forthcoming abolition of the GLC and the negative response of the 
SSE. 85 The Inspector went on to state that the city fringe should be 
looked at as a separate area for office development because of the 
particular demands made upon it, and on the figures presented by 
Tower Hamlets, there was expected to be insufficient supply over 
demand for office space in the Borough over the next seven years. 
In concluding that this development would not lead to an 
oversupply of offices the Inspector took into account evidence on the 
importance, in terms of invisible earnings within the economy, of the 
relationship between international and London markets facilitated by 
office development in this area. He also concluded that the supply 
84 This distinction between the economic and allocation of space 
is intended to refer to the perceived role of planning and should not 
be read as confirmation of the two actually as distinct processes. In 
other words the allocation and use of space is a necessarily political 
process which effects and is affected by social (including economic) 
conditions. See eg., Foucault, M. Discipline & Punish, 1977. Trans. 
A. Sheridan. London: Pantheon. 
65 DOE Statement of the SSE on Alterations to the Greater 
London Development Plan, October 23,1984. HMSO. 
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and demand of offices is primarily a matter to be determined by the 
market, yet, in identifying the particular market and the particular 
area (within which demand for offices is actually highest) as relevant 
factors on this application for development, the Inspector treated 
market forces as part of his planning decision. 
In dealing with the remaining issue identified by him, the 
location of offices, the Inspector brought in economic considerations 
wider than merely market forces. He began by making reference to 
the Borough Plan Inquiry and the treatment of the location criteria 
within that document (400m from a designated transport interchange) 
as not being a rigid line, so as to include the site within an area 
where office development could be allowed. He refered to the 
distance from Aldgate East station as being 440m and the other 
stations which are in walking distance, and the proximity of this site 
to other office developments as making it an appropriate site. He 
then looked at the criteria for allowing office development, as set out 
in paragraph 4.15 of the GLDP, and discussed environmental issues, 
planning gain and employment as the relevant tests. 
In reaching conclusions on each of these, he took into account 
characteristics of the area, the availability of industrial space and the 
types of employment required in the area. In considering the plot 
ratio of the proposed site he acknowledged that it exceeded the 
normal and that identified in the IDP and the Borough Plan, but did 
not simply apply these measures but examined the scale and setting of 
nearby developments to find the development acceptable. He found 
that office development would have less affect on the amenity of the 
area than industrial development by taking into account the likely 
noise generated and the proximity of housing to the site. In assessing 
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the contribution made by the planning gain element the Inspector 
began by comparing the amount of floorspace (21,000f2 of industrial 
units and 42,000f2 of offices) but went on to consider the provision of 
employment this represented, which would not be feasible without the 
level of office space at Prescot Street. So, again, he was not simply 
applying percentage criteria but assessing the economic value of the 
proposal as a whole in light of the social structure of the Borough. 
The scheme not only provides for a new building on the site 
of scale similar to others in the immediate locality but it 
will enable development of the Fairclough Street industrial 
conversion, a planning gain, to proceed as secured by an 
agreement. The provision of new jobs is an important 
feature of the proposal and the related scheme. With the 
staggering potential of some 50m. sq. ft. of office space in 
Central London the proposed scheme of up to 42,000 sq. ft. 
cannot be regarded as one of strategic importance. I attach 
considerable weight to the Borough Council's resolve to 
permit the development, a decision which must have been 
taken after having regard to all its obligations to the 
community. "86 
Nowhere in his decision did the Inspector question the validity of 
the planning agreement, which he had before him, nor the necessity of 
considering the obligations of the Council which extend to the socio- 
economic status of the Borough as a whole. The assumption 
throughout was that this was a necessary aspect of planning rather 
than exceptional. Finally, the conditions suggested by the Inspector 
made no reference to the planning gain element nor to the planning 
agreement although his decision accepted the essential part they 
played in making the scheme acceptable. 
86 Decision letter supra note 81, p. 5, paragraph 22. 
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36/40 ARTILLERY LANE, SPITALFIELDS: Decision dated July 18,1983 
An Inquiry was held in May 1983 and the Inspector dismissed the 
appeals against the refusal of applications made for the demolition of 
an unlisted building in a conservation area and construction of a new 
office and residential building, whilst specifically not commenting on 
the Council's office policy. 
I do not find it necessary in this case to go further into 
this aspect of the case [the loss of industrial floorspace and 
insufficient level of residential gain] or to comment on the 
acceptability of the Council's policy of expecting a 
replacement of industrial floorspace or as much as a 55% 
proportion of residential accomodation. "87 
The Inspector did, however, recite in his report the attitude of the 
appellant, the Council and SHPRS to planning gain and his conclusions 
were strongly influenced by the representations made by SHPRS at the 
Inquiry. 
The scheme under consideration involved the demolition of 
buildings which formed part of a continuous terrace and, although 
delapidated and mediocre in appearance, contributed to the street 
scene of the area of narrow streets in this part of Spitalfields. On 
the other hand, they were almost opposite a seven storey glass-clad 
office building developed by Central & City. 88 Much of the evidence 
submitted concerned the viability of refurbishing these buildings in 
such a way as the development would conform with office policy and 
87 Appeals by Eversleigh Investment and Property Company Ltd 
under TCPA 1971 S. 36 and paragraph 8, Schedule 11. DOE reference 
App/5031/A/82/008586 and App/5031/E/82/257. Decision letter dated 
July 18,1983, Report of Inspector CF Allan CB, ARIBS, FRTPI attached, 
para. 41. 
88 See FABS Scheme. 
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both parties presented conflicting figures on refurbishment costs and 
the need for industrial floorspace in the area. The Inspector 
concluded that the developers had not effectively proved that such a 
scheme was impossible. The Inspector did, however, register concern 
over whether such a scheme if it had a high residential content would 
actually be undertaken, leaving the buildings to deteriorate still 
further. 
Having concluded that demolition could not be justified, leaving a 
presumption of preservation in a conservation area intact, the 
Inspector assessed the proposal for development. He concluded on this 
that the policies were not complied with and it would be against the 
public interest to allow speculative office development and the loss of 
potential light industrial and residential use. 
The evidence, particularly that submitted by the Spitalfields 
Housing and Planning Rights Service persuades me of the 
special character of the community of the locality, the 
potential buoyancy of its trades and businesses, its 
dependancy on a particular variety of job opportunities and 
low-cost housing and the need for an available choice of 
inexpensive small industrial units. None of the resultant 
community requirements would appear to be assisted by a 
net loss of potential small industrial units or potential 
residential accomodation and the Council's office and 
industrial policies are designed to avoid such losses. Indeed, 
it appears to me to be important in the interests of the 
local community to restrain the tendancy for speculative 
office development to make further incursions. "89 
In this, the Inspector reinforced the policy of restraint included 
in the office policy and the refusal had been issued on the grounds 
that only in exceptional circumstances, where the scheme improved or 
bestowed a public benefit on the neighbourhood, or directly 
contributed towards a specified and necessary planning objective, 
89 ibid. 
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would offices be allowed. 90 The scheme was for 824m2 of offices with 
two residential flats above, which had no independant access, and 
involved the loss of industrial space with no proposed replacement, 
and as such did not present an exceptional scheme and was in direct 
conflict with paragraphs 4.86,4.22 and 4.24 of the draft Borough Plan. 
During the course of the Inquiry the appellants argued that the 
planning gain requirement of 55% residential space on office 
development within a conservation area and not involving 
refurbishment was `arbitrary, onerous and inappropriate, ignoring the 
physical and economic constraints of individual sites'. They submitted 
in evidence as support for their argument the PAG report and the 
Draft Circular on Planning Gain. The Council for their part justified 
the policies on the basis of ensuring a mix of use by restricting 
speculative offices and increases in land values. SHPRS, on the other 
hand, presented detailed information on the dire state of housing, the 
demand for small industrial units and the adverse effect of office 
development on these needs which were, in their view, inadequately 
compensated for by planning gain policies. 
The Inspector, however, declined to comment upon the merits of 
any of these three approaches, or on the relevance of the PAG report 
and the draft circular to the issues raised, although neither document 
was mentioned in his findings or conclusions. The appellant had 
specifically directed the Inspector's attention to the draft circular's 
requirement to only impose planning gain obligations where it was 
unreasonable to grant permission without them, rather than as a 
90 Notice of Refusal of planning permission. 
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normal practice. 91 They also referred him to a ministerial decision92 
which supported this view. 
Section 4.15 of the GLDP says that account should be taken 
of planning; this should be construed on the merits and the 
ability of the site to give planning advantages, and should 
not be construed in a mandatory sense. "93 
The Inspector made no finding on this point and did not question the 
requirement of a planning gain, but merely assessed its adequacy. The 
approach he took to the development was squarely based on the 
figures presented on economic viability and on an assessment of the 
public interest from the evidence given, which in this case was largely 
supported by Council policy. 
C. THE COURTS 
The courts have rarely considered whether a Council's decision to 
refuse planning permission on the grounds of non-compliance with an 
office policy which requires planning gain94 is intra vires and 
91 DOE Draft Circular on Planning Gain, para. 4&6. London: 
HMSO (the content of these paragraphs are basically the same as the 
final version). 
92 Appeal against the decision of the London Borough of 
Richmond upon Thames Council to refuse planning permission for the 
erection of a four-storey building comprising three shops on ground 
floor with offices above, at 26/30 London Road, Twickenham, DOE 
Reference T/App/5028/A/81 /097 1 7/G7. Reported (1983) JPL 265-269. 
93 ibid. p. 266. 
94 This begs the question as to whether the courts can allow 
the challenge of a policy they consider to be invalid after the 
requirements of TCPA, 8.242(1) have elapsed. It appears that a plan 
cannot be challenged as invalid, Rv SSE ex Parte Ostler [1977] 1 QB 
122, EH Bradley & Sons Ltd v SSE [1983] JPL 43, but it remains 
arguable that the policy itself may be challenged as it is only 
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consequently have not commented on the legality of the practice. In 
the cases discussed in this section the court has been confronted with 
the status of planning gain policies, the effect of the PAG Report on 
those policies and the role of planning gain in the system of 
development control; yet the judgments are not categoric and rely 
upon a rational interpretation of the status of the policies examined 
and continue to use tests based upon 'proper planning objectives' and 
`proper planning objections' without clarifying their interpretation of 
those phrases. 
The courts have also been called upon to judge the validity of 
using conditions and agreements to achieve certain objectives but that 
involves an assessment of the legality of the method of enforcement 
rather than of the process of negotiation itself or of the policy 
making functions of the planning authority. 95 In view of the nature 
of the system it is not surprising that little judicial attention has 
focused upon this area. The major bargaining tool is the avoidance of 
conflict so as to avoid the delays and expense of invoking the court 
system as a mediating force. Any involvement by the courts, 
therefore, is necessarily marginal in terms of direct control, but 
remains important as an indirect influence on the operation of the 
process in that policies and practices are adapted and administered so 
something which the SSE must have regard to and may therefore be 
affected by other material considerations, Westminster City Council v 
SSE and Another [1984] JPL 27 (Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer). 
Whether the issue of the vires of the policy Is intact a material 
consideration is not certain. 
95 This distinction is made clear, eg., in Westminster Renslade 
Ltd v SSE and Another [1983] P&CR 255 where Forbes, J. at 264-267 
distinguishes between what may validly be taken Into account in 
assessing an application and what would be ultra vires if imposed as a 
condition. See below for discussion. 
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as to be justifiable under the law. This does not mean that the law 
can effectively control negotiation, but rather that negotiation will 
adapt to the circumstances presented to it by law: the few decisions 
by the courts were analysed by the officers (legal and planning) at 
Tower Hamlets to assess whether they may be interpreted in such a 
way as to allow negotiation to continue in its present form or whether 
its basis of operation must be adjusted so as to allow it to continue 
under a different guise. 
The courts have long indicated the function of local planning 
authorities to weigh the benefits of a planning application against its 
disadvantages when reaching a decision. 96 There has been some 
judicial acknowledgement of the relationship between this function and 
the provision of planning gain. For example, in RKT Investments Ltd. 
v Hackney London BC97 Sir Douglas Frank QC upheld the validity of 
an informative on a permission intended to encourage a planning gain 
to balance a planning loss produced by office development. 
This case concerned the use of a warehouse for offices and the 
Secretary of State attached a certificate to the Office Development 
Permit requiring the offices to be used only by the applicants. The 
permission included this as a condition and attached an informative to 
the effect that if the freeholders of the premises were to convert 
another building currently in office use to residential, the Council 
would consider an application to modify this condition. After finding 
that the office development was contrary to the developemnt plan 
96 See eg. Stringer v MHLG [1971]1 All ER 65; Granada 
Theatres Ltd v SSE [1976] JPL 96; Clyde & Co v SSE [1977] 2 All ER 
1123 at 1126. 
97 QBD, [1978] 36 P&CR 442. 
496 
which advocated the restraint of offices in central London, Sir Douglas 
treated the development as representing a planning loss which the 
Council had a valid ground for trying to balance with a planning gain. 
It is possible, as said in evidence, that but for the potential 
residential use of Insurance House permission might not 
have been granted at all, but that does not vitiate the 
certification. 
The conclusion that I have reached is that the only motive 
for the certification was to safeguard the development plan 
and that the informative (in the planning permission) was no 
more than an encouragement to someone to bring about the 
change to residential use of Insurance House so that there 
would be a planning gain in that use to set off against the 
planning loss at Chart Street. Accordingly it follows that in 
my judgment this action fails ". 98 
In performing this function the local planning authority is 
entitled to consider the benefits offered by the developer which would 
form the content of a planning agreement as well as those falling 
within the application itself, 99 although there must be a relationship 
between the two. 
In McLaren v SSE and Another'00 Woolf, J. considered an 
application under S. 205 TCPA 1971 in respect of a dismissal of an 
appeal against refusal of permission for the use of a building for the 
processing and retailing of meat in a green belt area. The facts are 
98 ibid. at 447. 
99 eg. Brittania (Cheltenham) Ltd v SSE and Tewkesbury Council 
[1978] JPL 554, where Sir Douglas Frank QC overturned the decision 
of the SSE as he had refused to consider the content of agreements 
reached on the provision of open space, a children's play area and a 
shopping/social centre within a housing development. These 
agreements had been made after refusal of permission but before the 
appeal was heard so were not a part of the application itself. Sir 
Douglas went on to say that the layout for these gains could be 
included as valid conditions on the consent as there was no required 
public dedication, distinguishing it from Hall & Co v Shoreham UDC 
[1964] 1 WLR 240. 
100 QBD, un reported, noted (1979) SJ 370, transcript: Barnett, Lenton. 
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unusual in that the appellants, realising the unacceptability of their 
proposal, persuaded the Council to consider planning gains including 
the extinguishment of existing use rights and limitations on the 
number of employees and working hours on the site. An agreement 
covering these gains was drawn up, 101 but due to local opposition the 
agreement was not signed and a refusal was isssued. 
At the appeal the Inspector referred to the agreement but did 
not consider the contents of it as relevant and the SSE accepted his 
conclusions. The issue before the court was the acceptability of this 
approach. Woolf, J. concluded that by refusing to balance the benefits 
proposed by the developer alongside the disbenfits of the application 
the SSE had erred and the reasons stated for the dismissal were 
inadequate. 
The Inspector, because he had ignored the S. 52 agreement in 
coming to his decision, never considered those planning 
gains; and, because the Secretary of State, as regards the 
merits, had merely said that he agreed with the Inspector's 
conclusions, he has likewise not dealt with those merits. 
Bearing in mind how extensive they were I think that it was 
at least incumbent on the Secretary of State to say 
something to the effect that although it was recognised that 
there would be planning gains from the proposals contained 
in the S. 52 agreement, they were not sufficient, in his view, 
to justify the development. " 
This approach was reiterated in Westminster Renslade Ltd v SSE 
and Another102 which affirmed the relevance of considering the 
provision of planning gain in deciding whether to grant or refuse 
planning permission, while also stating it to be outside the powers of 
a planning authority to require gains through the use of planning 
conditions. 
101 This case is also considered in chapter 6. 
102 QBD, [1983] P&CR 255. 
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Mr Brown [on behalf of the SSE and the planning authority] 
... accepts that any condition suggesting that there should 
be a provision of parking space subject to public control 
would be ultra vires the planning authority and, of course, 
the Secreatry of State equally. He goes on, however, to say 
that it is legitimate to take into account, in deciding 
whether to grant or refuse a planning permission, that the 
proposed development would produce a gain for the public 
and that the provision of public off-street car parking is 
such a gain and, therefore, a legitimate consideration in this 
case. Of course, if the developer freely chooses to give 
away his right because he considers that it is more likely 
that he will get planning permission if he does, then it may 
be legitimate to take into account what he is providing as a 
planning gain, but it cannot be right, in my view, to say 
that planning permission can be refused unless a landowner 
takes on the burden that should more properly be 
shouldered by a local authority in another capacity. "103 
This amounts to a denial of the underlying attitude behind the 
PAG Report in that Forbes, J. accepted `of course' that bargaining is a 
part of the development control process and that planning gains are 
not necessarily illegitimate if they cannot be included in a valid 
condition. Rather, he asserted a dichotomy between negotiating over 
the grant of permission and the content of what can be actually 
imposed on the developer through conditions. In accordance with this 
he spoke of freedom of choice on the developer's part, although at the 
same time acknowledging the motives behind that exercise of 'choice'. 
Looking more closely at the facts of this case, it clearly 
represents a negotiated planning scheme, but the court only addressed 
itself to one aspect of the gains involved and makes no reference to 
the benefits provided within the scheme itself. The application 
concerned a site for office development surrounding Feltham railway 
station in the London Borough of Hounslow and the notice of motion 
was against the several bases of the SSE's decision to refuse the 
103 ibid. at 266-7. 
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development including the scale of the development and the lack of 
provision for public car parking space. Planning gain was considered 
in the context of the latter point, in that the failure to provide this 
benefit could not form a valid ground for refusal. On this point the 
decision of the Secretary of State was quashed. 
The court did not comment directly on the gains actually 
included in the scheme and in a planning agreement already signed 
between the parties. The appeal arose, in fact, as a result of a 
deemed refusal following failure by the Council to determine the 
application within the prescribed time. 104 The local authority 
supported the developer at the appeal, with the GLC and local 
residents in opposition. The planning application for the site was not 
only for an office development but also for redevelopment of the 
railway station, a multi-storey car park, surface car parking, a bus 
and rail interchange, a car and pedestrian bridge, accommodation for 
public and community use, a rifle range, improvements to existing 
public gardens and pond and to a public house. It was accepted that 
these were elements of the scheme and the adequacy of them as 
planning gains was not argued, although it was indicated that the 
office development grew to its now unacceptable size as a result of 
gains provided. 
In reaching the decision that the requirement of public car 
parking was outside of the powers of the planning authority, the court 
relied strongly on the fact that the GLDP included its policy on this 
point in a section titled 'Parking' which was interpreted as a local 
authority objective addressed to non-planning functions. As such, it 
104 See TCPA, 1971, S. 37. 
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was outside of planning powers to achieve this objective through the 
vehicle of development control. 105 On the other hand, the provisions 
included in paragraph 4.15 were treated as proper planning policies. 
Taken together, all of the points made in this case do not 
detract from, or diminish, the operation of planning gain, but merely 
contain the use of conditions along established lines. The most 
significant aspect is the effect which it could have on respective 
bargaining positions by making the failure to provide planning gain an 
inadequate ground for refusal on its own. However, this part of the 
judgment is clearly concerned with planning gain which involves an 
obligation on the developer which should be provided by the local 
authority in a capacity other than as planning authority, rather than 
for the achievement of planning objectives. 
The approach here was largely mirrored by Glidewell J. in London 
Borough of Richmond upon Thames v SSE and Hutchison Locke and 
Monk, 106 in a judgment delivered during the same month, which dealt 
with non-compliance with a planning gain policy as grounds for refusal 
and the effect of the PAG Report. He concluded that where there 
were no legitimate planning objections other than the lack of planning 
advantages there was no valid ground for refusal. He found that the 
office policy was valid and had to be taken into account by the 
Inspector but did not go on to explore, in the light of non-compliance 
with that valid policy, what amounted to a legitimate planning 
objection. 
105 Hall & Co. Ltd. v Shoreham-by-Sea UDC [1964]1 WLR 240, 
[1964]1 All ER 1; Rv London Borough of Hillingdon ex Darte Rwro 
Homes Ltd [1974] QB 720, [1974] 2 WLR 805, [1974]2 All ER 643. 
106 QBD, CO/1171/82, May 9,1983, noted In [1984] JPL 24, The 
Times May 16,1983 (Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer). 
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It seems from his judgment that it is possible for office use to 
produce valid planning objections and, as an extension of this, for a 
policy to balance those objections to make it acceptable under certain 
circumstances, such as the provision of planning advantages. Yet, as 
in the Westminster Renslade case there is no clear statement as to 
when it is valid to operate the policy or what the characteristics of a 
`proper planning objection' are. If the planning authorities in these 
cases had argued that the policy was necessary to achieve the 'proper 
planning objective' of a balanced mix of land use would the courts 
have refused to uphold it? The only certainty here is that these 
judgments leave it open to argue that it would be a proper planning 
objection to allow office development without appropriate gains if the 
Council demonstrated that it was necessary to sustain a proper 
planning objective. 
Glidewell, J. certainly suggested that the PAG Report, by its 
definition of planning gain, was talking about something far more 
restricted than the 'planning advantages' referred to in the Richmond 
Plan and the GLDP, as some of the latter at least could be inherent in 
the application itself and/or be incorporated into valid conditions. 
[The authors of the report] defined 'planning gain ' as 
meaning 'advantages which could not be gained by the 
imposition of conditions on planning permission'. Thus, in 
my view, they clearly meant something quite different from 
the wider phrase 'planning advantage' used In the plan 
because, quite clearly, some at least of the planning 
advantages referred to in the plan would be inherent in the 
application itself and certainly some could be, in my 
opinion, the subject of condition. "107 
He went on to quote the guidelines suggested by the Report: that if 
there were no legitimate planning objections consent should be given 
107 Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer ibid. p. 6. 
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and if there was some technical problem with the development which 
could be overcome with a planning agreement the Council should grant 
consent subject to such an agreement. Overall, he concluded that the 
Borough's policy was valid, it should have been applied to the facts of 
the case which involved an extension to an existing office building and 
the PAG Report could not override that policy. He, however, did not 
quash the decision as he considered that the Inspector had found 
considerable planning advantages in the development. 
Three months after this decision planning gain was again 
considered by the Queen's Bench Division on an application under 
section 245 TCPA 1971 - Westminster City Council v SSE and Another 
- to quash the decision of an Inspector to allow office use to continue 
in premises in Mayfair. 1N Westminster, a strongly Conservative 
Council, have operated a planning gain policy'09 since the early 1970's 
and refused an application for permanent office use on premises which 
had a temporary office use until 1990, on the following ground: 
The proposal is contrary to the Council's policy as 
expressed in Chapter 10 of the City of Westminster District 
Plan which is to restrain the further development of offices 
in Central london and in particular paragraph 10.27 which 
states that permission for office development within the 
Central Activities Zone will normally only be granted, 
subject to other policies in the plan, if accompanied by 
appropriate planning gain. It is considered that planning 
gain in the form of residential accomodation can be 
provided on this site but that, in the absence of any such 
gain, the continued use of the building as offices beyond 
the expiration of the current limited period permission is 
unacceptable in the context of the above policies. " 
108 Westminster City Council V SSE and Another, QBD, 
CO/1193/82, noted in [1984] JPL at 27, transcript Martin Walsh Cherer. 
109 It has been suggested that Westminster and Tower Hamlets 
have been the two most consistent, pragmatic and successful boroughs 
to operate a planning gain policy. See Focus on City of London 
Fringes, (1983) Estates Gazette. 
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The paragraph of the District Plan referred to appeared under 
the heading 'Ensuring that Planning Advantages result from New 
Development' and stated that the Council would consider applications 
for office development subject to account being taken of the contents 
of paragraph 4.15 of the GLDP. The Council added an informative to 
the refusal enforcing the point that permission would only be granted 
if planning gains were included in the proposal: 
You are advised that in the City Council's view the 
potential to provide residential accomodation exists primarily 
in the 'Brick Street buildings ' and the top floor only of 17 
Old Park Lane and that if a scheme were submitted showing 
the conversion of these floors into residential use the 
Committee would be likely to approve permanent office 
consent in respect of the rest of the main building 17 Old 
Park Lane. " 
The appeal had been dealt with by an Inspector on written 
representations and his report was quite short and indicated that the 
planning gain policy was not one which could properly be applied, 
citing the PAG Report as authority. He, accordingly, decided that 
consent should be given and the Council appealed against the decision 
on five grounds: the Inspector had failed to have regard to the 
Statutory Development Plan; had failed to apply the residential and 
office policies of the District Plan and the GLDP; had taken account 
of and used as a deciding factor an advisory report; had misunderstood 
what amounted to new development under paragraph 7.6 of the GLDP. 
The most relevant parts of the Inspector's Report were as follows: 
2 ... I am of the opinion that the decision in this case is 
primarily dependent upon whether the continuation of the 
office use in question would involve a serious breach of a 
proper planning policy for office development in this part of 
London, bearing in mind the Report of the Property 
Advisory Group tp the Secretary of State on the subject of 
'Planning Gain ', their view that the practice of bargaining 
for planning gain is unacceptable, and the fact that the 
recommended issue of guidelines to which the Department's 
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press release of 26th October, 1981 referred, is a matter yet 
to be determined. 
3. The matter of whether the absence of planning gain is 
properly a compelling planning objection is in doubt, 
pending the issue of the Secretary of State's guidelines. In 
these circumstances, and because I take the view that 
planning permission cannot properly be withheld solely 
because an alternative new development is to be preferred, 
I am not satisfied that the continued use of the appeal 
premises as offices would involve the breach of a planning 
policy which may properly be applied for the control of 
office development, notwithstanding the fact that the policy 
in question is embodied in the adopted City of Westminster 
District Plan. 
4 ... even if the policy of requiring a planning gain is one 
which may in general be properly maintained under the 
provisions of the District Plan, the use under consideration 
may not be a new use which by virtue of paragraph 7.6 of 
the Greater London Development Plan, should be guided, in 
whole or in part, to another area. " 
Reading these three paragraphs together produces confusion. In 
the first the Inspector appeared to be putting the approved Plan aside 
and considering what the proper planning policy ought to be in the 
light of the PAG Report, but in the second he pointed out that the 
proper planning policy was that included in the Plan although he 
appeared to be talking about something completely different. Finally, 
he casts doubt in the last paragraph on the validity of the policy 
adopted in the Plan. Mr Widdicombe QC concluded that the 
Inspector's Report was 'a fine old muddle' and quashed the decision. 
However, a number of arguments were rehearsed before the Court 
which Mr Widdicombe QC went on to consider. It had been suggested 
that the policy itself was ultra vires and that the Court could hold it 
so"O notwithstanding the fact that the time limit for submissions on a 
policy had elapsed and the policy approved. Mr Widdicombe did not 
agree that the Court had the power to find It ultra vires once a 
110 Citing Anisminic Ltd. v Foreign ComiDensetion Commission_ 
[1969] 1 All ER 208. 
505 
statutory time limit had elapsed 11' but added that it could be 
challenged on appeal to the Secretary of State as they were not legal 
proceedings. This assessment infact goes further than Rv SSE ex 
Parte Ostler upon which Mr Widdicombe relied, as that case is 
authority for saying that a statutory Plan cannot be challenged, 
whereas what was submitted was that the policy itself could be 
challenged as invalid and so not applied to determination of the 
application. 
It was accepted in this case that the Development Plan was not a 
binding document but one which the planning authority, Inspector of 
Secretary of State should take regard of. 112 This being so, it could 
be argued that other relevant considerations dictated that the policy 
should not be applied, and arguably that could include the vires of the 
policy. 
Mr Widdicombe also commented upon the status of the PAG 
Report and relied upon his own judgment in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
West Oxfordshire District Council'1 and that of Glidewell, J. in 
London Borough of Richmond upon Thames v SSE and Hutchison Locke 
and Monk", to conclude that a draft circular could not be a relevant 
consideration but the final report of an advisory body to the Secretary 
of State was such a consideration and could be given whatever weight 
considered appropriate by the Inspector. As to the extent of its 
"' Rv SSE ex Parte Ostler [1977] 1 QB 122. 
112 See Niarchos (London) Ltd. v SSE and Another (1977) 35 
P&CR 259; Co-Operative Retail Services Ltd. v Taff _Ely rou h 
Council and Another (1979) 39 P&CR 223. 
113 [1982] JPL 577. 
114 QBD The Times, May 16,1983, noted [1984] JPL 24, 
CO/1171/82 Transcript Marten Walsh Cherer. 
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influence he went further than Glidewell J. in the Richmond case by 
saying that it could justify a departure from the Development Plan or 
be used as an indicator of what a proper planning policy should be. 
Glidewell, J. had specifically stated that the PAG report could not be 
used in such a way that it `wiped out the development plan or any 
part of it'. 115 
Glidewell J. 's approach was significant in that by treating the 
report as a relevant consideration, it follows that failing to take 
account of it would amount to an error in law. As discussed above, 
the Report betrays a lack of understanding of the process of 
development control and its conclusions are based upon a definition 
which fails to appreciate the form of planning gain. To require such 
a Report to be taken account of at law essentially allows the views of 
a consultation body to directly affect the development control process. 
Concern has been voiced about circulars and other official documents 
being considered as material considerations in that it allows direct 
government interference without the need for legislation; the Glidewell 
J. judgment widens that concern, but that of Mr Widdicombe QC could 
open the way for the displacement of statutory documents through this 
informal mechanism. 
In a less direct context the courts have commented upon the 
possibility of using development control to achieve positive planning 
purposes in enforcing a particular use. These cases are relevant to a 
consideration of planning gain on two levels: they interact with 
planning gain policies which involve requiring a developer to provide 
115 Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer, ibid. p. 11. 
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certain uses within a scheme and they also offer comment on the 
mechanisms through which a planning authority can enforce a 
particular use. The line of cases, begining in 1976 with Granada 
Theatres Ltd. v SSE and Another, '16 established that a preference for 
one use over another without any planning merits to support it did 
not amount to a material consideration but went on to acknowledge 
the relevance of weighing alternative uses for a site under 
consideration. This judicial acceptance of an essentially common sense 
approach, which was certainly departmental practice, 117 indicated a 
willingness by the courts to take into account more than purely 
private property interests118 and to consider applications in the light 
of less profitable as well as equally profitable competition of uses. 
In Clyde & Co. v SSE119 the court considered an application 
concerning the change of use of a building with the permitted use of 
offices and residential to solely office use. The Court of Appeal 
stated that it was relevant for the planning authority to consider the 
housing and other needs in the area against the application proposal 
when assessing its merits. 120 The fact that the premises had never 
been used for residential purposes, that such a use was considered by 
116 [1976] JPL 96. 
117 See Clyde & Co. v SSE [1977] 1 WLR 926 at 1126. 
118 See McAuslan, P. Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press p. 176-179 who notes that a similar movement from a 
private property ideology to one based on public interest can be 
detected in eg. Sovmots Investments Ltd. v SSE [1976] 1 All ER 178. 
119 supra note 117. 
120 These clearly represents quite a different approach from Rv 
London Borough of Hillingdon ex Parte Royco Homes Ltd. [1974] 2 All 
ER 643 mentioned above. See McAuslan, P. (1980)op. cit. supra note 
118, p178-9 for discussion. 
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the developer to be uneconomic and would in any event be restricted 
to the private market did not make it an immaterial consideration, 
whether or not it was included in a statutory plan. 
This approach was taken up by Niarchos (London) Ltd v SSE and 
Another'21 and applied by Forbes, J. In the later, 1981, Granada 
Theatres Ltd v SSE122 which concerned an appeal from the SSE's 
attempts to balance the existing uneconomic use (as a cinema), 
desirable in planning terms, with the less desirable use in the 
application (a bingo hall) by suggesting a mixed use within the 
building. In the earlier Granada case Woolf, J. had overturned the 
Secretary of State after a concession was made by counsel to the 
effect that the only reason for the refusal was to enforce a particular 
use. Forbes, J. did not consider the approach of the SSE in-the later 
case to be so unreasonable as to overturn the refusal to allow the 
undesirable use outright because the preservation of an existing use 
was necessarily a material consideration. Consequently, what Forbes, 
J. was saying in this case was that it was acceptable for the local 
planning authority to continue to refuse the bingo hall use unless the 
applicant agreed to include in the scheme a planning gain in the form 
of a partial cinema use. 
This was considered by Hodgson J. in L. O. Finn & Co. and Others 
v SSE and the London Borough of Brent'23 to represent a decision on 
what amounted to a valid planning consideration. After examining this 
line of cases he concluded that the development control process 
121 cited supra note 112. 
122 [1978] JPL 278. 
123 QBD, CO/476/83, noted [1984] JPL 734, transcript Marten 
Walsh Cherer, November 7,1983. 
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cannot be used to ensure a particular use unless there was a material 
planning reason for doing so. In looking at the two Granada cases he 
distinguished between them on the basis of the existence in one of a 
material planning reason. 
The point in both cases of Granada Theatres Limited v 
Secretary of State seems to me to have been whether there 
was any planning consideration which would entitle the 
Secretary of State to refuse to allow someone to do what 
he liked with his own property. In Granada Theatres Limited 
v Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] JPL 27 Mr 
Justice Woolf accepted, I think, that there was no 'planning 
gain ' to be achieved by the retention of use as a cinema 
over change of use to bingo. In Granada Theatres Limited v 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] JPL 278,257 
EG 1154 Mr Justice Forbes seems to have accepted that 
there was, because it does not seem that there was there 
any other material planning consideration why permission for 
change of use to bingo should be refused ... If the choice 
between cinema and bingo is not a matter for planning 
authorities (unless of course the change has an affect on 
the environment by, for example, an increase in vehicular 
traffic) then Mr Woolf was entirely right ... If it is a 
material planning consideration then Mr Justice Forbes was 
entirely right "124 
By implication he treated the existence of a 'planning gain' as a 
material planning consideration, although he did not define what is 
meant by that phrase in the context within which he made use of it. 
He also refered to a technical view of planning in the indication he 
did give of what in his view amounted to a 'matter for planning 
authorities'. 
This case concerned the use of a building for office use: the 
ground floor had an existing office use but the first floor had a 
permitted residential use which the appellants wished to change to 
offices. The application had been refused on the grounds of being 
contrary to the GLDP in that it represented a loss of residential space 
124 ibid. Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer. 
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and the appeal was dismissed after a public inquiry. The present 
appeal attacked the decision of the SSE for taking into account an 
immaterial consideration by assessing the possibility of the premises 
being used for residential use, for using a test of 'possibility' and for 
reaching an answer to the test in a way that no reasonable SSE could 
have done. In applying the arguments presented Hodgson, J. concluded 
that the possibility of the house reverting to residential use was 
undoubtedly a planning consideration and attempted by counsel to align 
this consideration with the Council pursuing an ulterior, rather than a 
planning purpose was unacceptable. 
" 
... Mr Horton in an elegant, if at times somewhat obscure, 
argument has attempted to extend the principles which have 
been developed in that field of planning law which deals 
with the validity of conditions imposed under sections 
29(1)(a), 30 and 30A of the Act. Any such extension cannot 
be justified by the rationes decidendi of the two Granada 
cases and Clyde ... What Mr Horton contends 
in this case is 
that by taking into consideration the possibility that there 
would be a reversion to residential use of the whole 
premises if planninmg permission for office use on the first 
floor was refused, the Secretary of State was seeking to use 
planning control to bring about the discontinuance of an 
established use without having to pay compensation, and 
that was an ulterior object and not a planning object. I 
cannot think that is right. The Secretary of State is 
entitled to take into account the possibility of a reversion 
of the planning unit under consideration "125 
Thus the court accepted in this case a distinction between 
material considerations and the method of enforcing a particular result 
and maintained that the developer could not be forced to continue or 
implement a particular preferred use. This essentially preserved the 
view of development control as a negative and regulatory power, 
rather than a positive one. However, Hodgson J. does suggest that 
the assessment of a planning application did represent an opportunity 
125 ibid. 
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for the planning authority to try and encourage the developer to 
continue or apply for a preferred use. 
On the Wednesbury aspect of the appeal Hodgson, J. did find in 
favour of the appellants on the basis that the SSE had not addressed 
his mind to the correct question, in that he only considered the 
practical possibility of converting the premises to residential use, 
rather than asking whether there was a 'fair chance that, within the 
period which present planning policies comprehend, the whole of these 
premises will revert to residential use V. In formulating this test he 
had regard to the Clyde & Co and the second Granada Theatres cases, 
and acknowledges that the determination of the test will usually 
depend upon the economic viability of the alternative use. Hence if 
the preferred use is economically unfeasible the planning authority 
must have other planning reasons upon which to refuse the proposed 
use, but where the competing uses are both feasible (although not 
necessarily equally profitable) it is legitimate to use the planning 
system to guide the developer into implementing the preferred use or 
both uses. 
SUMMARY 
Taken at their broadest sense these cases represent a significant 
movement in planning in that they seem to recognise the use of 
planning powers to achieve planning objectives through various means, 
of which valid conditions are only one. Certainly in determining what 
amounts to a planning consideration they signal an approach which 
allows consideration of a broad range of political variables including 
assessments of social needs, the viability of developments and the 
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opinions of government appointed bodies, while leaving the concept of 
'proper planning' intact. Judicial pronouncements against the practice 
of planning gain have not been forthcoming, and there have been 
attempts to distinguish unlawful planning gain from the lawful 
attainment of planning advantages on the basis of 'proper planning 
objectives', so as to leave the process to continue without direct 
judicial interference. 
In addition, the courts have made no attempt to draw up 
guidelines and have avoided consideration of the vires of the policies 
themselves. On the other hand they have demonstrated a willingness 
to quash decisions on the basis of procedural faults, such as the 
failure to give proper reasons and the failure to ask the correct 
question. In extending their view of planning considerations they have 
moved beyond considerations which are determinable through hard 
evidence to include some elements which are essentially questions of 
opinion or political choice, such as the test suggested in L. O. Finn & 
Co. v SSE. The total effect of this is uncertainty for the planners as 
to the lawfulness of taking into account various factors, an increase 
in the breadth of control exercised by the courts and a continued 
tension between what planners and lawyers perceive to be within the 
realm of 'proper planning'. 
CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 
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Before this study was commenced it was anticipated that its 
conclusions would answer the question of who actually gains and who 
actually loses through the practice of planning gain. It was assumed 
that there would be identifiable benefits and losses which could be 
attributed to groups of individuals with shared interests and who could 
be differentiated in terms of 'the local authority', 'the developers' and 
'the community'. What evolved, however, was something far more 
complex than this and what the study did succeed in demonstrating 
were the problems inherent in seeking to analyse objectively the 
interests of groups and individuals within a practice involving the 
exercise of power. These conclusions begin with an overview of those 
problems so as to highlight the limitations on the results of this study 
while establishing the importance of recognising those limitations in 
assessing the role of planning gain within the system. The failure to 
recognise the complexities of the process has been a major impetus for 
the demands made to outlaw the practice as 'unlawful' without any 
regard to the characteristics of the system which promoted it and 
which facilitate its continuance. Thereafter, the major arguments of 
this thesis will be briefly recapitulated. 
The hierarchical system of government portrayed in theories of 
liberal western democracy rests on the assumption that legitimacy of 
action is voluntarily given to the state by the population as a whole: 
the passivity of large sections of that population is then attributable 
to the existence of genuine authority of those in power to act on 
their behalf, in the interests of the collective good. ' This consensus 
I See eg. Parsons, T. Sociological Theory and Modern Society, 
1967, Glencoe: Free Press; Dahl, R, Who Governs? 1961, Yale 
University Press. 
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view has been widely criticised by Marxists and Non-Marxists so as to 
present a picture of power not only as the result of authority but as 
producing and reproducing its own legitimacy through coercion, 
inducement and manipulation. This latter view recognises the power 
inherent in defining what the interests of groups are and the use of 
what Gramsci called 'ideological hegemony' to give apparent legitimacy 
to those definitions. Thus the population may be prevented from 
voicing or even recognising what their 'real' interests are. 
Bachrach and Baratz2 have argued against consensus to assert 
that power can be used to avoid the emergence of opposition, and so 
preserve the status quo, by failing to respond to articulated views of 
the less powerful, by detering groups from voicing their objections, or 
by mobilising bias within the system. This latter tactic, referred to as 
the manipulation of political agendas, involves controlling the system 
so as to exclude certain demands from being considered or from even 
crossing anyone's mind. Thus, by excluding debate on particular issues 
the status quo may be preserved and the resulting non-decision 
represents a disguised exercise of power. This approach to non- 
decisions has been criticised and certainly produces methodological 
problems in assessing the influence of these processes in a system 
where power relations are largely routinised. As Durkheim pointed 
out3 one's aspirations are limited by one's expectations as to what is 
likely to be achieved, consequently common perceptions of power may 
preclude the possibility of action at an unconscious, rather than a 
conscious, level. 
2 Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M, Power and Poverty, 1970, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
3 Durkheim, E. Rules of Sociological Method, 1964, New York. 
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This debate raises two parellel issues which are repeated within 
the microcosm of planning gain: the first is one of formal legitimacy 
of any exercise of power and the other is whether the exercise of 
power is objectively in the interests of the population. As has been 
seen these two characteristics are considered necessary to a genuinely 
authoritative relationship but cannot simply be assumed from the 
nature of modern government' and, moreover, rest upon the 
assumption that the 'real' interests of a particular group or individual 
may be identified separately from how those interests are subjectively 
perceived. This assumption is problematic in itself and Keat and 
Urry5 have identified three epistemological traditions influencing the 
different approaches to analysing interests: namely positivism, 
conventionalism and realism. 
Under a positivist analysis relationships within the real world are 
reducable to hypotheses which are then tested through the scientific 
observation of directly perceived data: subjective views of interests 
are, therefore, the only valid criteria by which to measure whether or 
not interests are fulfilled and any objective view is external, 
metaphysical. This clearly excludes the consideration of ideology as a 
method of social controls and creates problems in distinguishing an 
individual's desires from his or her interests. A realist approach, on 
the other hand, takes the view that an individual is precluded from 
distinguishing between real needs and false needs by the existence of 
4 See chapter 3 above. 
5 Keat, R. and Urry, J. Social Theory as Science, 1975, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
6 There are many interesting discussions on this point but for a 
classic statement of it see Marcuse, H. One-Dimensional Man, 1964, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
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ideologies which manipulate and control his or her perceptions. Thus 
an individual, the only appropriate final arbiter, is only able to assess 
what is in his or her best interests if he or she is first released from 
the restraints imposed through ideology.? 
This approach is dominant within the Frankfurt school and 
Habermas has maintained that empirical research cannot be used to 
determine what is in the public interest as data is necessarily 
collected within the context of ideological and political bias. Thus it 
remains the domain of theory 
by counter-factually imagining the limit case of a conflict 
between the involved parties in which they would be forced 
to consciously perceive their interests and strategically 
assert them ... The social scientist can only hypothetically 
project this ascription of interests; indeed a direct 
confirmation of this hypothesis would be possible only in 
the form of a practical discourse among the very individuals 
or groups involved. "e 
As an extension of this, the work of Poulantzas and other structural 
Marxists has taken the view that all interests are class-interests and 
as such are determined by the outcome of class conflict within the 
context of capitalism. This view requires an acceptance of Marxist 
philosophy, which raises the conventionalist perspective on interests as 
it denies the possibility of objective definition outside of the 
theoretical framework in which interests are perceived. 
On this view objective interests cannot be measured, or 
alternatively do not exist, and different paradigms cannot be compared, 
as all may be equally valid in pursuing their individual aims. In 
7 See Marcuse ibid. 
8 Habermas, J. Legitimation Crisis, 1976, London: Heinneman. 
p. 114, cited and discussed by Saunders, P. Urban Politics: A 
Sociological Interpretation, 1983, London: Hutchinson, pp. 37/39. 
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Kuhn's version of this approach, he suggests that some comparison is 
possible but the 'truth' of any argument should only be considered 
within its own paradigm and Lukes, too, is not prepared to accept that 
there are absolutely no objective criteria. He contends that the 
concept of 'real interests' does exist and is an 'irreducibly evaluative 
notion' which gives 'a licence for the making of normative judgments 
of a moral and political character'. 9 Consequently, different views of 
interests will reflect different moral and political standpoints and as 
such will be contestable. 
Saunders, 10 after summarising the literature, contends that it is 
possible to go further than this and identify a definition of real 
interests which refers to the attainment of a benefit and the 
avoidance of cost in any given situation, determined independantly of 
subjective preferences and desires. This utilitarian approach goes on 
to state that it is possible to identify the actual value of the benefits 
and costs when they are viewed in context. The example he suggests 
is if pollution is viewed in the context of health, it can be decided 
objectively that the more pollution in the air the greater the risk to 
health. Thus if policy making is viewed in the context of allocation 
of public resources then benefits may be maximised by obtaining 
'environmental and locational' advantages without increase in local 
taxation, negative visible effects 'and so on'. Saunders goes on to 
state that short term benefits and costs can be empirically quantified 
so as to show an overall pattern between groups of gains and losses. 
9 Lukes, S. Power, A Radical View, 1974, London: Macmillan, 
p. 34. 
10 Saunders, P. Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, 
1983, London: Hutchinson. p. 45. 
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This analysis, however, does not necessarily take the definition 
of 'real interests' any further than Lukes' approach, but merely, in 
most cases, delays the value judgment. Certainly where there is 
strong scientific evidence to show that, for example, pollution is 
harmful to health, then, provided the empirical evidence is considered 
to be sound, a scale of objective values could be created. However, 
where the benefits and costs under analysis are themselves decided 
upon through subjective values, objectivity may be achieved in the 
comparison of one against another but not in the allocation of value 
to each. By requiring that the costs and benefits should be 
determined by someone other than the individuals concerned the 
problem of subjective desires and preferences is avoided, but merely to 
the effect of substituting another group's or individual's political or 
moral view of what amounts to a 'benefit' or, ultimately, 'interest'. 
The dangers inherent in such an opportunity for social control through 
paternalism are obvious. " 
The search for objectively assessed 'real' interests is misplaced 
and to advance a claim for their assessment by others leads to 
simplification and, thus, further obscuring of the very complexities 
which studies should be working to reveal. Not only should the 
perspective of the less powerful or excluded groups or individuals be 
taken, but the unstated assumptions must be revealed as a part of the 
analysis of power. Theorists and reformers who have called for the 
recognition of different perspectives have often reasserted the 
interests of those with access to power, merely changing the context 
11 See, eg., the work of feminist lawyers on the use of 
paternalism to perpetuate inequality as discussed by Jagger, A. 
Feminist Politics and Human Nature, 1983. 
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of existing assumptions12: in other words to dedicate oneself to 
assessing the interests of a disempowered group does not mean that 
unstated assumptions are removed. 
More attention must be paid to the relationship between power 
and knowledge and to the simplifying images of reality which shape 
and are shaped by the prevailing political, economic struggles over 
conflicting images of reality. Ideological success is secured when the 
competing views are perceived as ideology and the dominant view is 
regarded as truth. 13 This process conceals the subjectivity of the 
reality which prevails, making it appear neutral: beyond any single 
perspective. Those whose view remains excluded become convinced by, 
internalise and help reproduce the truth of this reality and challenge 
is subsumed by the routine of practices reinforcing existing structures. 
Any reference to knowledge of 'consensual values' or 'individual 
choice' or 'community benefit' made in this context necessarily raises 
inquiry as to which views of reality are being suppressed, rather than 
assessing the 'objectivity' of the view which is heard. 
Power, under this model, is at its most influential when it seems 
the least controversial: by shaping the content of agendas, 
predetermining preferences and excluding discussion, or thought, on 
possible challenges to the desired result. The interpretation of rules 
and the development of precedents in the way power is exercised 
reinforces the 'reasonableness' and the 'neutrality' of the political 
12 Here I am thinking specifically of the work of John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin which advocate equality but assume a single 
perspective. For discussion see Minow, M. "The Supreme Court 1986 
Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered" (1987) 101 Harvard Law Rev 10 
at 60/61. 
13 See Thompson, E. P. Whigs and Hunters, 1977, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
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practice and thus adds to its acceptibility while embodying a further 
exercise of power. 
Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a 
substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its 
ability to hide its own mechanism. " 14 
Any analysis must then seek out the hidden assumptions, explore 
alternative perceptions of reality and examine the basis of the exercise 
of power critically. The courts have not chosen to adopt this type of 
approach but have explored only the dominant versions of reality they 
are able to hear within the structure of their own position, declaring 
other views as the domain of politics and in so doing reconfirming 
their own 'neutrality'. 
Within this context it is possible to identify a range of different 
views on what amounts to a 'planning gain' in 'real' terms, but the 
reality of each is necessarily subjective. To some of the active local 
groups the only possible compensation for the loss of land to office 
development is low-cost housing: their perspective is coloured by 
emphasising the number of homeless in the borough and the inadequacy 
of existing accomodation. To other groups the restoration of listed 
buildings and the preservation of cultural activities in the borough is 
regarded as a benefit, on the grounds of national heritage and the 
importance of advancing 'community life'. To some developers there is 
no loss in providing local facilities or land for housing as a permission 
to develop is obtained and a measure of the costs could be set off 
against Development Land Tax liability. The Council for their part 
14 Foucault, M. History of Sexuality, Volume 1, trans. R. Hurley, 
1978, New York: Pantheon. p. 86. 
522 
could produce lists of `gains' to appear as compensation for `losses' 
which maintain the balance of mixed uses required by their own 
policies. 
It can be concluded that there are conflicting views on the 
content of an acceptable planning gain and that these views are 
articulated by persons with access to the planning system. They are 
not objective views of the interests of 'the community' or of 'the 
planners' or of 'the developers', but are views fed by the political and 
moral standpoint of the protagonist. Many other views remain 
unarticulated. Above all, the assumption that there is a 
'community' 
interest which merely requires identification is not substantiated 
by 
the data collected. 
These conflicting views extend to the conception of the role of 
planning and, consequently, the limits of that role. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the differing approaches taken towards defining 
planning gain and towards the use of planning agreements. In both of 
these areas the law is effective in tailoring those approaches, but is 
sufficiently flexible to allow any particular group to emphasise and 
interpret the application of law differently. Consequently, the officers 
of the Council were able to justify continuance of the office policy on 
the grounds of there being no judgment which actually declared it to 
be outside of local authority powers. Thus, the law did effect the 
ability of the Council to pursue its policy through its authoritative 
role, but the concern of the officers was to preserve the domain of 
planning gain as a part of the scope. of 'planning' so as to keep its 
legitimacy within their sphere of authority. 
The data collected from Tower Hamlets illustrates this interaction 
between law and planning, with the officers constructing planning gain 
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as justifiable in planning terms, and also by carefully drafting 
agreements to support that justification. Planning gain was not 
pursued as an alternative to the legitimate structure of development 
control, but as a part of it: using the tools and discretions provided 
by that structure and drawing upon the objectivity of their profession. 
The process of negotiation for planning gain did not, therefore, appear 
as underhand or as revolutionary but as a product of the development 
control system. It was operated with a concern for precedent and 
certainty and with a conscious awareness of the legal, political, 
economic demands that the local authority had to satisfy. 
This position was largely mirrored in Sydney, where structural 
reforms had been imposed which did not eradicate negotiation. The 
councils still made use of their discretion to bargain over the content 
of schemes and the level of developer contributions either through 
their interpretation of the legislation, or through operating other 
methods of obtaining contributions outside of the legislation itself. 
The structural reforms, therefore, did alter the framework but the 
economic and political demands upon the councils still remained the 
same. Negotiations were more limited as the bargaining power the 
planners possessed was restricted by the active interference of the 
Land and Environment Court and of state government, but the councils 
did continue to formulate alternative mechanisms for revenue raising. 
This took place within the ambit of 'planning' and in 'the public 
interest' and similar problems of definition of these terms arose in 
Sydney as in London. 
Finally, the influence of planning ideology should not be 
underestimated. The 'common sense' assumptions as to the benefit of 
town planning and of promoting 'community life' through physical 
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development are rarely questioned in the literature, and were used to 
justify the requirement of planning gain. The role of the planner was, 
therefore, guaranteed and reinforced as a necessary expertise for the 
efficient organisation of the city. The role of the local authority as 
provider of facilities and services has added to the scope of planning 
by bringing those concerns within its range. Thus, although appearing 
apolitical, planning is undeniably concerned with the distribution of 
valuable resources and planning determinations are necessarily political. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES 
526 
1. GENERAL 
ABRAHAMS, C. The Language of Cities, 1971. New York: Viking Press. 
ALBROW, M. Bureaucracy, 1970. London: Pall Mall. 
ALDER, J. Development Control, 1979. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
Modern Legal Studies Series. 
ALDERTON, R. Why Planning Gains? The 'contractural' Style of 
Development Control, 1980. Unpublished dissertation, University 
of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Department of Town and Country 
Planning. 
ALDERTON, R. & WILLIAMS, D. "Bargaining in Development Control- 
A Threat to Centralism, or a 'Material' Response to Local 
Problems" (1983) JPL 316. 
ALTSHULER, A. The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis, 1965. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
AMBROSE, P. & COLENUTT, B. The Property Machine, 1975. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. A Penguin Special. 
ARENDT, H. The Human Condition, 1958. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
ARENDT, H. On Revolution, 1963. New York: Viking Press. 
ASHFORD, D. E. Policy and Politics in Britain: The Limits of 
Consensus, 1981. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
ASHWORTH, W. The Genesis of Modern Town Planning, 1954. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
ATIYAH, P. S. From Principle to Pragmatism, 1978. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
ATIYAH, P. S. The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract, 1979. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
AUSTIN, R. "The Problem of Legitimacy in the Welfare State" (1982) 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1510/1517. 
AYES, M. "Enforcing Section 52 Agreements" (1976) JPL 216. 
BACHRACH, P. & BARATZ, M. S. "The Two Faces of Power" (1962) 56 
American Pol. Sci. Review 947/952. 
BACHRACH, P. & BARATZ, M. S. "Decision and Non-Decisions: An 
Analytical Framework" (1963) American Pol. Sci. Review 641/651. 
BACHRACH, P. & BARATZ, M, S. Power and Poverty, 1970, New York: 
Oxford UP. 
BACHRACH, P. & LAWLER, E. Power and Politics in Organisations, 
1980. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. 
BADCOCK, B. Unfairly Structured Cities, 1984. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
BAGEHOT, W. The English Constitution, 1963. London: Fontana. 
BANFIELD, E. "Urban Renewal and the Planners" (1972) 1 Policy & 
Politics pp. 163/169. 
BARKER, A. (ed. ) Quangos in Britain, 1982. London: Macmillan. 
BARRELL, D. & FALUDI, A. & HAMNETT, S. Five Project Papers on a 
Comparative Study of Planning in the Netherlands and England, 
1975. Unpublished, Oxford Polytechnic, Department of Town 
Planning. 
BARRETT, S. M. & BODDY, M. Local Authority/Private Sector Industrial 
Development Partnerships, 1981. Report on a Seminar held 24/26 
September 1980. Bristol University, School of Advanced Urban 
Studies, Working Paper 18. 
527 
BARRETT, S. M. & FUDGE, C. (ed. ) Policy and Action, 1981. London: 
Methuen. 
BENN, T. "Manifesto and Mandarins" IN: Policy and Practice: The 
Experience of Government. London: Royal Institute of Public 
Administration. 
BENTHAM, J, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, edited by Burns, J. H. and Hart, H. L. A. 1970, Reprinted 
in Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 3rd edition, 1972 
pp"185/186. 
BOYDELL, P. "Roles of the Lawyer in the Planning System" (1978) JPL 
590/3. 
BLACK, D. & MILESKI, M. (eds. ) The Social Organization of Law, 
1973. New York: Academic Press. 
BRADLEY, A. W. "Research and Reform in Administrative Law: The 
Implications of Discretionary Justice by K. C. Davis" (1974) Journal 
of Soc. of P. T. L. 35. 
BRAMLEY, G., STEWART, M. & UNDERWOOD, J. "Local Economic 
Initiatives: A Review" (1979) 50 Town Planning Review 131/147. 
BRAYBROOKE, D. & LINDBLOM, C. A Strategy of Decision, 1970. New 
York: Free Press. 
BROADBENT, T. A. Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, 1977. 
London: Methuen. 
BROGDEN, M. "A Police Authority - The Denial of Conflict" (1977) 25 
Sociological Review No. 2,325/349. 
BROWN, H. J. et. al. "The Hillingdon (Royco) Case" (1974) JPL 507. 
BURROWS, J. "Vacant Urban Land: a Continuing Crisis" (1978) 64 The 
Planner No. 1,7/9. 
BYRNE, S. "Conditions and Agreements: The Local Authority's 
Viewpoint" IN: (1979) JPL Occasional Paper, Development Control: 
Thirty Years On, 35. 
CADDY, C. "Implementation: When the Development Control Officer 
Meets the Developer. " (1978) 64 The Planner No. 3 (May) 86-87. 
CAMPBELL, C. M. & WILES, P. "The Study of Law and Society in 
Britain" (1976) 10 Law & Society Review, pp. 547-578. 
CASTELLS, M. The Urban Question, 1977. London: Edward Arnold. 
CAWSON, A. Environmental Planning and the Politics of Corporatism, 
1977. University of Sussex: Working Papers in Urban and Regional 
Studies, No. 7. 
CAWSON, A. "Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role of the State" 13 
Gvt. and Opposition, No. 2,178/198. 
COHEN, S. Visions of Social Control, 1985. London: Polity Press. 
COTTERELL, R. B. M. "Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution 
and Confrontations of Disciplines" (1986) 13 Journal of Law & 
Society, No. 1,9/33. 
COWAN, P. (ed. ) The Future of Planning: A Study Sponsored by the 
Centre for Environmental Studies, 1973. London: Heinemann 
Educational Books. 
CULLINGWORTH, J. B. (ed. ) Problems of an Urban Society, Volume 3: 
Planning for Change, 1973. London: George Allen & Unwin, Urban 
and Regional Studies Series, No. 6. 
528 
DAHL, R. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, 
1961. New Haven, Conn. & London: Yale University Press. 
DAVIES, A. "Planning Bargaining and Planning Gain" (1981) Law 
Society Gazette 1366/7. 
DAVIES, J. The Evangelist Bureaucrat, 1972. London: Tavistock. 
DAVIES, K. Local Government Law, 1982. London: Butterworths. 
DAVIS, K. C. Discretionary Justice, 1971. Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press. 
DAVIS, K. C. Administrative Law Text, 1958. 
DENNIS, N. People and Planning, 1970. London: Faber. 
D. O. E. Circular 54/67. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 23/69. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 102/72. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 112/73. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 71/77 Local Government and the Industrial Strategy, 
1977. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 26/79. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 94/52 Town & Country Planning (Housing 
Accomodation) Direction, 1952. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Draft Circular on Planning Gain, 1983. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 22/83 (46/83 Welsh office) Planning Gain, 1983. London: 
HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 15/84 Land for Housing, 1984. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Circular 1/85 The Use of Conditions in Planning Permissions, 
1985. London: HMSO. 
D. O. E. Development Control Policy Notes No. 9: Development in Town 
Centres, 1969. London: HMSO. 
DICEY, A. V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 
1885. London: Macmillan. 
DOUGLAS, C. "New Circular on Planning Conditions" (1985) 71 The 
Planner No. 3,28. 
DURKHEIM, E. Rules of Sociological Method (1895), 1950 translation. 
Glencoe: Free Press. 
DWORKIN, R. Taking Rights Seriously, 1977. London: Duckworth & Co. 
DWORKIN, R. Law's Empire, 1986. London: Fontana Paperbacks. 
EASTON, D. The Political System, 1953, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
ELKIN, S. Politics and Land Use Planning: The London Experience, 
1974. London: Cambridge UP. 
ESTATES GAZETTE, Focus on City Fringes, September 24, (1983) 
vol. 267,1142-1158. 
ETZIONI-HALEVY, E. Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
FAVA, S. F. Urbanism in World Perspective, 1968. New York: Thomas Y. 
Cravell. 
FAWCETT. I. "Planning Charges: The North American Perspective" 67 
The Planner No. 1,20/21. 
FEELEY, M. M. "The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and 
Notes on an Expanded View" (1976) 10 Law & Society Review 
497/524. 
FEYERABEND, P. Against Method, 1975, London: New Left Books. 
529 
FISHER, R. AND URY, W. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In, 1981. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
FOLEY, D. L. "British Town Planning: One Ideology or Three? " (1960) 2 
British Journal of Sociology 211. 
FORD, J. Paradigms and Fairy Tales, 1975, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Pau 1. 
FOSTER, C., JACKMAN, R. AND PERLMAN, M. Local Government 
Finance in a Unitary State, 1980. London: Allen & Unwin. 
FOUCAULT, M. The Archaelogy of Knowledge, 1972. Trans. A. 
Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
FOUCAULT, M. Discipline & Punish, 1977. Trans. A. Sheridan. London: 
Pantheon. 
FOUCAULT, M. History of Sexuality, Volume 1, trans. R. Hurley, 1978, 
New York: Pantheon. 
FOUCAULT, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977. ed. Colin Gordon, 1980, New York: Pantheon. 
FOUCAULT, M. "Disciplinary Power and Subjugation" IN: LUKES, S. 
(ed. ) 1986. 
FRUG, G. E. "City as Legal Concept" (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 
1057/1154. 
FULLER, L. The Law in Quest of Itself, 1940, Boston: Beacon Press. 
GABEL, P. & FEINMAN, J. M. "Contract Law as Ideology" IN: Kairys, ed. 
The Politics of Law, 1982. New York: Pantheon. 
GAFFNEY, M. "Land Planning and Property Tax" (1969) Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners 178. 
GAMES, S. "The Battle for the Soul of Spitalfields" (1983) The 
Guardian, June 8, p. 13. 
GANS, H. J. "From Urbanism to Policy Planning" (1970) 36 Journal of 
the American Institute of Planners 1. 
GANS, H. J. People and Plans, 1972. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
GARNER, J. F. "Agreements under Section 25" (1949) JPL, 682. 
GARNER, J. F. "Challenges to Grants of Planning Permission" (1975) 
Local Government Chronicle, 283. 
GARNER, J. F. "Planning Cases in 1974" (1975) Local Government 
Chronicle, 133. 
GELLTHORN, E. & ROBINSON, G. "Perspectives on Administrative Law" 
(1975) Col. Law Review, 771. 
GERTH, H. & MILLS, C. W. (eds. ) From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, 1948. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
GLIDEWELL, G. "Development-Some Current Legal problems" (1979) JPL 
Occasional Paper, Development Control 30 years On, 27. 
GOTTLIEB, G. The Logic of Choice, 1968. London: Allen & Unwin. 
GOULDNER, A. For Sociology, 1973, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
GRACEY, H. Urban Sociology and Planning: Sociology of Planning and 
Urban Growth, 1969. London: Centre for Environmental Studies, 
University Working Papers No. 7. . GRANT, M. "Planning By Agreement" (1975) JPL 501/8. 
GRANT, M. "The Community Land Act: An Overview. 3. Planning in the 
Market" (1976) JPL 732/748. 
GRANT, M. "Developer's Contributions and Planning Gains: Ethics and 
Legalities" (1978) JPL 8. 
GRANT, M. "Planning and Land Taxation: Development Land Tax and 
Beyond -1& 2" (1986) JPL 4/19; 92/106. 
530 
GRANT, W. & MARSH, D. "The Politics of the CBI: 1974 and After" 
(1975) 10 Gvt. and Opposition, 90/104. 
GRANT, W. & MARSH, D. The Confederation of British Industry, 1977. 
London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
GREAT BRITAIN Royal Commission on the Distribution of Industrial 
Population, 1937. Cmd. 6135 (The Barlow Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas, 1942. 
Cmd. 6378 (The Scott Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, 
1942. Cmd. 6386 (Uthwatt Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Report on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, 
1957. Cmnd. 218 (Franks Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN People and Planning, 1969 (Skeffington Report). 
London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Development Plans: A Manual of Form and Content, 
1970. London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN How Do You Want to Live? 1972. London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Report of the Working Party on Local 
Authority/Private Enterprise Partnership Schemes, 1972 (Sheaf 
Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Widening the Choice: the Next Steps in Housing, 
April 1973, Cmnd. 528. London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Review of the Development Control System. Final 
Report, 1975. (Dobry Report). London: HMSO. 
GREAT BRITAIN Report of the Committee on Planning Control over 
Mineral Workings, 1976. (Stevens Report). London: HMSO. 
GREATER LONDON COUNCIL Joint Report of the Policy and Resources 
Committee and the Planning Committee, 1975. London: GLC. 
GREATER LONDON COUNCIL Greater London Development Plan, 1976. 
London: GLC. 
GRIFFITH, J. A. G. "Judges in Politics: England" (1968) 3 Gvt. and 
Opposition, no. 4,485. 
GRIFFITH, J. A. G. The Politics of the Judiciary, 1981.2nd ed. London: 
Fontana. 
GUEST, A. G. Anson's Law of Contract, 25th ed. 1981. Oxford: Oxford 
U P. 
HAAR, C. M. Land Planning in a Free Society: A Study of the British 
Town and Country Planning Act, 1951. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP. 
HAAR, C. M. (ed. ) Law and Land: Anglo-American Planning Practice, 
1964. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 
HABERMAS, J. "Hannah Arendt's Communications concept of Power" 
(1977) Social Research 441. 
HABERMAS, J. Communication and the Evolution of Society, 1979. 
London: Heinemann. 
HABERMAS, J. "The Public Sphere - An encyclopedia Article" (1984) 1 
New German Critique 49/55. 
HABERMAS, J. Reason and Rationalisation of Society, 1984. London: 
Heinemann. 
HAGMAN, D. & PEPE, S. "The English Planning System" (1974) 2 
Harvard Journal of Legislation 557. 
HALL, P. (ed. ) Land Values, 1965. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
HALL, P. Urban and regional Planning, 1974. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
531 
HAMPTON, W. Democracy and Community: A study of politics in 
Sheffield, 1970, Oxford: OUP. 
HARLOE, M. (ed. ) Captive Cities, 1977. New York: Wiley. 
HARLOW, C. "Power from the People? Representation and 
Constitutional Theory IN: McAuslan, P. & McEldowney, J. F. (1985) 
eds. 62/81. 
HARLOW, C. & RAWLINGS, R. Law and Administration, 1984. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
HARRISON, M. L. "Development Control: The Influence of Political, 
Legal and Ideology factors" (1972) TPR 254. 
HARRISON, R. J. Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of 
Modern Democracies, 1980. 
HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, 1961. Oxford: Clarendon. 
HARVEY, D. Social Justice and the City, 1973. London: Edward Arnold. 
HARVEY COX, W. Cities: The Public Dimension, 1976. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
HAWKE, Dr. J. N., "Section 52 Agreements and the Fettering of Planning 
Powers"(1980) JPL 386. 
HAWKE, Dr. J. N. "Planning Agreements in Practice" (1981) JPL, 5-14 & 
86-97. 
HAY, D. et. al. (ed. ) Albion's Fatal Tree, 1977. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
HAYES, F. Correspondence (1979) JPL 166. 
HEAP, D. (ed. ) Encyclopedia of Planning Law and Practice, 3 vols. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. The Local Government Library Series. 
HEAP, D. AND WARD, A. J. "Planning Bargaining - the Pros and Cons: 
or How Much Can the System Stand ?" (1980) JPL 631-637. 
HILL, M. J. The Sociology of Public Administration, 2nd ed. 1983. 
HILLMAN, J. "High Rates -A Deterrent to Development ?" (1983) 265 
EG 369/372. 
HOYES, T. "Conditions and Agreements - The Developer's Viewpoint" 
(1979) JPL Occasional Paper, Development Control 30 Years On, 
27. 
HUGHES, D. Public Sector Housing Law, 1987, London: Butterworths. 
HUGHES, J. The Philosophy of Social Science, 1980, London: Longman. 
JACOBS, A. "Can the Inner City be Saved ?" (1979) Local Government 
Chron icle 897. 
JACOBS, J. Death and Life of Great American Cities, 1965. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
JAGGER, A. Feminist Politics and Human Nature, 1983. 
JESSOP, B. The Capitalist State, 1982. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 
JOHNSTON, R. J. City and Society: An Outline for Urban Geography, 
1980. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
JOHNSTON, R. J. "The Management and 
The Role of the Judiciary in the 
1305. 
JOHNSTON, R. J. "Texts, Actors and High 
and the Political Organisation 
Geography Q. 3. 
Autonomy of the Local State: 
US" (1981) 13 Env. and PI. A. 
Managers: Judges, Bureaucrats 
of Space" (1983) 2: 1 Political 
JUNES, G. Borough Politics, 1969, London: Macmillan. 
JOSEPH, C. Development Land Tax: A Practical Guide, 1980. London: 
Oyez. 
J. P. L. "Correspondence: The Implications of the Hillingdon (Royco) 
case (1974) JPL 660/661. 
532 
J. P. L. Occasional Paper: Development Control - 30 Years On, 1979. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
JOWELL, J. "Review of George Dobry's 'Review of the Development 
Control System'" (1975) 38 MLR 549/551. 
JOWELL, J. "Bargaining in Development Control" (1977) JPL 414-433. 
JOWELL, J. "The Limits of Law in Urban Planning" (1977) 30 CLP 63. 
JOWELL, J. (ed. ) The Changing Constitution, 1985. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
KAIRYS, D. (ed. ) The Politics of Law, 1982. New York: Pantheon. 
KAMENKA, E. & TAY, A. E-S. "Beyond Bourgeoise Individualism: The 
Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology" IN : Kamenka, E. 
& Neale R. S. (eds), 1975. 
KAMENKA, E. & NEALE, R. S. (eds. ) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, 
1975. Canberra : ANU Press. 
KEAT, R. AND URRY, J. Social Theory as Science, 1975, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
KERRIGAN, C. A History of Tower Hamlets, 1982. London: LBTH 
Community Services. 
KEOGH, G. Planning Gain: An Economic Analysis, 1982. Unpublished 
Discussion Paper in Urban and Regional Economics, Series C, 
No. 12, Department of Economics, Faculty of Urban and Regional 
Studies, University of Reading. 
KIRK, G. Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society, 1980. 
KUHN, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970,2nd ed. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
LA PALOMBARA, J. Interest Groups in Italian Politics, 1965. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
LASSWELL, H. D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, 1958, New 
York: Meridian. 
LAW SOCIETY "Planning Gain: The Law Society's Observations" (1982) 
JPL 346/351. 
LEACH, W. A. "The Hillingdon ('Royco') Case" (1974) JPL 507. 
LEACH, W. A. 'The Applicant and the Permission' (1982) JPL 37/42. 
LEHNER, P. H. A. "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" (1983) 
Columbia Law Review, 20. 
LEVINGS, A. "Planning by Agreement - the Beaconsfield Case" (1975) 
JPL 704/707. 
LEWIS, N. "Towards a Sociology of Lawyering in Public Administration" 
(1981) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 32. 
LEWIS, N. "Delegislation in Britain in the 1980's" IN: McAuslan & 
McEldowney (1985) eds. 107/127. 
LEWIS, N. "Who Controls Quangos and Nationalised Industries ?" IN: 
Jowell (1985). 
LEWIS, N. & HORDEN, J. The Rule of Law and the British 
Constitution, 1986. London: Hutchinson.. 
LEWIS, N. & WILES, P. "The Post-Corporatist State ?" (1984) 11 
Journal of Law & Society 65/90. 
LINDBLOM, C. "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through" (1979) 39 Public 
Administration Review 517/526. 
LITTLE, G. "Some Facets of the Amenity Concept" (1976) JPL 275. 
LLEWELLYN, K. "The Normative, the Legal and Law Jobs" (1940) 49 
Yale Law Journal 1355. 
533 
LLEWELLYN, K. The Common Law Tradition, 1960. New York: Little, 
Brown. 
L. B. T. H. Office Development Policy, 1971 and 1976. London: LBTH. 
L. B. T. H. Bricks and Mortar: The Buildings of Tower Hamlets, 1975. 
London: LBTH 
L. B. T. H. Towards a Local Plan for Spitalfields, Interim Report, Volume 
1 Consultation Report and Volume 2 Detailed Studies, 1977 
London: LBTH. 
LOUGHLIN, M. Development Control: The Importance of Social and 
Economic Considerations, 1977. University of Warwick, LL. M. 
Thesis. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "Bargaining as a Tool of Development Control: A Case 
of All Gain and No Loss ?" (1978) JPL 290/295. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "Cases and Materials on Planning Law by Michael 
Purdue" (1978) JPI 265. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "Planning Control and the Property Market" (1980) 3 
Urban Law and Policy 1. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "The Scope and Importance of 'material considerations'" 
(1980) 3 Urban Law and Policy 171. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "Planning Gain: Law, Policy and Practice" (1981) 1 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies No. 1 61/97. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "'Planning Gain': Another Viewpoint" (1982) JPL 
352/358. 
LOUGHLIN, M. Half a Century of Municipal Decline 1935-1985,1985. 
London: Allen & Unwin. 
LOUGHLIN, M. "Municipal Socialism and A Unitary State" IN: 
McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. 82/106. 
LOUGHLIN, M. Local Government and the Modern State, 1986 London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies Series. 
LUKES, S. Power, A Radical View, 1974. London: Macmillan. 
LUKES, S. Essays in Social Theory, 1977. London: Macmillan. 
LUKES, S. (ed. ) Power, 1986. London: Basil Blackwell. Readings in 
Social and Political Theory Series. 
LUSTGARTEN, L. "Democratic Constitutionalism and Police Governance" 
IN: McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) eds. 128/150. 
MACDONALD, K. "The Gains People Pay" (1983) Planning, March 18. 
MAIN, S. The Role of Negotiation in Development Control, 1979. 
Unpublished student dissertation, Department of Civic Design, 
University of Liverpool. 
MARCUSE, H. One-Dimensional Man, 1964, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
MARRIOTT, O. The Property Boom, 1967. London: Pan Books. 
MARSH, D. & GRANT, W. "The Politics of the CBI: 1974 and After" 
(1975) 10 Gvt. and Opposition 90-104. 
MARSH, D. & GRANT, W. "Tripartism: Reality or Myth ?" (1977) 12 
Gvt. and Opposition 194/211. 
MARX, K. & ENGELS, F. Selected Works, Volume 1,1962. Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
McAUSLAN, J. P. W. B. "The Plan, the Planners and the Lawyers" (1971) 
Public Law 247. 
McAUSLAN, J. P. W. B. "Planning Law's Contribution to the Problems of 
Urban Society" (1974) MLR 134. 
534 
McAUSLAN, P. Land, Law and Planning, 1975. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, Law in Context Series. 
McAUSLAN, P. The Ideologies of Planning Law, 1980 Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, Urban & Regional Planning Series, Volume 22. 
McAUSLAN, P. "Administrative Law, collective Consumption and 
Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 MLR, No. 1,1/21. 
McAUSLAN, P. & McELDOWNEY, J. F. "Legitimacy and the Constitution: 
the Dissonance between Theory and Practice" IN: McAuslan & 
McEldowney (1985) eds. 1/38. 
McAUSLAN, P. & McELDOWNEY, J. F. (eds. ) Law. Legitimacy and the 
Constitution, 1985. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal 
Studies Series. 
McCONNELL, G. Private Power and American Democracy, 1969. New 
York: Knopf. 
McCONNELL, S. Theories for Planning. An Introduction, 1981. London: 
Heinemann. 
McGREW, A. G. & WILSON, M. J. (eds. ) Decision Making: Approaches and 
Analysis, 1982. Manchester: Manchester UP/Open University. 
McMAHON, L. Paradigms Within Policy Analysis, 1980, unpublished 
SAUS paper. 
McMAHON, L., BARRETT, S. & HILL, M. "Power Bargaining Models in 
Policy Analysis ... What 
Prescriptions for Practitioners" (1983) 
Public Administration Bulletin No. 43, Perspectives on Policy 
Analysis. 
MERRETT, S. State Housing in Britain, 1979, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
MILLS, C. W. The Power Elite, 1956. New York: Oxford UP. 
MILLS, C. W. The Sociological Imagination, 1959. New York: Oxford UP. 
MILNE, R. "The Queen's Park Story" (1976) Planning, 5th March. 
MINGIONE, E. "Sociological Approach to Regional and Urban 
Development" (1977) 4 Comparative Urban Research 21/58. 
M. H. L. G. People and Planning, The Skeffington Report, 1969. London: 
HMSO. 
MINOW, M. "The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice 
Engendered" (1987) 101 Harvard Law Rev 10. 
MOORE, V. A Practical Approach to Planning Law, 1987. London: 
Financial Training Publications. 
MORLEY, S. "Positive Planning and Direct Development by Local 
Authorities" (1981) 52 Town Planning Review, No. 3.298/315. 
MUSIL, J. Urban Sociology and Planning: Examples of Sociological 
Research Relevant to Planning Problems In Some European 
Countries. 1969, London: Centre for Environmental Studies, 
University Working Paper, 6. 
NEVILLE BROWN, L. & GARNER, J. F. French Administrative Law, 3rd 
ed. 1983. London: Butterworths. 
OGUS, A. I. "Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making" IN: 
BURROWS, P. & VELJANOVSKI, C. G. The Economic Approach to 
Law, 1981, London: Butterworths. pp. 210/225. 
535 
PAHL, R. E. Urban Sociology and Planning, Urban Social Theory and 
Research, 1969. London: Centre for Environmental Studies, 
University Working Paper 5. 
PAHL, R. E. Whose City ? and other Essays on Urban Sociology, 1975. 
2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
PAHL, R. E. "Managers, Technical Experts and the State" IN: Harloe, M. 
(1977). 
PAHL, R. E. & WINKLER, J. T. "Corporatism in Britain: Why Protecting 
Industry Need Not Mean Bureaucracy" (1976) The Times, March 
26th. p. 7. 
PARKER, H. R. "The History of Compensation and Betterment since 
1900" IN: Hall, P. (ed. ) (1965) 53. 
PARSONS, T. Sociological Theory and Modern Society, 1967, Glencoe: 
Free Press. 
PATEMAN, C. Participation and Democratic Theory, 1970. Cambridge 
UP. 
PERLEMAN, C. "What is Legal Logic ?" (1968) 3 Israeli Law Review 1. 
PETERS, B. GUY "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of Pressure 
Group Influence on Bureaucracy" (1977) 9 Administration & 
Society, No. 2 191-218. 
PETERS, B. GUY The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative 
Perspective, 1978. New York: Longman Inc. 
PINSON, B. On Revenue Law, 14th ed. 1981, pp. 369/394. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. 
PLANNING ADVISORY GROUP Report on The Future of Development 
Plans, 1965 London: HMSO. 
POSNER, R. A. Economic Analysis of the Law 2nd ed. 1977, Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co. 
POULANTZAS, N. "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Milliband and 
Laclau" (1976) New Left Review, No. 95,63/83. 
PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP A Submission to the Department of the 
Environment on 'Planning Gain' 1981. London: HMSO. See (1982) 
JPL 1/6. 
PROSSER, T. "Towards a Critical Public Law" (1982) 9 Journal of Law 
& Society 1/19. 
PROSSER, T. "Democratisation, Accountability and Institutional Design: 
Reflections on Public Law" IN: McAuslan & McEldowney (1985) 
eds. 170/190. 
PURDUE, M. "The Use of Certiorari to Challenge a Planning 
Determination" (1975) JPL 342. 
PURDUE, M. Cases and Materials on Planning Law, 1977. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. 
PU RD U E, M. "The Economics of Development - Its Status as a 
Planning Consideration" (1979) JPL 146/151. 
RANNEY, D. C. Planning and Politics in the Metropolis, 1969. Columbus, 
Ohio: Charles & Merrill Publishing. 
RATCLIFFE, J. "Planning Gain is Not the Answer" (1974) Built 
Environment 148. 
RATCLIFFE, J. An Introduction to Town and Country Planning, 1974. 
London: Hutchinson. 
RATCLIFFE, J. Land Policy, 1976. London: Hutchinson. 
RATCLIFFE, J. "Development Control: Anathema or Nescience" (1978) 
The Planner 188. 
536 
RATCLIFFE, J. "Development Brief" (1979) Local Gvt. Chronicle 1139. 
RATCLIFFE, J. "Briefs for Prospective Developers" (1980) 253 EG 707. 
RAY, T. "Development Control 2: The Major Issues" (1978) 3 The 
Planner 56. 
READE, E. J. "Section 52 and Corporatism in Planning" (1982) JPL 8/16. 
REICH, C. "The Law of the Planned Society" (1966) 75 Yale Law 
Journal 1227. 
REX, J. Social Contflict, 1981. New York: Longman Inc. 
ROBSON, A. "The Outlook" IN: Laski, H. J. et. al. (eds. ) A Century of 
Municipal Progress 1835-1935,1935. London: Allen & Unwin. 
RODMELL, G. "Dobry on Development Control: Mind your A's and B's" 
(1975) JPL 258. 
ROGERSON, P. "On the Fettering of Public Powers" (1971) Public Law 
288. 
R. I. C. S. The Land Problem: A Fresh Approach, 1974. London: RICS. 
R. I. C. S. Discussion Paper on Planning Gain, May 1981. London: RICS. 
R. T. P. I. Development Control into the 1980's : Final Report of the 
Development Control Working Party, 1979. Lodon: RTPI. 
R. T. P. I. An Approach to Planning Gains, May 1981. London: RTPI 
R. T. P. I. Planning Gain: A Draft Code of Practice, 1982, London: RTPI. 
R. T. P. I. Planning Gain Guidelines Working Party, Agreed Memorandum 
and Code of Practice, 16 November 1982. London: RTPI. 
R. T. P. I. Agreed Memorandum and Code of Practice of the Planning 
Gain Guidelines Working Party of the R. T. P. I. November 1983. 
London: RTPI. 
RYAN, A. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1970, London: 
Macmillan. 
SAMUELS, A. "Planning Agreements: Their Use and Misuse" (1978) 
Local Gvt. Review 609 & 624. 
SAUNDERS, P. Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, 1983, 
London: Hutchinson. 
SCARSE, A. J. "Planning Conditions - The Law and Policy" (1987) JPL 
323. 
SCARSE, R. Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control, 1977. 
London: Tavistock. 
SCHMITTER, P. C. "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" (1974) 36 
Review of Politics, 85/131. 
SENIOR, D. "The Place of Development Control in the Planning 
Process" (1978) Town & Country Planning 202/203. 
SHANKLAND, G. "London Planning News - Precedent or Warning" 
(1975) JPL 5. 
SIMMIE, J. F. "Physical Planning and Social Policy" (1971) Journal of 
The Royal Town Planning Institute, 450-453. 
SIMMIE, J. Citizens in Conflict, 1974. London: Hutchinson. 
SIMMIE, J. Power, Property and Corporatism: The Political Sociology 
of Planning.. 1981, London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Sociology, 
Politics and Cities Series. 
SIMMONDS, D. "Planning versus Development Control" (1978) JPL 188. 
SKELLY WRIGHT, J. "Beyond Discretionary Justice" (1971) Yale Law 
Journal 575. 
SPITALFIELDS HOUSING AND PLANNING RIGHTS SERVICE What's 
Happening in West Spitalfields ? May 1980. London: SHPRS. 
537 
STREET, H. "Offending Planning Conditions -A New Challenge" (1974) 
Local Gvt. Chronicle 851. 
STEWART, M. (ed. ) The City: Problems of Planning, 1972. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, Interdisciplinary Readings Series. 
STUDDARDS, R. W. Listed Buildings: The Law and practice, 1982. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
STUNGO, A. & DEMPSEY, M. "Current Topics: Planning Gain" (1982) 
JPL 1/6. 
SUDDARDS, R. "Section 52 Agreements: A Case for New Legislation" 
(1979) JPL 661. 
SUMMERS, R. "The Technique Element in Law" (1971) 59 California 
Law Review, 733. 
SUTCLIFFE, A. Towards the Planned City: Germany, Britain, the 
United States and France, 1780-1914,1981. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. Comparative Studies in Social and Economic History 
Series, No. 3. 
TELLING, A. E. Planning Law and Procedure, 5th ed. 1977. London: 
Butterworths. 
TEUBNER, G. "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law" 
(1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239/285. 
THOMPSON, E. P. Whigs and Hunters, 1977, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
TUCKER, L. "Planning Agreements: The Twilight Zone of Ultra Vires" 
(1978) JPL 806. 
TWINING, W. & MIERS, D. How to Do Things With Rules, 2nd ed. 
1982. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Law in Context Series. 
UNDERWOOD, J. "Development Control: A Review of Research and 
Current Issues" (1981) 3 Progress in Planning 178/242. 
UNGER, R. "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harvard 
Law Review 561. 
VASU, M. L. Politics and Planning :A National Study of American 
Planners, 1979 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
VICKERS, G. Value Systems and the Social Process, 1970. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
WADE, H. W. R. Administrative Law, 5th ed. 1982. Oxford: Clarendon. 
WARD, A. J. "Planning Bargaining - Where Do We Stand ?" (1982) JPL 
74/84. 
WARD, H. et. al. (ed. ) Bricks and Mortar: The Buildings of Tower 
Hamlets, 1975. London: LBTH Community Services. 
WEBER, M. "Politics as Vocation" IN: Gerth, H. & Mills, C. W. (1948) 
WEBER, M. Economy & Society, 1978. Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press. 
WEST, W. A. "Open Spaces in Urban Development - The Legal Background" (1973) JPL 23. 
WHITE, J. B. When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitution of Language, Character and Community, 1984 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
538 
WILLIAMS, D. D. An Investigation into the Justification and Practice of 
the Local Planning Authority Seeking 'Planning Gains ', 1980. 
Unpublished Student Dissertation, University of Newcastle-Upon- 
Tyne. 
WINKLER, J. T. "Law, State and Economy: the Industry Act 1975 in 
Context" (1975) British Journal of Law & Society 103. 
WINKLER, J. "Corporatism" (1976) 19 European Journal of Sociology 
100/136. 
WRIGHT-MILLS, C. The Sociological Imagination, 1959, New York: 
Oxford UP. 
YOUNG, E. AND ROWAN-ROBINSON, J. "Section 52 Agreements and the 
Fettering of Powers" (1982) JPL 673-685. 
YOUNG, K. Essays on the Study of Urban Politics, 1975. London: 
Macmillan. 
YOUNG, M. & WILLMOTT, P. Family and Kinship in East London, 
Revised ed. 1962. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
ZETTER, R. "Planning Control and the Quality of Residential 
Environments" (1974) JPL 515. 
2. AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES Urban Consolidation: 
The Experience of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, 1983. 
Canberra: AIUS. 
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES Urban Australia: Living 
in the Next Decade, 1984. Canberra: AIUS. 
AUSTRALIAN SEMINAR SERVICES Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Bill 1979: A New Era for Planning and Development in 
N. S. W. 1979. Sydney: ASS. 
BALL, M. "Circumvention of Environmental Law in N. S. W. " (1983) 12 
Environmental Law Newsletter, June, 21/23. 
BALL, M. "Section 94 Conditions in the Land and Environment Court" 
(1983) 13 Environmental Law Newsletter, September, 22. 
BECHERVAISE, H. Workshop on Section 94: Papers Presented to the 
University of New South Wales Planning Department, July 1 1983. 
Unpublished. 
BEDFORD, E. "Official opening of Seminar on the First 100 Days of 
the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act, 12 August 1983" 
(1983) 13 Environmental Law Newsletter, September, 15/19. 
BEST, G. Section 94: Current Trends. Paper presented to the 
University of New South Wales Planning Department, 1983. 
Unpublished. 
BIGNOLD, N. R. "The Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 
(NSW) - An Overview", 1981. IN: Aspects of Administration and 
539 
Planning Law. Sydney: University of Sydney Faculty of Law, 
Committee for Postgraduate Studies in the Department of Law. 
BLACKBURN, J. H. H. "Introduction to Local Government in N. S. W. " IN, 
Mobbs, M. (ed. ) Local Government and Planning Service, Volume 
C: Commentary, 1000/1079. Sydney: Butterworths. 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Planning Schemes Ordinance Under LGA 
1919,1976. Sydney: BCC. 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Codes on Townhouse and Villas 
Residential Flat Building; Cluster Housing; Industrial; Residential 
Street Design. Sydney: BCC (undated). 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Development Control Plans: 4,20,17,19. 
Sydney: BCC (undated). 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Section 94 Rates Under Local 
Environmental Plans 18,72,64 for the Period April 1 1985 to 30 
June 1985 (with maps). Sydney: BCC (undated). 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Local Environment Plans Nos. 16 to 90 as 
gazetted 23 October 1981 to 5 October 1984. Sydney: BCC. 
BLACKTOWN CITY COUNCIL Report to the NSW Local Government 
Grants Commission, 1983/1984, Sydney: BCC. 
BRYANT, T. L. "Conditional Town Planning Permits" (1980)12 Melbourne 
University Law Review 139/157. 
CITY OF SYDNEY Western District Local Environmental Study, 
Summary Volume, 1983. Sydney: CCS. 
CITY OF SYDNEY Local Enviroment Plan No. 53 and Development 
Control Plan No. 1,1984. Sydney: CCS. 
CITY OF SYDNEY Local Environment Plans Nos. 19 & 26. Sydney: CCS. 
CITY OF SYDNEY Strategic Plan 1980. Sydney: CCS. 
CITY OF SYDNEY Development Control and Floor Space Ratio Code, 
Dec. 1971. Sydney: CCS. 
CRANSTON, R. Law, Government and Public Policy, 1987, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 
DALTON, P. "Developer Contributions under Section 94 of the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, Parts 1& 2" (1982) 
37 Local Government Bulletin, October 16/19 & 
November/December 36/40. 
DAY, P. D. Planning and Development: The Philosophy and Practice of 
Development Contributions, 1982. Canberra: AIUS. 
D. O. E. P. (NSW) The Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979: 
A Guide for Local Government, 2nd ed. 1970. Sydney: D. O. E. P. 
(NSW). 
D. O. E. P. (NSW) Circular 23, Guidelines for Section 94 Contributions, 
1981. Sydney: D. O. E. P. (NSW). 
D. O. E. P. (NSW) Circular 42, Contributions for Community Amenities and 
Services Under Section 94,1982. Sydney D. O. E. P. (NSW). 
D. O. E. P. (NSW) Annual Report 1983/4. Sydney: D. O. E. P. (NSW). 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION "Submission to State 
Government on the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act" 
(1982) Environmental Law Newsletter, July, 2/7. 
540 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION "Official Opening by Mr Eric 
Bedford, Minister for Planning Environment of the Environmental 
Law Association Seminar on the First 100 Days of the EP&A Act 
- 12 August 1983". Sydney: NSW Environmental Law Newsletter 
No. 13, September 1983. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION "Redevelopment of Darling 
Harbour" (1984) 15 Environmental Law Newsletter, June, 11/13. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER "New Darling Harbour Authority 
Act" (1984) Environmental Law Newsletter, July, Supplement. 
ETZIONI-HALEVY, E. Bureaucracy and Democracy, 1983. Sydney: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
EVANS, G. (ed. ) Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975: The Whitlam 
Years in Australian Government, 1977. Melbourne: Heinemann. 
FARRIER, D. Course by Radio and TV on Environmental Law and 
Urban Development, November 1982. Sydney: University of New 
South Wales, Faculty of Law. 
FARRIER, D. (ed. ) University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law: 
Course Materials for Environmental Law, Chapter 4 Project 
Control: Permissions. Unpublished. 
FARRIER, D. Lecture Notes for a Course on Environmental Law at the 
University of New South Wales, 1984. Unpublished. 
FARRIER, D. "The Ubiquitous Part V" (1984) 15 Environmental Law 
Newsletter, June, 41/44. 
FISHER, D. E. Environmental Law, 1980. Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press. 
FISHER, D. E. "Environmental Planning in N. S. W. " (1982) 56 Australian 
Law Journal 399/413. 
FOGG, A. S. Australian Town Planning Law, Revised ed. 1982. St Lucia, 
Queensland: University of Queensland Press. 
FREELAND, J. M. Architecture in Australia: A History, 1972. Sydney: 
Penguin. 
GRANT, B. The Australian Dilemma: A New Kind of Werstern Society, 
1983. Sydney: Macdonald Futura Press. 
HART, L. "An Introduction to Environmental Planning & Assessment", 
1981, IN: Mobbs, M. (ed. ) Local Government Planning & 
Environment Service, Volume C, 9000/9057. 
HOLT, W. J. Guidebook to Environmental Planning Practice In N. S. W. by 
the Honourable W. S. Holt and K. J. Palmer, 1980. Sydney: CCH. 
HORNBY, D. "Statutory Valuations in Local Gvernment", 1982, IN: 
Mobbs, M. (ed. ) Local Government & Environment Service, Vol. C, 
6000/6048. 
HORT, L. & MOBBS, M. Outline of N. S. W. Environmental and Planning 
Law, 1979. Sydney: Butterworths. 
KAHN-FREUND, O. "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law" (1974) 
37 MLR 1. 
KEMENY, J. The Great Australian Nightmare, 1983. Melbourne: 
Georgian House. 
541 
LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT NOTES, 1980/1982. Sydney: 
Butterworths. 
LANTERI, A. "Compensation Under the Town and Country Planning Act 
1961 (Vic. ) Pts. 1& 2" (1980) 12 Melbourne University Law 
Review, 311/339,437/466. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BULLETIN, "Local Government and the Costs of 
Housing" (1982) 37 Local Government Bulletin, July, 11/14. 
LOGAN, M. I. "Planning and Conservation in Victoria: An Overview" 
(1982) 56 Law Institute Journal 890. 
MANNING, H. "Johannesburg Betterment Tax" (1969) Australian 
Planning Institute Journal 43/45. 
MANT, J. "Development Control: A Tale of Three Acts" (1982) 
Australian Planner 2,20,74/77. 
McPITT, I. The Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme" (1982) 56 
Law Institute Journal 895/900. 
MOBBS, M. (ed. ) Local Government, Planning and Environmental 
Service, Volume B: Planning and Environment Legislation and 
Volume C: Commentary. Sydney: Butterworths. 
MOBBS, M. T. "Environmental Planning Instruments" 1982, IN: Mobbs, 
M. (ed. ) ibid. Vol. C, chapter 10. 
MOBBS, M. "Problems with Environmental Planning Instruments" (1983) 
21 Law Society Journal 186. 
MOBBS, M. "Unreasonable Exercise of Ministerial Discretions" (1983) 
TPG 1. 
MOBBS, M. "Locus Standi Under the Environmental Planning & 
Assessment Act" 75 S&M Record 466. 
MYERS, A. J. "An Analysis of Taxation Aspects of Land Development 
IN: Town Planning, Conveyancing and Land Development in Focus, 
Seminar held 24/25 October 1977, Melbourne. Melbourne: Business 
Law Education Centre. 
NEUTZE, M. Australian Urban Policy, 1978. Sydney: George Allen & 
Unwin. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, HERITAGE COUNCIL Annual Report, 1983. 
Sydney: NSW Gvt. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, LAND COMMISSION Annual Reports, 1977/8, 
1979,1983. Sydney: NSW Gvt. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PLANNING AUTHORITY Sydney Region Growth 
and Change: Prelude to a Plan, 1967. Sydney: NSW Planning 
Authority. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PLANNING AUTHORITY A Report by the State 
Planning Authority of NSW Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970-2000 
AD, A Strategy for Development, 1968. Sydney: NSW Planning 
Authority. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION 
Sydney Region Outline Plan 1970-200 AD, 1968. Sydney: NSW 
State Planning Authority. 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION 
Review Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1980. NSW Sydney: NSW 
Planning and Environment Commission. 
542 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION 
REVIEW COMMITTEE Report on Law and Administration of 
Planning and Environmental Protection in NSW (Whitehouse 
Report), 1977. Sydney: NSW Gvt. 
NOTT, A. J. Environmental Planning and Development Law (NSW), 1982. 
Sydney: Penman Press. 
OPUS, P. H. N. "Resolving the Issues Between Good Environmental 
Planning and Economic Development - Does the Planning Appeals 
Board Help? " (1982) 56 Law Institute Journal, 1040/1048. 
PARTINGTON, M. The Reform of Public Law in Britain: THeoretical 
Problems and Practical Considerations" IN: McAuslan, P. & 
McEldowney, J. F. (1985) eds. Law, Legitimacy and the 
Constitution. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Modern Legal Studies 
Series, 191/211. 
PAYNE, M. Blacktown City Council: Finance and Implementation Study, 
Plumpton, Rooty Hill & Minchinbury Release Areas, July 1982, 
Sydney: BCC. 
PAYNE, M. The Impact of the Urban Development Program on Local 
Government Finance, March 1985. Paper prepared for the Local 
and State Governments Working Party on the Capital Costs to 
Local Government of the Urban Development Program. Sydney: 
DEP. 
PENRITH COUNCIL Local Environment Plans Nos. 37-105. Sydney: PCC. 
PENRITH COUNCIL Draft South Werrington Section 94 Contributions 
Assessment. Sydney: PCC. 
PRESTON, R. (ed. ) Contemporary Australia: Studies in History, Politics 
and Economics, 1969. Durham, N. C. U. S. A.; Duke University Press. 
PUGH, A. Guidelines for Implementing Section 94,1984. Unpublished 
paper presented to University of NSW Planning Department. 
PULLEN, J. M. "The Betterment Levy" (1968) Australian Planning 
Institute Journal 43/51. 
RHODES, G. Section 94 Contributions, 1983. Unpublished paper 
presented to University of NSW Planning Department. 
RYAN, P. "The Land and Environment Court" 1981 IN: Mobbs, M. Local 
Government Planning and Environment Service, Vol. C Chapt. 12. 
SPANN, R. N. Public Administration in Australia, 1975. NSW: D. West 
Government Printer. 
TOMASIC, R. (ed. ) Legislation and Society in Australia 1980. Sydney: 
George Allen & Unwin. Law in Society Series No. 4. 
UNIVERSITY OF NSW, DIVISION OF POSTGRADUATE EXTENSION 
STUDIES Law and the Environment, A Series of Ten Lectures 
Given on Radio, 1976. Unpublished transcript. 
543 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA "Comparison 
Between `Traditional' Items Required to be Provided by 
Developers as a Condition of Development Consent, and 'New' 
Items Sought Under Section 94 of the EP&A Act", 1983 and 1984. 
Unpublished. 
WESTERN SYDNEY REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF COUNCILS 4th 
Report on Local Government Finance and Commonwealth Revenue 
Sharing in Western Sydney, A Submission to the National Inquiry 
into Local Government Finance, November 1984. Sydney: WSROC. 
WHITE, S. (ed. ) Building Planning and Development Service for NSW 
Vol. 3 Planning and Development 1984. Sydney: Law Book 
Company. 
WHITMORE, H. Local Government and Environmental Planning Law 
(NSW), 1981. Sydney: Law Book Company. 
WILCOX, M. "The EPA Bill 1979" IN: Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Bill 1979 -A New Era For Planning and Development 
in NSW, 1979. Sydney: Australia Seminar Services. 
APPENDIX 
m9hc> 
.C r 
hi, 
v+ mt Co 
ma «m r 
rn V70hrn3c, LC 
41 c 
cä 
;c 
as 
dc "' cLE> 
pLmF 0c 
LO 7m pä ,_Ewp 
v a- O O> Co aC lÖ c7mC 
C 
ZU 
Q! (D 
a 
L, 
+ 
3L 
49 
L>QCty 
L- 00 L- dz 
Er r. CL Co 
> 
mm0dT 
cM gLh Em 
m y0 U> tp CmWmL>. 
amm O1 O CL 
m . 
t! 
_1 
ma> +' m>ECLo0 
as ap 0y 3 ad 8a00 v'mLrv 
o" a0rp 
t0 
Ü>tN 
yO Dy3LYYMnaäC00 
Ö q, 
C.. L c. 
; CO++ E GL 
CO cl. Co 
-- V>C; Öl > _,, C Ü"p c 
++ mmmNVp0m>J>- 
ELrCö; ý'' TmNyc). 0 4) r 
`d 1.1. >. 
0 Co 
0 v- Erä ýý mac« ro 
pE 
pLOÖCr c- mpmNW7 
m> O08mmL 
ýi ya +± Orap 
~' L Lp 
U 
QEmyCh 
n1 
L 1` LC Co Y ým C ý_ 
aa 
Co 
Z (1 
NU 
týA 4' mLÖ3p. 
EL -a 41 mpt« 
E (P 3c > ce mm >+ mam>00tý 4) mc3ma ý' cm Ca 
ci r- m r- L L. C. +t+ 
LC 
Cl L( 
YßxWrrn 
7O0 Ol armm 
>, 10 0 rU t» 13 r- 4+ rLC 4) od -- 3 =O 20 
41 x it Z« C3v 
Tw 33ttmoä ;Ov 
Tt 
,> 
aý m 3$ 33aiöBoi3n33yö co xö8mam 
ti ' pf C" NMd tÖ C- Of NMM 
lV (V N fV (V NNNNNMM 
mNO 
m 
c0m Co r -5 c 
w to 41 .- r_ 
0 V, 01piLpc8' Si 
C ýp nL 7o 
r_ 4- 
W yppýý 
n L" 3 ry V 41 
C5 Oar Lm$ o' 4' 
7G 
mmWr m +'m p DOp 7m p . 
GC 
Z yLV2 ö ýEm mr i ý0 
Lý ým 
< 77ý m C, f1 rcm 91 > 
42 m 0 °'Z öäwcOc§_ p' o 4) v 
. 
Z. ýR"j'LL 0a 'V Cy tx 
>mO 
_L Z ý+ +ý 
tmCär. 
-9 ýrrr m" gym, >, xx 
NrnhLnmr 
aVmcmaLC3Nm 
CL aMmmmmthdLO '-2 m« OÖ 
Co 
tu 15 ir 
4O'c vp- 
;C¬Lm7 
-> La 
CL C>9G >'- >« 
9 
ý > to or 0ý_Q 
0äLaC 
a ý+c'- 
rc 
LS . Cn 
! 
oä 
YLCM pLn ma mn9_Y III 
7Z 
low- 
«3 
tlD 
ýý Cýa> OtC w(! 
1 Ow WA -O Lý Wt ýj 
0rmOVtrw ý_ aU 
u0 rmc. ý_ anC 0 
º+ 
ÜOVCrhEr 
0) ;' *' 
pm>CbCL. 
C LÖm"r 
10 8<mt. rC 
9aLCn 
ýp 
§4 
'c 
-r 
a~ 
88Z 
CCM - 'ý" 
«äý$§1aO=p0 
13 
ý% 
.. 
~Z 
... " 
1- 
1O23 
nmr mtrC; n 
Imo 
> r0 
c 4D 
xG `r i< $« c3ö in vw 3« eC33«H. ä 
Z<2Öw 
cV cý V Fx- <. tÖ W Oi - 
ci 913 -- 
. 
ý. 
Ü 
maLL 
E >. ö; o 
p2r 
rn 
mmVj2NCc 
3E"m aro 
mt$Y0a 
Lmm-mL 
-0 
c -L+ raEo 
Y l0 Lw0=rm ÖI 
Om 
UU) Uäm 
qÜmÜý>, 
öa9 
CLNmÖC 
co 
mL aý 
ý. 
LqL 
Am m 
qjyy _V _7 ý1 -mqXVCUC 
0 10 DCm 
L- *VmOC . - 
ix >CraävL 
CO Uj 0&' 
r- 7c i-o 0q 
41 vNCaLmaÄL 
41 L. (0 0 
CL 0 4) cl 0 
CL 4) V m- m m'm$ao8°7G G mpY" Lý 
Qr 
++ ao Ca c 
,dqUaC 
t' 
Lm q9a qG 
14- >` OmTCqmdr>Crv map 
N 
LL 0 
0v 
'ý- t !'N!. ' NO µ- 
q0 Co 
2u 
L1 
!q 
33 ý7 . O7 
AC>3cLCL lt 
3iE, _=öä si. - 03 möi 
In 
4 
uni uý 
ýi ö (0 A 
3$ 
mD5 öý cQ mv ýE JCL 
(4 ý rm o CL c 
FN AO 8V ! '' 
Oaqrpy 
QqYjOCC :Cq 
yg 
0CC C_r ýM U8 
4) x .5 
rc 4- 
1 
5- = am J 
`° 
Cr 
C» m 
rý 
L ät; 
g 
c m2 
21121 
> 
ýL $Lara °caL ,ý 
W-vm 
L rpý 
ýý-+ 
Z j? bp, 
h3 
öL"ým, ýb j Gm 3G 
-- CL >, mE $ _ i+ a LýOLoýb 94> 4- aj LLZL 
is 3CQE 
ä 
rß- 
G .' 
w_ü oý 
'4 q ýö . 
t. d1 
rO_ 
to 4- 
ö$5 co- 5t ä vC 
m- 1% V- 3c- ~ 
cQ aq 
C 
CCL 
m C° 
0L +QC ýO g>, 
4 
&1MC 
0S9mO 
1§ 
0 tl N 
qWjMmO4 ý0 
L$CMRM 
Oi 
ýd Ot'ý C CU 
CZ 
O 
ýG 
s rCLEýCý_. 9 4$ 
10 mrrmQCa.. 
«mm 10 8L1 tr t' Ea. C- 
§ß! 2 Lmi' s` c eM cv 41 >y p>v O- 
_ Sei 
-21 
2 ig $ 38 3Z äpgöMv. 
1äc 
< ýä 
l9 MýMSr ýf fýý ýf 'º 
ýr 
0 
